ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

Adopted: December 9, 2020
Released: December 17, 2020

By the Commission: Commissioners O’Rielly and Rosenworcel concurring; Commissioner Starks concurring and issuing a separate statement

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The 2.5 GHz band (2496-2690 MHz) is the single largest band of contiguous spectrum below 3 gigahertz. Too much of this spectrum, which is prime mid-band spectrum for next generation mobile operations, including 5G, has lain fallow for more than twenty years. In the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, the Commission transformed the regulatory framework governing the band in order to move this spectrum into the hands of those who will provide service to Americans across the country, and particularly in rural and Tribal areas. The Commission replaced an outdated regulatory regime, developed in the days when educational TV was the only use envisioned for this spectrum, with one that not only gives incumbent users more flexibility in how they use the spectrum, but also provides opportunities for additional entities to obtain access to unused 2.5 GHz spectrum. Among other things, the Commission established a Tribal Priority Window to address the acute problem of lack of access to wireless communications services in rural Tribal areas, and it decided to hold an overlay auction thereafter for remaining unassigned spectrum rights.¹

2. Three parties sought reconsideration of various aspects of the order. The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) seeks reconsideration of our decision to focus the Tribal Priority Window opportunity on rural Tribal land.² The Schools, Health & Libraries Broadband Coalition and others (SHLB et al.), meanwhile, ask that we reinstate the eligibility restrictions the Commission eliminated in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order and create a window for additional educational use of the band.³ And the Hawai‘i Broadband Initiative filed a Petition for Reconsideration,⁴ which it subsequently requested leave to withdraw.⁵

² Petition for Reconsideration by the National Congress of American Indians (filed Nov. 25, 2019) (NCAI Petition).
⁴ Petition for Reconsideration by Burt Lum, Strategy Officer for the Hawai‘i Broadband Initiative (filed Nov. 25, 2019).
3. We grant the Hawai‘i Broadband Initiative’s request to withdraw its petition, and we dismiss in part and, alternatively and independently, deny the other two petitions. In doing so, we affirm the framework the Commission adopted to make available the 2.5 GHz band quickly by eliminating outdated legacy regulations that inhibited full use of the band and establishing flexible-use rules that will allow commercial providers to use this large swath of prime mid-band spectrum to provide 5G and other advanced services to American consumers.

II. BACKGROUND

4. The Commission established a Tribal Priority Window to address the acute problem of lack of access to wireless communications services in rural Tribal areas. The Tribal Priority Window represents a particularly important and unprecedented opportunity to address the communications needs of rural Tribal communities, many of which lack meaningful access to wired and wireless communications services. Successful applicants in the Tribal Priority Window will be able to acquire licenses for all available 2.5 GHz spectrum over their rural Tribal lands—for free, which should afford sufficient bandwidth to offer broadband wireless service to these communities.

5. The Commission established criteria for the Tribal Priority Window that would “provide the most effective and targeted way to achieve the Commission’s goal of closing the digital divide in Tribal lands.” Specifically, the Commission included four basic requirements for Tribes and Tribal entities seeking to take advantage of the Tribal Priority Window: (1) eligibility is limited to federally recognized American Indian Tribes and Alaska Native Villages or entities owned and controlled by federally recognized Tribes or a consortium of such Tribes; (2) the license must be for Tribal land, as defined in part 54 of the Commission’s rules; (3) the geographic service area requested must be rural, meaning not part of an urbanized area or urban cluster area with a population equal to or greater than 50,000; and (4) the eligible Tribal entity must have a local presence on the rural Tribal land for which it is applying.

6. We observed that, “[b]ecause the problem of access to wireless communications services is most acute in rural areas . . . the purpose of the Tribal priority window should be to promote service to (Continued from previous page)
areas that are currently unserved or underserved.” The Commission previously has reported that “the population of individuals living on Tribal lands is disproportionately skewed toward rural, rather than urban, areas.” As the Commission found in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, “individualized policies tailored to specific deployment issues, such as increasing access to spectrum over unserved rural Tribal areas,” honored the Commission’s trust relationship with Tribal Nations. As such, we established the Tribal Priority Window for rural Tribal lands that “are not part of an urbanized area or urban cluster area with a population equal to or greater than 50,000.”

7. Tribal land for purposes of the Tribal Priority Window consists of:

[A]ny federally recognized Indian Tribe’s reservation, pueblo or colony, including former reservations in Oklahoma, Alaska Native regions established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688) and Indian Allotments, see § 54.400(e) of this chapter, as well as Hawaiian Home Lands—areas held in trust for native Hawaiians by the state of Hawaii, pursuant to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, July 9, 1921, 42 Stat 108, et seq., as amended; and any lands designated prior to July 10, 2019, as Tribal Lands pursuant to the designation process contained in § 54.412 of this chapter.

