whether in politics, labor relations, or social life, whites held the upper hand.

Those blacks who sought to challenge the system, or who refused to accept docilely the insults and demands for demeaning behavior that were a daily feature of life, faced not only overwhelming political and legal power but also the very real threat of violent reprisal. Between 1880 and 1968, nearly 3,500 persons were lynched in the United States, the vast majority black men in the South. Some lynchings occurred secretly at night; others were advertised in advance and attracted huge audiences of onlookers.

The resurgence of racism was both cause and effect of the nation's abandonment of the Reconstruction ideal of egalitarian citizenship. Relegating blacks to the position of an economically dispossessed and politically disempowered caste fit neatly with the general pattern of racial thinking in the late nineteenth century. The retreat from egalitarian ideals went hand in hand with the resurgence of an Anglo-Saxonism that united patriotism, xenophobia, and an ethnocultural definition of nationhood in a renewed rhetoric of racial exclusiveness. Derogatory iconography depicting blacks and other "lesser" groups as little more than savages and criminals filled the pages of popular periodicals, legitimizing and "naturalizing," the new system of political and economic inequality. Scholars like Columbia University's John W. Burgess, a founder of American political science, taught that "a black skin means membership in a race of men which has never of itself succeeded in subjecting passion to reason, and has never, therefore, created any civilization of any kind." A century later, Americans would look back on segregation as a relic of an era of crude prejudice. When installed, however, the system was justified by political, religious, and scientific leaders as a forward-looking solution to a seemingly intractable problem -- the presence of a race that posed a danger to white America and its democratic institutions.

Slowly, the boundaries of nationhood, expanded so dramatically in the aftermath of the Civil War, contracted. For example, while ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment awarded citizenship to children of Chinese immigrants born on American soil, the Supreme Court also affirmed the right of Congress to set racial restrictions on immigration, and to expel without due process foreigners who had not been naturalized (as Chinese could not be). Beginning in 1882, Congress excluded immigrants from China from entering the country altogether. Exclusion profoundly shaped the experience of Chinese-Americans, long stigmatizing them as unwanted and unassimilable, and justifying their isolation from mainstream society.

On the eve of the twentieth century, America's triumphant entry onto the world stage as an imperial power in the Spanish-American War tied nationalism ever more closely to notions of Anglo-Saxon superiority, displacing, in part, the earlier identification of the nation with democratic political institutions (or defining those institutions in a more explicitly racial manner). Having demonstrated their special aptitude for liberty and self-government on the North American continent, Anglo-Saxons would now spread these institutions and values to less fortunate peoples throughout the world. As in the South, the domination of non-white peoples by whites was part of the progress of civilization, a fulfillment, not a violation, of American freedom.

By the turn of the century, the language of "race" -- race conflict, race feeling, race problems -- had assumed a central place in American public discourse. The putative inborn capacity of one or another "races" was commonly invoked to explain everything from the standard of living of various groups of workers to the ability or inability of various peoples to participate in American democracy. Immigration, it was claimed, weakened the fiber of American society by allowing "inferior" races to outnumber the Anglo-Saxons best fitted for national and worldwide hegemony. The new

immigrants, wrote economist Francis Amasa Walker in 1890, were "beaten men from beaten races, representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence."

As the economist Simon Patten noted in 1896, American society seemed to be fracturing along interpenetrating lines of class and race, as universalistic definitions of citizenship were replaced by an obsession with strictly demarcating the borders of nationality:

> Each class or section of the nation is becoming conscious of an opposition between its standards and the activities and tendencies of some less developed class. The South has its negro, the city has its slums. . . . The friends of American institutions fear the ignorant immigrant, and the workingman dislikes the Chinese. Every one is beginning to differentiate those with proper qualifications for citizenship from some other class or classes which he wishes to restrain or exclude from society.

With black disenfranchisement, Chinese exclusion, the rigid segmentation of the job market along racial and ethnic lines, and the emergence of an imperial policy toward non-white peoples overseas, the polity and economy were more thoroughly racialized at the dawn of the twentieth century than at any other point in American history.

"Race" also did much to circumscribe the reach of Progressivism, the reform movement of the early twentieth century that sought to improve democracy and bring the power of government to bear to regulate concentrations of economic power and uplift the conditions of working Americans. In some ways, the disenfranchisement of Southern blacks was a typical Progressive reform, a step, its advocates claimed, toward "upgrading" the electorate and allowing for a broader democracy among remaining voters. Women's suffrage, another reform of the Progressive era, was achieved by a constitutional amendment that left the states free to limit voting on other grounds, and thus did nothing for the vast majority of the country's black women. Progressive intellectuals, social scientists, labor reformers, and suffragists displayed a remarkable indifference to the black condition. Walter Weyl waited until the last fifteen pages of The New Democracy to introduce the "race problem." While he acknowledged that "white democracy" was a contradiction in terms, he offered no concrete proposal for moving toward a more egalitarian standard. Some settlement house reformers tried to address the problems of the urban black poor, but few understood the innumerable disabilities under which blacks labored. Most accepted segregation as natural and equitable, assuming there should be white settlements for white neighborhoods and black settlements for black.

Theodore Roosevelt's ingrained belief in Anglo-Saxon racial destiny (he called Indians "savages" and blacks "wholly unfit for the suffrage") did nothing to lessen the Progressive intellectuals' enthusiasm for his New Nationalism. His Progressive Party convention of 1912 rejected a civil rights plank in its platform and barred contested black delegates from the South. Woodrow Wilson, a native of Virginia, could speak without irony of the South's "genuine representative government" and its exalted "standards of liberty." His administration imposed full racial segregation in Washington and hounded from office considerable numbers of black federal employees.

The status of blacks, however, was only one strand in what Progressives called the era's "race problem." The Dictionary of Races of Peoples, published in 1911 by the U. S. Immigration Commission, listed the immigrant "races" within a hierarchy ranging from Anglo-Saxons at the top down to Hebrews, Northern Italians and, lowest of all, Southern Italians -- allegedly violent, undisciplined, and incapable of genuine assimilation. Popular best-sellers like The Passing of the Great Race, published in 1916 by Madison Grant, president of the New York Zoological Society, warned that the influx of new immigrants

and the low birthrate of native white women threatened to obliterate the foundations of American civilization. If democracy could not flourish in the face of vast inequalities of economic power, neither, most Progressives believed, could it survive in a nation permanently divided along racial and ethnic lines. Somehow, the very nationalization of politics and economic life served to heighten awareness of ethnic and racial difference, and spurred demands for "Americanization" -- the conscious creation of a more homogenous national culture.

The task of Americanizing the new immigrants was taken up by public and private bodies of all kinds. No matter how coercive, Americanization programs assumed that the new immigrants (and especially their children) could adjust to the conditions of American life, embrace "American ideals," and become productive citizens, enjoying the full blessings of American freedom (as blacks, most Progressives believed, could not). Nonetheless, the linkage of Americanism and "race" helped to inspire a fundamental change in immigration policy, the implementation of a new answer to the venerable question, "who is an American?" In 1924, in a repudiation of the tradition of open entry for whites except for specifically designated classes of undesirables, Congress imposed the first sharp limits on European immigration, establishing a nationality quota system that sought to ensure that descendants of the old immigrants would forever outnumber children of the new. Although enacted by a highly conservative Congress, the 1924 immigration law reflected, among other things, the Progressive desire to improve the "quality" of democratic citizenship and employ scientific methods to rationalize public policy. In calculating the new immigration quotas, based, supposedly, on the origins of the American population in 1890, non-whites were excluded altogether – otherwise African nations would have received a far higher quota than the tiny numbers they were eventually allotted. The law also mandated the complete exclusion of Asians from the United States.

Confronted with the wholesale repudiation of the universalist definition of American nationhood, prominent black leaders took to emphasizing economic self-help and individual advancement into the middle class as an alternative to popular political agitation. Symbolizing this shift was the juxtaposition, in 1895, of the death of black abolitionist Frederick Douglass with Booker T. Washington's widely-praised speech at the Atlanta Cotton Exposition urging blacks to adjust to segregation and forego agitation for civil rights and the suffrage. The path to racial advancement, Washington asserted, lay in acquiring skills and property. In the early twentieth century, led by W. E. B. DuBois, a more militant group of black leaders joined with white reformers to found the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, dedicated to regaining the rights supposedly guaranteed in the Reconstruction constitutional amendments. Most black leaders saw American participation in World War I as an opportunity to make real the promise of equality. The black press rallied to the war, insisting that the service of black soldiers would result in the dismantling of racial inequality. But the result produced an alienation that drove many blacks even further from the American mainstream.

The war unleashed social changes that altered the contours of American race relations. The combination of increased wartime production and the cutoff of immigration from Europe opened thousands of industrial jobs to black laborers, inspiring a massive migration from South to North. By 1920, nearly half a million blacks had left the South. Yet a series of violent confrontations that shattered cities throughout the country also exposed the vast disappointments that migrants encountered -- severely restricted employment opportunities, exclusion from unions, rigid housing segregation, and machine control of urban politics that limited the impact of the right to vote. Meanwhile, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 sacrificed the principle of self-determination -- ostensibly the Allies' major war aim -- on the altar of imperialism, so far as the world's nonwhite peoples were concerned. Nation-states were created for Eastern Europe, but not for

what Wilson's advisor Colonel Edward House called the "backward countries" of Asia and Africa.

