

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of)
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services) WC Docket No. 12-375
)
)
)

To: Commission

**REPLY COMMENTS OF
EMERALD CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT**

Bruce Bickham
Chief Financial Officer
Emerald Correctional Management
315 South College Road
Suite 205
Lafayette, LA 70503

January 27, 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
I. Emerald Operates Private Correctional Facilities on Behalf of its Correctional Agency Clients.....	2
II. Correctional Agencies Are Uniquely Suited to Manage Their ICS Functions.....	3
III. The <i>Second FNPRM</i> Will Have Predictable Outcomes That May Conflict With the Commission’s Objectives to Increase Inmate Access to ICS	5
IV. To the Extent That the Commission Decides to Further Regulate ICS, the Commission Should Enable Private Facilities to Generate Profits for Their Investors.....	7
V. The Commission Should Not Require Facilities to Hire Multiple ICS Providers.....	9
VI. The Commission Should Provide Facilities With An Appropriate Transition Period.....	10
VII. Conclusion	12

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Correctional agencies (“Correctional Agencies”) are best suited to develop and implement inmate welfare policies, including policies related to inmate calling services (“ICS”). Unlike the Federal Communications Commission (“Commission”), they are experts in the corrections field and have been charged by state and local governments with maintaining inmate welfare and funding inmate welfare programs, including ICS. Accordingly, the Commission should not dictate to Correctional Agencies the manner in which they administer their ICS functions.

To the extent that the Commission nevertheless determines to intervene in the management of ICS by Correctional Agencies, the Commission should take into account financial issues specific to for-profit correctional facilities by ensuring that such facilities maintain their ability to generate profits for their investors. Just as the Commission has proposed ICS regulations that will maintain the ability of ICS providers to generate reasonable profits, the Commission should refrain from adopting regulations, such as the elimination of site commissions, that would impede the ability of for-profit correctional facilities to generate reasonable profits. At minimum, if the Commission prohibits site commissions, it should adopt a mechanism such as the Praeses LLC (“Praeses”) proposal that enables correctional facilities to recover their ICS costs. The Praeses proposal also offers the added benefit of providing an incentive for facilities to promote inmate access to ICS.

In addition, the Commission should not require facilities to hire multiple ICS providers. Further, the Commission should provide an appropriate transition period for Correctional Agencies, private correctional facilities, and ICS providers to adjust their contractual arrangements to any changes in the ICS regulatory landscape.

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of)
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services) WC Docket No. 12-375
)
)
)
)

To: Commission

REPLY COMMENTS OF EMERALD CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT

Emerald Correctional Management (“Emerald”) hereby submits these Reply Comments in response to the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“*Second FNPRM*”) issued by the Federal Communications Commission (“Commission” or “FCC”) in the above-captioned docket.¹ As set forth herein, correctional agencies (“Correctional Agencies”) are best suited to develop and implement inmate welfare policies, including policies related to inmate calling services (“ICS”).

To the extent that the Commission nevertheless determines to intervene in the management of ICS by Correctional Agencies, the Commission should take into account financial issues specific to for-profit correctional facilities by ensuring that such facilities maintain their ability to generate profits for their investors. Eliminating the ability of such facilities to recover their ICS costs will impede their ability to do so. Accordingly, the Commission should adopt a mechanism, such as the Praeses LLC (“Praeses”) proposal, that

¹ *Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services*, Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd 13170 (2014) (“*Second FNPRM*”).

enables correctional facilities to recover their ICS costs while providing an incentive for the facilities to promote inmate access to ICS. In addition, the Commission should not require facilities to hire multiple ICS providers and should provide an appropriate transition period for Correctional Agencies, private correctional facilities, and ICS providers to adjust their contractual arrangements to any changes in the ICS regulatory landscape.

