

**Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554**

In the Matter of:)
)
Petition of Bijora, Inc. for Declaratory Ruling) CG Docket No. 05-338
to Clarify Scope and/or Statutory Basis for)
Rule 64.1200(a)(3)(iv) and/or for Waiver)

PETITION OF BIJORA, INC. FOR DECLARATORY RULING AND/OR WAIVER

Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") rules,¹ Bijora, Inc. d/b/a Akira ("Petitioner") respectfully requests that the Commission issue a declaratory ruling clarifying that Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) of the Commission's rules does not apply to text advertisements sent with the prior express consent or permission of the recipient ("solicited faxes"). In the alternative, Petitioners respectfully request that the Commission clarify that the statutory basis for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is not 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). If the Commission declines to issue either declaratory ruling, Petitioners respectfully request that, pursuant to Section 1.3 of the FCC's rules,² the Commission grant a retroactive waiver of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) with respect to texts that have been transmitted by Petitioner with the prior express consent or permission of the recipients.

INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Petitioner is a small business owner currently facing a class action lawsuit seeking multi-billions of dollars in damages because it sent text messages to customers who had expressly consented to receive them. The basis for these lawsuits is the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA" or the "Act"), which prohibits sending an "unsolicited advertisement"

¹ 47 C.F.R. § 1.2.

² *Id.* § 1.3.

and provides a private cause of action for violation of the statute or implementing rules promulgated by the FCC. The plaintiff suing Petitioner relies on a regulation, Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), issued by the Commission in an order implementing amendments to the TCPA. That regulation requires that certain opt-out language appear on faxes, but its scope is unclear. It is part of a rule expressly limited to *unsolicited* faxes, but confusingly also references recipients *that have agreed* to receive such faxes. Uncertainty as to the meaning of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), as well as whether it should be considered grounded in the TCPA, have led to disputes across the country and numerous petitions filed with this Commission.

Petitioner asks the Commission to resolve this uncertainty by clarifying that Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv)'s ambiguous language should be limited to unsolicited faxes and texts, as that reading best accords with the TCPA's language and legislative history, and avoids an interpretation that would render the rule unlawful under basic principles of administrative law and the First Amendment. Alternatively, Petitioner asks the Commission to clarify that the statutory basis for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is not the TCPA. Through either of these actions, the Commission can ensure that its rules are consistent with Congress' intent, in addition to providing much needed guidance to courts and litigants. If the Commission declines to issue either declaratory ruling, Petitioner asks for a retroactive waiver of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) with respect to solicited text messages. Neither the Commission's goals nor the public interest are served by subjecting Petitioner's small business to multi-billion dollar lawsuits from plaintiffs who have suffered no actual harm.

BACKGROUND

The TCPA prevents the use of a telephone facsimile machine to send an "unsolicited advertisement."³ Since the passage of the TCPA in 1991, Congress has exempted solicited advertisements from regulation under the Act. Specifically, the TCPA defines an "unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person *without that person's prior express invitation or permission.*"⁴ Through its enactment of the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 ("JFPA"), Congress amended the TCPA to permit the transmission of unsolicited faxes to a person with whom the sender has an established business relationship ("EBR") so long as such an advertisement contains an "opt-out" notice.⁵ Importantly, however, the TCPA, as amended, continues to cover only fax advertisements that are transmitted without an individual's "express invitation or permission." Thus, by its terms, the TCPA's general prohibition against fax advertisements and the exception to that prohibition (allowing faxes sent pursuant to an EBR if they contain an appropriate opt-out notice) simply do not apply to faxes and text messages transmitted with a recipient's prior express consent.

Following the passage of the JFPA, the Commission sought comment on proposed implementing regulations and, in 2006, issued a final order ("*JFPA Order*") that "amend[ed] the Commission's rules on unsolicited facsimile advertisements."⁶ Despite the TCPA's express limitation to unsolicited faxes, one of the rules adopted by the Commission, Section

³ 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(a)(5) & (b)(1)(C)

⁴ *Id.* § 227(a)(5) (emphasis added).

