

# Appendix A

## ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR RATE-OF-RETURN COMPANIES

### Introduction

In its FNPRM (§ 235) on the MAG Plan, the Commission seeks comment on the extent to which a productivity offset or initial rate reduction should be part of any alternative regulatory plan for ROR (rate-of-return) carriers, as well as the means for establishing a productivity offset and the level at which it should be set. In this appendix, historical data for the NECA common line and traffic sensitive pools are used to estimate the productivity offset. First, AT&T's prior analysis of the MAG plan is updated to include data for the year 2000 and revised to more accurately model special access rates. Second, AT&T's proposed alternative to the revenue per line (RPL) mechanism proposed by MAG is presented and the productivity factor associated with this proposal is estimated.

The analysis supports AT&T's prior conclusion, as well as the position of numerous commenting parties, that the incentive regulation scheme proposed in the MAG plan is likely to provide ROR carriers with a substantial windfall. Growth in the GDP Price Index (GDP-PI) tends to exceed increases in the ROR carriers' costs per line, and thus the use of annual GDP-PI adjustments must be accompanied by an X-factor in order for both the MAG RPL mechanism and AT&T's proposed alternative to be consistent with the trend in carriers' cost per line.

Data for the NECA common line and traffic sensitive pools presented in this appendix indicate that during the 1990s historical growth in the GDP-PI has exceeded both the growth in pooled revenue per line and growth in embedded costs per line. The likely impact of MAG is estimated by calculating what LEC switched access revenues would have been if the MAG plan for incentive regulation had been in effect historically, with primary emphasis on the recent five year period from 1995 to 2000. Using NECA data for the common line and traffic sensitive pools, AT&T demonstrates that if all the ROR carriers had been operating under the MAG plan during those years, they would have received substantially more revenue than was actually obtained, and that an X-factor of about 4.7% would have resulted in revenue neutrality.

A similar analysis is also provided for AT&T's alternative proposal, which retains the RPL mechanism for the common line category, but utilizes conventional price cap formulas to cap traffic sensitive and special access rates. Evidence is presented in support of applying the RPL mechanism to common line without any annual inflation or productivity (i.e., GDP-PI minus X) adjustments, while applying conventional price caps to the other services with an X-factor of about 9.6%.

### Updated Analysis of MAG Proposal

The basic premise of the MAG incentive regulation scheme is fairly simple. A carrier is entitled to receive a certain amount of revenue from the pool for each access line it provides, with the revenue per line (RPL) amount adjusted each year for inflation using the GDP-PI, the same index used for the price cap carriers. Growth in a carrier's common line and traffic sensitive revenue is thus approximately equal to the growth in its lines plus the rate of inflation.<sup>1</sup> Tables 1 and 2 attached show that this growth exceeds the historical growth in revenues and revenue requirements for the NECA common line and traffic sensitive pools. Under the MAG plan, this additional revenue would come mainly from ever-increasing subsidy support, rather than from increasing interstate access charges.

Historical data for the NECA common line (CL) pool from 1990 to 2000 are summarized in Table 1. A revenue requirement for the pooling companies is calculated based on their expenses, net investment, an 11.25% rate-of-return, and a 39% marginal income tax rate. In addition, universal service contributions (i.e., flowback), which amounted to about \$40 million in 1998 and 1999 but do not represent a cost of providing service, are removed to obtain the pool's adjusted revenue requirement.

Various growth rates for the 1990-2000 and 1995-2000 periods are shown in the lower portion of the table. The growth in GDP-PI and lines combined represents the growth in revenue that would result from the MAG plan. For both the 1990-2000 and 1995-2000 periods, this growth exceeded that of both common line revenue and common line revenue requirements.

Historical data for the NECA traffic sensitive (TS) pool are summarized in Table 2, with selected growth rates shown in the lower portion of the table. In addition to adjusting the pool's revenue to generate an 11.25% return, special access revenues are removed in order to focus on the trend in switched access revenue. (The MAG proposal did not provide any details on how special access rates would be capped.)

