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Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of	)	
	)	
Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection Changes Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996	)	CC Docket No. 94-129
	)	
Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes of Consumers' Long Distance Carriers	)	

COMMENTS OF GTE SERVICE CORPORATION

Gail L. Polivy
GTE Service Corporation
1850 M Street, N.W.
Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-5214

Richard McKenna
GTE Telephone Operations
600 Hidden Ridge
Irving, TX 75038
(972) 718-6362

Jeffrey S. Linder
Suzanne Yelen
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 429-7000

Its Attorneys

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COMMENTS OF GTE SERVICE CORPORATION

GTE Service Corporation and its affiliated telecommunications companies (collectively "GTE")[1] respectfully submit their Comments on the Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in the above-captioned proceeding.[2] As discussed herein, GTE urges the Commission to adopt slamming rules that fully protect customers while encouraging robust competition.

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[1] GTE Alaska, Incorporated, GTE Arkansas Incorporated, GTE California Incorporated, GTE Florida Incorporated, GTE Hawaiian Telephone Company Incorporated, The Micronesian Telecommunications Corporation, GTE Midwest Incorporated, GTE North Incorporated, GTE Northwest Incorporated, GTE South Incorporated, GTE Southwest Incorporated, Contel of Minnesota, Inc., Contel of the South, Inc., GTE Communications Corporation, GTE Hawaiian Tel International Incorporated, and GTE Wireless Products and Services.

[2] Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 94-129 (rel. July 15, 1997) ("FNPRM").

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

As the Commission has acknowledged, slamming, the unauthorized changing of a customer's telecommunications carrier, is the number one cause of common carrier-related complaints[3] and remains a growing problem. With the introduction of local competition, unscrupulous carriers will have even more opportunities to slam consumers in the local and intraLATA toll markets. Slamming deprives customers of the benefits of competition, exposes them to potential liability to an unauthorized carrier, and forces them to invest time and effort to ensure that they are switched back to their authorized carrier.

Recognizing that slamming has become a serious problem, Congress enacted Section 258 of the Communications Act, which requires carriers to submit and execute changes to customers' service providers in compliance with the Commission's rules. Carriers that violate those rules are liable for returning to the authorized carrier all charges paid by the customer.

In crafting its rules to enforce this provision, the Commission should protect and empower customers by removing incentives for carriers to slam, and to ensure that customers who are slammed are made whole. To this end, the Commission should require that all primary carrier ("PC") changes for telephone exchange and toll service be verified and compel unauthorized carriers to remit to authorized carriers all payments received from customers. In addition, the Commission should make certain

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[3] Common Carrier Scorecard, Federal Communications Commission at 3 (Fall 1996).

that slammed customers pay no more than they would have paid their authorized carrier and receive all premiums due them. And, the Commission should refrain from unduly restricting the competitively neutral use of PC-change freezes, which are the most powerful weapon in consumers' arsenal against slamming.

At the same time, the Commission should avoid unnecessarily restricting vigorous competition. For example, there is no need to impose additional burdens on incumbent LECs ("ILECs") in the absence of evidence that industry-wide abuses have occured. Nor should LECs be subject to liability if they make a mistake in processing PC changes from submitting carriers. LECs performing a processing role (as opposed to executing PC changes on their own behalf) have no incentive to slam, and mistakes performed in that role are outside the scope of conduct that Congress intended to deter and punish under Section 258. Indeed, the Commission has long recognized that LECs should be able to limit their liability in such circumstances.

In addition, all carriers, including LECs, should be free to try to win back customers they have lost as long as such efforts are (1) separate from any notices informing a customer that a carrier change has been authorized and (2) do not affect processing of the change order. Finally, resellers should be permitted to change underlying carriers without notifying their customers, as long as doing so does not result in deception, *i.e.*, they have not led their customers to rely on the use of a particular underlying carrier. GTE respectfully suggests that these recommendations will best implement Congress's goals in enacting Section 258.

II. GTE URGES THE COMMISSION TO ADOPT RULES THAT PROTECT AND EMPOWER CONSUMERS WITHOUT CONSTRAINING COMPETITION.

A. GTE agrees that the Commission's verification rules should be expanded to cover local exchange and toll services.

In its FNPRM, the Commission asks whether expanding application of the PC-change verification rules to the local market would help protect consumers and promote competition.[4] GTE believes that it would. With the introduction of competition in the local market and enhanced competition in the intraLATA toll and long distance markets, consumers will have rapidly expanding choices among different carriers offering new services and pricing packages. Unfortunately, this expansion will also lead to increased opportunities for slamming.