The result was a feeling of deep betrayal that affected everyone from W. E. B. Du Bois, who had traveled to Paris to plead the cause of colonial independence, to ordinary black Americans. Du Bois was forced to conclude that Wilson had "never at any single moment meant to include in his Democracy" black Americans or the nonwhite peoples of the world. In the new black ghettoes of the North, the disappointed hopes of World War I kindled widespread support for the separatist movement launched by Marcus Garvey, a recent immigrant from Jamaica, who demanded for blacks the same internationally-recognized identity now enjoyed by Poles, Czechs, and the Irish. The massive following his movement achieved in the early 1920s offered the best testimony to the sense of betrayal the war and its aftermath kindled in black communities.

A decade later, the New Deal fundamentally changed the relationship of American citizens to the national government, and seemed to open new possibilities for challenging the racial status quo. Suffering more severely from the Depression than any other group of Americans, blacks benefitted enormously from new government programs of economic relief, even though these were often administered in blatantly discriminatory fashion. By 1936, northern blacks, who retained the right to vote, had abandoned their historic allegiance to the party of Lincoln and shifted in the ranks of the Democratic party, where they have remained ever since. Nonetheless, race profoundly shaped the New Deal, and blacks experienced its programs in ways far different from white Americans.

Roosevelt conceived of the New Deal as expanding the meaning of economic liberty by extending assistance to broad groups of needy Americans -- the unemployed, elderly, and dependent -- as a universal right of citizenship, not charity or special privilege. His goal, according to Frances Perkins, was a broadly inclusive cradle-to-grave system of social provision that guaranteed every American a measure of economic security. But as enacted, New Deal measures were far from universal. Political realities -- especially the enduring power of urban political machines in the North and black disenfranchisement in the South -- powerfully affected the drafting of legislation. The result was a two-tiered system that offered generous, nationally-established benefits to some Americans, primarily white and male, while leaving others with lesser entitlements or none at all.

The Social Security Act, the centerpiece of the New Deal "welfare state," encompassed a series of programs with divergent structures and target populations. The most generous -- old-age pensions and unemployment insurance -- provided aid automatically and without the stigma of dependency. By linking benefits to taxes paid by eligible wage workers, these programs identified assistance as a right rather than charity. But the exclusion of agricultural, domestic, and casual laborers left uncovered the large majority of the employed black population.

Social Security also included public assistance programs, notably aid to dependent children and to the impoverished elderly. These were open to all Americans, regardless of race, who met a means test. But they set benefits at extremely low levels and authorized the states to determine eligibility standards. Because recipients did not pay Social Security taxes, they soon came to bear the humiliating stigma of dependency on government handouts. The gap between the two programs widened in 1939, when wives, elderly widows, and dependent survivors of covered male workers were moved from general public relief into the Social Security system, leaving single mothers and the non-white poor to dominate what would come to be called "welfare." Social Security established the key elements of federal social policy for the next half century. And the power of the Solid South helped to mold the New Deal welfare state into an entitlement of white Americans. Black organizations strongly supported an alternative plan, introduced by Congressman Ernest Lundeen of Minnesota, for a federally-controlled system of old age,

unemployment, and health benefits for all wage workers, and lobbied strenuously for a Social Security system that enabled agricultural and domestic workers to receive unemployment and old-age benefits and that established national relief standards. In the end, however, because of the "Southern veto," non-white workers were confined to the weakest, least generous, and most vulnerable wing of the new welfare state. The National Resources Planning Board presciently noted in 1942 that because of their exclusion from programs "which give aid under relatively favorable conditions," blacks were becoming disproportionately dependent on "general relief," a program widely viewed with popular "disfavor." The situation, the report concluded, seemed certain to stigmatize blacks as recipients of "welfare," and welfare as a program for minorities, thus dooming it forever to inadequate "standards of aid," and further reinforcing a powerful line of division in how black and white Americans experienced the New Deal welfare state.

Overall, the Depression and New Deal had a contradictory impact on black Americans. Although Roosevelt seems to have had little personal interest in race relations or civil rights, key members of his administration, including his wife Eleanor and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, directed national attention to the injustices of segregation, disenfranchisement, and lynching. But hopes for broad changes in the nation's race system were quickly disappointed. Despite a massive lobbying campaign, a Southern filibuster prevented passage of a federal anti-lynching law. The New Deal began the process of modernizing Southern agriculture, but tenants, black and white, footed much of the bill. Tens of thousands of sharecroppers were driven off the land as a direct result of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's policy of supporting crop prices by paying landowners to reduce cotton acreage. Landlords were supposed to share federal payments with their tenants, but many failed to do so.

Nowhere were the limits of the New Deal more evident than in the evolution of federal housing policy, which powerfully reinforced residential segregation. The Home Owners Loan Corporation and Federal Housing Administration insured millions of long-term mortgages issued by private banks. At the same time, the federal government itself constructed thousands of units of low-rent housing. Thanks to the FHA and, later, the Veterans' Administration, home ownership was brought within the economic reach of tens of millions of families.

Like Social Security, however, housing policy was put into practice by local officials, who established a two-tiered system that reinforced existing racial boundaries. (In Texas, some communities financed three sets of housing projects -- for whites, blacks, and Mexicans.) The FHA, moreover, had no hesitation about insuring, and sometimes insisted upon, mortgages with racially restrictive covenants, and resolutely refused to channel money into any but segregated neighborhoods. It declared entire areas, mostly in central cities, ineligible for loans. In some cases, the presence of a single black family on a block led the agency to declare the entire block off-limits for federal mortgage insurance. Along with discriminatory practices by private banks and real estate companies, federal policy was a major factor in institutionalizing housing segregation in America. Today, white Americans recall the New Deal as a time when the government took energetic steps to combat the economic ills of unemployment and homelessness. To blacks, it is also a time that reveals the persistent hold of racial inequality on public policy.

It was not so much the New Deal as World War II that, for the first time since Reconstruction challenged the hold of racial thinking and policy on national life. The struggle against Nazi tyranny and its theory of a master race gave new emphasis to the civic definition of American nationality and discredited ethnic and racial inequality. In public and private pronouncements, a pluralist vision of American society now became part of official rhetoric. Racism was the enemy's philosophy; Americanism rested on toleration of diversity and

equality for all. By the end of the war, the new immigrant groups had been fully accepted as ethnic Americans, rather than members of distinct and inferior "races." And the contradiction between the putative American Creed and the actual status of blacks had come to the forefront of national life.

During World War II, government and private agencies avidly promoted group equality as the definition of Americanism. Officials rewrote history to establish racial and ethnic tolerance as the American way. To be an American, declared the president, had always been a "matter of mind and heart," and "never . . . a matter of race or ancestry" -- a statement more effective in mobilizing support for the war than in accurately describing the nation's past. Horrified by the uses to which the Nazis put the idea of inborn racial difference, physical and social scientists retreated wholesale from the idea of race, only recently central to their disciplines. The writings of Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and other anthropologists critical of the link between race, culture, and intelligence, now for the first time reached a mass audience. Benedict's Races and Racism, published in 1942, described racism as "a travesty of scientific knowledge."

Of course, the internment of tens of thousands of citizens of Japanese descent during the war belied the new spirit of racial accommodation. So too did the persistence of segregation (even in Washington D. C. and in the army), disenfranchisement, and lynching. The wide disparities between wartime ideology and the actual condition of black Americans helped to spawn a renewed movement for equality. Angered by the almost complete exclusion of African-Americans from employment in the rapidly-expanding war production industries (of 100,000 aircraft workers in 1940, fewer than 300 were black), labor leader A. Philip Randolph in July 1941 called for a March on Washington to demand not only defense jobs but an end to segregation in government departments and the armed forces. Hurling Roosevelt's rhetoric back at the president, Randolph declared racial discrimination "undemocratic, un-American, and pro-Hitler." To persuade Randolph to call off the march, Roosevelt issued an executive order banning discrimination in defense employment and establishing a Fair Employment Practices Commission to monitor compliance. Essentially an investigative agency, the FEPC had few enforcement powers. But its very existence marked a significant shift in public policy, and its hearings exposed patterns of racial exclusion so ingrained that firms at first freely admitted that their want-ads asked for "colored" applicants for porters and janitors, and "white" ones for skilled manufacturing jobs, or that they allowed black women to work only as laundresses and cooks. The FEPC played an important role in obtaining jobs for black workers in industrial plants and shipyards, an enormous step forward for migrants from the rural South. By 1944, over one million blacks held manufacturing jobs, 300,000 of them women.

During the war, a broad political coalition centered on the left but reaching well beyond it called for an end to racial inequality in America. The NAACP and American Jewish Congress cooperated closely in denouncing racial and religious intolerance and advocating laws to outlaw discrimination in employment and housing. Despite considerable resistance from rank and file white workers, CIO unions made significant efforts to organize black workers and win them access to skilled positions. A racial job ceiling persisted in most industrial plants, and AFL craft unions by and large continued their long tradition of excluding black workers. But during the war, the CIO was probably more racially integrated than any labor organization since the Knights of Labor.

Nonetheless, the black migrants who poured out of the South into the industrial heartland encountered hostility, sometimes violent, from white residents in the North and West. Detroit in June 1943 experienced a race riot that left 34 persons dead and a "hate strike" of 20,000 auto workers protesting the upgrading of black workers in a plant manufacturing aircraft engines. In the same year, the Zoot Suit riots, in which club-wielding soldiers, sailors, and policemen attacked Mexican-American youths on the streets of Los Angeles, also illustrated

the limits of the wartime commitment to pluralism and tolerance. In February 1942, the Pittsburgh Courier coined the phrase that came to epitomize black attitudes during the war -- the "double-V." Victory over Germany and Japan, it insisted, must be accompanied by victory over segregation at home. While most of the white press supported the war as an expression of American ideals, black newspapers persistently pointed to the gap between those ideals and reality. Surveying wartime public opinion, political scientist Horace Gosnell concluded that "symbols of national solidarity" had very different meanings to white and black Americans. To blacks, freedom from fear meant, among other things, an end to lynching; freedom from want included an end to "discrimination in getting jobs." "Our fight for freedom," said a black veteran returning from Pacific combat, "begins when we get to San Francisco."