Because NECA does not report the total number of access lines for companies in the TS pool, the growth in lines was estimated based on access minutes (which NECA does report) and the assumption that minutes per line for the pooling companies grew at the same rate as that for the entire ROR LEC industry. The growth in lines for pooling companies is thus estimated as the growth in pooled access minutes minus the growth in industry minutes per line. As discussed below, there are problems with the TS pool data prior to 1995, presumably as a result of carriers leaving the pool. Focusing on the growth rates for 1995 to 2000, which are shown in the lower portion of Table 2, it is clear that the growth in GDP-PI plus lines far exceeds the growth in either TS revenue or revenue requirements.

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<sup>1</sup> More precisely, the rate of growth in revenue can be calculated as:

$$\% \Delta \text{Rev} = (1 + \% \Delta \text{Lines}) * (1 + \% \Delta \text{GDP-PI}) - 1.$$

The tendency for revenues to grow under MAG by far more than the growth in costs means that over time carriers will enjoy ever increasing amounts of excess revenues and earnings. This is illustrated in Table 3, which shows the trend in switched access revenues (common line plus traffic sensitive) if all ROR carriers had operated under the MAG Plan for incentive regulation from 1995 to 2000. The calculations are based on illustrative data whereby data for the NECA pools are used to represent the entire ROR carrier industry.

The historical period of 1995 to 2000 was selected to represent recent history while also being of long enough duration to establish a trend. In addition, it appears that a substantial number of companies exited the NECA traffic sensitive pool during the years 1993 to 1995, and, as a result, trends in the NECA data for those years cannot be used to represent the industry. Traffic sensitive minutes reported by NECA declined from 1993 to 1995, while total minutes for the ROR carriers increased as they normally do. As a result, the trend in NECA pooled revenues and revenue requirements for those years cannot be considered representative of the entire ROR LEC industry. It is likely that those companies leaving the pool had relatively lower costs, causing the pool's overall average cost per unit to rise, even though unit costs may have been declining for individual companies.<sup>2</sup> The situation appears to have stabilized since 1995, with growth in NECA TS minutes similar to that for all ROR carriers in total. 1995 is thus an appropriate year to use as the initial year in the analysis.

In the upper portion of Table 3, industry revenues are developed on the basis of revenues reported by NECA for its common line and traffic sensitive pools. Data on total access lines reported by the pool were compared with total ROR industry lines to estimate the percentage of industry CL revenue represented by the pool. To account for the fact that rates within the pool are somewhat higher than those of non-pooling companies, the fraction of pooled lines to total lines was multiplied by a factor of 1.0135, the ratio of NECA's CL revenue per line to that for ROR LECs as a whole.<sup>3</sup> The resulting fraction provides an estimate of the percentage of total ROR LEC CL revenue that resides in the pool. Industry revenues and revenue requirements are then estimated by dividing the pool amounts by this percentage. The key assumptions underlying these calculations are that: (a) the ratio of NECA's revenue per line to that for ROR LECs as a whole has remained constant over the period; and (b) the financial performance of companies outside the pool has been similar to that of the pool. In any case, because the vast majority of ROR companies are members of the common line pool, NECA pool data provide a reasonably proxy for the entire industry.

With the traffic sensitive pool, the number of participants is considerably smaller. Data on access minutes reported by the pool were compared with total ROR industry minutes to estimate the percentage of industry TS revenue represented by the pool. To account for the fact that rates within the pool are somewhat higher than those of non-pooling companies, the fraction of pooled minutes to total minutes was multiplied by

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<sup>2</sup> While minutes in the traffic sensitive pool declined from 1993 to 1995, the pool's overall revenue per minute rose. The longer-term trend is for minutes to grow while revenue per minute declines over time.

<sup>3</sup> Calculated from prospective data in the June 2000 TRP filings.

a factor of 1.184, the ratio of NECA's TS revenue per minute to that for ROR LECs as a whole.<sup>4</sup> The resulting fraction provides an estimate of the percentage of total ROR LEC TS revenue that resides in the pool. Industry revenues and revenue requirements are then estimated by dividing the pool amounts by this percentage.