Section 258 expressly authorizes the Commission to adopt rules governing changes to customers' providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service.[5] Verification of customer carrier selection will be even more crucial as many new carriers enter the market. Verification rules applicable to exchange and toll services will promote competition by ensuring that customers get the benefits provided by the carriers they select while protecting customers from unauthorized changes to their preferred carriers. When combined with the Act's requirement that unauthorized carriers remit to the authorized carrier any revenues received from slammed consumers and strict enforcement by the Commission, broad application of the verification rules

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[4] FNPRM, ¶ 11.

should reduce the incidence of slamming in the long distance market and minimize the possibility of unauthorized changes to customers' local and intraLATA toll carriers.

B. The term "executing carrier" should be defined consistent with the overall scheme of the Act and Congress's intent to deter and punish violation of the verification rules.

Section 258(a) states that "[n]o telecommunications carrier shall *submit or execute* a change in a subscriber's selection of a provider of telephone exchange service or telephone toll service except in accordance with such verification procedures as the Commission shall prescribe."[6] The Commission asks whether defining a submitting carrier as "any carrier that requests that a consumer's telecommunications carrier be changed," and an executing carrier as "any carrier that effects" a PC-change request[7] is sufficient to "hold accountable all carriers involved in PC-change transactions."[8] GTE agrees with the proposed definition of "submitting carrier," but believes the proposed definition of "executing carrier" misinterprets Congress's intent. Accordingly, as discussed below, the term "executing carrier" should be defined as "any carrier that changes a consumer's telecommunications carrier on its own behalf."

The use of the term, "executing carrier," in Section 258 must be considered in light of the Act's principal purpose of extending competition to new markets, including

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(...Continued)

[5] 47 U.S.C. § 258(a).

[6] 47 U.S.C. § 258(a) (emphasis added).

[7] FNPRM, ¶ 13.

[8] *Id.*

the local exchange. Prior to the 1996 Act, PC changes only occurred in the long distance market. Thus, there were only "submitting carriers": long distance carriers that directed local exchange carriers to process PC-change requests. With the advent of local exchange competition, however, carrier changes now can be made by local exchange carriers – both ILECs and facilities-based CLECs – on their own behalf, without "submitting" a change to any other entity. That is, a GTE telephone company could follow the necessary verification procedures and switch a customer from a CLEC back to its own services. This, GTE believes, is what Congress meant by referring to "executing" carriers: carriers that execute PC changes on their own behalf, rather than submitting such changes to another carrier for processing.

GTE's interpretation of the statute is more consistent with Section 258 than the Commission's reading for two reasons. First, the plain language of Section 258(a) suggests that Congress intended both submitting and executing carriers to comply with Commission-prescribed verification rules. Use of GTE's definition is faithful to this requirement because any carrier making a PC change for its own benefit – whether a submitting carrier or an executing carrier – would need to comply with the rules. There would be no duplication of verification responsibility because only one carrier would verify any particular transaction. Under the Commission's proposed definition of "executing carrier," in contrast, the verification rules would not apply to executing carriers. While the exemption of executing carriers from those rules is necessary under the Commission's approach in order to avoid wasteful dual verification, it is inconsistent with the language of Section 258(a).

Second, the Commission's proposed definition and treatment of "executing carriers" would unreasonably – and contrary to well-established precedent – expose LECs to substantial liability for honest mistakes in processing PC-change requests. Section 258 liability is not appropriate in such circumstances. A processing LEC (that is, a LEC that implements PC-change instructions from a submitting carrier) that erroneously changes or fails to change a customer's PC will not have ignored the Commission's verification rules and will not have collected charges from a customer. Thus, it will not have engaged in conduct Congress meant to deter or penalize under Section 258, which is intended to address only intentional misconduct, and should not be subject to the considerable liability contemplated by that provision.

Indeed, the Commission's proposed "but for" test for liability[9] and interpretation of "executing carrier" would ignore the agency's longstanding policy not to abrogate common carrier tariff provisions that limit the carrier's liability for negligence but do not exclude liability for willful misconduct such as slamming. In this regard, and in a case that is directly relevant to this proceeding, the Commission in 1985 refused the demands of Sprint and MCI to impose absolute liability on ILECs for presubscription errors.[10] In doing so, it recognized that carriers' limitation of liability tariff provisions

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[9] *See* Section V, *infra*.