The civil rights impulse inspired by the war flowed over into the postwar world. It was especially evident in President Truman's decision to make civil rights a major plank in the Democratic platform of 1948, prompting delegates from several southern states to walk out of the gathering. But as the Cold War deepened, criticism of American society became increasingly suspect. Aside from the integration of the armed forces, ordered by the President in 1948, little came of the Truman administration's civil rights flurry. Time would reveal that the waning of the civil rights impulse was only temporary. But it came at a crucial historical juncture, just as the greatest housing and employment boom in American history was reconfiguring the society, opening vast new opportunities for whites while leaving blacks locked in the rural South or the decaying urban ghettoes of the North. Indeed, during the postwar suburban boom, federal agencies continued to insure mortgages with racially-restrictive provisions, thereby financing housing segregation. Even after the Supreme Court in 1948 declared such covenants unenforceable, banks and private developers continued to bar nonwhites from the suburbs and federal lending agencies refused to subsidize mortgages for blacks except in segregated enclaves. The vast new communities built by developer William Levitt, which epitomized the suburban revolution, refused to allow blacks to rent or purchase homes. In 1957, not a single black family resided among the 60,000 inhabitants of Levittown, Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, under the slogan of "urban renewal," cities used their power of eminent domain to remove the poor from urban areas slated for redevelopment, frequently replacing them with all-white middle-income complexes like New York's Stuyvesant Town, which opened in 1947 and only agreed to admit a handful of black families as tenants after years of protests and lawsuits.

With black migration from the rural South to the urban North reaching unprecedented levels (three million blacks moved from South to North between 1940 to 1960, followed by another 1.4 million in the following decade), the process of racial exclusion became self-reinforcing and self-justifying. As industrial jobs fled the central cities of the industrial heartland for suburbs and the South -- a process soon to be known as deindustrialization -- more and more poor blacks remained trapped in urban ghettoes, associated in the white mind with crime and welfare. Suburbanites, for whom the home served not only as an emblem of freedom but also as the family's major accumulation of capital, became increasingly fearful that any nonwhite influx would lower the quality of life and destroy property values. Suburban home ownership long remained a white entitlement, with the ability of nonwhites to rent or purchase a home where they desired overridden by the potent mixture of private property, the right to privacy, and "freedom of association." Thus, even as the old divisions between white ethnic Americans faded in the suburban melting pot and a black movement arose in the South to challenge institutionalized segregation, racial barriers in housing and therefore in public education and jobs were being reinforced. Despite pervasive Cold War rhetoric, to many black Americans the boundary between the "free" and "unfree" worlds seemed to run along the color line, not the Iron Curtain. Speaking of the street that marked the entrance to an all-white Los Angeles neighborhood, a black resident of the city later

recalled, "we used to say that Alameda was the Berlin Wall."

On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks, a veteran of civil rights activities in Montgomery, Alabama, was arrested for refusing to surrender her seat on a city bus to a white rider, as required by municipal law. The incident sparked a year-long bus boycott, the beginning of the greatest mass movement in modern American history. The movement found in the black church the organizing power for a militant, nonviolent, assault on the edifice of segregation. Then, beginning with the sit-ins of 1960, college students, black and white, propelled the struggle to a new level of mass activism and civil disobedience. Within a decade, the civil rights revolution had overturned the edifice of de jure segregation and won the ballot for black citizens in the South.

Although they had been "treated in a way that makes mockery of our belief in liberty," commented a white faculty member at a black college in Tennessee, African-Americans believed "wholeheartedly" in the ideal of constitutional equality. The movement invoked the unfulfilled promises of the Declaration of Independence, Emancipation Proclamation, and Fourteenth Amendment to demand that the nation live up to the letter of the law and to its professed values.

It was in the soaring oratory of Martin Luther King, Jr., who more than any single individual came to lead and symbolize the movement, that the protestors' many goals and aspirations were forged into a coherent whole. A master at appealing to the conscience of white America without appearing to be dangerous or threatening, King presented the case for black rights in a vocabulary that bridged the gap between the races and fused the black experience with that of the nation. Suffused with Christian themes derived from his family background and training in the black church, King's speeches resonated deeply in the broader culture. Central to his theology was the story of Exodus, a mainstay of black preaching that interpreted the African-American experience as a divinely-guided progress toward Canaan, the promised land of freedom. Among other things, Exodus suggested that individual rights and group empowerment were interdependent and reinforcing, a point King drove home when he proclaimed, "we as a people will get to the promised land."

At a time when Cold War ideology had highlighted the danger to liberty from excessive government and made respect for the distinction between "civil society" and the realm of politics a cornerstone of liberal thinking, civil rights activists resurrected the vision of federal authority as the custodian of citizens' rights. Despite the long history of federal complicity in segregation, blacks' historical experience suggested that they had more hope for justice from national power than from local governments or the voluntary acquiescence of well-meaning whites. This conviction was reinforced not only by Southern resistance to integration, but by the failure of Northern states to enforce the fair employment laws that had been enacted in the aftermath of World War II. Liberal opinion of the time strongly emphasized the importance of insulating "civil society" from governmental interference. Blacks understood that the institutions of civil society -- businesses, unions, homeowners' associations, private clubs, and the like -- were often riddled with racism, which only federal power could eradicate. The movement reinforced the longstanding tradition that saw black Americans rely much more strongly on an activist national state than most white citizens.

In the 1960s, the movement's growing militancy and the violent resistance it encountered created a national crisis that propelled a reluctant federal government to champion the cause of black freedom. By June 1963, with demonstrations sweeping the country (in one week, over 15,000 Americans were arrested in 186 cities) and the violence unleashed against black protesters in Birmingham attracting worldwide attention, president John F. Kennedy went on television to announce that the nation confronted a "moral crisis." Two years later, the crisis in Selma -- where voting rights marchers were assaulted by the

Alabama state police -- led Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, to demand legislation securing the right to vote. Appealing to "the outraged conscience of the nation," Johnson closed his speech by quoting the demonstrators' favorite song, "We Shall Overcome." Never before had the movement received so sweeping or powerful an endorsement from the federal government.

By 1965, with court orders having dismantled legal segregation and new federal laws prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, employment, and voting, the movement had succeeded in eradicating the legal bases of second-class citizenship. In the same year, inspired in part by the conviction that racism should no longer serve as a basis of national policy, the Hart-Cellar Act abandoned the national origins quota system, substituting "family reunification" and job skills as new, non-racial, criteria for immigration. Taken together, the civil rights revolution and immigration reform marked the triumph of a pluralist, civic definition of Americanism. By 1976, a public opinion survey reported that eighty-five percent of respondents agreed with the statement: "the United States was meant to be ... a country made up of many races, religions, and nationalities."

Yet even at its moment of triumph, the civil rights movement confronted a crisis as it sought to move from access to schools, public accommodations, and the voting booth to the intractable economic divide separating blacks from other Americans. In its first decade, civil rights activity had not entirely ignored the economic dimensions of the black condition: expanded employment opportunity was one part of the "treaty" that ended the Birmingham crisis of 1963, and "Jobs and Freedom" the slogan of that year's March on Washington. But the issue had been muted, partly because of the pressing need to challenge the legal and political dimensions of black inequality, and partly because the Cold War had severed the civil rights movement from left-wing groups that linked the black condition to a broad critique of economic inequality. Even as the struggle achieved its greatest successes, however, violent outbreaks in black ghettoes outside the South -- Harlem in 1964, Watts in 1965 (just a few days after Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act), other cities in ensuing years -- drew attention to the fact that racial justice was a national, not Southern problem, and to the inequalities in employment, education, and housing that the dismantling of legal segregation left intact.

In the mid-1960s, with black unemployment two and a half times that of whites and average black family income little more than half the white norm, economic issues rose to the forefront of the civil rights agenda. In 1964, King called for a "Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged" to mobilize the nation's resources to abolish the scourge of economic deprivation. His proposal was directed against poverty in general, but King also insisted that after "doing something special <u>against</u> the Negro for hundreds of years," the United States had an obligation to "do something special <u>for</u> him now."

In 1966, King launched the Chicago Freedom Movement, with demands quite different from its predecessors in the South -- upgrading black employment, ending discrimination by employers and unions, equal treatment in granting mortgages, and the construction of low-income housing scattered throughout the region. His aim was nothing less than to make Chicago an "open city." Encountering the entrenched power of Major Richard J. Daley's Democratic machine and the ferocious opposition of white homeowners, the movement failed. Southern tactics -- marches, sit-ins, mass arrests -- proved ineffective in the face of the less overt but no less pervasive structures of racial inequality in the North. And the violent reactions of white residents of Chicago's ethnic enclaves stunned King. By 1967, when he composed his last book, <u>Where Do We Go From Here?</u>, the optimism that had sustained him during the southern phase of the movement had faded. Open housing and equal employment opportunity remained "a distant dream," he wrote, and radical economic reforms -- full employment, a guaranteed

annual income, "structural changes" in capitalism itself -- were necessary to bring blacks fully into the social mainstream.