8. As explained in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, we adopted the same general definition of Tribal land as set forth in part 54 of our rules related to the Universal Service Fund. In addition to “on-reservation” lands, we also included off-reservation Tribal lands as eligible for the Tribal Priority Window if they were designated as Tribal lands prior to July 10, 2019 pursuant to the process set forth in section 54.412 of our rules.

9. After the Tribal Priority Window closes, any remaining unassigned 2.5 GHz spectrum will be made available for commercial use via competitive bidding, as we found this to be the best way to assign spectrum quickly and efficiently for its highest-valued use.

In seeking to modernize the 2.5 GHz band and make this valuable spectrum available expeditiously for a wide range of consumer uses, we also determined that the original motivations for adopting restrictions on EBS licenses were now obsolete. In the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, we explained:

The circumstances that led to the creation of a dedicated educational service no longer exist. Substantial technological changes over the last 30 years enable any educator with a broadband connection to access a myriad of educational resources—a content distribution model that does not require dedicated educational spectrum licensed to educational institutions. . . . [T]oday there are a multiplicity of other sources of educational programming available to institutions with broadband connections. All of these factors support eliminating the eligibility restrictions at this time.

13 Id. at 5466, para. 56.


15 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5466-67, para. 57.

16 47 CFR § 27.1204(b)(3).

17 47 CFR § 27.1204(b)(2).

18 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5465, para. 51.

19 Id. at 5465-66, para. 54.

20 Id. at 5472, para. 75.

21 Id. at 5451, para. 16.
10. Meanwhile, only a handful of EBS licensees have deployed their own networks or use their EBS licenses in a way that requires dedicated spectrum. Instead, most licensees rely on lessees to deploy and operate broadband networks using their licensed spectrum, and they use the leases as a source for revenues or devices. In considering the arguments surrounding the former EBS eligibility restrictions, we determined that their elimination would promote more efficient use of the spectrum, improve operators’ ability to attract capital, make the spectrum more appealing for commercial operators to include in their long-term service plans, and better align these licenses with the flexible-use licensing policies used in similar spectrum bands. Based on the record, we found that eliminating long-standing, but obsolete, eligibility restrictions on EBS licenses was the best way of ensuring that the band could be fully used for high-speed broadband services.

11. For similar reasons, we declined to establish a priority window for educational institutions. In the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, we explained that an educational priority window “would be at odds with our other decisions to provide greater flexibility for more providers to make use of the 2.5 GHz band to offer high-speed broadband service to the public.” An educational priority window raised the additional complication that mutually exclusive applications for licenses sought through such a window would need to be resolved through a system of competitive bidding, and that educational institutions in a majority of states would likely be precluded from participating in such a process.

12. In its petition, NCAI supports our decision to establish a Tribal Priority Window but asks that we: (1) allow non-rural Tribal lands to be eligible in the Tribal Priority Window, and (2) revise the applicable rules for defining eligible Tribal lands. SHLB et al. ask that we reconsider our decisions to eliminate the educational eligibility restrictions and to not create an educational priority window.

13. The Wireless Communications Association International (WCAI) and the Wireless

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22 Id.
23 Id.
24 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5451, para. 15. Similarly, we decided that eliminating the educational use requirements would promote flexibility and broadband deployment, which ultimately would be of great benefit to educators and students. Id. at 5456-57, paras. 26-28.
25 Id. at 5451, paras. 15-16.
26 Id. at 5469, para. 66.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 5469-70, paras. 67-68; see id. at 5471, para. 73 (concluding that “a Tribal priority window is less likely to trigger mutual exclusivity in a significant number of license areas than a priority window for educational institutions” because “most rural Tribal lands areas will likely be associated with a single Tribal entity, whereas many localities have a wide variety of educational institutions that could have a local presence”).

SHLB et al. argue that the Commission failed to address the use of a settlement window to resolve mutual exclusive applications. See SHLB et al. Petition at 14-15. To the contrary, the Commission rejected the use of a settlement window, along with all the other alternatives suggested by the parties as possible means of avoiding mutual exclusivity, because it would not comply with the public interest test of section 309(j)(6)(E). See 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5470, para. 68 & n.195; id. at 5470, para. 68 (rejecting all suggested alternatives to avoid mutual exclusivity, including, but not limited to, the examples listed in the text, as “inconsistent either with the Communications Act’s requirement that the Commission use competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive applications or with the public interest test applicable to alternatives that avoid mutual exclusivity.”).