[10] *Annual 1985 Access Tariff Filings*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Docket No. 85-125, 2 FCC Rcd 1416, 1422-23 (1987). The Commission stated: "We decline ... to adopt the [Common Carrier] Bureau's tentative view that the LECs should be required to modify their general liability provisions to ensure that they do not disclaim liability for ordinary negligence for assigning an end user to an [IXC] other than the one the one the end user had requested." It observed that without such a limitation of liability, "the LECs may be exposed to thousands of claims for damages which, to defend

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have "been upheld routinely by the courts,"[11] and that, "without such a limitation of liability, the LECs may be exposed to thousands of claims for damages which, to defend successfully, would inevitably raise the cost of providing service."[12] The Commission's policy on this point – which goes back to the *Esteve* case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1921[13] – has not changed, as indicated by decisions in 1993[14] and 1996.[15] Certainly, there is no indication that Congress intended *sub silentio* to override decades of precedent that, both as a matter of general practice and specifically as applied to PC-change processing errors, limits the liability of the processing LEC. Accordingly, the Commission should not classify processing LECs as "executing carriers" and, in harmony with longstanding precedent and the intent of Section 258, should affirm that processing LECs are not subject to liability under Section 258 for mistaken handling of PC-change requests.

(...Continued)
successfully, would inevitably raise the cost of providing service." *Id.* at 1423.

[11] *Id.* at 1423.

[12] *Id.*

[13] *Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co.*, 256 U.S. 566 (1921).

[14] *Local Exchange Carrier Line Information Database*, CC Docket No. 92-24, Order, 8 FCC Rcd 7130, 7134 (1993).

[15] *Revision of the Commission's Rules To Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems*, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 94-102/RM-8143, 11 FCC Rcd 18676, 18728 (1996) (footnote omitted): "While the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has issued rulings affecting the liability of carriers subject to their rules and requirements, those actions were taken pursuant to specific language that gives the ICC authority to modify the imposition of liability. No such statutory provision is applicable here."

C. The same verification procedures should be applied to all carriers.

The Commission asks whether ILECs should be subject to different verification rules because of any perceived advantages they may have as incumbents.[16] There is no basis for treating ILECs differently from other carriers. The assumption that, in the new competitive environment, LECs require independent, third-party verification of all PC-change requests because of "an enhanced ability or incentive" to slam is logically flawed. The fact that ILECs (or, in the new environment, any facilities-based local service provider) may control the facilities necessary to effect a change gives them no greater ability to slam than any other carrier. All long distance carriers regularly request customer carrier changes in bulk (via magnetic tape), subject only to their obligation to follow the Commission's verification procedures. Rather than imposing uniquely burdensome and anticompetitive rules on an entire industry segment, the Commission should apply its verification rules equally to all carriers.

In a related question, the Commission asks whether an ILEC may send a letter to its subscriber in an attempt to have the customer reconsider a decision to switch to a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC").[17] GTE believes that all carriers should be free to send promotional materials to customers or potential customers at any time, in compliance with the Commission's existing rules.[18] However, in order to protect the

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[16] FNPRM, ¶ 15.

[17] FNPRM, ¶ 15.

[18] 47 C.F.R. § 64.1150.

customer, all such materials should be separate from any notices informing a customer that a carrier change has been authorized. In addition, marketing efforts should not affect processing of the change order in any way.

D. A lower level of scrutiny is necessary to verify a customer carrier change requested by a customer on an in-bound call.

The Commission tentatively concludes that the same verification rules for verifying PC changes should be applied to in-bound calls from customers requesting a carrier change.[19] In particular, the Commission is concerned that there would be no record to verify what occurred during the conversation and that customers may be lured into calling a carrier because of the use of sweepstakes advertisements or deceptive marketing materials.[20] Although GTE agrees that some verification procedures are necessary, in-bound calls by customers are less likely to result in slamming disputes and do not require the Commission's full verification procedures.

In most cases, a customer that calls a carrier intends to initiate service and has already made the decision to switch carriers. The Commission should recognize that carriers have the option of recording the customer's decision to switch carriers on in-bound calls (as long as such recording complies with relevant privacy laws). If the customer complains that he or she was slammed, the carrier's recording can be used to verify that the customer authorized the change in service. If the carrier is unable to produce such a recording or other evidence that it complied with another Commission

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[19] FNPRM, ¶ 19.

