"best practices" customer service programs as well as the development of new programs arising from these activities.

E. The Merger Is Necessary To Enable SBC and Ameritech To Implement Their New Strategy

Absent the merger, neither SBC nor Ameritech had plans for facilities-based entry into out-of-region local markets. Kahan Aff. ¶¶ 91; Weller Aff. ¶ 31. Each had scaled back or abandoned various out-of-region proposals because none provided a compelling business rationale commensurate with the risks and costs, and because none offered prospects as attractive as the companies had seen in their wireless, international and other businesses.

SBC and Ameritech, however, have a particular reason – and, together, they would have the ability - to expand their out-of-region ventures, because they face unprecedented new challenges in the profitable core of their operations, in-region service to business customers. Kahan Aff. ¶ 21; Carlton Aff. ¶ 12; Weller Aff. ¶ 35. In the first quarter of 1998, CLECs as a group, for the first time, added more business lines – especially the high-capacity lines, where both SBC and Ameritech have seen tremendous losses of businesses – than the BOCs.[62] Carlton Aff. ¶ 12. Foreign carriers with enormous resources – NTT, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom and British Telecom – will soon be numbered among those vying to serve the high-growth, high-profit telecommunications market of multinational corporations. See Table 14 at the "Tables"

[62] One analyst noted: it was "a startling event to have the crossover occur so soon." Saloman Smith Barney, CLECs Surpass Bells in Net Business Line Additions for First Time (May 6, 1998) (Saloman Smith Barney 1998). To put this in perspective, the non-AT&T long distance competitors did not have more incremental minutes than AT&T until 1986, a full 10 years after MCI carried its first switched long distance minute. Id. At this pace, "the 50 percent loss of market share that AT&T saw from 1986 through 1996 could be replicated in the local market in a much quicker time period." Id.

attachment; Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 22. Each has already established a beachhead in the U.S.[63] ILECs are also rapidly losing share in a second, traditionally profitable market, the market for intraLATA toll services.[64] At the same time, SBC and Ameritech face unprecedented new obligations to implement entry-facilitating changes mandated by the 1996 Act. The companies have spent over $3 billion so far on this effort. Carter Aff. ¶ 7; Appenzeller Aff. ¶ 10. The changes occurring at a rapid pace in the industry, and the growing capabilities of competitors, have forced SBC and Ameritech to consider anew ways that they can effectively compete outside their regions. Gilbert/Harris Aff. ¶¶ 5-26.

It was the considered business judgment of both SBC and Ameritech that the two companies had to make a choice. They could stick to their existing businesses and regions and try to hang on in the face of the inroads of new competitors, or they could combine forces to become one of the small number of companies with the size, scope and commitment to compete everywhere. The top managers of the two companies did not

---

[63] Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. recently made a major commitment to a CLEC in the United States, investing $100 million in Teligent, which is constructing digital wireless network that ultimately will reach more than 700 cities and towns across the U.S. See Teligent Press Release, Teligent Announces $100 Million Strategic Investment by NIT (Sept. 30, 1997), available at <http://www.teligentinc.com/news/rel100.htm>. Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, of course, have made substantial investments in Sprint and formed the Global One alliance. BT's small presence in the U.S. was augmented by its acquisition of an interest in MCI and the formation of the Concert alliance. See Sprint, Deutsche Telecom and France Telecom Investment in Sprint Completed (visited July 21, 1998) <http://www.sprint.com/sprint/press/releases/9604/9604260249.html>; Sprint, Global One Obtains Final European Union Approval (visited July 21, 1998) <http://www.sprint.com/sprint/press/releases/9607/9607170276.html>.While its relationship with MCI is unwinding, it has shown a clear interest in being a major global player. See Hilary Clarke, BT to Woo City Over Europe, The Independent (London), May 3, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13648693; Amanda Hall, BT Put on Hold Following the Collapse of the Merger with MCI, Sunday Telegraph, Nov. 16, 1997, at 6.

[64] See D. M. Hollingsworth, George K. Baum & Company, Competitive Local Exchange Carriers – Industry Report, Investext Rpt No. 1940508, at *6 (June 25, 1997) (stating that ILECs have been steadily losing revenues and market share in the intraLATA toll business).

believe there was a middle ground between these two approaches that was viable for them in the long term. SBC and Ameritech have opted to grow and compete. The new SBC is committed to enter new markets aggressively, offering service from coast to coast, and beyond. Kahan Aff. ¶¶ 10-15; Weller Aff. ¶ 11.

Neither SBC nor Ameritech currently has the scale, scope, resources, management and technical ability to implement the proposed national and global strategy on its own. SBC, the larger of the two companies, currently provides local exchange service in seven states.[65] Those states include only 11 of the nation's top 50 markets and generate only 18 percent of U.S. telecommunications revenues. The 30 out-of-region markets that the new SBC will enter stretch across 24 states and have a population of 70 million people. Viewed in the perspective of the considerably larger market that spans the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa, SBC's existing base of operations is smaller still.

Neither SBC nor Ameritech could, on its own, take on the considerable financial burden of entering both national and global markets in the way that they have proposed. Kahan Aff. ¶¶ 79-80; Weller Aff. ¶ 36. The new strategy that the companies intend to execute together projects negative cash and earnings flow on a cumulative basis until almost a decade from now. Kahan Aff. ¶ 80. Established companies like SBC and Ameritech are valued by financial markets based on their earnings performance, and neither alone could suffer the earnings dilution that would accompany implementation of this plan. Id. ¶¶ 79-80; Weller Aff. ¶ 34.

