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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY

**Before the  
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of )  
 )  
Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 )  
of the Communications Act )  
 )  
Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services )

GN Dkt. 93-252

**OPPOSITION OF NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.**

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## **SUMMARY**

Nextel Communications Inc. ("Nextel") as an ESMR provider will become subject to the Commission's Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") rules at the expiration of the Budget Act's statutory transition period. Nextel is therefore vitally interested in the development and implementation of fair CMRS regulations that take account of differences in the licensing, spectrum assignments, operational rules and, most importantly, market power of CMRS licensees.

Nextel supports the Commission's efforts to forbear from regulation where it can be demonstrated that markets are competitive. The Order, however, appears to have prejudged the degree of competition in the cellular market by applying the same level of regulatory forbearance to cellular as to CMRS providers that are functioning in a competitive marketplace. Nextel submits that the Commission should revisit its decision to forbear from rate regulating dominant cellular operators pending the completion of the promised cellular market competition analysis. The Commission should regulate cellular carriers with market power under traditional concepts of dominant carrier regulation while forbearing from such regulation of new entrant, non-dominant CMRS licensees.

Nextel opposes McCaw Cellular's position that cellular operators should be permitted flexible use of cellular spectrum to provide private services. If the Commission

ultimately decides to permit cellular operators to provide private mobile radio services ("PMRS") on a portion of their spectrum, cellular operators should be required to demonstrate via an application that the proposed service is in fact PMRS. McCaw's attempt to achieve full pricing flexibility in this proceeding is likewise unwarranted. Similarly inappropriate are the attempts of dominant LECs to remove their wireless businesses from the general regulatory framework and scope of competitive safeguards fashioned by the Commission and state regulatory bodies.

Nextel looks forward to the Commission's elaboration of LEC interconnection obligations in its recently initiated proceeding. Several of the petitions filed in response to the Order highlight the need for the Commission to assert its full authority over mutual compensation and rate regulation and describe with specificity the degree of "other terms and conditions" regulation that will be permitted to the states.

Finally, the Commission need not resolve the resale and CMRS interconnection issues raised by several petitioners on reconsideration. The Commission already has initiated a proceeding directly addressing these issues and the comments filed in that proceeding will assist the Commission in making determinations on these issues.

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Nextel Communications Inc. ("Nextel"), by its attorneys, hereby responds to petitions for reconsideration filed in the above captioned proceeding concerning the future regulation of Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") providers.<sup>1/</sup> The Federal Communications Commission's ("Commission") Second Report and Order ("Order") adopted rules and policies designed to implement regulatory parity for similarly situated CMRS providers. As the Commission recognized, however, the Order was only the beginning of a process of reviewing Commission rules and policies and gathering relevant information to rationalize the disparate technical, operational and commercial practices that characterized different segments of the mobile communications industry.

While the Order generally has taken a cautious, gradual path in its application of CMRS definitions and in the development of its analysis, a number of parties filed

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<sup>1/</sup> Second Report & Order, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Service, 9 FCC Rcd 1411 (1994).

petitions for reconsideration or clarification of many aspects of the Order. Nextel, as the first and leading ESMR operator and as an entity that will be directly affected by the new CMRS regulations, submits these comments on the petitions.

I. BACKGROUND

Nextel is a leading licensee of SMR systems, with extensive experience and expertise in providing mobile communications services. Nextel and its subsidiaries provide mobile communications for approximately 200,000 mobile units on a daily basis on both 800 and 900 MHz SMR systems. Moreover, Nextel was the first SMR licensee to seek and obtain authority to implement advanced, wide-area digital Enhanced Specialized Mobile Radio ("ESMR") mobile systems.<sup>2/</sup> These systems incorporate state-of-the-art digital and frequency reuse technology, providing improved transmission quality, coverage and enhanced service features. Nextel has initiated ESMR service in the Los Angeles area and is aggressively expanding EMSR services within its other authorized markets. Nextel's ESMR services will, after the expiration of the statutory transition period, become subject to CMRS regulation. Nextel is therefore vitally interested in the development of fair and balanced CMRS regulation.

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<sup>2/</sup> In February 1991, the Commission authorized Nextel to construct and operate 800 MHz ESMR systems in Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW MOBILE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK DOES NOT REQUIRE REVISITATION OF EVERY REGULATION AFFECTING MOBILE SERVICES OPERATORS

The Commission's charge under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (the "Budget Act") was to rationalize, under a common regulatory framework, the disparate markets and market conditions that characterize the wide variety of CMRS service providers and service offerings; to promote further competition and economic growth in the mobile communications marketplace; and to establish an appropriate level of regulation to protect consumers. As the Commission correctly recognized, these goals necessarily cannot be achieved once and for all by the adoption of a single order. It is critical, however, that the Commission's decision-making in this area take due account of differences in both the technical parameters of actual operations and the relative market power of various CMRS market segments.