[20] FNPRM, ¶ 20.

verification procedure, the Commission could establish a presumption that the customer was slammed.

Even though not required to do so by the Commission's rules, GTE's long distance subsidiary currently records in-bound calls as a means to verify customer change requests. Therefore, GTE recommends that the Commission add recording of in-bound customer calls to its list of verification procedures. This option would address the Commission's concerns with respect to "the lack of record"[21] while recognizing that in-bound customer calls are much less likely to result in slamming.

III. RESTRICTIONS ON PC-CHANGE FREEZES ARE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR CONSISTENT WITH CUSTOMER INTERESTS.

A critical focus of the Commission's action should be to alleviate customers' feeling of powerlessness by encouraging the use of tools for customers to defend themselves against slamming. To this end, customers should be well-informed and empowered to protect themselves by taking appropriate action to freeze their PC choice. The Commission should refrain from restricting implementation of PC-change freezes developed by a carrier, as long as the freeze procedures are competitively neutral and carried out fairly.

As the Commission recognizes, PC-change freezes were designed by ILECs as a response to slamming complaints from their customers.[22] Although slamming complaints have arisen almost exclusively from the actions of long distance carriers,

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[21] FNPRM, ¶ 20.

[22] FNPRM, ¶ 22.

slammed customers usually complain to their LEC. This has put LECs in the difficult position of having to assist customers in remedying unauthorized changes caused by other carriers. The PC-change freeze was developed so that LECs would be able to offer their customers, some of whom have been slammed numerous times, protection from further unauthorized changes.

In opposing MCI's Petition for limits on this anti-slamming mechanism,[23] GTE and several other ILECs explained that these freezes are tailored to prevent slamming and are implemented in a nondiscriminatory manner.[24] For example, GTE only offers customers a PC-change freeze when requested directly by the customer or when a customer is slammed. Following nondiscrimination requirements that apply to all LECs, GTE treats all carriers, including affiliates, the same for PC-change freeze purposes.[25]

GTE agrees with the Commission that all notifications for PC-change freezes should explain the customers' rights in clear language and should not be combined with other promotional materials that could confuse customers.[26] Such materials should

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[23] MCI Telecommunications Corporation Petition for Rulemaking, RM-9085, CCB/CPD 97-19 (filed Mar. 18, 1997).

[24] *See, e.g.*, Opposition of GTE Service Corporation, RM-9085, CCB/CPD 97-19 at 4-5 (filed June 4, 1997); Comments by Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Pacific Bell, and Nevada Bell in Opposition to MCI's Petition for Rulemaking, RM-9085, CCB/CPD 97-19 at 6-9 (filed June 4, 1997); SNET Comments in Opposition to MCI's Petition for Rulemaking, RM-9085, CCB/CPD 97-19 at 4-7 (filed June 4, 1997); Ameritech Comments, RM-9085, CCB/CPD 97-19 at 9-10 (filed June 5, 1997).

[25] Second Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-149 and Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-61, CC Docket No. 96-149, CC Docket No. 96-61, ¶¶ 162-165 (rel. Apr. 18, 1997).

[26] FNPRM, ¶ 23.

explain which carrier selections would be affected by the freeze and how customers can have the freeze terminated. However, the Commission already has the authority to prevent deceptive practices by carriers,[27] so no new rules are needed.

The Commission asks whether it should apply verification procedures to PC-change freeze requests.[28] GTE already verifies such changes by mailing a form to the customer which clearly explains the terms of the PC-change freeze. The freeze is not initiated until the customer signs and returns the form. To change carriers, the customer simply calls GTE and is sent by mail a numbered form explaining that the freeze will be lifted and requesting the customer's signature. When the customer signs and returns the form, the carrier change is made. GTE will also participate in a three-way call with other carriers and the customer and then mail the necessary form to the customer upon completion of the call. GTE uses these procedures, including requiring customers to return specifically numbered forms, to prevent fraud. When GTE allowed other carriers to send the forms to customers, it had the experience of receiving a four-inch high stack of forms with forged signatures, leading to additional slamming complaints. GTE's use of verification procedures ensures that PC-change freezes are used for their intended purpose of protecting and empowering customers.