Even before these disappointments, the fiery orator Malcolm X had drawn on the nationalist tradition of Marcus Garvey to repudiate the integrationist ideal and insist that blacks must control the political and economic resources of their own communities and rely on their own efforts, not alliances with whites or federal assistance, to achieve full emancipation. After his death in 1965, his powerful language struck a chord among younger civil rights activists. More than any other individual, Malcolm X was the intellectual father of Black Power, a slogan that first came to national attention in 1966 when SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael and other young blacks employed it during a civil rights march in Mississippi. To King, Black Power was a "cry of disappointment, certain to alienate whites." In terms of specific content, the term was hopelessly imprecise. Black Power suggested everything from the election of more black officials (hardly a radical idea, given the long history of ethnic politics in the United States) to the belief that black Americans were a colonized people, analogous to inhabitants of the Third World, whose freedom could only be won through a revolutionary struggle for self-determination. But however employed, the slogan's prominence marked a subtle shift in the goals of the movement, identifying it less with integration into the American mainstream than with group self-determination. Black Power helped to inspire similar movements among other racial minorities, including Native Americans and Chicanos, and a renewed emphasis on ethnic identity among third-generation whites.

Although the remarkable victories of the early 1960s were soon followed by a period of frustration, the black movement succeeded in placing the question of economic equality back on the nation's political agenda. Having swept to a landslide election victory in 1964 that shattered the conservative stranglehold on Congress, Lyndon Johnson not only presided over the legislative triumphs of the civil rights era -- the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 -- but launched the most far-reaching domestic agenda since the New Deal. Johnson's Great Society programs provided health services to the poor and elderly (in the new Medicaid and Medicare programs) and poured federal funds into education and housing. The government's reach was felt through new agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (the latter a fulfillment, under a new name, of the postwar campaign for a permanent FEPC). Taken together, these measures went far toward creating for the first time an "equal-opportunity welfare state" that brought under its wing those excluded from New Deal entitlements, especially blacks and working women.

Johnson's Great Society represented a remarkable reaffirmation of the ideas of social citizenship and racial equality, the most expansive effort in the nation's history to mobilize the powers of the national government to address the needs of the least advantaged Americans. His War on Poverty succeeded in greatly reducing the incidence of poverty, all but wiping it out among the elderly. But the sums expended (a total of a few billion dollars) were far too low to achieve the utopian goal of ending poverty altogether or the more immediate task of transforming the conditions of life in impoverished urban neighborhoods. Together with the civil rights movement itself, government action opened doors of opportunity for black Americans, spurring an enormous expansion of the black middle class. But millions of African-Americans remained trapped in poverty. By the 1990s, the historic gaps between white and black in education, income, and access to skilled employment had narrowed considerably. But the median wealth of white households remained quadruple that of blacks, unemployment was far lower, and nearly a quarter of all black children lived in poverty.

The election of 1968, moreover, marked the inauguration of a long period of more conservative policies in Washington, during which civil rights issues faded slowly from the national agenda. Well

before the rise of black power, indeed, a backlash against black civil rights offered conservatives new opportunities and threatened the stability of the Democratic coalition. Increasingly, explicitly racist language disappeared from political discourse. But there could be no denying that the conservative litany of law and order, local autonomy, "freedom of association," the evils of welfare, and the sanctity of property often had strong racial overtones. The surprisingly strong showing in the 1964 Democratic primaries of George Wallace, who as governor of Alabama had won national notoriety with his cry, "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever" indicated that politicians could gain votes by appealing to white uneasiness with civil rights gains, an uneasiness by no means confined to the South. The same year witnessed the passage by popular referendum of California's Proposition 14, which repealed a 1963 law banning racial discrimination in the sale of real estate. Although Lyndon Johnson swept to victory in California, Proposition 14 received a considerable majority, winning three of four votes among whites.

The California housing battle presaged subsequent conflicts -- over court-ordered busing to achieve school integration in Boston, for example -- in which racism, concern for neighborhood stability, and fear of crime fused to create a fertile ground for attacks on the activist liberal state among previously Democratic ethnic working-class voters. The often crude epithets hurled against blacks by opponents of busing and open housing in South Boston, New York's Canarsie, and other such neighborhoods helped to consolidate the image of the blue-collar ethnic as a retrograde racist. But affluent suburbanites who had learned to discard such language were no less determined to keep their neighborhoods lily-white, as the California referendum showed.

As the nation approaches the end of the twentieth century, what is remarkable is how much its racial situation has changed, and how much remains the same. Thanks in large measure to a generation of affirmative action policies by public and private institutions, not only has the traditional color line been dismantled, but in every realm of American life, from sports and entertainment to universities, corporate boardrooms, and the military, an unprecedented racial diversity has been achieved and nonwhites play roles inconceivable only a few decades ago. The right to vote has been guaranteed and blacks cast ballots throughout the country in about the same proportion as whites. Nonetheless, progress in many areas remains decidedly mixed. Far more blacks live in suburbs than ever before, but predominantly in largely black suburban communities -- most suburbs remain almost exclusively white, and as a result, schools in communities throughout the nation remain effectively segregated by race. The black middle class has grown enormously, but so too has an "underclass" trapped in urban poverty. The gap in income, job categories, and education between white and black families has narrowed significantly since 1940 or 1960, but the median wealth of black families remains far below that of white counterparts, black unemployment remains, as it has historically been, double that of whites, and poverty is far more widespread among nonwhites than whites. In life expectancy and health, the gap between the races remains enormous.

The nation's long history of unequal treatment of racial minorities, embedded in our present in these statistical indices of difference in status, have also produced profound differences in outlook. On issues ranging from the proper role of the federal government to economic policy, the equity of the criminal justice system, and even the current problems of President Clinton, public opinion polls consistently reveal an enormous difference between black and white attitudes. Most striking of all are different perceptions of race itself as a salient feature of modern American society. Most whites tend to think that race has only a minor impact on the daily experiences and future expectations of Americans whatever their background, and that blacks receive the same treatment as themselves from individuals and institutions of authority. Most nonwhites feel that race still matters a great deal, and considerable numbers report having experienced discriminatory

treatment in shops and restaurants, or in encounters with the police. These differences in outlook and perception are not the result of inborn "racial" traits, but stem from the distinct historical experiences of white and nonwhite Americans. As long as the historic memory and current reality of racial inequality remain alive, so too will profound differences in how black and white Americans understand the nation's past, present, and future.

EXPERT REPORT OF ALBERT M. CAMARILLO

Gratz, et al. v. Bollinger, et al., No. 97-75321 (E.D. Mich.)
Grutter, et al. v. Bollinger, et al., No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich.)

1. My name is Albert M. Camarillo. I am Professor of History and Director of the Center for Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity at Stanford University. I have been a member of the faculty at Stanford University since 1975.

2. I received my A.B. degree and Ph.D. degree from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1970 and 1975 respectively. A detailed record of my professional qualifications and scholarly achievements is set forth in the attached curriculum vitae, including a list of publications, awards, research grants, and professional activities.

3. I have authored and co-edited six books, published three research bibliographies, and have written over a dozen articles and essays dealing with the historical and contemporary status of Mexican Americans and Hispanic Americans in general. My current book manuscript (to be published by Oxford University Press) compares the urban histories of European and Asian immigrants, African Americans, and Mexican Americans from 1850 to 1950. My research explores how various institutions and prevailing attitudes in American society over time have created barriers to the inclusion of ethnic and racial minorities into mainstream society. Much of my work has documented how Hispanic Americans and other racial minorities -- particularly African Americans -- experienced residential, educational, and labor market isolation as they settled in cities throughout the nation since the mid-nineteenth century.

4. I have not testified as an expert witness in the preceding four years. I am being compensated at a rate of $200 per hour for my work in connection with this case.

5. At the request of attorneys with Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, I have prepared this report which outlines the historical patterns and legacies of racial isolation and separation of Hispanics in American society. My research is based on archival collections, syntheses of secondary literature, and other primary sources such as U.S. government reports including Bureau of the Census population reports. Based on my knowledge and research, this report outlines the historical developments that resulted in patterns of racial exclusion and isolation of Hispanics in the states and cities where they have settled since 1900. In particular, this report will discuss how residential, educational and occupational isolation of Hispanic Americans developed in the century after the first group of Hispanics -- Mexican Americans -- were incorporated into the United States in 1848.

6. By 2005, according to U.S. Census Bureau projections, Hispanics will become the nation's largest minority group, a development that reflects the rapid population growth of this diverse sector of American society in recent decades (*Current Population Reports*, February 1996). Composed of many national origin groups -- Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central and South American, and Caribbean-origin people -- the contemporary status of Hispanics, especially for the two largest subgroups (Mexican-origin and Puerto Rican-origin people), cannot be properly understood without consideration of significant historical legacies in the U.S. which continue to deeply influence their social, political, economic, and educational profiles. Over the past twenty-five years, a growing volume of scholarly literature has documented extensively the historical contours of the experiences of Mexican Americans in the states of the Southwest and Midwest and Puerto Ricans throughout the United States mainland (Gutierrez 1993; Bonilla 1998). This report will focus on the historical experiences of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans as illustrations of the broader Hispanic experience in American society. Although the individual group experiences may vary to some degree, these historical experiences have a shared

context that link Hispanics in a common community.

7. The history of racial and ethnic minorities was born of ideas about group differences. Since the initial contact of Europeans with native societies in the New World, ideas held by whites about non-whites resulted in the categorization of "racial" differences which typically dichotomized people into a hierarchical order ranging from superior to inferior, from dominant to subordinate, and from civilized to savage. These and other developing ideas about racial differences in colonial America and elsewhere were codified in laws and statutes that largely determined the status of racial minorities as groups which occupied the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder in society. These ideas, which set whites apart from non-whites, were institutionalized in a set of social, cultural, and political norms which, over time, help explain not only why American Indians were pushed off their native lands and increasingly forced to live on government-regulated reservations, but why African Americans were subjected to an institution of slavery and a long history of systematic exclusion from opportunities in American society. Though the ideas of the so-called "scientific racism" school of thought from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been thoroughly debunked by scientists and social scientists in the second half of the twentieth century, the historical legacies of ideas about racial differences -which served to isolate, separate, and discriminate against "racialized" minorities in the United States -- deeply affected the status of many groups in addition to American Indians and African Americans. Immigrants from Asia and Europe also fell victim to ideas which labeled them as racially or culturally different. This was also the case historically for the nation's soon-to-be largest minority group -- Hispanics.