29 NCAI Petition at 6-7.
30 Id. at 4-5 (citing 47 CFR §§ 54.5, 73.7000).
31 SHLB et al. Petition at 4-21.
Internet Service Providers Association (WISPA) opposed the SHLB et al. Petition.\textsuperscript{32} SHLB et al. filed a late reply without seeking leave to file a late reply.\textsuperscript{33} We will treat the reply as an \textit{ex parte} presentation.

14. The Tribal Priority Window commenced on February 3, 2020, and lasted until September 2, 2020.\textsuperscript{34} In the \textit{Bureau Procedures PN}, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau specified a simplified application process to allow for the inclusion of any waiver request(s) as part of a specific application—including a waiver of the Tribal land definition as applied in the Report and Order.\textsuperscript{35} A number of Tribes have filed applications availing themselves of this waiver mechanism to seek licenses for lands falling outside the section 27.1204(b)(2) definition following release of the \textit{Bureau Procedures PN}.\textsuperscript{36}

III. DISCUSSION

15. It is well established that reconsideration “will not be granted merely for the purpose of again debating matters on which the tribunal has once deliberated and spoken.”\textsuperscript{37} Petitions for reconsideration that rely on arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission may be dismissed or denied.\textsuperscript{38} Both the NCAI and SHLB et al. petitions primarily repeat arguments that we considered and rejected previously. We fully considered the policy benefits of focusing on rural Tribal lands in the \textit{2.5 GHz Report and Order}.\textsuperscript{39} And we adopted the definition of Tribal lands contained in our part 54 rules.\textsuperscript{40} To the extent NCAI’s petition reiterates already rejected arguments, it is procedurally improper, and we dismiss the petition and otherwise deny it in its entirety.

16. Regarding the SHLB et al. Petition, the Commission previously fully considered all the arguments raised therein, including whether an educational window or flexible use would be the best
means of promoting broadband deployment, the likelihood of mutually exclusive applications if we opened an educational window, and the distinctions between the Tribal Priority Window and any educational window. Since the petition merely repeats previously raised and rejected arguments, the petition is procedurally improper and dismissed. As a separate and independent ground for rejecting this argument, we find that in any event it lacks merit. SHLB et al. present no compelling argument that warrants reconsideration of our decision to make this spectrum available for flexible use nor to limit any priority application window to Tribal entities.

17. In short, we dismiss in part and deny both petitions for reconsideration. We discuss each issue raised by the petitions in turn.

18. First, we find that the NCAI petition provides no new facts or arguments that would provide a basis for reconsidering our decision to focus the Tribal Priority Window on rural but not other Tribal lands. In its comments, NCAI claimed that limiting the Tribal Priority Window, inter alia, would “create separate classes of tribal governments, which is inconsistent with the intent of Congress.” NCAI now repeats its argument that the trust relationship between federally recognized tribes and the Federal government “applies equally to all federally recognized tribal nations, not just to certain sub-sets of tribal nations based on location of tribal lands.” In other words, it repeats the same argument that we already rejected. And for good reason. NCAI has failed to demonstrate that the Commission, in affording Tribes in this window an opportunity to obtain spectrum licenses over their rural Tribal lands, has failed to uphold any specific trust responsibility expressed by Congress. In contrast, the Commission does have a statutory responsibility to manage the radio spectrum and Congress has exhorted us to speed the deployment of broadband to all Americans in a reasonable and timely manner. In managing this important mid-band spectrum, we continue to believe that an approach of targeting rural Tribal lands for the Tribal Priority Window, where the problem of access to wireless communications services is most acute, and subsequently offering overlay licenses for any remaining unassigned spectrum via a competitive bidding process is the most effective way to make this spectrum available for next generation wireless services. We carefully considered how to make this spectrum available quickly to those able to deploy service, and determined that, while spectrum over urban areas should be made available via competitive bidding, we would first make spectrum available over rural Tribal Lands for free to Tribal entities to help them meet the communications needs of these rural areas without the delay and cost of engaging in competitive bidding.

19. Although NCAI claims that limiting rural lands to areas “not part of an urbanized area or urban cluster area with a population equal to or greater than 50,000” was arbitrary and prevents Tribes from serving more populated portions of their lands, focusing this spectrum opportunity on rural Tribal

41 Id. at 5469, para. 66.
42 Id. at 5469-70, paras. 67-68.
43 Id. at 5470-71, paras. 71-73.
44 NCAI Comments at 3.
45 NCAI Petition at 6 (emphasis in original).
48 See 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5466, para. 56; see also Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 2020 Broadband Progress Report, 35 FCC Rcd 8986, 9013, para. 47 (2020) (“Rural Tribal lands continue to lag behind urban Tribal lands, with only 52.9% of all Tribal lands in rural areas having deployment of both [fixed and mobile broadband] services, as compared to 93.1% of Tribal lands in urban areas.”).
49 NCAI Petition at 7.
Lands is in furtherance of a specific policy goal of lowering the cost for Tribes to serve the unserved. Indeed, NCAI fails to explain its claim that the Commission’s choice is unsupported. Further, NCAI does not offer a single example of a Tribe whose ability to serve its Tribal lands is hampered by the limitation. NCAI’s argument overlooks the fact that the underlying purpose of the Tribal Priority Window is “to address the communications needs of their communities and of residents on rural Tribal lands, including the deployment of advanced wireless services to unserved or underserved areas.”