Nor does it make business sense for either SBC or Ameritech on its own to attempt to go national on a more incremental basis, entering fewer markets more slowly.

---

[65] This does not include Connecticut, which SBC will serve should its merger with SNET be approved.

The success of the new strategy pivots on economies of scale and scope and a rapid national and global reach. In particular, for the new national and global strategy to work, SBC must be in the major markets in which its large customers need service, and it must be there promptly. Kahan Aff. ¶ 54. Moreover, SBC believes that gradual, incremental expansion will not permit it to respond to requests for proposals from multilocation customers or compete with the carriers that have the scale and scope to respond to those needs. Id. ¶ 13; Carlton Aff. ¶ 22. Starting from a smaller base would increase the cost and risk of the strategy prohibitively. It also would increase the number of markets SBC alone would have to enter, while reducing the base of customers it could expect to follow into new markets. Kahan Aff. ¶ 76; Carlton Aff. ¶ 24-30. Any alternative strategy would at best delay, or more likely preclude, the onset of significant new competition by SBC for both business and residential consumers in major and second tier markets. Kahan ¶ 51; Carlton Aff. ¶¶ 43-44.

SBC and Ameritech strongly believe that only the combined company will have the financial resources, customer base, managerial and employee talent, economies of scale and scope and business commitment most effectively to offer integrated telecommunications services (local, long distance, high-speed data and other services) to consumers nationwide and beyond, for the benefit of both their customers and shareholders.

Resources. Entering 30 new major markets in the U.S. and 14 foreign cities essentially simultaneously – by building and operating new facilities and marketing new packages of service to large, medium-sized and small businesses and residential consumers – presents daunting management challenges. Carlton Aff. ¶ 31. Neither SBC nor Ameritech alone has the management depth to implement such a strategy. Kahan Aff. ¶¶ 77-78; Weller Aff. ¶ 33. In order to do so, each would have to hire and train additional employees, an especially difficult task during a time of low unemployment and high demand for personnel with telecommunications experience. Kahan Aff. ¶ 78. With the merger and the efficiencies it will entail, however, the new SBC will have a much larger pool of experienced personnel upon which to draw. Id.; Carlton Aff. ¶¶ 31-35. The pool of skilled and experienced personnel the combined company can field as one will facilitate implementation of the strategy. Carlton Aff. ¶ 35.

The new SBC also will have the capital it needs to execute its plan. Entering all of these new markets will be costly and the merger allows these costs, and the attendant earnings impact, to be spread over the much larger customer and shareholder base of the combined company. Kahan Aff. ¶¶ 79-81.[66] Based on current results, the new SBC would have annual revenues of $43 billion and net income of $4 billion. While it will be a large company, it would still have fewer customers, generate less revenue and have lower operating cash flow than AT&T/TCG ($51 billion/$4.6 billion, even before adding the revenues of TCI) and it would be comparable in size to other major carriers.[67] In the

[66] As Commissioner Ness has recognized, there are "huge investment requirements for expansion of telecommunications infrastructure." See Susan Ness, Global Competition in Telecommunications, Remarks before the Women's Foreign Policy Group (Jan. 23, 1997), available at <http://www.fcc.gov/speeches/ness/spsn701.html>.

[67] Comparative figures for other carriers are as follows: WorldCom/MCI ($27 billion/$500 million); Sprint ($15 billion/$1 billion); Bell Atlantic ($30 billion/$2.5 billion); BellSouth ($21 billion/$3.3 billion); GTE ($23 billion/$2.8 billion); Nippon Telephone ($77 billion/$2.4 billion); Deutsche Telekcom ($39 billion/$2 billion); and France Telecom ($27 billion/$2.5 billion). See The Fortune Global 500, Fortune, Aug. 3, 1998, at F15; MCI, S.E.C. Form 10-K (1997); WorldCom, S.E.C. Form 10-K (1997).

global arena, the new SBC's revenues will leave it substantially smaller than NTT and two of the four existing global alliances.[68] See Table 14 at the "Tables" attachment.

Economies of Scale and Scope. Network industries are characterized by powerful economies of scale and scope, which are critical factors in purchasing and deploying new technologies and services.[69] Large buyers of equipment are able to negotiate large discounts with hardware and software vendors, such as Nortel, Lucent, Siemens and Alcatel. See Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 11-12. Purchases of bulk services, like wholesale interexchange transport or Internet backbone access, also become much less expensive with scale. Id. ¶ 13. Scale also eliminates many duplicative general and administrative costs, providing selling and maintenance efficiencies.[70] As discussed above, SBC and Ameritech anticipate efficiencies in these and other areas. See Gilbert/Harris Aff. ¶¶ 39-47.

---

[68] WorldPartners is an alliance among 17 foreign carriers and AT&T; GlobalOne is an alliance among France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint; Unisource is an alliance among incumbents in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Cable & Wireless Inc., a U.K. holding company with ownership interests in over 25 foreign PTTs, also has ownership interests in at least 10 other foreign long distance and wireless carriers. See Table 17 at the "Tables" attachment.