⁵ *Id.* § 227(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii); see *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19,758 (2005) ("JFPA NPRM") (explaining regulatory background of EBR provision). Congress left the definition of an unsolicited advertisement largely unchanged, simply adding a clause to clarify that express permission could be given "in writing or otherwise."

⁶ *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005*, Report and Order and Third Order on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd 3787 (2006) ("*JFPA Order*"); see also *JFPA NPRM*, 20 FCC Rcd 19,758.

64.1200(a)(4)(iv), references opt-out notices for faxes "sent to a recipient that *has* provided prior express invitation or permission."⁷ The scope of that provision is unclear, however, as it is confusingly worded as part of a rule that also references *unsolicited faxes*.⁸ The *JFPA Order* also contains contradictory language regarding the scope of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), simultaneously explaining that "the opt-out notice requirement only applies to communications that constitute *unsolicited* advertisements" and that an opt-out notice is required for solicited faxes "to allow consumers to stop unwanted faxes in the future."⁹ The administrative record sheds no light on the scope of the rule because the Commission never sought comment on applying the TCPA to solicited faxes and texts. Although the Office of General Counsel has argued that Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) should be read to apply to solicited faxes, the Commission itself has yet to opine on the issue.¹⁰

Meanwhile, Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) has had unintended and unjust consequences, subjecting Petitioner, as well as numerous others, to lawsuits seeking damages for engaging in consensual communications with their customers that are entirely permissible under the TCPA. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that solicited faxes are expressly excluded from coverage under the TCPA, plaintiffs suffering no actual harm have seized upon Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv)'s reference to solicited faxes to bring class action lawsuits under Section 227(b) of the TCPA, which authorizes a private right of action to recover statutory damages based on a violation of "this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection."¹¹ Many of these lawsuits seek millions of dollars in damages, despite the fact that the plaintiffs fully and freely admit that

⁷ 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) (emphasis added).

⁸ *See id.*

⁹ *JFPA Order*, 21 FCC Rcd at 3810, 3812, ¶¶ 42 n. 154, 48 (emphasis added).

¹⁰ *See* Amicus Brief for the Federal Communications Commission Urging Reversal at 13-14, *Nack v. Walburg*, 715 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2012), 2012 WL 725733.

¹¹ 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A)-(B).

they expressly agreed to receive the faxes and texts.¹² Instead, these suits are premised solely on the fact that the fax and text advertisements at issue do not contain opt-out notices or contain opt-out notices that the plaintiffs deem inadequate.

Petitioner is a defendant in one such suit. Eric Hseuh owns a small business, Bijora, Inc. that does business as Akira that sells dresses, shoes, and accessories in Illinois. In 2009, Opt It, Inc. (“Opt It”) solicited Akira to use Opt It’s services for marketing its products and stores via a text messaging marketing campaign. Opt It offered a program that would send out mass texts promoting Akira’s products and retail locations. In soliciting Akira, Opt It represented to Akira that its text marketing services complied with the law. Akira accepted Opt It’s offer and paid Opt It in exchange for Opt It operating the text marketing program. Akira only sent texts to those who consented to receiving text advertisements.

The plaintiff in the lawsuit, Nicole Blow has filed a lawsuit against Akira seeking to represent over Akira 22,000 consumers who were sent these texts. The texts did not contain an opt-out notice.¹³ Blow seeks to recover \$1,500 for each text sent by Akira, for a total of in excess of \$2 billion. On March 18, 2014 the district court certified the class sought by plaintiff. Petitioner has argued to the court that the TCPA cannot provide a basis for liability where, as here, the plaintiff and other class members expressly agreed to receive the texts at issue.