I. EMERALD OPERATES PRIVATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES ON BEHALF OF ITS CORRECTIONAL AGENCY CLIENTS

Like the Correctional Agencies that have participated in this proceeding, Emerald is an expert in the corrections field.² Since beginning operation in 1996, Emerald has evolved to provide correctional services, including low- and medium-security detention and incarceration services, to four federal agencies and county jurisdictions. Specifically, through its Emerald Correctional Management and Emerald Healthcare Systems divisions, Emerald currently operates six correctional facilities and detention centers in Arizona, New Mexico, Montana, and Texas and has a total service capacity of more than 3,600 beds. Emerald is dedicated to providing its clients with the latest solutions in detention services, and it operates safe, humane, and secure facilities that offer detainees and inmates training, education, and treatment programs designed to create personal stability and reduce recidivism. Moreover, Emerald's facilities operate in accordance with various national accreditation standards as well as client-, company-, and facility-specific policies and directives. In addition, Emerald continually seeks to comply with standards promulgated by independent industry oversight organizations such as the American Correctional Association and the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare.

² See Emerald Companies, http://www.emeraldcompanies.com/emerald_correctional.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).

At present, Emerald has direct control over the selection of the ICS providers that serve its facilities, but Emerald's Correctional Agency clients determine the ICS policies with which Emerald must comply at each facility. Specifically, Emerald chooses the process that it will use to select ICS providers for its facilities, and it has discretion to choose each such provider. In addition, Emerald retains all site commissions paid by the ICS providers to offset its costs of providing ICS to inmates consistent with Emerald's contractual obligations to its Correctional Agency clients.³ Emerald's contractual agreements with its clients include detailed specifications governing Emerald's provision of ICS. Thus, Emerald's clients, and not Emerald, determine the nature of the services provided to inmates at Emerald's facilities, as well as applicable ICS security protocols.

II. CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES ARE UNIQUELY SUITED TO MANAGE THEIR ICS FUNCTIONS

The Correctional Agency commenters in this proceeding demonstrated that they appreciate the problems asserted by the Wright Petitioners, but they uniformly opined that they, and not the Commission, should determine their respective ICS policies. Based on its experience working with its Correctional Agency clients and operating correctional facilities on their behalf, Emerald agrees with the Correctional Agencies. The development, operation, and funding of inmate welfare programs, including ICS, is complex and challenging. It requires specialized knowledge in the corrections field and often necessitates facility-specific policymaking.

State and local governments are uniquely qualified to determine the best means of balancing the competing public policy priorities that they individually face, including with

³ Certain of Emerald's contractual agreements with its Correctional Agency clients permit the agencies under certain circumstances to take over the ICS provider selection process and redirect the payment of site commissions from Emerald to the agencies.

respect to their corrections functions such as ICS.⁴ They do so through a combination of promulgating broadly applicable corrections laws and regulations⁵ and delegating the day-to-day management of corrections functions to their expert Correctional Agencies. The Correctional Agencies, in turn, are required to make the difficult decisions required to implement applicable statutory mandates and to develop and fund the best possible inmate welfare programs in light of their limited budgetary resources. This includes making decisions appropriate for their facilities regarding the scope and management of their ICS programs and how to fund ICS. Through its interactions with its Correctional Agency clients and its experience with state and local corrections laws, Emerald has extensive experience with the unique challenges faced by Correctional Agencies and the facility-specific ICS issues that arise. Based on this experience, Emerald agrees that Correctional Agencies are best suited to determine ICS policy.

⁴ See, e.g., Letter from Ted Hull, Chairman, Legislative Committee, Virginia Association of Regional Jails, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 5 (filed Jan. 6 2015) (“VARJ Letter”) (“[T]he inmate’s use of the phone and the costs associated therein have been and should be within the purview of local public policy debate and should reflect the public policy priorities of the *localities or states*.”) (emphasis added); Letter from Downing A. Bolls, Jr., County Judge, Taylor County, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 1 (dated Dec. 30, 2014) (noting that Texas counties “cost-effectively provide services ranging from transportation infrastructure to basic healthcare services for the indigent” in addition to operating county jails); *id.* at 2 (“In 2015, Taylor County will be initiating . . . a new inmate calling system which will bring phone service at the jail into the 21st century, hopefully addressing many of the present concerns with the current rates and services offers. That, we believe, is how the process should work.”); Letter from James M. Cummings, Sheriff, Office of the Sheriff Barnstable County, to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 4 (dated Dec. 24, 2014) (discussing providing services within the Barnstable County, Massachusetts jail with changing state funding).

