Comment of Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
Acting Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

I write to support the Federal Communications Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on Restoring Internet Freedom.\(^1\)

The FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Economics have filed a separate comment.\(^2\) Their comment supports the NPRM’s proposal to reverse the FCC’s 2015 Title II classification of broadband internet access service (BIAS), noting that this will “restore the FTC’s ability to protect broadband consumers under its general consumer protection and competition authority.”\(^3\) The comment also surveys the FTC’s extensive privacy and data security expertise.\(^4\) It explains that restoring FTC jurisdiction over BIAS providers will enable it to apply this privacy and data security expertise\(^5\) and its general


\(^2\) Comment of the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Economics, WC Docket No. 17-108 (filed July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Bureau Comment]. Due to the current status of the Commission, with only two Commissioners, the Bureaus are filing their comment without a Commission-level vote. Commissioner McSweeny has filed a separate comment that reflects her views.

\(^3\) Bureau Comment at 2.

\(^4\) Id. at 3-11.

\(^5\) Id. at 12-21.
consumer protection authority. Finally, it discusses how the FTC’s competition authority would again apply to BIAS providers if the Title II classification were reversed. 7

I fully support the Bureau Comment on these points. I comment separately to further highlight the FTC staff’s long-standing position on the topic of net neutrality and to address several additional issues raised in the NPRM.


Ten years ago, the FTC unanimously approved a report stating the FTC staff’s position on net neutrality regulation.8 Under Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, I led the FTC’s Internet Access Task Force, which was charged with evaluating issues related to internet access and net neutrality.9 After holding a two-day workshop on these issues and gathering public comment, the Task Force drafted a report “focus[ed] on the consumer welfare implications of enacting some form of net neutrality regulation.”10 And in June 2007, the FTC unanimously adopted that report (2007 FTC Staff Report or Report). The findings and recommendations of that report remain highly relevant today. Indeed, several of the report’s recommendations are borne out by market and regulatory developments during the past decade.

The 165-page report comprehensively examines the net neutrality issue circa 2007. It sets the foundation by describing the technical functioning of the internet and the legal and regulatory

---

6 Id. at 21-23.
7 Id. at 23-29.
10 Id. at 4.
developments driving the debate in 2007. (Chs. I & II) It then catalogs the various arguments for and against net neutrality. (Ch. III)

Next, the report analyzes the consumer welfare effects of potential conduct by internet service providers (ISPs). After examining various types of vertical integration of broadband with internet services (Ch. IV), the report concludes that, consistent with well-established antitrust and economic principles, vertical integration has the potential to benefit or harm consumers and competition, depending on the circumstances.\(^\text{11}\) While integration could prompt blocking, degrading, and higher prices, it could also offer procompetitive and pro-consumer efficiencies, such as facilitating infrastructure investment and spurring the entry of new competitors. Similarly, after evaluating a wide variety of possible data prioritization techniques (Chs. IV & V), the report determines that such techniques promise significant benefits to consumers and competition but also have some risks depending on the specific technique and use.\(^\text{12}\)

The report then evaluates the current and likely future state of competition in broadband internet access. (Ch. VI) At that time, as today, there was considerable debate about the level of competition in the broadband market. This is an important question. Many of the potential harms to consumers or competition are premised on market power, and nearly all arguments for net neutrality regulation assert a lack of sufficient broadband competition. The report emphasizes the importance of determining the state of competition through careful product and market definition, including analysis of the disciplining effect of substitutes and potential entrants.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{11}\) Id. at 82.
\(^{12}\) Id. at 96-97.
\(^{13}\) Id. 99-100, 104-05.
Ten years later, however, despite the centrality of market power analysis to arguments for regulation, most broadband market competition analysis is even less rigorous than in 2007. Many advocates casually conclude that BIAS providers have market power or are monopolists. Others cite the national percentage of consumers with access to one wireline broadband service at an arbitrary speed threshold as the primary or sole data point needed to demonstrate market power. This imprecision in the current debate may reflect the FCC 2015 Order’s wholesale rejection of market power analysis. I agree with the 2007 FTC Staff Report’s recommendation that a decision to adopt net neutrality regulation should be based on a rigorous market power analysis.