[69] The FCC has recognized that firms that can take advantage of scale economies by spreading development costs over a larger customer base are more likely to invest in infrastructure upgrades. See, e.g., In re Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc. and NYNEX Mobile Communications Co., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 13368, ¶ 46 (1995) ("[T]he alleged efficiencies will improve service to customers by promoting technological innovation and new or improved service offerings for consumers."); see also In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Services, Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962, ¶ 71 (1990) ("[I]ncreased concentration [in the cable industry] has provided economies of scale and fostered program investment").

[70] See M.J. Renegar et al., ABN AMRO Chicago Corp., CLEC Fourth Quarter and 1998 M&A Outlook – Industry Report, Investext Rpt. No. 2617676, at *1 (Dec. 30, 1997); B. Garrahan et al., Lehman Brothers, Inc., 1998: The Year of Telecom Consolidation – Industry Report, Investext Rpt. No. 3312761, at *14 (Nov. 25, 1997) (estimating that horizontal mergers can generate up to a 10-15 percent reduction in combined sales, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses).

In addition, large providers of service can distribute the costs of funding the development of new technology over an extended base of operations. Kaplan Aff. ¶ 20(c); Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 13. Size also diminishes the risks of developing new services. Kaplan Aff. ¶ 20(c); Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 19.

Geographic scale and scope are equally important to national and multinational customers. Because of their market reach and the breadth of service they can provide, large companies like AT&T/TCG/TCI and WorldCom/MCI/MFS/Brooks/UUNet can bid to serve a large customer's telecom needs around the world. Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 14. The new SBC will have the economies of scope and scale essential to permit it to develop new services and market them nationwide, at competitive prices. Kahan Aff. ¶ 81.

* * *

The structure of the telecommunications industry cannot be set in stone. Congress recognized this in enacting the 1996 Act, and the Commission has recognized it in approving major mergers as in the public interest. Limiting the RBOCs to the regions to which they were assigned in the divestiture decree makes no sense in the dynamic environment of today's global industry.

The 1984 decision to divide the old Bell System into eight parts was made by AT&T and reflected little more than Bell's own traditional practice of dividing the nation up into local operating companies and regional marketing territories.[71] The divestiture decree itself

[71] As summarized by the United States Telecommunications Suppliers Association in 1983, "Western Electric's existing 'Bell Sales' operation performs a wide variety of procurement related functions for the BOCs through a highly integrated network of facilities, organized into seven regions which are virtually identical to the areas covered by AT&T's proposed 'regional holding companies." See Comments of United States Telecommunications Suppliers Association Concerning AT&T's Proposed Plan of

did not call for seven Regional Holding Companies;[72] both Assistant Attorney General William Baxter and AT&T's then-general counsel testified before Congress that the decree would not have precluded AT&T to spin off all of the BOCs into a single holding company.[73] No public official expressed any strongly held views regarding how many or few Regional Bells there would be, since no one anticipated any competition by, among or (least of all) against Bells.[74] The decree assumed that the local exchange was a natural economic monopoly and resolutely quarantined the presumptive monopolists.[75]

Subsequent developments established that the natural monopoly assumption was wrong and counterproductive. Thus, the 1996 Act assumes the opposite: competition is not only possible but inevitable, and the quarantines are to be phased out to the extent (as with out-of-region competition) they were not eliminated immediately in 1996.

Reorganization at 7-8, United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civ. Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1983).

[72] See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating to the contrary that "nothing in this decree shall require or prohibit the consolidation of the ownership of the BOCs into any particular number of entities").

[73] See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing AT&T Proposed Settlement: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1982) (testimony of William F. Baxter)), aff'g in part, dismissing in part, 627 F. Supp. 1090 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Department of Justice Oversight of the United States versus American Telephone and Telegraph Lawsuit: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 58, 141-142 (1982) (prepared statement of William F. Baxter; testimony of Howard J. Trienens); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 142 n.41 ("The number of new Operating Companies is not specified in the settlement proposal."); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227.

[74] The Decree expressly prohibited the Bell Companies from competing against AT&T in the long distance market, or indeed against anyone in any other market. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227 ("no BOC shall . . . provide interexchange telecommunications services"); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1108 (D.D.C.) 1986 ("The conclusion that the local companies may not engage in exchange telecommunications outside their own areas is also supported by policy underlying the decree"), aff'd in part, dismissed in part, 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

[75] See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.

Exclusive franchises have been eliminated, and rapid technological advance is propelling fundamental change in the price, quality and variety of telecommunications services. Gilbert/Harris Aff. ¶¶ 5-26.The Act further anticipates that telephone, cable and data services will converge, and includes a range of initiatives to facilitate that process. Id. ¶¶ 11-21. There is no reason that the old industry structure, erected on the pillars of exclusive local franchise, regulated monopoly and analog technology, should endure in the new environment. Indeed, the regional structure of the RBOCs is the result of the AT&T settlement and Consent Decree, not the result of current or historic patterns of economic efficiency. See Carlton Aff. ¶ 14. The Commission, likewise, has recognized that the number of Bell Companies is not immutable.[76] The proposed merger of SBC and Ameritech acknowledges and embraces these changes, and offers the prospect of significant new competition at the local, national and global levels.