⁵ For example, Texas mandates that ICS contracts may only be awarded to vendors that provide for (1) installation, operation, and maintenance of the service without any cost to the state; (2) a monetary site commission; and (3) security measures, among other requirements. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 495.027(a). Similarly, California and Arizona statutorily require that ICS revenues be used for inmate welfare and education. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4025 (mandating ICS revenues be deposited in an Inmate Welfare Fund); A.R.S. § 41-1604.03 (instructing ICS revenues be used to fund inmate education, work programs, and substance abuse treatment).

III. THE *SECOND FNPRM* WILL HAVE PREDICTABLE OUTCOMES THAT MAY CONFLICT WITH THE COMMISSION'S OBJECTIVES TO INCREASE INMATE ACCESS TO ICS

As a for-profit company supplying services to Correctional Agencies, Emerald is charged with cost-effectively implementing the policy decisions made by its Correctional Agency clients while earning a profit on behalf of its investors. As a result of this dual role, which is unique to private companies operating correctional facilities, Emerald has limited latitude in its ability to modify its management of ICS to comply with any new ICS rules adopted by the Commission in this proceeding. Consequently, any decision by the Commission to tightly regulate or eliminate site commissions will have a predictable outcome when applied to Emerald's correctional facilities: it will reduce inmate access to ICS or the quality of ICS available to inmates, which is contrary to the Commission's stated objectives.⁶

For-profit correctional facilities first and foremost must fulfill requirements imposed by their Correctional Agency clients, and Emerald strives to deliver the best results for its clients and for the inmates in its care. Emerald, however, also has an obligation to provide a reasonable and fair return to its investors. To accomplish both of these objectives, Emerald relies on site commission payments from ICS providers. If the Commission prevents for-profit correctional facilities such as Emerald from recovering their ICS costs through site commissions, the Commission simultaneously will impede the ability of private facilities from returning a profit to their investors. This will result in a predictable outcome. Private correctional facilities will be forced to provide inmates with only the minimum level of ICS mandated by their contracts with their Correctional Agency clients.

⁶ See *Second FNPRM*, 29 FCC Rcd at 13171 ¶ 2 (explaining that reforming ICS will "make[] it easier for inmates to stay connected to their friends and families," which will reduce recidivism and help children of incarcerated parents).

As demonstrated by the record, the Commission’s proposals in this proceeding will simultaneously increase ICS costs to facilities while decreasing the site commissions that are used to offset such costs.⁷ Therefore, the Commission’s proposed actions in this proceeding threaten to remove the economic incentive for Correctional Agencies, and in turn for-profit facilities that serve such Correctional Agencies, to increase inmate access to ICS and other advanced communications capabilities.⁸ Just as it “would be irresponsible” for Correctional Agencies to balance “inmate costs against commissions without considering the burden to taxpayers,”⁹ it would be economically irresponsible for private facilities not to consider the

⁷ Letters were filed with the Commission by a host of correctional facilities noting that implementing the proposed caps on rates, fees, and single-payment products, if it does increase call volume, would likely double the cost of monitoring calls. *See, e.g.*, Letter from John M. Foster, Jr., Chief Deputy, Yell County Sheriff’s Department, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375 (dated Nov. 25, 2014); Letter from Carrie Gaines, Jail Administrator, Wheeler County Sheriff’s Office, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375 (dated Dec. 1, 2014); Letter from Tim Graver, Commander, Graham County Sheriff’s Office, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375 (dated Dec. 1, 2015 [sic]); Letter from Samye Johnson, County Judge, San Augustine County, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375 (dated Dec. 1, 2014).