Focusing the Tribal Priority Window opportunity on rural Tribal lands not only satisfied this policy objective but also makes sense from a licensing perspective, as most of the spectrum over urban Tribal lands already is assigned and thus unavailable for licensing as part of the Window.

20. Moreover, the Commission regularly distinguishes between rural and non-rural areas in carrying out policy objectives—in our universal service rules, in our competition rules, and even in our spectrum-bidding rules—because the wide geographies and dispersed populations in rural areas merit a different policy response than the challenges faced in non-rural areas. We have never before suggested that such differentiation impugns the sovereignty of the states nor our trust responsibilities to Tribes, and (as we noted in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order) we fail to see how such differentiation here could have such effects. We also note that our definition of what land would be considered “rural” is both administrable and objective—not something that requires us to make discretionary judgments about individual Tribes.

21. And to the extent that NCAI thinks this decision contravenes the Commission’s 2000 Tribal Policy Statement, we disagree. There the Commission committed to working with Tribes “to ensure, through its regulations and policy initiatives, and consistent with Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934, that Indian Tribes have adequate access to communications services.”

Making spectrum available over rural Tribal lands in the Tribal Priority Window before making remaining unassigned spectrum available via competitive bidding does exactly that; NCAI fails to show otherwise.

22. Second, we decline NCAI’s request to use the Commission’s definition of Tribal lands contained in its part 73 rules in lieu of the definition based on part 54. NCAI has not convinced us that the part 73 definition of Tribal lands (which includes off reservation trust lands) is more appropriate in this context than the part 54 definition. The part 73 definition was adopted for a completely different

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50 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5463, para. 47.

51 Interested parties can use the 2.5 GHz Rural Tribal Priority Window mapping tool, available at https://www.fcc.gov/rural-tribal-window-updates, to see where eligible Tribal lands are located, which reservations contain urban lands, and where 2.5 GHz spectrum is licensed.

52 See, e.g., 47 CFR Part 54, Subpart G (Universal Service for Rural Health Care Program); 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4) (rural service provider bidding credit); Modernizing Unbundling and Resale Requirements in an Era of Next-Generation Networks and Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 34 FCC Rcd 11290, 11304-05 (2019) (proposing differing regulatory treatment depending on whether an area is a rural or not).

53 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5466-67, para. 57.


55 See NCAI Petition at 4-5.

56 The Commission adopted the definition of “Tribal lands” almost verbatim from the part 54 universal service rules. Compare 47 CFR § 27.1204(b)(2), with id. § 54.5, and id. § 54.400(e). Although the Commission has extended “Tribal lands” in the universal service context to include certain off-reservation lands, see Establishing a 5G Fund for Rural America, Report and Order, FCC 20-150 (rel Oct. 29, 2020) at paras. 40-44; Bridging the Digital Divide for Low-Income Consumers et al., Fourth Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Notice of Inquiry, 32 FCC Rcd 10475, 10480-81, paras. 12 & n.34, 14 & n.44 (2017), we note that the Lifeline and high-cost programs serve a different purpose than the Tribal
purpose than the Tribal Priority Window: *i.e.*, to permit comparison between non-commercial educators applying for broadcast stations.\(^{57}\) By contrast, the Tribal Priority Window was adopted to encourage the provision of necessary communications services in rural areas and to provide federally recognized Tribes with direct access to unassigned 2.5 GHz spectrum over their own Tribal lands before making any remaining unassigned spectrum available to any eligible provider via competitive bidding.\(^{58}\) The Commission required the direct participation of Tribal governments, or entities owned and controlled by such Tribes, in the 2.5 GHz context to ensure that licensees would have the requisite authority over the deployment of facilities and service on their rural Tribal lands.\(^{59}\)