III. THIS MERGER WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT DIMINUTION IN COMPETITION

The merger of SBC and Ameritech offers tremendous benefits to consumers of telecommunications services and to the U.S. as a whole, as described in the preceding section. Moreover, the merger does not pose any harm to competition.

With very limited exceptions, SBC and Ameritech provide telecommunications services in geographically distinct areas. The principal exception is the overlap of their

[76] See In re Applications of Pacific Telesis Group and SBC Communications Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 2624, ¶ 32 (1997) ("SBC/Telesis") ("[N]othing in the Communications Act or the antitrust laws requires the present number of RBOCs, or any particular number of them").

cellular systems in Chicago and St. Louis (and certain surrounding areas).[77] Consistent with the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.6 & 22.942, the Applicants will transfer one of their overlapping cellular licenses in each area to a third party, thereby resolving this issue. The Applicants are actively negotiating with a number of parties and will promptly advise the Commission as soon as a definitive agreement to transfer these licenses is reached.

As discussed below, there is also no reason for concern about the elimination of potential competition between SBC and Ameritech in any local market. For one thing, there is substantial actual competition in both markets, as we discuss in greater detail in Section IV.C.1. Furthermore, neither SBC nor Ameritech is a significant potential competitor of the other. Long before consideration of this merger, SBC had affirmatively rejected trying to use its cellular assets as a base for providing local exchange service in Ameritech's Chicago service area. Ameritech's sole plans to provide local exchange service in any SBC service area were limited to: (a) reselling SWBT service to Ameritech's residential cellular subscribers in St. Louis and (b) reselling local service out-of-region to Ameritech's largest in-region customers (a service for which Ameritech has only one customer). Ameritech had no plans to offer facilities-based competition in

---

[77] These systems consist of certain MSAs and RSAs operated as single systems, headquartered in Chicago and St. Louis.

The complete list of overlapping cellular license areas is as follows: Chicago, IL MSA; St. Louis, MO-IL MSA; Gary-Hammond-East Chicago, IN MSA; Springfield, IL MSA, Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL MSA; Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA; Decatur, IL MSA; Illinois RSA 2-B3; Illinois RSA 5-B2; Illinois RSA 6; Missouri RSA 8; Missouri RSA 12; Missouri RSA 18; and Missouri RSA 19. SBC and Ameritech have clustered these license areas into their Chicago and St. Louis systems. In addition, while SBC has no ownership interest, it does manage a portion of the cellular system in Missouri RSA 10, where part of Ameritech's competing system is located.

any SBC service area and is not a significant potential competitor of SBC, much less one of a few significant potential competitors. Put another way, neither SBC nor Ameritech is a "most significant market participant" in any market where the other is the incumbent LEC.

A. The Merger Will Not Eliminate Any Substantial Actual Competition

The merger will not eliminate or substantially lessen actual competition in any relevant market. The only significant actual competition between the Applicants today is in the provision of cellular service in Chicago, St. Louis and certain surrounding areas. As discussed below, and as required by the Commission's Rules, Applicants will cure those overlaps by divesting overlapping cellular licenses. There is also de minimis, isolated "competition" between the Applicants in providing local exchange service to large business customers and in long distance service outside their respective regions. These overlaps are, however, trivial and do not give rise to any significant competitive concerns.

1. Wireless Services

The Commission has previously defined interconnected mobile phone service, including cellular, broadband PCS and interconnected, trunked SMR services, as a relevant market for competitive analysis.[78] As noted above, SBC and Ameritech hold interests in certain overlapping cellular licenses in the Chicago and St. Louis areas. In

---

[78] See In re Application of Pittencrieff Communications, Inc. and Nextel Communications, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 8935, ¶ 24 (1997); In re Applications of Pacificorp Holdings, Inc. and Century Telephone Enterprises, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 8891, ¶ 28 (1997). See also Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Third Report, FCC 98-91, at 13-14 (June 11, 1998) ("Third CMRS Competition Report").

each such area and in all their wireless markets, SBC and Ameritech compete with other providers of cellular, PCS, SMR and other wireless services.[79] See Section IV.C.2, below.

The competitive analysis of wireless overlaps can be abbreviated because SBC and Ameritech will comply with the Commission's rules prohibiting anyone that owns or controls a cellular license from acquiring an ownership interest in another licensee in the same cellular geographic service area. 47 C.F.R. § 22.942. The Commission's spectrum aggregation rules also prohibit a commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") licensee from having an attributable interest in a total of more than 45 MHz of licensed CMRS spectrum with significant overlap in any geographic area. 47 C.F.R. § 20.6. Applicants will comply with the Commission's rules prior to consummation of the transfer of control of such licenses from Ameritech to SBC as contemplated by this Application.

Indeed, not only will the merger of SBC and Ameritech not eliminate any competition, it will strengthen competition and benefit consumers of wireless service by allowing the merged company to provide wider calling scopes, more consistent features and other consumer benefits. See Section IV.C.2, below.