8. The identification of group difference spawned a set of attitudes and behaviors which tainted relations among the majority population and those they viewed as "different." How a person or a group of people were categorized or classified was a powerful determinant of one's status. Relations between various groups of people were based on ideas, assumptions, preconceptions and misconceptions, stereotypes, notions, attitudes, sentiments, and other thoughts about how people were different. These constitute what I refer to as American ideologies about "group differentness." [The word "differentness" is used here instead of "differences" because ideologies about variations among groups were not merely descriptions about cultural, linguistic, national-origin, ethnic, or perceived racial differences. "Differentness" connotes an ascription, a value about the quality of being different.]

Never static, and always influenced by multiple factors, these ideologies changed, sometimes drastically and sometimes imperceptibly. In many cases, national influences affected these ideologies (e.g., political party agendas, economic cycles of boom and bust, and international warfare and diplomacy). In other cases, regional and local influences were more pervasive: regional economies, local labor markets, demographic concentrations of particular groups of people in particular areas of cities or states, and proximity to international borders. Historical legacies, of course, gave form and substance to ideologies about group differentness.

Among the many international, national, and regional factors which have continuously shaped Americans' conceptions of other Americans, none stand out more conspicuously in the nation's past than ideas about racial and ethnic differences. But to label the attitudes and the resulting ideologies as "racial" and "ethnic" is to miss much of the context. Americans and their European counterparts elsewhere were surely attuned to differences they observed or ascribed to groups who were different phenotypically -- especially if they were non-white -- but much more was involved. In addition to skin color, cultural (i.e., the ways in which people conduct their lives), political, religious, and economic/social class differences were all part of a complex set of factors which influenced the minds

of Americans about group "differentness" in an increasingly diverse society.

Prevailing attitudes about ethnic-immigrant and racial minority group differentness often constituted a widely adopted, though changing set of ideas and beliefs among the majority population. These shifting ideas -- buffeted by the winds of scientific and pseudoscientific knowledge and influenced by American conceptions of national identity and citizenship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- formed the core of what we can usefully refer to as "ideologies." As was so often the case, these ideologies about group differentness in the U.S. equated being different to being inferior. And, these conceptions of inferiority and superiority typically played a role in justifying or rationalizing a different behavior toward and treatment of racial and ethnic minorities and other groups deemed by the majority as different. The resulting denial of many basic rights, privileges, and opportunities for large segments of the American public created life experiences vastly different from those of the majority.

Ideologies about group differentness obviously had enormous bearing on social interactions among and between groups. However, as these ideologies were institutionalized through laws and public policies, as well as through other less formal practices and customs, they did more than set the contexts for social relations -- they could largely determine the status of entire groups of people in American society. Institutional policies often codified and legitimated social practices based on racial/ethnic, gender, cultural, and social class differences. The result was a set of statutes, laws, and public policies which separated and dichotomized American people: men v. women, white v. non-white, citizen v. alien, voters v. disenfranchised, workers v. employers.

People of color and immigrants were affected negatively -- and some systematically -- by political, legal, educational, law enforcement, and other institutions in American society. From local elections to state anti-miscegenation laws to federal legislation restricting immigration of certain races and ethnicities, institutional policies established a system of disadvantageousness ranging from constraints and hurdles to impregnable barriers in people's lives. Opportunities for social, economic, educational, and political advancement were at stake. Exclusion from or marginalization within society, more often than not, was the by-product.

In addition to "formal" institutions and policies, the political-economies of regions and localities served as "informal" institutions which shaped the lives of working people. In combination with dominant political institutions, political-economics -- especially through the development of local and regional labor markets -- helped determine why certain groups of Americans remained mired at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy while others could set their sights on better employment opportunities for themselves or for their children. Labor markets were also greatly influenced by the popular attitudes and ideologies regarding racial and ethnic/immigrant minorities and their respective "places" as workers in the economy. Where people lived, the types of jobs they held, the quality of their lives and expectations for the future were dependent on their relationships to the informal and formal institutions of the nation. For people categorized as "different," institutions in nineteenth and twentieth-century America exerted powerful forces which defined and reinforced group status. These developing and changing ideologies about "group differentness" provide a lens through which to view the history of Hispanics -- particularly Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans -- in the United States.

9. Among the many historical benchmarks that have influenced the course of history for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, two dates stand out with particular importance: 1848 and 1898. The war with Mexico and the Spanish-American War, respectively, set the stage for the incorporation of Spanish-speaking peoples from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba into the U.S. and, at the same time, established a set of economic, political, and social conditions which resulted in

Hispanics emerging as yet another "racialized" minority in nineteenth-century America. For Mexican Americans, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war between the U.S. and Mexico in 1848, resulted in the annexation of Mexico's northern-most states and the incorporation of a new regional minority, Mexican Americans, into the American territories and states of the new Southwest (Camarillo, 1993; Griswold del Castillo, 1990).

10. Americans took control of a vast territory in the period that began with the Texas Revolution of 1836, saw the Bear Flag Revolt a decade later in California, and culminated in the cession of nearly half of Mexico's national domain to the U.S. in the wake of the Mexican War. Americans quickly established their social and cultural institutions, their political and judicial systems, and their commercial capitalism in the region. The ramifications of this societal change -- which was uneven in its effects, depending on locality, on the growth of the American population, and on one's social class -- were, in the end, catastrophic for the former Mexican citizens who became the first "Mexican Americans." The borderland societies of the Republic of Mexico (before 1821 the Spanish colonial borderlands were concentrated in New Mexico but included settlements from Texas to California) were largely self-sufficient communities only tenuously connected to the core of Mexico by the time the Americans began to travel and settle in the region. By the 1820s and 1830s, especially in Texas, large numbers of American settlers -- some welcomed and authorized to establish colonies on Mexican soil but a larger number considered to be "illegal aliens" -- were not content to live under the flag of Mexico. Though cultural differences between Mexican and American settlers were certainly to blame in part for increasing tension, even more important were the institutional and economic considerations which eventually led the Anglo Texans -- and some Mexicans -- to rebel against the authority of Mexico and proclaim the independent Republic of Texas. Texas represented the vanguard of American interests in the region, and the Texas Revolution portended the fate of the Mexican settlements throughout the borderlands in the 1840s (Weber, 1982; Montejano, 1986).

The attitudes that many if not most Americans held toward Mexican Texans and their cousins elsewhere in the region have been thoroughly documented by various historians. For example, David J. Weber, in his important work on the Spanish-Mexican borderlands and the origins of anti-Mexican stereotypes, described succinctly the views that bred hatred and violence between the two peoples during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Mexicans were considered, he wrote, "bigoted, greedy, tyrannical, fanatical, treacherous and lazy" (Weber, 1979). These characterizations of the inhabitants of Mexico congealed especially during the decades following Mexico's independence from Spain in 1821, as more and more American travelers, adventurers, trappers, and traders ventured into northern Mexico. Here they encountered, for the first time on a regular basis, the frontier inhabitants of a nation for which they held many negative attitudes. Manifest Destiny and the designs among those who envisioned the westward march of the growing U.S. empire across the continent helped to redefine Mexico and Mexicans in the minds of Americans. Several scholars have written on the subject of American attitudes toward Mexicans during the mid-nineteenth century and these studies, taken together, illuminate the evolution of a set of ideas that justified the actions of the U.S. against Mexico and that supported the belief in the inferiority of Mexicans as a race. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, American attitudes toward Mexico and its people began to constitute an ideology, one that helps us understand not only why Americans revolted in Texas, but to understand how this changing ideology largely determined the status of Mexican Americans in the new Southwest and, later, throughout the nation (De Leon, 1993).

Cecil Robinson, in his pioneering study of Americans who recorded their travels, explorations, and experiences in the region of northern Mexico, analyzed hundreds of published accounts that reflect

an abundance of attitudes toward Mexicans. Included in these publications were novels and personal narratives as well as official reports of explorers and agents commissioned by the U.S. government. Robinson aptly described many of the themes evident in a variety of sources published before and during the Mexican War. He wrote:

> Pioneer America could find little to approve of in the Mexican society it collided with, being affronted in all its major convictions by Mexican attitudes, real and alleged. Americans, in their Protestant individualism, in their ideas of spirit and hard work, in their faith in progress through technology, in their insistence upon personal hygiene, in Puritanism and racial pride, found Mexico much to their distaste because of its priestly power, its social stratification with a pronounced sense of caste, its apparent devotion to pleasure and its indifference to cleanliness, and its reputation for pervasive sensuality ... Adding to all this was the Anglo-Saxon's contempt for a people who had lowered themselves to a state of general cohabitation with the Indians and had thus forfeited the right to be considered "white." (Robinson, 1977)

In a more recent study about the characterizations of Mexican Americans in American literature, French scholar Marcienne Rocard came to a conclusion similar to that of Robinson. "Everything about Mexican-Americans went against the American mentality," she wrote, "everything thus reinforced the pioneer writers' sense of superiority and encouraged them to look down upon the Other and see him as nothing more than a 'greaser'" (Rocard, 1989). Weber, in his analysis of the development of stereotypes, reflected on the same genre of American literature and concluded that "Mexicans were described as lazy, gambling, cruel, sinister, cowardly, half-breeds" (Weber, 1979).