23. We nonetheless recognized that there may be exceptions to the general rule. That’s why case-by-case waivers are available, effectively allowing for a result similar to designation of off-reservation lands in the specific context of the applying for unassigned 2.5 GHz spectrum. Indeed, the Commission has received a number of waiver requests during the Tribal Priority Window to include certain off-reservation lands as Tribal lands.\(^{60}\) And this approach mirrors the Commission’s approach in the context of spectrum auctions, excluding off-reservation lands from the definition of “Tribal lands,”\(^{61}\) requiring a winning bidder to provide a certification from a Tribal government in order to receive Tribal land bidding credits\(^ {62}\) and entertaining waivers to include off-reservation lands within the scope of such

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Priority Window—*i.e.*, those programs award funding “for the provision, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and services.” 47 U.S.C. § 254(e). In other words, when targeting universal service funds, the Commission increases funding for rural Tribal areas because they (and off-reservation lands) face similar broadband deployment and adoption challenges. In contrast, the Tribal Priority Window is designed to provide federally recognized Tribes with direct access to spectrum over their own Tribal lands—as such, a narrower initial definition accompanied by a waiver process that contemplates possible expansion of Tribal lands in special circumstances is more appropriate.

\(^{57}\) 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5465, para. 51.

\(^{58}\) See, e.g., 47 CFR § 27.1204(b)(1), (4) (requiring an applicant for 2.5 GHz licenses in the Tribal Priority Window to be “[a] federally recognized American Indian Tribe or Alaska Native Village[] or an entity that is owned and controlled by a federally-recognized Tribe or a consortium of federally recognized Tribes” that has a local presence on the Tribal land for which it is applying for a license); 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5463-67, paras. 47-59; see also Bureau Procedures PN, 35 FCC Rcd at 312, 313, paras. 15, 19 (stating that “[n]on-reservation lands are not eligible” for the Tribal Priority Window).

\(^{59}\) See, e.g., 47 CFR § 27.1204(b)(1), (4); 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5463-67, paras. 47-59.

\(^{60}\) See 2.5 GHz Rural Tribal Priority Window Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 312, 313, paras. 15, 19 (providing a simplified process to allow applicants for the Tribal Priority Window to submit a waiver request).

\(^{61}\) 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(3)(i) (Tribal lands bidding credit); Extending Wireless Telecommunications Services to Tribal Lands, Third Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 17652, 17660, paras. 19-20 (2004) (acknowledging that “certain areas abutting tribal lands often share the same characteristics as tribal lands” but declining to extend the Tribal lands bidding credit program to such “adjacent non-tribal areas”); Extending Wireless Telecommunications Services to Tribal Lands, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 4775, 4781, 4787, paras. 16, 33 n.53 (2003) (declining to expand the Tribal lands bidding credit program to non-tribal areas and noting that “extending bidding credits based on near reservations could be overinclusive in terms of furthering the goal of increasing telephone deployment and subscribership to the most underserved areas”); see also Improving Communications Services for Native Nations by Promoting Greater Utilization of Spectrum over Tribal Lands, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd 2623, 2630, para. 18 (2011) (proposing to adopt the definition of “Tribal lands” from section 1.2110(f)(3)(i) for purposes of proposals to promote greater use of spectrum over Tribal lands).

\(^{62}\) See, e.g., 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(3)(ii); Extending Wireless Telecommunications Services to Tribal Lands, Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 11794, 11800-01, 11805, paras. 17, 32 (2000) (adopting a certification requirement for the Tribal land bidding credit because Tribal governments “are uniquely situated to monitor the deployment of service on their lands,” to “allow the bidder to site facilities and provide service on its Tribal lands,” and “to ensure that carriers will meet their commitments to deliver service to the tribal areas with the greatest need”).
bidding credits.\textsuperscript{63}

24. \textit{Third}, we reject NCAI’s request to re-open the off-reservation designation process in section 54.412 of the Commission’s rules.\textsuperscript{64} Contrary to NCAI’s claim, the Commission already addressed this issue by creating a waiver process that applicants can take advantage of to the extent they seek to include additional off-reservation lands as part of their applications. This case-by-case waiver process is not dissimilar from the designation procedure provided for in part 54.\textsuperscript{65} In circumstances where Tribes can show good cause to include as eligible off-reservation lands specifically for purposes of participation in the Tribal Priority Window, the waiver process provides an opportunity for them to do so. That waiver process was made part of the application procedures to allow Tribes to seek eligibility for off-reservation lands without delaying the Tribal Priority Window or unreasonably limiting the ability of Tribes to apply for this spectrum. More than 50 such waivers were filed in the Tribal Priority Window, which closed on September 2, 2020.

25. We are not legally required to, and we see no benefit in, reopening and starting anew a different process that would not only require Tribes to make additional filings but also delay the processing of all applications already filed during the Tribal Priority Window, including applications of those Tribes who properly sought eligibility for such off-reservation lands using the waiver process available to them in the Tribal Priority Window.