⁸ *See, e.g.*, Comments of the National Sheriffs’ Association, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 5 (dated Jan. 12, 2015) (“National Sheriffs Comments”) (“Denying payments to jails or restricting such payments to levels that do not at least cover costs, will have the effect of reducing the incentive and ability to allow ICS in jails.”); *id.* (“site commissions and/or other payments to correctional facilities have made it possible for even the smallest of jails and jails with the most limited of budgets to allow this labor intensive activity.”); Letter from Wesley O. Landers, Chief Financial Officer, State of Tennessee Department of Corrections, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 1-2 (dated Jan. 12, 2015) (If the FCC bans commissions, “inmate access to ICS may be restricted and result in less communication with friends and family”); Comments of Lattice Incorporated, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 6-7 (dated Jan. 12, 2015) (“Lattice Comments”) (“[b]anning all site commissions will not foster a more competitive marketplace for the provision of ICS . . . but rather will decrease the availability of ICS.”) (internal quotations omitted).

⁹ Letter from James R. Wilson, Sherriff, Williamson County, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 1 (dated Dec. 22, 2014); *see also id.* (“Public servants should not be ridiculed for serving the economic interests of the governing bodies they represent.”); VARJ Letter at 6 (“[E]thics, public safety and fiduciary responsibilities require local facilities to evaluate the entire *value proposition*. In execution of this requirement the agency insures [sic]

financial interests of their investors when administering the ICS environments in their facilities. But unlike Correctional Agencies, which can fundamentally alter their ICS policies in light of new Commission regulations, Emerald is contractually beholden to its Correctional Agency clients. Consequently, the financial pressure placed on private correctional facilities by the elimination or significant restriction of site commissions will result in pressure on the private facilities to cut ICS costs wherever possible under their ICS contracts. This inevitably will lead to reductions in the quality of ICS available to inmates – a predictable and economically rational outcome even though it is contrary to the Commission’s professed objectives in this proceeding.¹⁰

IV. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE COMMISSION DECIDES TO FURTHER REGULATE ICS, THE COMMISSION SHOULD ENABLE PRIVATE FACILITIES TO GENERATE PROFITS FOR THEIR INVESTORS

To the extent that the Commission determines to intervene in the management of prison ICS environments by regulating site commissions, the Commission should better align its regulatory dictates with the fiscal realities of operating for-profit correctional facilities by adopting an alternative means for such facilities to recover their ICS costs. Just as the

that all of its public services requirements are met.”) (citation omitted); Letter from Robert J. Kasabian, Executive Director, American Jail Association, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 2 (dated Jan. 12, 2015) (“Jails must cope with stringent local jurisdiction budgetary concerns. Jails must operate a balanced budget each year, providing essential services first, and then expanding additional services benefiting inmates, including the overhead costs associated with ICS. The interim interstate rate caps in place currently, and the withholding of revenue to Jails by ICS providers, has put undue financial pressure on many facilities. This is a financial burden that Jail Administrators were unable to plan for.”).

¹⁰ Similarly predictable outcomes have already been observed in the provider context. See Letter from Ed Benson, President, EagleTel, Inc., to FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 1 (dated Nov. 8, 2014) (“During the first quarter of this year, my company divested itself of the [ICS] portion of our business in no small part due to impending regulation by the FCC. It appeared to me that just meeting the reporting requirements would place a significant burden on a small business such as mine.”).

Commission has placed a priority on enabling ICS providers to earn a reasonable profit, the Commission also should enable for-profit correctional facilities such as Emerald to earn a reasonable profit. Permitting such facilities to recover their ICS costs is a necessary step towards enabling these facilities to earn such a profit.