2. Local Exchange Service to Large Business Customers

Ameritech and SBC compete to a de minimis extent for the provision of local exchange service to large business customers. Ameritech provides resold local exchange service outside its five-state region to only one large business customer. It currently serves, on a resale basis, 398 access lines in California, 118 lines in New York, and 86

[79] Paging markets are highly competitive with many providers, switching providers is easy and inexpensive, and there are no barriers to entry. See Third CMRS Competition Report at 51. Accordingly, there are no competitive concerns in any paging market.

lines in Texas for this customer. Weller Aff. ¶ 32. This is the product of a pilot project to expand relationships with existing, large in-region customers. Id. Unlike the National-Local Strategy that SBC intends to implement as a result of the merger, Ameritech's plan was aimed at reselling local service only to large business customers and was not designed to be the springboard for a broad-based entry into out-of-region local exchange service. There was limited customer interest in the service and it has not been expanded, because its financial performance was not meeting expectations and the expected margins did not justify a further roll-out. Id.

Large business and government customers enjoy the largest number of options for their local exchange and other telecommunications needs.[80] See Section IV.C.1. These are the customers most avidly pursued by CLECs. See Carlton Aff. ¶ 36. Accordingly, any competitive overlap between Applicants in the local exchange business is de minimis and not a cause for competitive concern. See Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 28.

3. Long Distance Service

Neither SBC nor Ameritech is currently permitted to provide interLATA service in its region, except for incidental service, such as that provided to cellular customers. Each has begun to provide long distance service to a small degree outside its region, and

[80] The Commission implicitly acknowledged this in focusing its attention in BA/NYNEX on residential and small business customers. BA/NYNEX at ¶ 53.

there is thus some competitive overlap between them.[81] This overlap is de minimis, however.

The relevant geographic market for long distance service is nationwide.[82] Long distance networks are nationwide in scope, interexchange carriers market their services to customers across the nation and rates are averaged on a national basis. The business is dominated by the major interexchange carriers, AT&T, MCI/WorldCom and Sprint, which share over 80 percent of the market.[83] In contrast, SBC and Ameritech are two very small competitors among hundreds of resellers. As Drs. Schmalensee and Taylor conclude, the effect of the merger on competition between them is too small to trigger any competitive concerns. Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 29.

This conclusion would be unaffected if the product market were limited to specific types of customers or if the geographic market were limited to various states,

---

[81] To the extent that SBC or Ameritech is providing landline long distance service in the other's region, it will make alternative arrangements for these customers to receive landline long distance service after the merger, if necessary (as, for example, in the case of SBC's cellular customers in Illinois and Indiana, if SBC's Chicago cellular system is not divested as part of SBC's compliance with the Commission's rules regarding ownership of overlapping cellular licenses).

[82] See, e.g., In re Regulatory Treatment of LEC Provision of Interexchange Services Originating in the LEC's Local Exchange Area, Second Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15756, ¶ 67 (1997) ("LEC Interexchange Order"). In BA/NYNEX, the Commission considered LATA or metropolitan-area based markets to be relevant geographic markets for long distance service, although this does not appear to have been central to the competitive analysis. Given that the only barriers to expansion by a long distance carrier are those imposed uniquely on the RBOCs by section 271 of the 1996 Act, defining the relevant geographic market by LATA seems too narrow. In any event, as discussed below, this will not affect the result in this case.

[83] See FCC Common Carrier Bureau, Long Distance Market Shares: First Quarter 1998 table 3.2 (June 1998), available at <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-state-link/ixc.html#marketshares> (noting market share in revenues reported to shareholders).

metropolitan areas or LATAs.[84] There is no plausible cause for concern about anticompetitive effects resulting from the merger in any long distance market.[85] To the contrary, as discussed in Section IV.C.4, below, the merger will promote long distance competition.

B. The Merger Will Not Eliminate Any Substantial Potential Competition

In its decision approving SBC's merger with Pacific Telesis, the Commission set out a framework for analyzing mergers between large local exchange carriers that focused on potential competition analysis.[86] Subsequently, the Commission refined that analysis in BA/NYNEX to take account of dynamic factors affecting the industry. In that decision, the Commission focused on identifying "the most significant market participants" as central to its analysis.[87] In this case, the merger of SBC and Ameritech will not eliminate substantial potential competition between them, nor is SBC or Ameritech a "most significant market participant" in any market in which the other is the incumbent LEC.

---

[84] SNET's affiliate, SNET America, Inc., provides long distance service to customers in Connecticut, but there is no measurable overlap there with either Ameritech or SBC.

[85] Subsidiaries of SBC and Ameritech also issue calling cards to their customers which can be used in virtually all states where these customers travel. Neither company, however, markets, or had any plans to market, service in the other's territory. Thus, the provision of originating long distance service by either company in the other's territory is the fortuitous consequence of the use of a calling card by a travelling customer. This "competition" is obviously de minimis. See Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 29.

[86] SBC/Telesis at ¶¶ 17-18.

[87] BA/NYNEX at ¶¶ 7, 61-62.

1. Relevant Product Market

The Commission has defined a relevant product market as "a service or group of services for which there are no close demand substitutes."[88] In BA/NYNEX, the Commission defined three relevant product markets for analysis: local exchange and exchange access service ("local service"); long distance (i.e., interLATA) service; and local exchange and exchange access service bundled with long distance service ("bundled services"). See BA/NYNEX ¶ 50. We will thus discuss the effects in those proposed markets. There are no other markets in which there are any plausible competitive concerns.