26. \textit{Fourth}, SHLB et al.’s suggestion that, were the Commission to maintain eligibility restrictions and adopt a separate priority window, most new educational licensees would choose to deploy their own networks, belies strong evidence in the record to the contrary.\textsuperscript{66} We disagreed with this perspective in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order,\textsuperscript{67} and likewise do so today.\textsuperscript{68}

27. To start, the vast majority of existing licensees, including in rural areas, have not deployed their own networks but instead lease to commercial providers.\textsuperscript{69} As of May 13, 2019, there were 2,087 active leases of EBS spectrum, compared with 2,193 licenses.\textsuperscript{70} In fact, SHLB et al.’s assertion that “the record is replete with examples of EBS licensees offering service” qualifies that

\textsuperscript{63} See, e.g., Request for Waiver of the Definition of “Federally Recognized Tribal Land” under Section 1.2110(f)(3)(i) of the Commission’s Rules to Include Additional Areas within the Eastern Navajo Agency of the Navajo Nation, Order, 29 FCC Rcd 13769, 13771-76, paras. 6-15 (WTB 2014) (waiving the definition of “federally recognized Tribal land” under section 1.2110(f)(3)(i) of the Commission’s rules to expand it to include additional areas within the Eastern Navajo Agency of the Navajo Nation to allow any winning bidder in Auction 97 (i.e., the auction of Advanced Wireless Services licenses) to seek eligibility for Tribal lands bidding credits in those underserved areas of New Mexico).

\textsuperscript{64} NCAI Petition at 4, 5.

\textsuperscript{65} See Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, et al., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 27 FCC Rcd at 6656, 6725-27, paras. 156-62 & n.407 (2012) (adopting the individualized designation procedure for section 54.400(e) based on the “similar process” that was adopted for radio stations that seek to serve Tribal lands but do not meet the definition in section 73.7000); Policies to Promote Rural Radio Service and to Streamline Allotment and Assignment Procedures, Second Report and Order, First Order on Reconsideration, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 26 FCC Rcd 2556, 2561-63, paras. 8-11 (2011) (referring to the individualized process for radio stations as a “waiver showing”).

\textsuperscript{66} SHLB et al. Petition at 16-18.

\textsuperscript{67} 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5469, para. 66.

\textsuperscript{68} See Letter from Steve B. Sharkey, Vice President of Government Affairs Technology and Engineering Policy, T-Mobile USA, Inc. to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (filed Sept. 16, 2020) (noting the SHLB et al. Petition “repeats previously rejected arguments and should be denied”).

\textsuperscript{69} See 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5448, para. 6.

\textsuperscript{70} Id.
assertion by acknowledging that they are offering service “through the EBS leasing model.”\textsuperscript{71} This “EBS leasing model” is not an example of EBS licensees providing service, but of EBS licensees merely leasing spectrum to a commercial provider; that the vast majority of EBS licensees chose to lease spectrum rather than use the spectrum to provide service is one of the very reasons we concluded that liberating this spectrum and making it readily available for flexible use by providers—rather than engage in a delayed process that put the spectrum in the hands of hundreds of entities, with each of whom the service provider must negotiate a lease—was in the public interest.

28. In fact, the instances that SHLB et al. identify where EBS licensees deployed their own networks are notable because of how rare they are. For example, SHLB et al. cite the self-deployment undertaken by Northern Michigan University (NMU), under a waiver of the EBS filing freeze.\textsuperscript{72} In granting the waiver, however, the Bureau noted: “NMU is unique among EBS licensees—while most EBS licensees have not built their own facilities and have leased their spectrum to commercial providers, NMU has built and operates its own LTE broadband network that covers a significant portion of the rugged, underserved territory in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.”\textsuperscript{73} Although SHLB et al. state that the Commission has granted seven waivers in the last six years to “allow[] educational entities access to EBS spectrum for the purpose of building wireless networks,” these seven waivers cover only three entities (i.e., NMU, Kings County, CA, and Monterey County, CA),\textsuperscript{74} which further demonstrates the rarity of self-deployed systems. SHLB et al. also point to the interest in developing statewide broadband networks expressed by states such as Nebraska and Utah, but they fail to explain how such interest will result in actual deployment, given that much of the spectrum in more populated areas of those states is already licensed and used by commercial providers, in contrast with northern Michigan where the spectrum was mostly unassigned. In short, although NMU has shown itself to be a motivated educational institution with access to technical expertise, we would expect most EBS licensees to act consistently with their behavior to date and lease spectrum to commercial providers if we retained the former eligibility rules.