A. Forbearance for Small Mobile Services Providers

Several small mobile service providers and their associations have filed petitions raising concerns over reclassification as CMRS providers.<sup>3/</sup> As required under the Budget Act, the Order reclassifies current mobile

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3/ See e.g. Petition for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration of Waterways Communications System, Inc.; Petition for Reconsideration of American Mobile Telecommunications Association, Inc.; Petition for Reconsideration of Personal Communications Industry Association and Petition for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of Cue Network Corp.

communications services by applying the statutory definitions of "commercial" and "private" mobile services to the services provided by mobile carriers.

It is understandable that relatively small mobile providers are concerned that their reclassification as CMRS may create new regulatory compliance burdens. Rather than strain to reclassify interconnected mobile services as PMRS, however, the Commission should examine ways to forbear from unnecessary regulation. The Commission already has initiated this process in its Notice on further forbearance for small CMRS providers.<sup>4/</sup> If CMRS regulations create undue hardship on small carriers without any countervailing public benefit, they should be revised.

B. Cellular Forbearance Should Not Precede the Promised Cellular Market Power Analysis

While the Commission has instituted a Further Notice to determine future adjustments to the technical rules for CMRS providers, the Order made basic determinations on the general competitiveness of the CMRS market and forbearance from Title II regulation for CMRS providers. While finding that all CMRS providers with the exception of cellular licensees lack market power, the Commission nevertheless contradicted itself by applying the same degree of

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<sup>4/</sup> Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Further Forbearance from Title II Regulation for Certain Types of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, GN Docket No. 94-33 (FCC 94-101), adopted April 20, 1994, released May 4, 1994.

regulatory forbearance to cellular licensees and emerging and future CMRS service providers.

As Nextel observed in its comments and reply comments on the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in GN Docket No. 93-252, forbearance determinations must be based on an analysis of market power and competitive circumstances.<sup>5/</sup> The Commission should draw distinctions among classes of CMRS providers predicated on its analysis of relative market power and apply these distinctions to its regulatory forbearance determinations. The Budget Act expressly provides the Commission with flexibility to classify CMRS providers and to subject different classes to different regulations.

For example, as an EMSR provider in the midst of implementing wide scale digital mobile communications systems in several non-contiguous markets, Nextel can hardly be equated in size, scope, spectrum availability or market power to the incumbent cellular operators, particularly those affiliated with dominant landline carriers. Accordingly, Nextel submits that the Commission's generalized CMRS forbearance analysis, as applied to cellular and as highlighted in MCI's petition for reconsideration, must be revisited.<sup>6/</sup> The Commission

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<sup>5/</sup> See, Nextel's Comments filed November 8, 1993 at 18 and Nextel's Reply Comments filed November 23, 1994 at 3-9.

<sup>6/</sup> See MCI Petition for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration at 4-5.

cannot rationally treat new market entrants and cellular operators in the same manner on the record developed in this proceeding. The Commission has determined that the cellular market is not competitive at this time;<sup>7/</sup> thus it cannot rationally adopt similar forbearance rules for cellular operators and other CMRS providers. Cellular carriers are dominant carriers possessing market power. Other CMRS entities particularly new entrants such as ESMR providers are non-dominant carriers. Therefore the Commission's CMRS regulations should encompass a dominant/non-dominant regulatory scheme.<sup>8/</sup>

Perhaps predictably, cellular operators are attempting inappropriately to use the statutory review of the mobile rules to end or relax existing common carrier requirements in effect on their operations.<sup>9/</sup> For example, McCaw's petition seeks reconsideration of the Commission's apparent "unequal" treatment of PCS services that may be classified as PMRS and cellular "private" services.

McCaw's "uniform regulation" argument overlooks several important points. First, under the PCS regulatory framework Personal Communications Service providers are presumed to

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7/ Order at 1467.

8/ Nextel concurs in MCI's discussion of the appropriate levels of regulation for dominant and non-dominant CMRS providers as well as MCI's position on LEC interconnection obligations.

9/ See Petition for Reconsideration of McCaw Cellular Communications at pp. 12-14.

provide CMRS and only CMRS services unless they demonstrate via an application that some portion of their spectrum will be utilized for PMRS.<sup>10/</sup> The application to provide a PMRS service must include a demonstration that the proposed service in fact is properly classified as PMRS. While the regulatory framework allows PCS providers to offer PMRS, this allowance is conditional on Commission approval of an application. Second, the Commission already has initiated a Further Notice that may permit, within a regulatory framework, the offering of private services by cellular operators.<sup>11/</sup> Finally, McCaw is seeking to have the benefit of the same regulatory treatment as PCS despite the Commission's conclusion that the cellular market is not fully competitive. McCaw is asking the Commission to prejudge its promised review of cellular competition.