ARGUMENT

I. The Commission Should Issue a Declaratory Ruling to Eliminate Uncertainty Regarding the Scope of and Statutory Basis for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv)

¹² See, e.g., *Anda, Inc. Petition For Declaratory Ruling at 2, In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify That 47 U.S.C. 227(b) Was Not the Statutory Basis for Commission’s Rule Requiring an Opt-Out Notice for Fax Advertisements Sent with Recipient’s Prior Express Consent*, CG Docket No. 05-338 (FCC Nov. 30, 2010) (“*Anda Petition*”); *Petition of Staples, Inc. and Quill Corporation For Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling at 6, In re Petition of Staples, Inc. and Quill Corporation for a Rulemaking to Repeal Rule 64.1200(a)(3)(iv) and for a Declaratory Ruling to Interpret Rule 64.1200(a)(3)(iv)*, CG Docket No. 05-338 (FCC July 19, 2013) (“*Staples Petition*”).

¹³ The texts in question, along with others sent during the relevant time period, did not contain an opt-out notice because Akira did not believe that such a notice was necessary if it had obtained the prior express consent of the recipient.

Congress has granted to the Commission the "sound discretion" to issue a declaratory ruling in order to "terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."¹⁴ Here, there is both controversy and uncertainty over the scope of and statutory basis for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv). That uncertainty is confirmed both by the spate of lawsuits that have proliferated across the country involving solicited faxes and texts and the numerous petitions that have been filed with the Commission.¹⁵ Accordingly, the Commission should issue a declaratory ruling to clarify that fax advertisements and texts transmitted after express consent was obtained from the recipient are not required to contain an opt-out notice, or, in the alternative, that the statutory basis for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is not 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).

A. The Commission Should Clarify That Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) Does Not Apply to Solicited Faxes and Texts

The Commission should interpret Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to apply only to unsolicited faxes and texts for at least three reasons: (1) the plain language of the rule and the order promulgating that rule is unclear on the provision's scope, and excluding solicited faxes and texts best comports with the text and legislative history of the TCPA; (2) interpreting Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to apply to solicited faxes and texts would exceed the Commission's statutory authority under the Act; and (3) reading the provision to reach solicited faxes and texts would violate the First Amendment.

¹⁴ 5 U.S.C. § 554(c); see 47 C.F.R. § 1.2(a) ("The Commission may ... on motion or on its own motion issue a declaratory ruling terminating a controversy or removing uncertainty.").

¹⁵ See *in re Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 19,898, 19,900 ¶ 5 (1999) (agreeing to issue declaratory ruling where there was "substantial uncertainty whether and to what extent" pending class action lawsuits were precluded by the Communications Act, as evidenced- in part- by "extensive comments ... filed by interested parties" in response to Southwestern's petition). Respectfully, the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau erred by refusing to decide the petition filed by Anda, Inc. on the ground that there is no controversy or uncertainty. See *In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify That 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) Was Not the Statutory Basis for Commission's Rule Requiring an Opt-Out Notice for Fax Advertisements Sent with Recipient's Prior Express Consent*, Order, 27 FCC Red 4912 (2012); *Anda Petition*.

1. The Commission should interpret Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to apply only to unsolicited faxes and texts because the language of the rule is unclear in its scope, and excluding solicited faxes best comports with Congress's intent to regulate unsolicited faxes.

In relevant part, Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) states as follows:

No person or entity may:

...

Use a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine, unless-

...

A facsimile advertisement that is sent to a recipient that has provided prior express invitation or permission to the sender must include an opt-out notice that complies with the requirements in paragraph (a)(4)(iii) of this section.¹⁶

Given the punctuation and varied sentence structure of the rule, the plain text of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) does not make sense as drafted. And because the rule contains references to both unsolicited faxes and faxes sent with express permission, it is impossible to tell from the text alone whether the rule is intended to reach solicited as well as unsolicited faxes.