11. During the half century following the Mexican War, a set of racial attitudes and institutional developments resulted which relegated Mexican Americans to a second-class citizenship and widespread exclusion from opportunities in American society. Manifest Destiny in mid-nineteenth century America was an ideology of American nationalism that not only justified expansion of U.S. boundaries across the continent, it also served as a rationale to remove Indians from the path of western frontier development, and to conquer Mexico and claim its northern provinces for the American nation. Part and parcel of Manifest Destiny were attitudes that cast Mexican Americans in the second half of the nineteenth century into a widening net of inferior peoples who occupied precarious positions in America's racial hierarchy. The prevalent attitudes of the Manifest Destiny era were reinforced and reflected in the institutions, laws, and customs of the region which, in the end, set Mexicans apart from their white American counterparts. For the most part, the large majority of Mexicans in the decades following the war, despite the rights guaranteed them by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, were dispossessed of their lands through legal and extra-legal means, disenfranchised from the new political institutions brought by Americans, relegated to the lower class of workers in the emerging labor markets, and maligned socially and culturally as "foreigners and outsiders" by Anglo newcomers to the Southwest (Horsman, 1981; De Leon, 1983; Takaki, 1993). Though the majority of Mexicans avoided contact with Americans, tensions often erupted during the post-war decades that resulted in what some referred to as "race wars" along the border stretching from Los Angeles to Brownsville, Texas.

For the approximately 100,000 Mexicans who had opted to remain in their native land after war and annexation, sweeping changes characterized the two generations of Mexican Americans who experienced a new reality as a racial minority in a dominant white society. Mexican Americans entered the twentieth century as a group that had survived -- though at great costs -- a radical transformation of their society. Isolated in their *pueblos*-turn-*barrios* (segregated Mexican American neighborhoods) in the emerging cities of

the Southwest and separated into rural *colonias* (colonies), the majority were, to a large extent, excluded from mainstream society because of their racial, class, cultural, and linguistic differences. The racial tensions and antagonisms which had characterized Mexican-Anglo relations in the nineteenth century had reached, it seemed, a level of biracial accommodation by 1900, although social distance between the two peoples continued to define group relationships. This distance between Mexicans and whites, fueled by fears of mass immigration from Mexico, led to more stereotypes, strained relations, and continued separateness in the early twentieth century (Camarillo, 1984; Montejano, 1986; Sheridan, 1986).

12. The first great wave of immigrants from Mexico (an exodus of about a million people who fled their revolution-torn country) crossed the border between 1910 and 1928 and settled in Texas, Arizona, Colorado, and California, and later in states such as Michigan, Iowa, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Illinois (Cardoso, 1980; Valdes, 1986). As increasing numbers of immigrants from Mexico began to arrive in the Southwest and Midwest in the early twentieth century, it became quite obvious to them that their compatriots and Mexican Americans were being treated differently than were European immigrants. Immigrants from Mexico were concerned about being included in society, and they were keenly aware of how differential treatment affected them as workers. During the early decades of the century, the idea of Mexicans as a principal source of cheap labor for a growing agricultural economy became wedded to the existing racial ideology that helped justify why Mexicans worked in non-skilled jobs (work generally not attractive to white labor) and why they should be paid less than white workers. The occupations of the Southwest that came to be associated with immigrants from Mexico during the first third of the 1900s -- railroad and migratory farm work, mining and construction work, and other manual labor -- were often referred to as "Mexican jobs." As the Southwest labor market grew increasingly dependent on Mexican immigrant labor for particular types of work, a pattern of segmenting a racial minority in the regional work force developed. Racial wage differentials were a part of this segmentation of Mexican labor (Barrera, 1979).

Those who journeyed further north in search of opportunity in the large industrial cities such as Detroit, Chicago, and Gary found work largely restricted to the lowest skill jobs in the steel and auto industries, the meat packing plants, and railroad yards. By 1930, substantial communities of Mexicans dotted the urban landscape throughout the region (for example, nearly 20,000 lived in Chicago, 15,000 in Detroit, and over 9,000 in the East Chicago-Gary, Indiana area). Though the Mexican immigrants and their children in these cities did not encounter the historical legacy of anti-Mexican racism faced by their counterparts in the Southwest, they did not escape the effects [sic] discrimination and racial exclusion, especially as the 1920s came to a close. Mexicans increasingly found the environment in these northern cities inhospitable as discrimination mounted in housing, in public accommodations, and in work places (Vargas, 1993; Ano Nuevo Kerr, 1976; J. Garcia, 1996).

13. The reactions of Anglos to large-scale immigration was ambivalent. On the one hand, American employers increasingly became dependent on Mexican low wage labor but, on the other hand, they decried the problems Mexicans supposedly created. Among the reasons articulated by those who advocated restricting immigration from Mexico in the post-World War I era, the complaints cited most often included the following: Mexicans could not be assimilated into U.S. society because they were so different (i.e., racial and cultural differences); their children created problems in the public schools and made the educational process more difficult for Anglo students; their youth were inclined toward delinquency and gangs; they caused public health problems because of their propensity to live in dirty, overcrowded conditions which bred contagious diseases; and they took jobs away from American citizens (Gutierrez, 1994).

It is not surprising that responses by Americans to the so-called "Mexican problem"

during the inter-war years (1918-1941) resulted in what several historians have labeled the "age of segregation" for Mexican Americans. During this period, the barriers of segregation against Spanish-speaking people rose higher and became more institutionalized. For example, sometimes by law and other times by custom, the vast majority of Mexican youngsters were forced to attend segregated Mexican schools or were concentrated in "Mexican classrooms" within schools with predominantly white pupils. *De jure* and *de facto* segregation of Mexican American school children in the public schools also reminded parents that their children were perceived as inferior to white children and somehow were seen as a threat to the education of Anglo pupils. Two of the earliest successful court cases involving desegregation of minority children in the nation's public schools did not involve African Americans in the South, but rather they involved Mexican American children in two Southern California communities during the 1930s and 1940s (i.e., Alvarez v. Lemon Grove School District in 1931 and Mendez v. Westminister School District in 1946). (Wollenberg, 1976; Arriola, 1995)

This was also the era during which Mexicans could hardly escape the notice of Jim Crow in the Southwest as signs were commonly posted in restaurants, barber shops and other store front windows indicating "No Mexicans Allowed" or "White Trade Only." These were the years when Mexican American movie fans had to sit in the side aisles or balconies of theaters because custom required that whites received the best seats and Mexicans, blacks, and other racial minorities sat elsewhere. These were the decades when Mexicans and blacks were allowed to swim in the public swimming pools but only on the day before the water was drained because whites feared that minorities contaminated the water for white patrons. And this was the epoch during which the racial restrictive real estate covenant gained widespread use in communities throughout the Southwest and beyond where Mexican Americans and other minorities sought to buy or rent property (e.g., the number of communities that employed restrictive covenants in Los Angeles County rose from about twenty percent in the 1920s to about eighty percent in the 1940s). One need only to read the print in a deed of sale during the era which often plainly stated that "No portion of the herein described property shall ever be sold, conveyed, leased, occupied by, or rented to any person of any Asiatic or African race . . . nor to any person of the Mexican race" (Penrod, 1948; Montejano, 1986; Camarillo, 1984).

The consequences for Mexican immigrants and their Mexican American children during this age of segregation were disastrous. Youngsters from an early age were not encouraged, indeed they were often actively discouraged from pursuing education beyond the primary grades. High school attendance was more the exception than the rule for Mexican Americans before World War II. Relegated to jobs in the low skill, low wage sectors in which upward mobility was difficult if not impossible to attain, Mexican American workers performed the dirtiest and most dangerous jobs that other Americans avoided (e.g., migratory farm labor, railroad maintenance, construction laborers, mining, factory operatives, and domestic service work for women). See Table I.

TABLE 1 Occupational Distribution of Mexican Americans in the Southwest by Sex, 1930-1970

Occupational Level	*1930*		*1950*		*1960*		*1970*	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Professional & technical	0.9 (.18)	2.9 (.18)	2.2 (.25)	4.6 (.31)	4.1 (.33)	5.5 (.42)	6.4 (.39)	7.6 (.46)
Managers, proprietors & officials	2.8 (.28)	2.4 (.63)	4.4 (.35)	3.9 (.49)	4.6 (.36)	2.5 (.48)	5.2 (.43)	2.4 (.53)
Clerical))) Sales)	3.4 (.37)	10.1 (.33)	6.5 (.47)	2.39 (.58)	4.8 (.69) 3.6 (.47)	20.4 (.62) 7.6 (.93)	6.6 (.86) 3.9 (.50)	27.8 (.72) 6.1 (.77)
Craftsmen & foremen (skilled)	6.8 (.47)	.6 (1.06)	13.1 (.66)	1.4 (.75)	16.7 (.81)	1.2 (.97)	20.8 (1.02)	2.2 (1.30)
Operatives (semiskilled)	9.1 (.92)	21.9 (2.18)	19.0 (1.16)	28.1 (1.54)	24.1 (1.35)	24.8 (1.29)	25.4 (1.11)	23.1 (2.50)
Laborers (unskilled)	28.2 (2.50)	2.8 (2.53)	18.7 (2.22)	1.4 (1.69)	15.2 (2.12)	1.1 (2.35)	12.1 (1.85)	1.5 (1.80)
Service	4.0 (.68)	38.4 (1.36)	6.3 (.98)	27.8 (1.42)	7.5 (1.15)	26.1 (1.40)	10.5 (1.25)	26.2 (1.27)
Farm laborers	35.1 (2.62)	19.7 (3.10)	24.7 (3.89)	6.2 (2.47)	16.8 (4.16)	3.9 (3.20)	8.1 (3.42)	3.0 (4.78)
Farmers & farm managers	9.8 (5.9)	1.0 (.38)	5.1 (.64)	.3 (.58)	2.4 (.61)	.2 (.36)	.9 (.48)	.1 (.52)
Occupation not reported	—	—	—	2.4	—	6.6	—	—

14. The so-called "Mexican problem" of the 1920s turned into a "crisis" during the following decade, especially the worst years of the Great Depression. What had been previously a multifaceted problem now became a single issue, one which the federal government -- in conjunction with local public and private welfare agencies -- posed as a question of "how to get the Mexican off relief"? Mexicans, it was argued, were a drain on welfare coffers and they took scarce jobs away from unemployed American citizens. They were here as illegals, and according to many officials, including President Herbert Hoover, Mexicans were a chief source of the economic distress in the Southwestern and Midwestern communities in which they were concentrated.