In addition, the Commission in BA/NYNEX assessed the effects of the merger in three separate customer segments that were grouped as having "similar patterns of demand": residential customers and small businesses (the "mass market"); medium-sized businesses; and large business/government users. Id. ¶ 53. We will address the potential effects of the merger in each segment as the Commission did in BA/NYNEX.

2. Relevant Geographic Market

The Commission has defined a relevant geographic market as aggregating "those consumers with similar choices regarding a particular good or service in the same geographical area." Id. ¶ 54. In BA/NYNEX, the Commission defined a LATA – in that case, LATA 132, essentially covering NYNEX's New York Metropolitan Calling Area – as a relevant geographic market for local exchange, long distance and bundled services. Id. ¶ 55. Following that approach, we focus our analysis on the only two LATAs in

---

[88] BA/NYNEX at ¶ 50 (citing LEC Interexchange Order at ¶ 27); cf. Dept. of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (issued April 2, 1992) ("1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines") at § 1.0-1.1.

which there could conceivably be potential competition concerns, the St. Louis and Chicago LATAs. These are the only areas in which one of the merging parties is the incumbent LEC while the other may have given any consideration to entry into local services.[89] See Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 27. As discussed below, even in those two areas, the merger will not substantially lessen competition.

The Commission in BA/NYNEX also defined an alternative geographic market comprising the New York metropolitan area, including northern New Jersey, based on the finding that media advertising in New York reached consumers in Bell Atlantic's northern New Jersey service area. Id. ¶ 56. Varying the market definition did not affect the analysis in BA/NYNEX, nor would it in this case if the relevant geographic markets were defined as the Chicago and St. Louis metropolitan areas rather than the corresponding LATAs, as discussed below.

3. Market Participants

In BA/NYNEX, the Commission defined the universe of participants in the relevant market to include actual competitors – those firms currently competing in the relevant market and geographic markets – and "precluded competitors," described as "firms that are most likely to enter but have until recently been prevented or deterred from market participation by barriers to entry the 1996 Act seeks to lower." Id. ¶ 60. In this case, to the extent that either SBC or Ameritech is a precluded competitor in an area

---

[89] While SBC and Ameritech both provide service in the St. Louis LATA (LATA 520), they serve mutually exclusive territories (SBC in Missouri and Ameritech in Illinois) and are not actual competitors. Neither SBC nor Ameritech had even any preliminary plans to enter the local or bundled services markets in any other areas where the other is the incumbent LEC and, accordingly, there is no reason to analyze such markets further. Cf. BA/NYNEX at ¶ 57 ("Bell Atlantic was planning entry not only in LATA 132, but in other parts of the NYNEX territory as well.").

in which the other is the incumbent LEC, there is no reason to believe that it is a "most significant market participant" as that term was used in BA/NYNEX. Moreover, because there are numerous actual and precluded competitors in each of the relevant product markets (and in each customer segment of those markets) in the Chicago and St. Louis LATAs, there is no cause for competitive concern. See id. ¶ 65.

The Commission recognized in BA/NYNEX that "medium sized businesses are targeted by specialized firms that do not necessarily seek to address the mass market." Id. ¶ 53. In both Chicago and St. Louis there are numerous CLECs serving such customers. See Tables 5, 6, 9-12 at the "Tables" attachment. Those businesses are also served by the major IXCs. Accordingly, as the Commission found in BA/NYNEX, there are numerous market participants in that customer segment of all the relevant product markets, and no reason to believe that either SBC (in Chicago) or Ameritech (in St. Louis) is a significant market participant whose elimination through merger will result in competitive harm.

The same is true for the large business/government user segment. These sophisticated customers purchase telecommunications services, including local, long distance and bundled services, under individually negotiated contracts and are pursued by numerous vendors. Kahan Aff. ¶ 30; see also BA/NYNEX ¶ 53. Here, too, as in BA/NYNEX, there is no reason to believe that the merger will eliminate a significant market participant or otherwise lessen competition.

Thus, in BA/NYNEX, the Commission's analysis focused on the mass market for local and bundled services. In that case, the Commission found that Bell Atlantic was likely to enter the mass market for local and bundled services in New York; that it was one of a few most significant market participants; and, based on the record, it was the most significant competitor to the incumbent, NYNEX. As we discuss in detail below, the record in this case inevitably leads to a different conclusion.

SBC had rejected attempting to enter the Chicago market and cannot be regarded as a significant market participant. In St. Louis, Ameritech developed a limited plan to offer local service (including bundled services) in that one area by reselling SBC service to its existing base of residential cellular customers. The plan was defensive, designed to protect Ameritech's base of existing cellular customers. Ameritech had no plans to offer facilities-based local service, either wired or wireless. It could not be considered a significant market participant in St. Louis and is certainly less significant than such competitors as AT&T/TCG/TCI, WorldCom/MCI/MFS/Brooks/UUNet and Sprint. In any event, the planned divestiture of one of Applicants' cellular systems in St. Louis, permitting the new competitor to pursue the Ameritech resale strategy if it so chooses, will fully resolve any arguable loss of competition there. See Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 32, 35.

a. Chicago

There are many actual and potential competitors in the markets for local and bundled services in Chicago. See Pampush Aff. ¶ 9, Attachment A; Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 42-65; Map 25 at the "Maps" attachment; Tables 6, 10 and 12 at the "Tables" attachment; Section IV, below. The Affidavit of Stan Sigman, President of SBC Wireless, Inc., demonstrates that SBC is neither an actual nor a potential competitor in local or bundled services in Chicago because it had no plans to enter those markets.[90] It

[90] The discussion in this section would be no different if the relevant geographic market were defined as the Chicago metropolitan area rather than the Chicago LATA.

certainly is not one of the most significant market participants. See Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 42, 65. Indeed, in BA/NYNEX the Commission found that non-adjacent out-of-region Bell Companies – like SBC in the case of Chicago[91] – were not among the most significant market participants in New York, and the same conclusion applies here. Id. ¶ 48; see BA/NYNEX ¶ 93. For this reason alone, further analysis of SBC as a competitor in Chicago is unnecessary.