The proposal of Praeses to implement an ICS cost recovery mechanism separate from Commission-regulated ICS rates could accomplish this result.¹¹ As the record clearly demonstrates, correctional facilities incur significant costs related directly to their provision of ICS that are separate and apart from the costs incurred by ICS providers.¹² Facilities should be, at minimum, reimbursed for these costs.¹³ The Praeses proposal creates a facility-specific mechanism for recovering such ICS costs that is closely tailored to the magnitude of the costs at each facility. Moreover, because Praeses' proposal relies on a per-minute cost-recovery mechanism, it creates a financial incentive for facilities to maximize the number of minutes of

¹¹ Comments of Praeses LLC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 37-42 (dated Jan. 12, 2015) (“Praeses Comments”).

¹² See, e.g., Letter from Lt. William Deatsch, Johnson County (Iowa) Sheriff’s Office, to FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 1 (dated Dec. 18, 2014) (ICS “is a benefit to the inmates but it comes at a monetary cost to our office.”); Lattice Comments at 6 (“Correctional facility operators do incur certain types of costs when they make ICS available to inmates through ICS providers.”); Letter from Simona Rollinson, Chief Information Officer, Cook County Office of the President, and Robert McInerney, Chief Information Officer, Cook County Sheriff’s Office, to Tom Wheeler, *et al.*, Chairman, FCC, WC Docket 12-375, at 3-5 (dated Jan. 12, 2015) (“Cook County Letter”) (reviewing the significant costs the Cook County Jail incurs in the administration of ICS); Letter from Colette S. Peters, Director, Oregon Department of Corrections, to Tom Wheeler, *et al.*, Chairman, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 1-2 (dated Dec. 9, 2014) (explaining costs it incurs with respect to security, investigations, review, disciplinary actions, and general office administration associated with ICS).

¹³ See, e.g., Cook County Letter at 5 (urging “the Commission to allow each correctional facility to determine its justifiable costs”); National Sheriffs Comments at 4-5 (“Although in general, jails with a larger average daily population (ADP) of inmates have a lower per minute cost, *this does not hold true for all jails*. Even jails with similar ADP’s have a significantly different per minute cost for monitoring/security and administrative duties.”) (emphasis added).

ICS use by inmates, which will, in turn, create an incentive for facilities to put downward pressure on the ICS rates charged by their ICS providers. Therefore, adoption of Praeses' proposal would help create an economic incentive for private facilities to offer robust ICS and to maximize inmate access to ICS, which is consistent with the Commission's objectives.

V. THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT REQUIRE FACILITIES TO HIRE MULTIPLE ICS PROVIDERS

Emerald also agrees with others in the record that the Commission should not mandate that facilities retain multiple providers because doing so would increase security risks and ICS costs without any concomitant benefits to inmates.¹⁴ In addition to the security problems that multiple providers would introduce into the ICS system, “[t]he administrative and technical complexity of such an undertaking would be prohibitive and the operational and capital costs would be enormous.”¹⁵ Likewise, “[t]he idea of managing two or more systems would result in a reduction of available phone use to inmates” in order to reduce the burden on facilities of monitoring calls and juggling multiple systems “especially in small jails which may only have

¹⁴ See, e.g., Letter from Sherriff John Bishop (Ret), Executive Director, Oregon State Sheriffs' Association, to Tom Wheeler, *et al.*, Chairman, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 6 (dated Jan. 5, 2015) (noting the significant additional time and expense and increased security risk of a potential multiple provider system); Comments of Global Tel*Link Corporation, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 35-38 (dated Jan. 12, 2015) (noting that introducing multiple providers into a correctional facility would decrease call volume, reduce security, and increase costs); Letter from Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 3 (dated Dec. 31, 2014) (“Arizona DOC”) (“it makes no sense to operate multiple ICS providers in a prison system”); Letter from April Grady, Contracts Management Bureau Chief, Montana Department of Corrections, to FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 2 (dated Dec. 29, 2014) (“While it is possible to enter into contracts with multiple providers, security and intelligence functions are more successful when all on the same system.”); Letter from A. Dale Pinkerton, *et al.*, Chairman, County of Butler Prison Board, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 2 (dated Dec. 18, 2014) (“Forcing us to sign contracts with multiple phone providers will create a huge burden for us and make it astronomically more difficult for us to maintain security.”).