If the Commission determines ultimately that cellular operators should be permitted to dedicate cellular spectrum to PMRS services, cellular operators should, at the very least, be required to conform with the same requirement as contained in the PCS rules to demonstrate by application that the proposed service to be offered is in fact private service. McCaw cannot expect to reap the benefits of

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<sup>10/</sup> See 47 C.F.R. §20.9 (1994).

<sup>11/</sup> See, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of The Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, GN Docket No. 93-252 (released May 20, 1994).

regulatory flexibility without accepting the concomitant burden of proving that the services it seeks to reclassify as private services in fact meet the statutory definition of private mobile radio services.

McCaw also seeks to gain an unwarranted degree of pricing flexibility by arguing that existing CMRS competition is sufficient to constrain cellular operators' ability to engage in predatory pricing. Specifically, McCaw argues that the Commission should "allow the competitive marketplace to discipline rates and accord CMRS providers sufficient latitude in the pricing of CMRS offerings to meet competition."<sup>12/</sup> During the transition period and, presumably afterwards, McCaw argues that cellular service pricing should be presumed lawful if it can be shown that comparable service at a comparable price is available from a different provider.

Nextel opposes McCaw's attempt to justify rates by employing a competitive necessity presumption of lawfulness. The Commission has repeatedly rejected the use by dominant carriers of "competitive necessity" in setting regulated prices and there is no reason for the Commission to vary this approach.<sup>13/</sup> For example, in the interexchange

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<sup>12/</sup> McCaw Petition at 12.

<sup>13/</sup> See e.g., Memorandum and Order, Competitive Pricing Plan Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22, 6 FCC Rcd 5615 (1991); Memorandum and Order, Competitive Pricing Plan No. 2 Resort Condominiums International, 6 FCC Rcd 5648 (1991); see also (continued...)

market, if the Commission had allowed AT&T to justify lowering its rates to match MCI or Sprint on the basis of competitive necessity, there likely would not be a competitive interexchange market today.

The flaw of McCaw's argument, of course, is its attempt to bootstrap the presumption in favor of general CMRS pricing flexibility in order to achieve pricing flexibility in the non-competitive cellular markets. The Commission has found that the cellular market is not fully competitive. Because the Commission has deferred a definitive cellular market competitive analysis, there is no basis to create any automatic presumption of lawfulness of cellular rates based on competitive necessity.

C. LEC CMRS Operators Are Improperly Seeking Relief In This Proceeding

Several Local Exchange Carriers ("LECs") filed petitions seeking clarification of the application of dominant LEC accounting, structural separation and other LEC competitive and structural safeguard rules they claim are misapplied in the CMRS context. These petitions seek to address issues that are beyond the scope of the CMRS regulatory parity rulemaking and accordingly should be raised, if at all, in other proceedings or in requests for declaratory ruling.

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13/ (...continued)  
Competitive Pricing Plan Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15,  
16, 17, 18, 6 FCC Rcd 6656.

For example, GTE requests clarification of the treatment of LEC-affiliated CMRS services that could be treated as "enhanced" services under the Commission's Computer III rules and therefore subject to state rate regulation.<sup>14/</sup> GTE claims that because LEC-provided enhanced and basic services "may be subject to differing regulatory requirements and obligations at both the federal and state level" clarification is required that LEC CMRS enhanced services will be treated in the same manner as any other CMRS offering in order to "avoid unnecessary distinctions, and minimize state regulation of innovative, advanced radio services."<sup>15/</sup>

Pacific Bell ("PacBell") asks that the Commission confirm that LEC CMRS providers be subject to non-structural accounting safeguards only if they engage in unregulated activities or in transactions with affiliates. PacBell seeks confirmation that "Part 64 accounting safeguards do not apply and should not be made to apply among regulated services or to transactions between regulated affiliates."<sup>16/</sup> Ameritech's Petition argues that elimination of cellular-landline structural separation requirements is timely and that the need for the removal of this regulatory safeguard has already been demonstrated.

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<sup>14/</sup> GTE Petition at 11.

<sup>15/</sup> GTE Petition at 12.

<sup>16/</sup> Pacific Bell Petition at 3.