Having analyzed the core policy issues in the net neutrality debate, the 2007 FTC Staff Report turns to the application of antitrust and consumer protection law to various potential BIAS provider practices and business arrangements. (Chs. VII & VIII) It then outlines the various regulatory, legislative, and other proposed solutions. (Ch. IX)

Finally, based on all of the previous analysis, the 2007 FTC Staff Report offers guiding principles for policy makers “to consider prior to enacting any new laws or regulations” regarding net neutrality. Specifically, the report concludes:

“Policy makers should be wary of calls for network neutrality regulation simply because we do not know what the net effects of potential conduct by broadband providers will be

17 Broadband Report at 5.
on consumers, including, among other things, the prices that consumer may pay for Internet access, the quality of Internet access and other services that will be offered, and the choices of content and applications that may be available to consumers in the marketplace.”18

In fact, as the Report explains, broadband providers, even assuming they have market power, face mixed incentives.19 Some align with subscribers’ interests and some are contrary, and “[i]n the abstract, it is not possible to know which of these incentives would prove stronger.”20 The Report explains that many of the practices involved are the types of vertical arrangements that economists generally, but not always, find to improve consumer welfare.21 According to the Report, providers’ competing incentives “raise complex empirical questions and may call for substantial additional study” of the general or local market or of specific transactions.22

Having explained the difficulty of evaluating the net consumer welfare effects of various practices ex ante, the Report expresses concern about the “potentially adverse and unintended effects of regulation… particularly those imposing general, one-size-fits-all restraints on business conduct.”23 For example, the Report notes that regulation “could result in a long-term decline in investment and innovations in broadband networks,” because “providers that cannot differentiate their products or gain new revenue streams may have reduced incentives to upgrade their infrastructure.”24 The Report argues that these concerns are heightened in the broadband industry, which is relatively young, quickly evolving, and moving in the direction of more, not less, competition.25

19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 70.
22 Id. at 82.
23 Id. at 159-60.
24 Id. at 160.
25 Id.
After cautioning against prescriptive regulation, the Report explains that the FTC will “continue to devote substantial resources to maintaining competition and protecting consumers … in the area of broadband Internet access.”26 In enforcing the antitrust laws, “because the various conduct and business arrangements at issue in the broadband area have both procompetitive and anticompetitive potential, the FTC would carefully analyze the net effect of particular conduct or arrangements on consumer welfare, rather than challenge them as per se illegal.”27 The Report also states that the FTC will continue active consumer protection enforcement. In particular, the Report suggests that providers should clearly and conspicuously disclose the material terms of broadband internet access, particularly if they engage in various traffic-shaping practices.28

Ten years later, the 2007 FTC Staff Report remains remarkably relevant. Indeed, the various arguments for and against net neutrality regulation are largely unchanged today.29 And between 2007 and the FCC’s 2015 Order, no pervasive marketplace problem emerged. In fact, the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order cited only four real-life examples of potentially problematic practices.30

However, a few important things have changed. Over that ten-year span, broadband speed has accelerated and – with mobile – taken flight. Broadband speeds over the past 10 years have soared, with average wireless 4G LTE speeds today more than three times faster than

---

26 Id. at 161.
27 Id. at 161-62.
28 Id. at 162.
29 See id. at 51-69 (summarizing arguments for and against net neutrality regulation).
average wireline speeds were in 2007. But probably the biggest marketplace difference is the rise of mobile internet access. The first iPhone hit the market in June 2007 (the same month the FTC released its report) and mobile internet usage has since exploded. By late 2016, mobile visits to websites exceeded desktop visits worldwide, and in the U.S. more than 42% of U.S. webpage visits were from mobile devices. Mobile devices can and do easily switch between Wi-Fi and wireless provider networks, suggesting that the four national and numerous regional wireless providers (as well as countless Wi-Fi hotspot providers) likely already discipline wireline broadband provider behavior. And the next generation of wireless technology promises speed and performance that rival even advanced wireline networks. These developments further support the 2007 Staff Report’s observation of a trend toward more broadband competition.