¹⁵ Comments of the Georgia Department of Corrections, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 15 (dated Jan. 12, 2015).

five phones in total.”¹⁶ As the administrator of small facilities, Emerald is particularly sensitive to this issue and urges the Commission to heed the warning of an ICS provider that specializes in providing services to smaller facilities: “It would be more cost effective for most small jails to *eliminate unlimited* use of ICS phones and go back to allowing use of an administrative phone at the jail’s convenience.”¹⁷

VI. THE COMMISSION SHOULD PROVIDE FACILITIES WITH AN APPROPRIATE TRANSITION PERIOD

Emerald agrees with Correctional Agency commenters that it is necessary for the Commission to allow for a sufficient transition period to enable affected parties to adjust their contractual arrangements to take into account whatever new regulations the FCC adopts in this proceeding.¹⁸ The Commission’s 2013 *ICS Report and Order*¹⁹ suddenly and significantly reduced expected ICS revenue to correctional facilities when certain ICS providers unilaterally

¹⁶ Comments of Network Communications International Corp., WC Docket No. 12-375, at 16 (filed Jan 12, 2015).

¹⁷ *Id.* (emphasis added).

¹⁸ *See, e.g.*, Comments of the Florida Sheriffs Association, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 5 (dated Jan. 5, 2015) (supporting a “two-year transition period before any new rules become effective.”); National Sheriffs Comments at 10 (supporting “a transition period of at least two years before any new rules become effective”); Arizona DOC at 2; Letter from John McMahan, Sheriff-Coroner, San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 3 (dated Nov. 6, 2014); VARJ Letter at 9 (urging the Commission, if it decides to further regulate ICS, to adopt a two-year transition period, at minimum); Letter from Mark Warner, United States Senator, to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC (dated Sept. 4, 2014) (“I would strongly urge that any rate changes be phased in gradually and thoughtfully in order to reduce additional transition burdens. Sheriffs often have long-terms contracts with vendors, and the costs of breaking these contracts, in addition to other transition costs, should not act to compromise inmate services.”).

¹⁹ *Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services*, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd 14107 (2013).

ceased paying site commissions without renegotiating their ICS contracts.²⁰ To avoid this disruption from being compounded when the Commission issues its next ICS order, a transition period “is absolutely vital to prevent serious local economic dislocation.”²¹ Emerald agrees that “[i]t is simply not possible for the ICS industry to implement fundamental changes in its operational structure in a matter of several months.”²² This problem is heightened in the context of for-profit correctional facilities, because in this context there are two different contracts that must be renegotiated in tandem: the contract between a Correctional Agency and a private facility, as well as the contract between the facility and its ICS provider. Therefore, the Commission should introduce any further ICS regulation gradually and thoughtfully, and the Commission should grandfather existing ICS arrangements.

²⁰ See Praeses Comments at 40-41.

²¹ Letter from A. Travis Quesenberry, County Administrator, King George County, Virginia, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 2 (dated Dec. 17, 2014)

²² Praeses Comments at 42.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Commission should refrain from dictating ICS policies to Correctional Agencies, including through the regulation of site commissions. To the extent that the Commission nevertheless regulates site commissions, the Commission must do so in a manner that takes into account the fiscal realities of for-profit correctional facilities by preserving their ability to generate profits for their investors. The Praeses proposal offers a mechanism that will accomplish this result. In addition, the Commission should refrain from mandating that correctional facilities hire multiple ICS providers and should provide the correctional industry ample time to adjust to any changes in the ICS regulatory landscape.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Bruce Bickman
Bruce Bickman
Chief Financial Officer
Emerald Correctional Management
315 South College Road
Suite 205
Lafayette, LA 70503

January 27, 2015