The *JFPA Order* is equally confusing. The Order makes almost no mention of the rule codified in Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv). There is just one short paragraph mentioning the new rule and absolutely no explanation or discussion of the basis for that rule, other than that an opt-out notice is required "to allow consumers to stop unwanted faxes in the future."¹⁷ But as the Eighth Circuit has recognized, the *JFPA Order* is internally contradictory, because elsewhere the Commission explained that "the opt-out notice requirement only applies to communications that constitute unsolicited advertisements."¹⁸ Given these ambiguities, there is legitimate uncertainty regarding whether Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) applies to solicited faxes.¹⁹

¹⁶ 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv).

¹⁷ JFPA Order ¶ 48.

¹⁸ *Id.* ¶ 42 n. 154; see *Nack*, 715 F.3d at 684.

¹⁹ See, e.g., *Nack v. Walburg*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8266, at* 11 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2011) ("Reviewing the regulation as a whole, the provision in question ... purports, on its face, to apply only to unsolicited faxes."), *overruled by* 715 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2013).

The Commission should end this uncertainty and make clear that Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) does not apply to fax advertisements that were sent with the prior express consent of the recipient, as that interpretation best accords with the text and history of the TCPA. As explained above, the TCPA is limited to "unsolicited advertisement[s]," the definition of which expressly excludes any fax advertisement sent with the recipient's "prior express invitation or permission."²⁰ Likewise, the legislative history of the original TCPA enactment makes clear that the purpose of the Act was to address the problem of "*unsolicited*" fax advertisements.²¹ And the legislative history of the JFPA is no different, showing that Congress meant only to "[c]reate a limited [EBR] statutory exception to the current prohibition against the faxing of unsolicited advertisements," and for those "unsolicited advertisements," to require "notice of a recipient's ability to opt out of receiving any future faxes containing unsolicited advertisements."²² There is no indication whatsoever that Congress was concerned about communications between businesses and their consenting customers.²³ It is thus unsurprising that the Commission never provided notice, in its notice of proposed rulemaking or elsewhere, that it was even considering applying any regulations to solicited faxes and texts. Accordingly, the Commission should interpret Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to apply only to unsolicited faxes and texts.

2. Moreover, because Section 227(b) of the Communications Act is limited to unsolicited advertisements, interpreting Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to apply to solicited faxes and texts would render that regulation unlawful. By excluding solicited faxes and texts from the

²⁰ 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)&(2); *id.* § 227(a)(5).

²¹ S. Rep. No. 102-178 at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1970 ("The bill as introduced proposed to ban artificial or prerecorded messages to residential consumers and to emergency lines, and to place restrictions on unsolicited advertisements delivered via fax machine.")

²² S. Rep. No. 109-76 at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 319, 319.

²³ See *Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc.*, 323 F.3d 649, 654-55 (8th Cir. 2003) (reviewing legislative history).

reach of Section 227(b), Congress has limited the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction to unsolicited fax advertisements.²⁴ Indeed, the Commission itself has recognized – in the *JFPA Order* and elsewhere – that the TCPA is limited to unsolicited fax advertisements.²⁵ If Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) were nevertheless applied to solicited faxes and texts, then the rule must be invalidated as *ultra vires* because, simply put, the TCPA does not give the Commission the authority to regulate faxes and texts transmitted with the prior express consent of the recipient.²⁶ Interpreting Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) of the Commission's rules to apply only to unsolicited fax advertisements is thus the only proper reading of the rule.

3. Finally, applying Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to faxes and texts sent with prior express consent would violate the First Amendment, which provides an independent reason to interpret the provision to apply only to *unsolicited fax* advertisements. Under well-established Supreme Court precedent, truthful commercial speech may be burdened only where the government can show that the proposed restriction directly advances a substantial government interest and that the regulation "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."²⁷ The Commission has not even tried to meet its burden of building a record to justify applying Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to solicited advertisements, nor has it articulated how requiring an opt-out notice for a solicited fax directly advances an important government interest or why any such

²⁴ See *Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC*, 406 F.3d 689, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Commission can only issue regulations on subjects over which it has been delegated authority by Congress."); *ACLU v. FCC*, 823 F.2d 1554, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (where Congress has addressed a question with a "specific statutory provision," the Commission lacks the authority to "weigh in" with a contrary regulation on the same subject).