As GTE explained in responding to the MCI Petition, there is no evidence of widespread ILEC abuse of these freezes,[29] and GTE has found this tool highly effective

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[27] *See* 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).

[28] FNRPM, ¶ 24.

[29] Opposition of GTE Service Corporation, RM-9085, CCB/CPD 97-19 at 1, 6-9 (filed
(Continued...)

at preventing further slamming of the affected customer. The Commission can consider any complaints of improper or deceptive practices on a carrier-by-carrier basis. In evaluating whether a particular PC-freeze practice is reasonable, GTE agrees that the Commission should focus on whether there were any circumstances suggesting fraud or deception, whether the implementation is discriminatory or competitively biased, and whether consumers are fully and accurately informed of the terms and effect of the PC-change freeze.[30]

IV. SLAMMED CUSTOMERS SHOULD ONLY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING THE CHARGES THEY WOULD HAVE INCURRED WITH THEIR AUTHORIZED CARRIER AND SHOULD HAVE ANY LOST BENEFITS RESTORED.

GTE agrees with the Commission's finding in its *1995 Report and Order* that a slammed customer should be responsible only for the charges the customer would have paid if there had been no carrier change.[31] Under this rule, a slammed customer would pay to the unauthorized carrier the same amount that customer would have paid to the preferred carrier. As the Commission has recognized, the alternative approach of absolving the customer of any liability for services provided by an unauthorized carrier

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(...Continued)
June 4, 1997).

[30] FNPRM, ¶ 24.

[31] FNPRM, ¶ 26.

could encourage consumers to delay reporting they have been slammed or lead to fraudulent slamming claims.[32]

Making slammed customers liable for the charges they would have incurred from their authorized carrier also serves to make the authorized carrier whole. Under Section 258(b), if the customer makes any payments to the unauthorized carrier, that carrier must turn over all such funds to the authorized carrier. If the unauthorized carrier has received more than the customer should have paid under the authorized carrier's rates, the difference should be refunded or credited to the customer.

GTE believes that the Commission's proposal to require unauthorized carriers to remit to the authorized carrier the value of any premiums, such as discounts on services or other products, to which the customer would have been entitled, is unnecessary. Once the authorized carrier has received payment from the unauthorized carrier for the charges the customer would have paid, the authorized carrier has been made whole. If the authorized carrier also receives the value of the premiums the customer is entitled to, it has received compensation above what it would have received from the customer. Therefore, once the authorized carrier has been reimbursed for the charges the customer would have incurred, it should restore to the customer the benefits that would have been received had he or she not been slammed.[33]

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[32] FNPRM, ¶ 27.

[33] Although GTE agrees that the unauthorized carrier should be liable to the authorized carrier for expenses incurred to collect customer payments, the Commission should define such reimbursable expenses narrowly so as to avoid additional disputes between carriers.

The Commission's proposal that carriers be required to undertake private settlement negotiations prior to bringing any disputes to the Commission[34] will encourage carriers to resolve such issues quickly and efficiently. The carriers involved in a slamming dispute should make a good faith effort to determine whether any charges must be remitted to the authorized carrier so that the customer can be made whole as quickly as possible.

V. THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE PROPOSED "BUT FOR" TEST AND SHOULD DECLINE TO REQUIRE THIRD-PARTY VERIFICATION.

In the FNPRM, the Commission tentatively concludes that it should apply a three-part "but for" test to determine liability for carriers violating the Commission's rules.[35] There are three parts to this test: 1) when the submitting carrier authorizes a change that fails to comply with the verification rules and the executing carrier performs the change, the submitting carrier is liable; 2) when the submitting carrier authorizes a change in conformance with the Commission's rules and the executing carrier fails to process the change properly, the executing carrier is liable; and 3) when the submitting carrier authorizes a change that fails to comply with the rules and the executing carrier fails to perform the change, the submitting carrier is liable.

GTE respectfully submits that use of such a test is unnecessary, since it is based on the Commission's proposal to treat processing LECs as "executing carriers" under

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[34] FNPRM, ¶ 31.

[35] FNPRM, ¶ 34.

the statute. As GTE made clear in Section II.B above, the term "executing carrier" should encompass only those carriers that make PC changes on their own behalf. Congress did not intend that this term cover processing LECs, and certainly did not intend that LECs that make an error in processing a PC-change request be held liable under Section 258. The second prong of the proposed "but for" test would unreasonably subject processing LECs to such liability.