Nextel opposes these petitions for reconsideration or clarification of the CMRS rules as applied to LECs and their affiliates. It is plainly inappropriate for the LECs to attempt to use the Commission's regulatory parity proceeding to gain relief from rules put in place to protect the public and the markets beyond their landline monopolies from LEC cross-subsidies and discrimination. The LECs have made no case for special relief from any rules and no special relief should be considered.

**III. Reasonable and Cost-Based Interconnection with LECs  
Will be Critical to the Development of Competition**

**A. The Requirement of Mutual Compensation  
Advances Competition.**

In its petition, McCaw argues that the Commission should clarify that the principle of mutual compensation between LEC and CMRS providers should apply to intrastate as well as interstate traffic.<sup>17/</sup> McCaw properly characterizes the LECs' obligation to provide reasonable interconnection as not segregable between intrastate and interstate commercial mobile radio services and the lack of its availability for intrastate traffic "would negate the important federal purpose of ensuring CMRS interconnection to the interstate network".<sup>18/</sup> McCaw observes that the requirement of mutual compensation is not subject to state

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<sup>17/</sup> See McCaw petition at 5-7.

<sup>18/</sup> Order at 1498.

regulation because the Commission would not be setting intrastate interconnection rates.

Nextel agrees with McCaw that the concept of mutual compensation is critical to opening new markets to CMRS providers. Nextel supports McCaw's analysis and requests that the Commission clarify its mutual compensation requirement in the manner proposed by McCaw.

**B. The Commission Must be Vigilant to Ensure that States Do Not Encroach on the FCC's CMRS Jurisdiction**

Several states and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC") filed petitions seeking clarification of aspects of the Order dealing with the scope of continuing state authority to regulate rates, terms and conditions of service of intrastate CMRS providers.<sup>19/</sup>

The New York State Public Service Commission and NARUC argue that the Order goes too far in concluding that the Commission has the authority to preempt the states from regulating interconnection rates of CMRS providers if the Commission ultimately requires CMRS interconnection. Both NARUC and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission express concerns about the level of detail the Commission's rules

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<sup>19/</sup> See New York State Department of Public Service Petition for Reconsideration; Petition for Limited Reconsideration and Clarification of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission; Petition for Reconsideration National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.

would require a state to provide in any future petition to reassert rate authority over intrastate CMRS providers.

As an initial matter, the Commission has deferred its determination of CMRS interconnection obligations to a further proceeding. State regulatory jurisdiction over prospective CMRS should be dealt with in that proceeding.

Nextel is concerned, however, that despite the Budget Act and its legislative history, states may seek to maintain an unwarranted degree of control over CMRS operations by requiring informational filings or status reports that may adversely affect the flexibility of CMRS providers operations. While the Budget Act permits states to regulate "other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services", that authority cannot include informational tariffing requirements. Informational tariffing is plainly beyond the authority of the states as reflected in the legislative history of the Budget Act.

Finally, Nextel views the Commission's rules on state petitions to reassert CMRS rate authority as consistent with the intent of the Budget Act. It is entirely appropriate for states seeking to reassert authority over CMRS rates to provide the Commission and interested parties with the details of the rate regime proposed. Without requiring state petitions to reveal the proposed regulatory scheme, the Commission will not have the basic information it needs to arrive at a reasonable judgment of the impact of the

proposed regulation on competition as required under the Budget Act.

C. Petitions Dealing With CMRS Interconnection Issues Can be Considered in the Commission's Recently Adopted Further Notice

Several petitioners urge the Commission either to impose more stringent resale obligations on cellular operators or seek further clarification of CMRS interconnection and resale obligations.<sup>20/</sup> Because the Order indicated that the Commission intended to solicit comment in a further proceeding on CMRS resale, interconnection and equal access matters and the Commission has initiated this proceeding, it would be wasteful of Commission resources to attempt to resolve resale and CMRS interconnection at this stage. Nextel intends to participate in the resale proceeding and believes that the Commission is best served by deferring any decisions on these issues until a record has been developed.

IV. CONCLUSION


The process of developing and implementing CMRS regulations is necessarily cumbersome, as the tasks of rationalizing disparate regulatory regimes, policies and federal/state jurisdiction are complex and difficult. The Order represents a cautious first step on the road to achieving regulatory symmetry among similarly situated CMRS

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<sup>20/</sup> See Petition for Reconsideration of the National Cellular Resellers Association and the Petition for Reconsideration of Cellular Service, Inc. and ComTech, Inc.

provides. As described herein, the Commission should clarify aspects of its Order to better recognize the differences among CMRS providers and reflect these differences in the CMRS regulations.

Respectfully submitted,  
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June 16, 1994

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Pamela Marie DuBost, hereby certify that today on this 16th day of June, 1994, I caused a copy of the OPPOSITION OF NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC. to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following:

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
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