²⁵ See, e.g., *JFPA Order*, 21 FCC Rcd at 3788-89, 3791, ¶¶ 1-3, 7 (referring multiple times to Commission "rules on unsolicited facsimile advertisements"); 21 FCC Rcd at 3810, ¶ 42 n. 154 (opt-out requirements apply only to "communications that constitute unsolicited advertisements"); *JFPA NPRM*, FCC Rcd at 19,758, ¶ 1 (announcing "propose[d] modifications to the Commission's rules on unsolicited facsimile advertisements").

²⁶ See *Nack*, 715 F.3d at 682 (expressing doubt as to whether "the regulation at issue [if interpreted to apply to solicited faxes] properly could have been promulgated" under Section 227(b)); see also *City of Arlington v. FCC*, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013) (explaining that administrative agencies' "power to act and how they are to act is authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is *ultra vires*"); *id.* at 1871 ("[T]he question in every case is, simply, whether the statutory text forecloses the agency's assertion of authority").

²⁷ *Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).

interest could not be as well served by a less restrictive requirement.²⁸ As the Eighth Circuit has suggested and other petitions to the Commission have explained, the balancing of interests regarding unsolicited faxes and texts (the regulation of which has withstood First Amendment scrutiny) and solicited faxes and texts (which the Commission has never tried to defend) is different.²⁹ Indeed, the government's interest is much weaker where, as here, the consenting customer has already agreed to receive the advertisement and therefore has a simple and effective method of communicating an opt-out request to the sender. And even assuming that the same government interest articulated in the context of unsolicited faxes and texts could support the application of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to solicited faxes and texts (i.e., the government's interest in preventing advertising cost-shifting from businesses to consumers), the opt-out requirement is hardly necessary to meet that interest.

B. Alternatively, the Commission Should Clarify that the Statutory Basis of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) Is Not 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)

If the Commission declines to interpret Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to exclude fax advertisements for which the sender has obtained prior express consent, the Commission should at least issue a declaratory ruling that Section 227(b) of the Communications Act is not the statutory basis for its rule. Such a ruling would clarify the Commission's authority for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) while making clear to litigants and the courts that solicited faxes and texts sent without the precise opt-out language described in the Commission's rules cannot form the basis of a private action under the TCPA.

²⁸ See, e.g., *Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S.*, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (careful cost and benefit analysis required before speech rights can be burdened); *Edgefield v. Fane*, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (government bears burden to develop record sufficient to justify state interest).

²⁹ *Nack*, 715 F.3d at 687 ("Suffice it to say, the analysis and conclusions as set forth in *American Blast Fax* would not necessarily be the same if applied to the agency's extension of authority over solicited advertisements."); see *Anda Petition* at 11; *Staples Petition* at 14-16.

The statutory basis for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is not clear.³⁰ The Commission cited eleven different statutory provisions in the *JFPA Order* as authority for the multiple amendments it made to Section 64.1200, of which the addition of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) was only one.³¹ It is therefore unclear whether the Commission relied on its authority under Section 227 (which contains the private right of action provision) in promulgating Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), or on one of the other cited provisions.

A clarification by the Commission that its basis for promulgating Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) was some statutory provision other than Section 227(b) would serve both the Commission's interests and promote the public's interest in fairness and justice.³² By making clear that Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is not grounded in the Commission's authority under Section 227(b), the Commission could assist small businesses by removing the threat of massive class action lawsuits based solely on communications with consenting consumers. At the same time, articulating a different statutory basis for the rule would preserve the Commission's ability to enforce the rule as appropriate using its broad, flexible enforcement powers. Purported violations of the rule where there is no actual harm could then still be addressed, but would not be subject to multi-millions of dollars in statutory damages claims. By contrast, declining to clarify the basis of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) leaves the courts to guess at the Commission's exercise of jurisdictional authority, complicating the class action suits that are pending around the country and prejudicing litigants who could otherwise have a clear defense.