In any event, SBC is not even a potential competitor. SBC considered – and rejected – entry into the local exchange business in Chicago. Beginning in late 1995, SBC considered whether it could provide local exchange service to its out-of-region cellular customers. Sigman Aff. ¶ 3. It selected the Rochester, New York MSA as the pilot market for such a venture and entered the market in early 1997, reselling the service of the incumbent LEC, Frontier. Id. ¶ 7.

SBC's actual experience in Rochester was quite disappointing. SBC won few customers. Moreover, the customers it gained were not buying cellular service or generating other service revenues, and presented collection difficulties. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. SBC thus projected unprofitable operations for an unacceptably long period. Id. ¶ 9. By the fall of 1997, well before and independently of any consideration of this merger, the management of SBC's cellular business decided to discontinue the experiment and stop

---

Accordingly, references to Chicago or the Chicago LATA may be understood to refer as well to the Chicago metropolitan area.

[91] While SBC's region is "adjacent" to Ameritech's in the sense that they share a border between Illinois and Missouri, SBC's nearest local exchanges are hundreds of miles from Chicago. SBC sells cellular service in Chicago under the Cellular One brand name, which proved to be ineffective as a brand name for local exchange service in Rochester. Sigman Aff. ¶ 13. Thus, SBC has no more "visibility" in Chicago than Bell Atlantic or BellSouth, and considerably less than the major IXCs.

marketing to new customers, although SBC continues to provide local exchange service to the pilot customers in Rochester in order to preserve their goodwill. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.

Prior to the Rochester experiment, SBC had considered offering local exchange service in its other out-of-region wireless markets, including Chicago. Id. ¶ 10. It never took any steps toward such entry, however. The Rochester experiment led SBC to conclude that its cellular business did not provide a useful base for entering the local exchange business. Id. ¶¶ 11-16. During the summer of 1997, when it became clear that the Rochester experiment was not successful, SBC discontinued its consideration of providing local exchange service in any of SBC's other out-of-region cellular markets, including Chicago.[92] Id. ¶ 17.

In contrast to SBC, the most significant mass market participants would include AT&T/TCG/TCI, WorldCom/MCI/MFS/Brooks/UUNet and Sprint, just as the Commission concluded with respect to New York in BA/NYNEX. See BA/NYNEX ¶ 82; Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 48-56. AT&T has millions of long distance and wireless customers in Chicago, as well as the best recognized brand name in telecommunications, and it will have direct access to over one million households and tens of thousands of businesses in Chicago through TCI and TCG, respectively. See Map 25 at the "Maps" attachment; Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 49-52. Indeed, Chicago is one of TCI's major cable clusters. WorldCom/MCI/MFS/Brooks/UUNet also has extensive CLEC facilities in Chicago. Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 53-54. It and Sprint likewise

[92] SBC also had no plans whatsoever to provide local exchange service in the parts of Illinois outside Chicago in which it provides cellular service, or elsewhere in Illinois or Ameritech's other four states.

have many thousands of customers in Chicago and well-recognized names. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. These firms are clearly more significant competitors to Ameritech than SBC. Id. ¶ 56.[93]

b. St. Louis

As in the case of Chicago, the list of actual and precluded competitors for local and bundled services in the St. Louis LATA is a long one.[94] See Section IV.C.1, below; Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 43-64; Map 15 at the "Maps" attachment; Tables 5, 9 and 11 at the "Tables" attachment. While Ameritech had proposed an embryonic entry into bundled local and wireless service in St. Louis, the accompanying Affidavit of Paul G. Osland makes clear that that effort was defensive in nature and limited to reselling ILEC service to Ameritech cellular customers. In fact, it resembles somewhat the venture that SBC unsuccessfully attempted in Rochester. It does not make Ameritech a significant market participant in St. Louis.

In early 1997, the management of Ameritech's cellular business unit perceived that its new wireless competitors in St. Louis – including AT&T and Sprint PCS, which have PCS licenses, and Nextel – were in a position to offer local exchange service

---

[93] Because Ameritech does not yet have authority to provide interLATA service to its in-region customers, it cannot yet provide bundled services. Other competitors in the market, such as WorldCom/MCI, WinStar, USN and Focal, face no such constraints and are providing bundled service to certain business customers. See Pampush Aff. ¶ 8, Attachment A. These competitors could easily expand their service. For that additional reason there is no potential anticompetitive effect in a market for bundled services.