29. In short, we find little support for the argument that educators are better positioned to deploy their own broadband networks in areas that are not served by commercial operators.\textsuperscript{75} Even in rural areas, that simply has not been the case. For example, WISPA explains that several WISPs “have acquired EBS spectrum lease rights . . . to improve service to subscribers and/or expand service to new areas, in many cases to rural communities” and lists examples of these WISPs.\textsuperscript{76} WISPA further argues that “WISPs have shown time and again that they can deploy licensed, lightly licensed, and unlicensed fixed wireless services in rural areas—and do so cost-efficiently with unencumbered access to licensed 2.5 GHz spectrum.”\textsuperscript{77} And SHLB et al. demonstrate the success of commercial operators (rather than educational institutions) in building out this spectrum: “WISPs like BeamSpeed, LLC, Evertek, Inc., Redzone Wireless, Rise Broadband, SiouxLan Communications, and Watch Communications have ‘invested many millions of dollars’ in networks that ‘utilize leased [EBS] spectrum to provide high-quality, competitive broadband services to consumers, often in more rural areas of the United States where broadband options are limited.’”\textsuperscript{78} SoniqWave Networks LLC also intends to participate in the

\textsuperscript{71} SHLB et al. Petition at 8.

\textsuperscript{72} Id. at 12-13.

\textsuperscript{73} Application of the Board of Trustees of Northern Michigan University, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 34 FCC Red 6293, 6297, para. 13 (WTB 2019) (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{74} SHLB et al. Petition at 12 & n.36.

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 17-18.

\textsuperscript{76} WISPA Comments at 3-4.

\textsuperscript{77} WISPA Opposition at 6.

\textsuperscript{78} SHLB et al. Jan. 15 \textit{ex parte} at 3 (quoting Letter from BeamSpeed, LLC, Evertek, Inc., Redzone Wireless, SiouxLan Communic’ns, and Rise Broadband to Chairman Ajit Pai (filed Apr. 23, 2019)).
upcoming auction and is planning deployments using spectrum it has acquired in the secondary market from former EBS licensees.79

30. In sum, SHLB et al. have failed to present any new facts or arguments that would cause us to change our conclusion that the best approach to accelerate deployment and enable a wide range of potential uses for consumers nationwide is to license this spectrum for flexible use and eliminate the transaction costs (both money and time) associated with leasing by educational institutions.80

31. Fifth, we reject SHLB et al.’s continued reliance on a flawed study in support of maintaining the eligibility requirements.81 We previously found this study to be premised on an unrealistic deployment model.82 Not only did we find that history and experience discredit the study’s assumption that, in unserved rural areas, EBS licensees would self-deploy rather than seek to enter into a lease agreement with a commercial carrier; we also found problems with the study’s assumption that, in rural served areas, licensees would be able to provide broadband service at $15/month.83 Further, we note that, while CTN and NEBSA supported the existing eligibility requirements, they did not view the proposal around which the SHLB Economic Study was based as workable.84 Finally, we found the study to undervalue the potential benefits of an auction rather than a direct assignment to educational and/or tribal entities on numerous counts.85 Generation of revenue is not the only measure of value of an


80 SHLB et al.’s argument that EBS licensees should be given additional access to free 2.5 GHz spectrum in a priority window because E-Rate funding cannot be used to support off-campus or home use of E-Rate supported infrastructure (SHLB et al. Petition at 5) is unpersuasive; this fact is not new. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B), (b)(2). SHLB’s argument ignores the fact that this statutory restriction was in place when the vast majority of EBS licensees chose to lease the spectrum, rather than self-deploy networks.


82 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5454-55, para. 21-23.

83 SHLB et al. Petition at 8-9. See 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5454, para. 21. SHLB et al. claim that we wrongly characterize the SHLB Economic Study as assuming a $15/month price for both served and unserved areas. SHLB et al. Petition at 7-8. We recognize that the $15/month price applies only to the served areas and that the price is assumed to be $35/month in the unserved areas. We find it unrealistic, however, that educational providers could sustain service to rural areas at the $15/month price. 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5455, para. 21. We found no evidence in the record of such low prices except in the case of Mobile Citizen and Mobile Beacon, which have leases with Sprint for spectrum licenses in “major and more densely populated markets.” 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5454, para. 21. Furthermore, we find that the $35/month price in unserved rural areas would be unrealistic because it assumes that educational providers would self-deploy in those areas, which is contrary to our history and experience with the 2.5 GHz band. History has shown that the vast majority of EBS licensees simply do not provide service—at any price—but, instead, lease the spectrum. We are unpersuaded that repeating history will provide a different result.