A less positive change since 2007 provides the main impetus of the NRPM: the tool the FCC chose to implement net neutrality rules. To adopt rules in 2015, the FCC reclassified broadband as a common carrier service under Title II of the Communications Act. Yet in 2007, reclassifying broadband as a Title II service was not even on the table. Indeed, in 2007,

---


34 Broadband Report at 160, Chapter VI.B.

35 Broadband Report at 139 n.683 (quoting Gigi Sohn, “I don’t know anybody who is talking about going back to Title II … [T]hat is not what this debate is about.”).
stakeholders on all sides of the issue recognized the negative impact a Title II approach would have on FTC jurisdiction and emphasized the importance of FTC jurisdiction over BIAS providers.36

The 2007 FTC Staff Report warned about the potential adverse consequences of regulation. While a healthy debate rages about other effects of the 2015 Order, one negative side effect cannot be disputed: the 2015 Order stripped the FTC of jurisdiction over broadband providers, creating a consumer protection gap that remains unfilled.37

Together, the developments over the past ten years demonstrate that the FTC was correct in its unanimous, bipartisan 2007 recommendation that regulators “proceed[] with caution before enacting broad, ex ante restrictions in an unsettled, dynamic environment.”38 Today, there is still no evidence of sustained injury to consumers or to competition. Instead, the internet ecosystem has remained vibrant over the past decade. And the most indisputable side effect of the 2015 Order, the stripping of FTC jurisdiction, is a clearly an adverse outcome for consumers.

A unanimous, bipartisan FTC approved the 2007 FTC Staff Report. What was good advice in 2007 remains good advice ten years later. I reiterate that advice today by filing the Report as an attachment to this comment.

II. The FTC’s Tools are Capable of Protecting Consumers and Competition Online

The FTC’s dual mission is to protect consumers and promote competition. The essence of this mission is to ensure that consumers can efficiently pursue their many, varying market preferences, whether those preferences are for low prices, new goods, or certain features such as

36 See generally Broadband Report at 138-40.
38 Broadband Report at 155.
neutrality. The FTC’s complementary competition and consumer protection tools work together to protect consumers and competition online.

A. Antitrust Protects Competition, Which Drives Firms to Match Consumer Preferences

The FTC’s antitrust tools are powerful protectors of market competition. The FTC’s antitrust authority can and has addressed a wide range of harmful behavior across a nearly all U.S. industries. As highlighted in the Bureau Comment, some of the harmful practices that the FTC can address include: foreclosing rival content in an exclusionary or predatory manner; problematic conduct relating to access, discrimination, pricing, bundling, and regulatory evasion; harmful exclusive contracts; agreements between competitors to fix prices, reduce output, or allocate customers; and problematic vertical mergers that could deny competitors access to essential inputs or to downstream distribution outlets. Many of the practices that concern advocates of net neutrality regulation fall within one or more of these categories of anticompetitive actions and therefore could be addressed by the FTC’s antitrust enforcement.

Furthermore, these antitrust tools do not solely protect attributes such as price and output. Instead, antitrust protects competition, which delivers the qualities that consumers demand. Therefore, antitrust can help protect any feature or quality that consumers demand, including free speech and democratic participation. Advocates vigorously argue, citing surveys, anecdotes, and counts of comments filed, that consumers place great value in the equal treatment of data by ISPs. In that case, any ISP that systemically degrades applications and content that its subscribers demand will face a consumer backlash. There is strong evidence that edge providers

39 Bureau Comment at 23-29.
are quite capable of mobilizing their customers to make known their demands.41 Indeed, the limited number of non-neutral practices even before the 2015 Order suggests that ISPs are already accommodating consumer demands. In such circumstances, there may not be a need for regulation. In fact, prescriptive regulation risks cementing in place practices that may need to evolve as consumer preferences change. I have addressed these issues at further length in a journal article, which I also attach.42

B. Consumer Protection

Likewise, the FTC’s consumer protection tools are also powerful protectors of the market. We use our consumer protection tools to protect the integrity of the mutual beneficial exchange at the heart of the market process, by stopping practices that subvert that exchange. These tools are as applicable to the provision of broadband service as to every other industry.

The practices that concern advocates of net neutrality regulation involve consumer protection issues. For example, much of the concern about Comcast’s alleged treatment of certain BitTorrent streams was that it was not apparent to consumers, and therefore Comcast allegedly deceived consumers about the service they purchased.43 Indeed, according to the D.C. Circuit, the “upshot” of the 2015 Order is to “fulfill the reasonable expectations of a customer who signs up for a broadband service that promises access to all of the lawful internet.”44

The FTC’s consumer protection tools are well suited to ensure the fulfillment of consumers’ reasonable expectations about their broadband service. Our deception authority

41Harmon, supra note 40.
42Ohlhausen, supra note 16, at 119.
44 United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir 2016), reh ‘g en banc denied, United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concurring statement of Judge Srinivasan and Judge Tatel).
prohibits companies from selling consumers one product or service but providing them something different. It ensures consumers get what they were promised. Notably, many major BIAS providers have now explicitly promised to adhere to net neutrality principles. These kinds of promises are enforceable by the FTC, assuming it has jurisdiction over the BIAS provider. Our deception authority also requires companies to disclose material information if not disclosing it would mislead the consumer. Therefore, if a broadband provider failed to disclose blocking, throttling, or other practices that would matter to a reasonable consumer, the FTC’s deception authority would apply.