The solution for dealing with the Mexican problem during the early 1930s was to deport them by any means necessary. Spearheaded by the Department of Labor, the Immigration Service, and local welfare and law enforcement agencies, a massive, repatriation/deportation program aimed at Mexicans was conducted between 1931 and 1935 (Hoffman, 1974; Balderrama and Rodriguez, 1995). While these deportation drives were centered in Southwest cities, they also took place in the Midwest, in places such as Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; and Gary and East Chicago, Indiana (Ano Nuevo Kerr, 1976; Kiser and Silverman, 1979; Vargas, 1993). Many tactics were employed, ranging from devious scare campaigns whereby federal agents made arrangements with metropolitan newspaper editors to print articles warning of imminent immigrant sweeps to offering free one-way train travel to Mexico for those who would leave voluntarily. The results of these governmental efforts was the involuntary deportation and "coerced" voluntary repatriation of over half a million Mexican immigrants and their native born children, who were legally American citizens. This program gave rise to the largest

government-initiated deportation effort in American history. More than anything else, the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans demonstrated vividly that they were "second class" citizens (for those born in the U.S.) at best, and an expendable group of foreign workers who constituted a social problem to be eliminated. Recalling their maltreatment in the U.S., many deportees could relate to the words repeated time after time in the following *corrido*, or Mexican folk ballad.

> Now I go to my country
> Where although at times they make war
> [Mexican Revolution]
> They will not run us from there.
> Goodbye, my dear friends,
> You are all witness
> Of the bad payment they give.
> (Balderrama, 1982)

15. For a different group of Spanish-speaking people in a different region of the nation, the Great Depression and reality as a segregated minority went hand-in-hand. Puerto Ricans, concentrated in New York City, faced a reality of separation and exclusion from mainstream society that paralleled that of their ethnic kin in the Southwest. However, their emergence as a Spanish-speaking minority evolved differently from that of Mexicans. For Puerto Ricans, a different war -- the Spanish-American War -- set in motion forces that later propelled hundreds of thousands of people from the island of Puerto Rico to American shores. The U.S. acquired Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898 and established a colonial relationship that not until 1917 allowed Puerto Ricans status as American citizens, just in time to make them eligible for military service in World War I. Though Puerto Rico was accorded commonwealth status in 1947, this development did not appreciably change the status of the island and its people as possessions of the United States. Interdependency and U.S. domination of the island's economy by World War I resulted in a migration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland U.S., a movement that gained greater momentum in the decades after World War II. Poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity on the island, combined with cheaper transportation costs, resulted in steady migration streams of Puerto Ricans to mainland cities, especially New York City's East Harlem, or "Spanish Harlem," where a highly segregated urban experience unfolded (Sanchez-Korrol, 1983).

The migration of Puerto Ricans from the island to the mainland began in earnest during the 1920s and 1930s, as American sugar cane companies invested heavily in the island economy and contributed to the breakup of subsistence farming carried out by rural islanders. The development of agribusiness in Puerto Rico also resulted in an impoverished working class that sought opportunity by relocating to the mainland. Though the migration slowed to a trickle during the Great Depression, it resumed with greater intensity during the 1940s and 1950s as the U.S., in collaboration with Puerto Rico's governor Luis Munoz Marin, initiated "Operation Bootstrap," a program to industrialize the island, shore up a lagging economy, and increase work opportunities for the people. The program was successful in part because it opened the door to industrial development, urbanization, and greater wealth for a sector of the Puerto Rican population, but it could not stem the migration flow to the U.S., primarily because unemployment on the island remained high and poverty in the emerging urban slums increased. A population boom among Puerto Ricans, moreover, prompted hundreds of thousands of poorer islanders in the post-World War II decades to venture to the mainland in search of work and opportunity, especially during the years of growing American economic prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1940, to illustrate, fewer than 70,000 Puerto Ricans lived on the mainland, the majority of whom resided in New York City. Within twenty years the Puerto Rican population in the U.S. outside the island increased to nearly 900,000 and, by the early 1970s, had grown to over 1.7 million persons -- a third of all Puerto Ricans now lived off the island (Moore and Pachon, 1985; Rodriguez-Fraticelli, 1986).

The expectations for greater economic and employment opportunities eluded most Puerto Ricans who journeyed to and settled in the U.S. Some traveled to the rural farmlands of the Midwest and found work in the migratory farm worker streams. Some moved to the urban industrial centers of the Midwest such as Chicago and Detroit (Maldonado, 1979). The majority settled in New York City and inhabited the crowded and dilapidated old tenement districts in East Harlem, the South Bronx, and near the Navy shipyards in Brooklyn. Puerto Rican migrants to urban America found an environment and a society that cast them into a racial hierarchy which they shared in many ways with African Americans. Racial attitudes about Puerto Ricans were complicated in ways not unlike that for Mexican Americans; most were *mestizo* but others appeared more European. However, unlike Mexican Americans, a substantial percentage of Spanish-speaking Puerto Ricans were black, and this factor of color added yet another condition that served to isolate Puerto Ricans from mainstream society. The prevailing attitudes about Puerto Ricans in the post-war decades thus characterized them as a poor foreign-born minority of mixed racial origins. The work they performed, both before and after World War II, mirrored that of their African American counterparts in places such as New York and Chicago. Puerto Rican women labored in garment factories and worked as hotel maids and housekeepers. Men worked in unskilled jobs in factories or in the urban service industries. Though some were able to achieve upward mobility to better jobs and better neighborhoods, the great majority remained seemingly trapped in urban *barrios* and in a labor market that offered few opportunities for advancement (Sanchez-Koffol, 1983).

By the 1960s, the condition of Puerto Ricans in New York stood precariously close to that of their African American counterparts. The schools they attended were highly segregated and lacked basic resources. To make matters worse, large numbers of Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican children, much like their Mexican American peers elsewhere in the nation, were typically labeled, as a result of IQ tests, as "slow learners" and often placed in classrooms for the "educable mentally retarded" (Rodriguez-Fraticelli, et al., 1986). Though some inter-generational advances were made by the children of the first migrants from the island, the overall picture of Puerto Ricans in New York City by 1960 was rather dismal. Whereas unemployment for white males in the city was 5 percent and 7 percent for blacks, the rate was nearly 10 percent for Puerto Ricans. Puerto Rican family income in 1960 was only 63 percent of that for white families in the city (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963). Puerto Rican school children had the highest high school drop out rate of any group in the city (87 percent) and the lowest educational attainment rates (Moore and Pachon, 1985). From all socio-economic and educational indicators, therefore, Puerto Ricans shared a dubious distinction, together with African Americans and Mexican Americans, as one of the most impoverished and disadvantaged communities in American urban society in the immediate post-World War II decades.

16. The social and economic conditions faced by Mexican-origin and Puerto Rican-origin people in the U.S. during the first half of the twentieth century, exacerbated by both individual acts of discrimination and institutionalized forms of exclusion from opportunities, gave rise to an unprecedented development in the number and variety of self-help organizations among Hispanics. These organizations mirrored the social reality of the native-born and immigrants and illustrate the pressing issues faced by Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in the decades between the world wars. First, an enormous proliferation of mutual aid-type organizations went hand-in-hand with mass immigration from Mexico. In adjusting to life in the U.S., Mexican immigrants organized hundreds of new mutual aid organizations to meet their needs for sickness and death benefits and, in a broader context, to recreate their social networks in a new environment. Many of these mutual aid associations were founded as strictly local groups, while others, such as La Sociedad Benito Juarez and La Union Patriotica Benefica Mexicana Independiente, had dozens of chapters in various states of the

Southwest and later in Midwestern communities (Hernandez, 1983; Camarillo, 1984; J. Garcia, 1996).

The mutual aid organizations, much like their predecessors of the previous century, often played a variety of key roles in Mexican American communities. They not only provided insurance benefits and sponsored social-cultural events for members, they also helped to mobilize for political action and helped organize workers against economic discrimination they faced in their communities. It was no surprise, for example, that many Mexican American mutual aid societies were responsible for the development of ethnic-oriented labor unions throughout the period, especially during the 1920s and 1930s. The major U.S. labor unions had made it quite clear that they had no intention of organizing Mexican workers, and some unions were adamantly opposed to the large-scale use of immigrant workers in the Southwest labor market. With little help from the national unions, Mexican Americans were particularly vulnerable to exploitation. The list of discriminatory and exploitative practices used against Mexican immigrants and Mexican American workers in the mining, food processing, construction, and transportation industries and in agribusiness have been well documented by scholars: racial wage differentials, contract labor, wages paid in script for purchases only at company stores, jobs designated for "Mexicans only," deportation of union leaders, and so forth. These and other conditions forced many mutual aid associations to take the lead in organizing Mexican American workers into unions. For example, in 1927, a federation of mutual aid societies from throughout Southern California gathered in Los Angeles to form the first Mexican American labor union in 1928, La Confederacion de Uniones Obreras Mexicanas, or the Confederation of Mexican Workers' Unions (Acuna, 1981, Barrera, 1985; Camarillo, 1984).