[94] If the geographic market were defined as the St. Louis metropolitan area rather than the St. Louis LATA, the analysis would be no different. Thus, references to St. Louis or the St. Louis LATA should be understood to refer as well to the St. Louis metropolitan area. Ameritech is the incumbent LEC in some suburban areas in the Illinois portion of the metropolitan area but its territory and SBC's are mutually exclusive and there is no competition between them other than that described in this section. There is no evidence that SBC had any interest in competing in Ameritech's suburban St. Louis exchanges. Any visibility or name recognition that Ameritech had in St. Louis would derive mainly from its wireless presence in St. Louis. Indeed, Ameritech's plans regarding local exchange entry in St. Louis, discussed below, were based entirely on its wireless assets.

bundled with wireless service. Osland Aff. ¶ 4. As a defensive strategy to protect its cellular customer base, Ameritech considered bundling resold local exchange service with its cellular product in St. Louis. Id. The original plan was to resell Southwestern Bell Telephone ("SWBT") service to Ameritech residential and small business cellular customers. Id. ¶ 6. That plan, known as Project Gateway, was scaled back to target only existing residential cellular subscribers (less than half the customer base) due to difficulties with system interfaces and development. Id. Project Gateway did not assume any facilities-based local service and required no use of existing Ameritech wireline facilities. Id. ¶ 7. The proposed service packages were to be priced to attract cellular customers and were neither intended nor expected to appeal to non-cellular customers. Id.

A trial was begun in January 1998, and approximately 390 trial customers (Ameritech employees and their families) have signed up for the service. Id. ¶ 8. The trial identified a number of financial, marketing and operational problems, including a confusing bill format, pricing and order processing problems, and the financial impact of increased competition in St. Louis, which reduced the economic attractiveness of some packages. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11. These issues were under review by Ameritech and had not been resolved at the time the proposed merger was announced. Ameritech's current financial projections for Project Gateway indicate that the project would produce a net income loss for three years and a free cash flow loss for five years. Id. ¶ 9. Ameritech put the project on hold for several reasons, including the financial projections, the issues raised by bill format and rate structure, operational problems, the other demands on the resources of Ameritech Cellular, the failure of wireless competitors to offer bundled service and uncertainties created by the planned merger with SBC. Id. ¶¶ 10-14. Even had Ameritech decided to go forward with Project Gateway, a limited resale offering to its residential cellular customers would not have constituted a significant entry into the local exchange business in St. Louis. Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 35. Indeed, Ameritech never had any plan to offer facilities-based local service in St. Louis. Osland Aff. ¶ 7.

Moreover, as in Chicago, the major IXCs are clearly significant competitors in St. Louis. See Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 48-56. Both AT&T/TCG/TCI and WorldCom/MCI/MFS/Brooks/UUNet have large customer bases and actual CLEC facilities in St. Louis. See Map 15 at the "Maps" attachment. AT&T/TCG also has a large number of existing long distance customers and PCS subscribers. With the addition of TCI, which has a major St. Louis cluster, AT&T will reach 185,500 cable households in SBC's service area.[95] MFS, one of WorldCom's principal CLEC operations, has at least 81 route miles of fiber and at least 38 buildings on-net in St. Louis,[96] which will be combined with many MCI long distance customers. Sprint has both long distance and PCS customers in the market. All three of the major IXCs enjoy equal or greater brand identification in St. Louis and, in light of their existing facilities and customer bases, are clearly more significant market participants than Ameritech. Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶ 56.

---

[95] See TCI, Market Profile: St. Louis DMA (visited July 17, 1998), <http://www.tcimediaservices.com/stlouis/index.html>. TCI also serves another 70,000 subscribers in the Illinois portion of the St. Louis DMA, where Ameritech is the LEC. See id.

[96] See New Paradigm Resources Group and Connecticut Research, 1997 CLEC Report: Annual Report on Local Telecommunications Competition 450 (8th ed. 1997).

In any event, Applicants will have to divest one of their overlapping cellular systems in St. Louis. If the Ameritech system is sold, the purchaser will possess the same assets that Ameritech could have used as the base for CLEC entry in St. Louis – its cellular customer base and network – and thus would have the same ability as Ameritech to bundle wireless and local services.[97] Id. ¶ 36.

4. The Merger Will Not Produce Any Adverse Competitive Effects

As demonstrated above, there is no significant direct competition today between SBC and Ameritech (apart from the cellular overlaps that will be cured), and no markets in which SBC and Ameritech are significant potential competitors. As Drs. Schmalensee and Taylor conclude, applying the standards the Commission applied in BA/NYNEX and the framework of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this merger poses no competitive concerns. Schmalensee/Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 65-66. The same conclusion holds under the unilateral effects, coordinated effects and dynamic effects analyses considered by the Commission in BA/NYNEX.[98]

a. Unilateral Effects

The Commission applied a unilateral effects analysis in BA/NYNEX not unlike that in Section 2.21 of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. BA/NYNEX ¶ 102. This analysis is applied to mergers in markets for differentiated products and seeks to determine whether one of the merging firms has a leading position while the other is considered by buyers to be the "next best choice," meaning that the merger of the two

---

[97] This discussion assumes, for purposes of exposition, that Applicants will divest Ameritech's cellular license in St. Louis. The analysis and result would be no different if SBC's cellular license were divested.

[98] See, e.g., BA/NYNEX at ¶¶ 102, 114, 125.