In addition to deception, the FTC’s unfairness authority prohibits practices, even absent any promise, where the actual or likely consumer injury is substantial, unavoidable by the consumer, and not outweighed by benefits to consumers or to competition. The FTC has used this authority to hold liable companies that unilaterally change their past promises to consumers even where there was no deception.

Indeed, the FTC is currently using both its deception and unfairness authority to address alleged practices similar to net neutrality violations. In its case against AT&T Mobility, the FTC alleges that the wireless provider deceptively and unfairly “misled millions of its smartphone customers by charging them for ‘unlimited’ data plans while reducing their data speeds, in some

---


cases by nearly 90 percent.”

That litigation continues, but provides a good example of the FTC’s willingness to apply our consumer protection authority to a complex technical practice of a network provider that harms consumers.

C. Advantages of Enforcement Approach

Both of these market-preserving tools – antitrust and consumer protection – have structural advantages over prescriptive rules. Both rely on case-by-case enforcement, applying general legal principles to specific facts, constrained by certain institutional features and a focus on addressing real harm. And in both areas, the FTC can take action where private litigants would lack the incentives or resources to bring a case.

In dynamic, innovative industries like internet services, an ex post case-by-case enforcement-based approach has advantages over ex ante prescriptive regulation. It mitigates the regulator’s knowledge problem and allows legal principles to evolve incrementally. A case-by-case approach also focuses on actual or likely, specifically-pled harms rather than having to predict future hypothetical harms.

Of course, case-by-case enforcement without Constraining principles and processes is problematic. FTC enforcement seeks to balance flexibility and predictability. Our antitrust and consumer protection enforcement rely on long-standing legal precepts that are themselves hemmed in by case law, statute, and by our own policy statements. Our complaints and settlements are analyzed not just by lawyers but also by our Bureau of Economics and must be approved by the Commissioners. These institutional features build consensus and limit overreach. And perhaps most importantly, the FTC focuses on harm to consumers and to

---


competition, both when considering whether to bring a case and in calculating remedies. Focusing on harm not only ensures that FTC enforcement actually makes consumers better off, it also creates more business certainty.

Some have criticized the FTC’s case-by-case approach as reactive, with no capability to prevent future injuries. Yet civil law enforcement has always served as both a corrective for the specific behavior of the defendant as well as a deterrent against similar future actions by the same or other actors. Like the common law, the FTC’s process of applying general principles to specific facts enables flexibility yet yields outcomes that serve as guidance for future compliance, as those familiar with the FTC’s case law recognize. 50 Furthermore, even prescriptive rules must be enforced, and the outcomes of such enforcement actions are not inherently predictable, particularly when the prescriptive rules are out of date or applied to technologies and business models that were not contemplated when the rules were adopted.

III. A Benefit-Cost Analysis Ought to Consider the Wide Range of Existing Tools to Address Net Neutrality-Related Concerns, Should They Arise

The FCC has sought analysis of the costs and benefits of the various proposals in the NPRM. 51 Quite appropriately, the NPRM states that such analysis ought to compare the effects of today’s status quo regulation to the effects of protections that would remain in place if the proposals were adopted. 52 This “but for” world ought to include market mechanisms, facilitated by long-standing competition and consumer protection law enforced by the FTC, the Department of Justice, state attorneys general, and private litigants. The FTC Bureau comment and my comment have described the FTC’s powerful tools to protect consumers and competition.

51 NPRM ¶ 105.
52 NPRM ¶ 106.
This comment (and my attached paper) further describe some of the market forces that incentivize firms to match consumer preferences, including non-pecuniary values. The FCC also ought to include in its baseline the capability of advocacy groups to rally grassroots action for various “net neutrality” causes. This advocacy serves as a strong constraint on the ability of BIAS providers to violate norms these groups support. Indeed, the potent reactions to past actions by BIAS providers have demonstrated the potential of such market feedback mechanisms to affect firm behavior.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{IV. Conclusion}

For the reasons described in the comments above and the documents attached, I urge the FCC to return broadband internet access service to a Title I classification and to take other actions consistent with this submission.