Although the period from the turn of the century through the Great Depression was one marked more by failure than success for unionization among Mexican American workers, it nevertheless was a period in which the foundations were laid for more significant union victories during the post-World War II era. More than anything else, the unionization efforts of the early twentieth century reflected the dire circumstances that confronted Mexican Americans and their need to join together in organizations to protect their rights and interests as workers.

The protection of workers' rights was in many ways inseparable from efforts to protect basic civil rights, a reality most Mexican American labor unionists faced during the period. Mexican Americans struggled to achieve civil and legal rights through a variety of local groups and, later in the period, through their first national civil rights advocacy organization.

Although civil rights advocacy of Mexican Americans was something articulated by community leaders and spokespersons since the mid-nineteenth century, the first formal organizations to include protection of civil rights in their agendas were products of the early twentieth century. For example, in 1911, Mexican Americans in Texas organized El Primer Congreso, a statewide meeting of local organizations, to unite for action against discrimination and repression by Anglos. The Congreso also identified a variety of other issues with regard to racial inequality, in particular the educational segregation of Mexican American children and violation of citizens' legal rights in the political/judicial system in Texas (Limon, 1974).

The culmination of civil rights advocacy for Mexican Americans and other Hispanics occuffed in 1939 with the formation of the Congreso de Pueblos de Habla Espanola (Congress of Spanish Speaking People). Indeed, in many ways the Congress represented the amalgamation of the mutual aid, labor, and civil rights advocacy movements for Mexican Americans during the first four decades of the twentieth century. Delegates attending the 1939 meeting of the Congress represented Mexican American and other Hispanic groups with a combined dues-paying membership of 874,000 people. In addition to advocacy and protection of

civil rights for Hispanics and opposition to racial and class discrimination, the Congress offered Hispanics a broad platform for action: political advocacy condemning legislation adversely affecting Hispanics; promotion of labor unionization; promotion of the health, education, and welfare of Hispanics; and protection of the foreign born. The Congress was the first broad-based civil rights national organization for Hispanics. It achieved a degree of cooperation among Mexican Americans across the Southwest and Hispanics in other parts of the nation never attained before or since. Although it did not survive much beyond 1945 for a variety of reasons, it mirrored the need for civil rights protection for Hispanics and signaled a new period of increased political action among Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans during the post-World War II period (Garcia, 1989; Camarillo, 1984; Sanchez, 1993).

17. Though the Congress was the only organization for Spanish-speaking people in which both Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans participated, the organizational development of the Puerto Rican community in New York City in the twentieth century paralleled in many ways the history of that for Mexican Americans, though no similar nineteenth century analogue existed for Puerto Ricans. In the years following World War I and as the initial migration stream from the island began to increase, Puerto Ricans in the city realized the need to develop organizations to promote and maintain their social and cultural traditions in the new urban milieu. As a result, several civic and cultural clubs developed, both for the small group of middle class professionals and for predominantly working class people (Sanchez-Koffol, 1983, Rodriguez-Fraticelli, et al., 1991)

18. In the immediate post-World War II decades, both Puerto Rican and Mexican American community organizations were becoming more explicitly political in nature, a product of growing political maturation that linked the destiny of "Nuyoricans" increasingly to city politics and Mexican Americans of the second generation to U.S. partisan politics. Most historians agree that returning Mexican American GIs expected and demanded more from U.S. society after risking their lives overseas to defend democracy at home. Yet, when most returned to their *barrios* and *colonias*, they found conditions little changed since they left the home front. Many of the returning servicemen were convinced that political power was the key to creating more and better opportunities. Several of the most important postwar organizations founded by Mexicans illustrated this new preoccupation with political participation and the potential influence of the Mexican American citizenry. Three organizations founded during the 1940s and 1950s serve as examples of this new orientation among Mexican Americans to advance the educational and political status of their ethnic communities: the Community Service Organization (CSO) in Los Angeles, the Mexican American Political Association in California, and its counterpart in Texas, the Political Association of Spanish-Speaking Organizations. These organizations sought to achieve political influence as the avenue to improve the well being of its constituents. Dozens of organizations during the 1960s and later have followed the precedent of these earlier groups (Gutierrez, 1994; Acuna, 1981).

19. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the status of Hispanic Americans and African American [sic] -- the nation's two largest racial minorities -- was at a critical turning point. The gains of the civil rights movement that resulted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the development of a host of federally-supported programs to support educational and economic opportunity beginning in 1967 helped to open doors previously closed to most racial and ethnic minority communities. These unprecedented legislative and executive-mandated laws and acts not only made discrimination based on race and national origin illegal, they set a context for the nation to reconsider the direction society was headed with regard to the inclusion and incorporation of American minorities who had for too long been kept outside mainstream society. In 1971 and 1972, a series of reports documented the educational isolation and schooling gap that separated Mexican American students in

public schools from the achievement of Anglo pupils. The reports revealed, for example, that in 1960, 45 percent of all Mexican American school children attended schools that were predominantly Mexican American, with the greatest degree of racial isolation in Texas schools where 65 percent of all Mexican Americans attended ethnically isolated public schools. Drop-out or attrition rates for Mexican Americans in the Southwest were higher than for any other group, including African Americans. In 1970, for every 100 Mexican American children who started first grade, only 60 graduated from high school; the high school completion rates for blacks and Anglos was 67 percent and 87 percent respectively (*Mexican American Education Study*, 1971; *The Unfinished Education*, 1971; *The Excluded Student*, 1972).

Compelling evidence of educational neglect, segregation in the public schools, and lack of educational opportunities for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans into the 1970s was perhaps the most troubling socio-economic finding reported to the American nation as a result of the reports issued by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and other agencies during the decade. The problem was an enormous one with huge implications for the future of the nation's fastest growing ethnic group. In 1970, the number of Mexican Americans had surpassed the 4.5 million mark and the Puerto Rican population on the mainland reached about 1.4 million (*Americans of Spanish Origin*, 1974). Clearly, the issues that revolved around the inclusion of Hispanics in the institutional life of American society by the 1970s were strongly influenced by the legacies of the past.

20. The most recent report published by the Population Reference Bureau in Washington, D.C., based on calculations from the U.S. Census Current Population Report from March 1996, provides an excellent profile of the demographic, socio-economic, and educational status of Hispanic Americans in the late 1990s (del Pinal and Singer). Upon review of the data, it is clear that some group progress has been achieved, especially among those Hispanics who were able to access educational and employment opportunities in the post-1970 decades and secure for themselves a measure of middle class stability. But there are many troubling signs that indicate that in important areas of American life, the diversity that Hispanics add to society by virtue of their large numbers is not reflected in the institutions which have historically promoted opportunity. Most educational and economic indicators in the 1990s point to the reality that the history I have described carries its consequences into contemporary society: Hispanics are still grossly under-represented in institutions of higher learning and over-represented when measures of poverty and low occupational status are considered. The lagging behind of Hispanics in education and income looms as a major challenge for a diverse American society in the twenty first century, especially as the Hispanic population continues to soar over the next several decades.

Population growth of Hispanics, largely due to high rates of natural increase and continuing immigration from Mexico and other Latin American nations, have prompted Census Bureau demographers to project that Hispanics will constitute the largest single ethnic group in America by 2005. As Table 2 indicates, the population increase of Hispanics, especially for Mexican-origin people, has been tremendous since 1960. The total population of Hispanics in 1996 exceeded 25 million (Mexican-origin persons comprised 64 percent, Puerto Ricans 11 percent, Central and South Americans 17 percent, Cubans 6 percent, and "other" Hispanics accounted for 12 percent). Projections for the first half of the twenty first century target the Hispanic population to surpass 65 million persons by 2030 (about 19% of the U.S. total population), a figure that is further projected to reach 95 million by mid-century (Hispanics are projected to comprise about a quarter of all Americans in 2050). These population figures point clearly to the fact that ethnic diversity in American society into the next century will be driven

TABLE 2. Hispanic Population in The United States from 1960 to 1996 with Projections for 2000, 2030, and 2050 (in millions)

	1960	1970	1980	1996	2000	2030	2050
Total Hispanic Origin Population	6.9	9.1	14.6	25.3	31.4	65.6	95.5
Hispanics as Percent of Total U.S. Population	3.9%	4.5%	6.4%	10.7%	11.4%	18.9%	24.5%

Source: Frank Bean and Marta Tienda, The Hispanic Population of the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), Table 3.1, p. 59; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995-2050, P25-1130 (February 1996), Table 1. p. 12; Jorge del Pinal and Audrey Singer, "Generations of Diversity: Latinos in the United States," Population Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, Inc., October 1997), Table 1, p. 6.

disproportionately by the increasing numbers of Hispanics. The real question is whether this growing Hispanic diversity wffl be reflected in society, or whether Hispanic Americans will continue to live separately from white Americans.

21. The socio-economic and educational profiles for Hispanics in 1996 reflect many factors that help explain why this large ethnic group in American society has shown, on the one hand, some signs of progress and advancement and, on the other hand, some persistent patterns of under-representation in the institutional life of the nation. Though certain contemporary factors undeniably have great bearing on the economic and educational well being of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other Hispanic subgroups, the influence of history continues to weigh heavily on the status of Hispanics in American society. The historical legacies of educational, occupational, and residential isolation and separation that characterize the Hispanic American past are absolutely essential considerations in understanding the nature of American diversity in the late twentieth century.