It should be emphasized that, because the data on ROR carriers are incomplete, the calculations presented here are intended mainly for illustrative purposes. They illustrate the impact that implementation of the MAG plan in its current form is likely to have, as well as the type of data and analysis that are needed to formulate a better version of the plan. The Commission should require carriers to provide this data in a format that can be readily be analyzed by the Commission and other interested parties.

To simulate the impact of MAG incentive regulation on switched access, the analysis starts with estimated industry revenue requirements per line (RPL) in 1995 and adjusts the RPL at the beginning of each subsequent year by the percentage increase in the GDP-PI.

- The estimated impact of MAG depends critically on how the initial RPL is calculated. In this analysis, it is calculated on the basis of revenue requirements associated with the authorized ROR of 11.25%. This has the effect of reducing annual revenues by about \$16 million compared to an initial RPL calculated on the basis of actual revenues for 1995.
- For the inflation adjustments, 4th quarter values of the GDP chained price index (GDP-PI) were used, with each year's RPL calculated by adjusting the previous year's RPL by the most recent 4th quarter to 4th quarter growth in GDP-PI.
- Total switched access revenue (common line plus traffic sensitive) is then calculated by multiplying each year's RPL by the corresponding number of access lines.

Results: Revenues generated by the MAG plan are shown in the line labeled "Total CL + TS revenue" in the middle of Table 3. Excess revenues resulting from MAG are shown in the following line, which shows the difference between revenues under MAG and revenue requirements. The amount of excess revenue increases each year, reaching a total of \$749 million for the common line and traffic sensitive categories in 2000. For the entire five-year period, the cumulative amount of excess revenue is nearly \$2 billion.

The MAG plan generates excess revenues because it does not contain any type of X-factor that reflects growth in LEC productivity and declining unit costs. A reasonable X-factor can be estimated by calculating the X which, when included in the RPL mechanism, results in revenues for the year 2000 that are equal to the LECs' revenue requirement. This is conceptually the same type of analysis performed by the Commission staff in its Imputed X-Factor Study done for the price cap LECs<sup>5</sup> and results

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<sup>4</sup> Calculated from prospective data in the June 2000 TRP filings.

<sup>5</sup> *Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, CC Docket Nos. 94-1 and No. 96-262, released November 15, 1999, Appendix C.

in an imputed X-factor of 4.72% for the common line and traffic sensitive categories.<sup>6</sup> Because this figure does not include a consumer productivity dividend, nor does it reflect any decline in the LECs' cost of capital over the period, it represents a very conservative estimate of what an appropriate X-factor would be.

It should be noted that this X-factor is not directly comparable to the X-factor used for the price cap LECs, because the overall price cap mechanisms differ. Under MAG, each carrier's revenue per line, rather than individual rate elements, is governed by the price cap formula. Because the number of access lines has a tendency to grow by less than usage (e.g., minutes) and other billed volumes that depend on usage, the X-factor associated with MAG will be somewhat lower than that associated with conventional price cap regulation. Nevertheless, an X-factor is still needed to protect the interests of ratepayers, contrary to MAG's assertions.<sup>7</sup>

MAG contends that productivity growth for smaller LECs is less than that of the major LECs, arguing that "rural LECs do not have the size or operating scale to accommodate an annual productivity offset" (replies at v., 22). However, MAG offers no support for this. The undisputed fact that small LECs tend to have higher unit costs says nothing about the trend in their costs over time and does not imply that small LECs experience less growth in productivity. There is no reason to believe that prices of small LECs should perpetually increase relative to those of larger LECs, as MAG implicitly advocates.