Under GTE's interpretation of "executing carrier," in contrast, no "but for" test is necessary. Rather, any submitting or executing carriers that violates the Commission's verification procedures and collects charges from a customer would be held liable.[36] GTE's construction is consistent with the plain language of Section 258 and properly limits liability to intentional misconduct. Consequently, the Commission should accept GTE's interpretation of "executing carrier" and not adopt the proposed "but for" test.

The Commission also asks whether there are any alternative mechanisms, such use of an independent third party to carry out PC changes, which would reduce the number of disputes.[37] Introduction of a third party or other additional means of verification will only increase the cost of completing PC changes without solving any evident problem. The growing number of slamming complaints is not caused by executing carriers failing to carry out authorized carrier changes. Rather, these complaints arise because long distance providers have submitted unauthorized carrier change requests to ILECs. Employing a third party to execute PC changes will not

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[36] 47 U.S.C. § 258(b).

[37] FNPRM, ¶ 35.

prevent carriers from submitting unauthorized changes, and thus expenses will increase with no corresponding benefit.

VI. A BRIGHT-LINE TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A RESELLER MUST IDENTIFY A CHANGE IN ITS UNDERLYING CARRIER WOULD SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

As the Commission suggests, a reseller's obligation to disclose a change in its underlying carrier should be determined by the customer's reliance on statements made by a reseller that it would be using a particular underlying carrier.[38] Therefore, the Commission should establish a bright-line test that considers whether the reseller has advertised its underlying carrier through promotions or has included information on its underlying carrier in agreements with customers. A rule based on these factors will give carriers clear direction regarding their responsibilities and protect the interests of customers who have relied on carrier assurances.[39]

VII. CONCLUSION

In implementing the provisions of Section 258, the Commission should:

- Apply its verification rules to all customer carrier changes for telephone exchange and toll services.
- Define "executing carrier" as a carrier making a PC change on its own behalf, and distinguish such conduct from mere processing of PC-change requests from submitting carriers.
- Subject all carriers to the same verification procedures.

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[38] FNPRM, ¶ 39.

[39] In developing its rules, the Commission should note that some states require a reseller to disclose a change in the underlying carrier, while other states prohibit the release of such information.

- Recognize that carrier changes requested via in-bound calls from customers can be recorded to verify that the change was authorized because of the diminished likelihood of slamming.

- Allow carriers to develop their own verification rules for PC-change freezes and address complaints on a case-by-case basis.

- Hold slammed customers responsible only for paying the charges they would have incurred with their authorized carrier had they not been slammed. The unauthorized carrier should be responsible for remitting to the authorized carrier all charges paid by the customer. After receiving reimbursement from the unauthorized carrier, the authorized carrier should refund or credit to the customer any funds in excess of those that would have been charged prior to slamming and provide the customer with any premiums to which the customer would have been entitled.

- Affirm that a LEC that makes an error in processing a PC-change request will not face liability under Section 258.

- Obligate resellers to inform their customers of a change in underlying carrier when the reseller has caused customers to rely on the use of a particular underlying carrier through promotions or formal agreements.

Adoption of the these recommendations will facilitate achieving the Commission's goal of preventing slamming by depriving unauthorized carriers of

revenues and making them responsible for ensuring that slammed customers are made whole.

Respectfully submitted,

GTE Service Corporation and its affiliated telecommunications companies

By: _____

Jeffrey S. Linder
Suzanne Yelen
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 429-7000

Gail L. Polivy
GTE Service Corporation
1850 M Street, N.W.
Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-5214

Richard McKenna
GTE Telephone Operations
600 Hidden Ridge
Irving, TX 75038
(972) 718-6362

Its Attorneys

September 15, 1997

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of September, 1997, I caused copies of the foregoing COMMENTS OF GTE SERVICE CORPORATION to be served on:

Via Hand Delivery:

Cathy Seidel (1 copy & diskette)
Common Carrier Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
2025 M Street, N.W.
Room 6120
Washington, D.C. 20554

Formal Complaints Branch (2 copies)
Enforcement Division
Common Carrier Bureau
2025 M Street, N.W.
Mail Stop 1600A1
Washington, D.C. 20554

International Transcription Services (ITS)
2100 M Street, N.W.
Suite 140
Washington, D.C. 20037

Daphne A. Johnson