84 CTN/NEBSA Reply Comments at 8-9.

85 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5455, para. 22. The SHLB et al. claim we mischaracterize the SHLB Economic Study as purely county-based. SHLB et al. Petition at 10. While we recognize that the deployment model of the educational license holders is not county-based, our concern is that the SHLB Economic Study assumes that for winners of a potential auction, the “commercial deployment model only considers deployment to entire counties.” 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5455, para. 22. This is because the SHLB Economic Study rules out any deployment to a county with partial deployment or change in plan offerings by non-educational providers, which we find unreasonable. 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5455, para. 22. The SHLB et al. also claim that our belief in the potential for price reduction after the auction via cost reduction is misguided because “competitive dynamics are the key driver of reduced wireless prices.” SHLB et al. Petition at 10-11. While competition is an important determinant of wireless prices, the Commission has also recognized the roles of costs.
auction; society benefits when spectrum available for flexible use for next-generation wireless services and assigned to those who are most likely to use it themselves to deploy. We therefore find that making the remaining unassigned spectrum available via competitive bidding is in the public interest and is more likely to expeditiously put this spectrum to its highest and best use for the benefit of all Americans.

32. Sixth, we previously stated our reasons for establishing the Tribal Priority Window but not a broad window for educational institutions. Specifically, we concluded that Tribes have an interest in obtaining access to 2.5 GHz spectrum to serve their rural Tribal lands that is greater than and distinct from that of educational institutions, based on: (1) the unique status of federally recognized Tribes and the nature of the Commission’s federal trust responsibility, (2) the right of Tribes to set their own communications policies in the lands they govern, (3) the unique and significant obstacles to offering service in Tribal areas, and (4) the fact that Tribes have not previously had access to this spectrum. The SHLB et al. fail to address these distinctions.

33. In turn, we find that SHLB et al.’s advocacy for a narrower educational priority window analogous to the Tribal Priority Window, or an educational priority window limited to New Channel Group 3 (old Channels G1, G2, and G3), would not address our stated deployment objectives. The Tribal Priority Window is readily distinguishable from any form of educator window. Moreover, their suggestion of creating an educational priority window limited to New Channel Group 3, comprised of 17.5 megahertz of spectrum, would not only suffer from the same concerns we have previously identified, but also would result in inefficient allocation of mid-band spectrum. Under that proposal, only the 17.5 megahertz of non-contiguous spectrum in New Channel Group 3 would be assigned and licensed differently than the adjacent commercial Broadband Radio Service spectrum. The result would be that

(Continued from previous page)
educators would end up only with a narrow spectrum band that they might not be able to use fully because of the need to protect adjacent channel commercial operations. In contrast, in the auction context, potential bidders can take into consideration the availability of and ability to aggregate spectrum to make the best use of this smaller Channel Group.

34. For these reasons, we affirm our conclusion in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order that, “[g]iven the time and effort and delay that would be involved in establishing and running [an educational] priority window, and the likelihood that such a window for all educational institutions would result in having to auction the spectrum anyway, we find that moving directly to flexible use and open eligibility would be the most expeditious method of making spectrum available to provide broadband service in rural and underserved areas, consistent with our statutory objective to ensure ‘the development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public, including those residing in rural areas, without administrative or judicial delays.’”

We therefore deny the SHLB et al. Petition.

IV. ORDERING CLAUSES

35. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to Sections 4(i), 4(j), 303(r), and 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 303(r), and 309(j), as well as Section 1.429 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR § 1.429, that the Petitions for Reconsideration filed by the National Congress of American Indians and jointly by the Schools, Health & Libraries Broadband Coalition; Consortium for School Networking; State Educational Technology Directors Association; American Library Association; National Digital Inclusion Alliance; Nebraska Department of Education; Utah Education and Telehealth Network; Council of Chief State School Officers; A Better Wireless; and Access Humboldt on November 25, 2019, ARE DISMISSED to the extent specified in this Order on Reconsideration and, alternatively and independently, DENIED as specified herein.

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36. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Section 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 1.429 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR § 1.429, that the Request for Withdrawal of Petition for Reconsideration filed by the Hawaii Broadband Initiative on March 30, 2020, IS GRANTED, and the Petition for Reconsideration by the Hawaii Broadband Initiative on November 25, 2019, IS DISMISSED.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER GEOFFREY STARKS
CONCURRING

Re:  Transforming the 2.5 GHz Band, WT Docket No. 18-120

Last July, I dissented to the Report and Order in this proceeding because, while the Educational Broadband Service (EBS) model has not been perfect, it should have been improved rather than undercut. To that end I still believe there was a better way to handle EBS, but the 2.5 GHz band has been underutilized for too long. Given our nation’s need for mid-band spectrum and the importance of this spectrum to future wireless broadband service, particularly in tribal communities and rural America, I concur so we can make this spectrum available as soon as possible.