MAG claims its plan is revenue neutral,<sup>8</sup> however, this claim is based on projections that are highly dependent on certain assumptions. Although MAG's assumptions are not totally unreasonable, they are tilted in favor of the MAG plan and against continued ROR regulation. For instance, MAG's assumption of low inflation, i.e., 1.5% annual increases in the GDP-PI, is favorable for the MAG plan, while its assumed 5.8% growth in TS revenue requirements is higher than recent experience (see Table 2) and unfavorable for continued ROR regulation. MAG's claim of revenue neutrality is also predicated on the fact that it ignores the additional High Cost Loop Fund costs that will result from its plan, costs that MAG itself projects will be nearly \$300 million higher in 2006 than under current rules. These additional costs would be borne by consumers of telecommunication service in general.

### **AT&T's proposal**

As an alternative to the MAG plan, AT&T proposes a synthesis plan that combines various elements of the MAG plan, the CALLS plan, and conventional price cap regulation. The plan involves capping common line rates on a revenue per line (RPL) basis and capping other rates – i.e., traffic sensitive and special access – via a

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<sup>6</sup> The methodology used in this study is compared to that of the FCC staff in Attachment 1 below.

<sup>7</sup> MAG contends that no X-factor is needed because the RPL mechanism limits growth in revenue, but offers no support for this claim (MAG replies at 25). AT&T's analysis indicates that an X-factor is still needed, albeit one that is significantly less than that associated with conventional price caps.

<sup>8</sup> MAG ex parte, 12/8/00.

conventional price cap mechanism, with X-factor reductions applied to the traffic sensitive and special access baskets. As with AT&T's analysis of the MAG plan, the appropriate X-factor can be estimated on the basis of historical trends.

Common line rates: The MAG proposal to cap common line rates on a revenue per line basis is reasonable and, except for its inflation adjustment, is similar to the mechanism adopted in the CALLS plan. Because costs in the common line category are primarily a function of the number of subscriber lines, and most of the revenue (once per minute CCL charges are phased out) is obtained from per line SLC charges, it is reasonable to adopt a revenue per line mechanism. Tariff filing procedures that incorporate USF support and potential SLC deaveraging have already been developed in connection with CALLS. It is likely these procedures could be adapted for the non-price cap companies with only minor modifications, if any.

There is, however, no evidence to support the MAG proposal that the RPL be adjusted each year by the increase in the GDP Price Index. As shown in Table 1, the trend in common line revenue requirements per line has been relatively flat over the past several years. Since 1995, common line revenue requirements per line for the NECA pool have risen only slightly, increasing at a 0.39% annual rate. It is thus more reasonable to adopt a formula that permits revenues to increase based on just the growth in lines, as in CALLS, than on growth in lines plus inflation.

In addition to being consistent with the trend in unit costs, a simple cap on revenue per line would also be consistent with stability in rates and subsidy requirements. Once SLCs reach their caps and the CCL charge is eliminated, most of the access revenue will come from SLCs and will tend to increase over time in proportion to growth in lines. With total common line revenue capped on a per line basis, subsidy requirements will also increase roughly in proportion to growth in lines. Common Line USF support per line will be relatively constant over time and thus predictable. Under the MAG proposal to adjust the RPL annually for inflation, however, support requirements are likely to increase substantially from year to year.<sup>9</sup>

Traffic sensitive and special access rates: These rates should be capped directly via a conventional price cap mechanism with separate baskets for the traffic sensitive and special access categories. Average price indexes (APIs) should be calculated to measure the price level in each basket, with the maximum permitted API determined by the increase in GDP-PI minus the X-factor.<sup>10</sup> The procedures for doing these calculations and filing TRPs have been well established over the past decade of price cap regulation.

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<sup>9</sup> This can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose a LEC's common line revenues amount to \$100 million, \$80 million of which is obtained from SLCs and the other \$20 million from common line USF support. If subscriber lines increase by 3% and the GDP-PI increases by 2%, capped revenues increase by about 5% to \$105 million. SLC revenue increases by the 3% growth in lines to \$82.4 million. In order to provide total CL revenue of \$105 million, USF support has to increase to \$22.6 million. The 13% growth in USF is far more than the percentage growth in lines plus GDP-PI.