³⁰ As explained in other petitions seeking similar relief, the Commission is obligated under the Administrative Procedure Act to state the statutory basis of its rule. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); *Anda Petition* at 11-15; *Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Petition For Declaratory Ruling and/or Waiver* at 15-16, *In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling and/or Waiver Regarding Substantial Compliance with Section 64.1 200(a)(4)(iii)*, CG Docket No. 05-338 (FCC June 27, 2013).

³¹ *See JFPA Order*, 21 FCC Rcd at 3817, ¶ 64 (adopting order "pursuant to the authority contained in sections 1-4, 201, 202, 217, 227, 258, 303(r), and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended; 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-154, 201, 202, 217, 227, 258, 303(r), and 332; and sections 64.1200 and 64.318 of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200 and 64.318").

³² *Cf. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC*, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring agencies to articulate the basis for its rules can "assist judicial review" and help to ensure "fair treatment for persons affected by a rule").

II. Alternatively, Petitioner Should Be Granted A Waiver

If the Commission declines to issue a declaratory ruling as discussed above, then Petitioner respectfully requests a retroactive waiver of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) for text advertisements sent since the effective date of the rule for which Petitioner obtained prior express consent.³³ Section 1.3 of the Commission's rules permits the Commission to grant a waiver for good cause shown, and the Commission should grant a waiver if, after considering all relevant factors, a waiver is in the public interest.³⁴ Among other things, a waiver is appropriate where "[t]he underlying purpose of the rule(s) would not be served" or "unique or unusual factual circumstances" mandate a waiver to avoid an application of the rule that would be "inequitable, unduly burdensome or contrary to the public interest."³⁵ Here, a waiver is appropriate for both reasons.

The only purpose the Commission has articulated for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is that an opt-out notice is required "to allow consumers to stop unwanted faxes in the future." Here, Petitioner sent texts to individuals that had expressly agreed to accept them. There is no evidence that recipients were unaware that they could opt out or that any opt out request was not honored in a timely way. Thus, even assuming that the goal of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is to allow consumers to easily revoke prior express consent to receive fax and texts advertisements, that goal would not be served by applying the rule to Petitioner in these circumstances.

At the same time, requiring strict compliance with Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) with respect to solicited faxes and texts in these circumstances would be inequitable, unduly burdensome, and

³³ See *In re United Telephone Co. of Kansas et al.*, Order, 25 FCC Rcd 1648, 1650, ¶ 5 (2010) (retroactive waiver may be issued as long as prior effective date of the waiver is specified); see also *In re Provision of improved Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities*, Order on Reconsideration, 20 FCC Rcd 5433 (2005).

³⁴ 47 C.F.R. § 1.3; *In re Rath Microtech Complaint Regarding Electronic Micro Sys., Inc.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 16,710, 16,714, ¶ 15 (2001).

³⁵ 47 C.F.R. § 1.925(b)(3)(i)-(ii).

contrary to the public interest. Petitioner is facing a multi-billion dollar class action lawsuit for an alleged failure to include appropriate opt-out notices on texts sent to plaintiffs who have suffered no actual harm. Where, as here, recipients of texts advertisements had explicitly agreed to receive them, had the means and ability to revoke their consent at any time, and never expressed any interest or desire to do so, requiring strict compliance with Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) would be both tremendously burdensome and inequitable. It would also be contrary to the public interest, as exposing fax and text senders to massive class action liability for engaging in consensual communications with their customers would work an economic injustice on small businesses and the consumers that they serve.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Commission should issue a declaratory ruling clarifying (1) that Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) of the Commission's rules applies only to unsolicited fax advertisements and/or (2) that Section 227(b) of the TCPA is not the statutory basis for Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) of the Commission's rules. In the absence of such a ruling, the Commission should grant a retroactive waiver of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) for any text sent by Petitioner with the recipient's prior express consent.

Respectfully submitted,

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