<sup>10</sup> Specifically, the API is not permitted to exceed the PCI (price cap index) for that basket, which is adjusted each year by the change in GDP-PI minus an X-factor. The PCI can also be adjusted for exogenous cost changes if deemed appropriate.

It is not clear what advantages a revenue per line cap, as proposed by MAG, would offer, as the MAG proposal did not provide any justification for its RPL mechanism applied to traffic sensitive and special access rates. Indeed, as shown in AT&T's Comments (pp. 5-6), there are serious drawbacks associated with a revenue per line mechanism applied to traffic sensitive rates.

The appropriate X-factor for traffic sensitive rates can be inferred from the data in Table 2 by examining the trend in TS revenue requirements per minute for the NECA pool. From 1995 to 2000, TS revenue requirements per minute (excluding special access) declined by 8.3% annually. The average inflation rate, as measured by the GDP-PI, was 1.7% during this period. The imputed X-factor, calculated as the difference between inflation and the trend in unit costs, is thus about 10%.

The impact of AT&T's proposal applied to historical data is shown in Table 4, which shows what LEC revenues would have been if AT&T's proposal had been in effect from 1995 to 2000. Price cap revenues are calculated as follows:

- Price caps are initialized by first adjusting 1995 revenues to provide an 11.25% return for both the common line and traffic sensitive categories, as was done in analyzing the MAG plan.
- Since common line revenues are capped at a constant revenue per line, total common line revenue grows in direct proportion to the number of access lines.
- The level of traffic sensitive rates is represented by TS revenue per minute, so that TS revenue varies directly with the number of access minutes. Because over 90% of TS revenue is obtained from per minute charges, while the remainder is obtained from charges for dedicated facilities that tend to increase with the amount of traffic, this is a reasonable assumption. The impact of price cap adjustments on TS rates can thus be simulated by adjusting the TS revenue per minute each year by the percentage increase in GDP-PI minus the X-factor.

As shown in Table 4, an X-factor of 9.63% applied to traffic sensitive rates would have resulted in revenues that provide an 11.25% return in 2000.

Note that this analysis does not include special access, as there was not sufficient data in NECA's TRP filings to do so. Instead, NECA's data on special access are analyzed separately in Table 5, which shows TRP data for Voice Grade and High Capacity (DS1) services taken from the 1995 and 2000 annual filings. Rates, demand quantities, and revenues for the 1995-96 tariff year are shown on the left-hand side of the table, with similar data for the 2000-01 tariff year shown in the center. (These services accounted for approximately 81% of total special access revenue in the first year and 65% in the last year.)

The right-hand side of Table 5 shows that application of a 5.02% X-factor to the initial rates would have provided the same amount of revenue as did the July 2000 rates.

The rates shown on the right-hand side of Table 5 rates are those that result from applying a series of 5 successive price cap adjustments with a 5.02% X-factor to the initial 1995-96 rates, which has the effect of reducing the initial rates by 15.5%. 5.02% thus constitutes the imputed X-factor for NECA's Voice Grade and Hi-cap special access services over a period similar to that used in the rest of this analysis. This suggests that the composite X-factor for traffic sensitive and special access may be somewhat less than the 9.63% estimated for traffic sensitive alone. Note, however, that the data used here are not complete, and special access accounts for only about 12.5% of the ROR LECs' total interstate revenue.<sup>11</sup>

### Conclusion

AT&T's updated analysis of the MAG plan provides further support for the Commission's conclusion that the plan's inflation-adjusted RPL mechanism is far too generous to the carriers, as it would give them all the benefits of productivity gains without any benefit to access customers. AT&T thus offers an alternative plan that, like the CALLS plan, seeks to balance the interests of carriers and ratepayers. Analysis of NECA data for the common line and traffic sensitive pools leads to the tentative conclusion that an X-factor in the neighborhood of 10% should be applied to the LECs' traffic sensitive and special access services. An X-factor of 10% appears to be reasonable based on the following considerations:

- An X-factor of 9.63% applied annually from 1996 to 2000 to traffic sensitive rates results in total common line plus traffic sensitive revenue equal to year 2000 revenue requirements at an 11.25% rate-of-return.
- A similar exercise applied to NECA special access rates over approximately the same period yields a somewhat lower X-factor of 5.02%, but the available TRP data do not include all special access services.
- In light of the fact that the smaller price cap carriers have reduced their switched access rates by far more than ROR carriers during the past five years,<sup>12</sup> it is reasonable to expect the ROR carriers to improve upon their recent price performance. Adding a modest Consumer Productivity Dividend to historically achieved X-factors leads to an X-factor in the neighborhood of 10%.
- Since traffic sensitive and special access services account for only about 35% of the ROR LECs' interstate revenue,<sup>13</sup> an 8% rate reduction for these services (based on a 2% increase in GDP-PI minus a 10% X-factor) is equivalent to an across-the-board reduction in all interstate rates of only 2.8% (35% times 8%). Because demand is likely to grow by far more than 2.8% annually, the LECs will still be able to realize moderate growth in interstate revenues.

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<sup>11</sup> Based on prospective data from the December 17, 2001 access charge tariff filings.

<sup>12</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>13</sup> Based on prospective data from the December 17, 2001 access charge tariff filings.

Finally, it is worth reiterating that, because the data on ROR carriers are incomplete, the calculations presented here should be regarded as tentative in nature. The Commission should require carriers to provide sufficient data in a format that can be readily be analyzed by the Commission and other interested parties.

**Attachment 1**  
**Comparison with The FCC Staff Imputed X Study**

As part of the analysis underlying its Further Notice of proposed Rulemaking on prescribing the X-factor in the local exchange carrier (LEC) price cap formula, the FCC staff performed an imputed X study (FCC 99-345, November 15, 1999, Appendix C). Like the analysis done here, the FCC study calculated imputed X-factors that would, if applied to historical data, result in the LECs as a group earning a certain rate-of-return during the final year of the study period. Using interstate financial data for the price cap LECs, and a subset consisting of just the RBOCs, the FCC staff calculated imputed X-factors for the periods 1991 to 1995 and 1991 to 1998. There are several differences between the FCC study and the one presented here:

- The FCC's imputed X-factors were chosen so as to produce a "competitive" rate of return, which was estimated to be 9.65% for 1995 and 8.68% for 1998. AT&T's study used the authorized rate of return of 11.25% as the target return for 2000. Because AT&T's study did not reflect any reduction in the cost of capital, as did the FCC, it provides a more conservative estimate of the X-factor.
- The FCC study took into account the demand response that would have resulted from lower access rates had the higher X-factors been in effect during the historical period. The FCC also provided X-factor calculations that did not assume any demand response. No demand response is assumed in this study, making it a more conservative approach. This is reasonable, however, since the imputed X-factors calculated here result in revenues that do not differ much from those actually realized.
- Because the FCC study applied to LECs who had already been operating under price cap regulation while this study applies to ROR LECs, the mechanics of calculating imputed X-factors differs between the two studies. The FCC's calculations involved determining how much the historical X-factors in effect would have to be raised in order to reduce earnings to the competitive return. This study involves determining what the X-factor would have to have been in order for the level of access rates, measured in terms of TS revenue per minute, to generate the target level of earnings.
- The FCC staff also performed additional calculations that determined the X-factor required in each year to maintain the LECs' average rate of return at the level of the previous year. This was not done here.

TABLE 1 - COMMON LINE POOL DATA

	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>
<b>NECA CL pool results (1):</b>											
IXC Access revenues	162,356,354	147,717,943	143,844,616	163,458,470	192,870,614	193,505,188	192,583,677	197,284,932	291,480,289	343,638,609	378,407,162
End user revenues	338,015,374	343,606,106	353,842,015	370,889,531	387,503,795	409,871,512	432,953,709	462,837,325	492,650,517	527,554,053	560,771,229
Long term support	262,563,073	271,729,978	305,735,598	322,608,953	346,644,678	382,255,111	425,624,307	469,515,463	472,564,542	472,774,206	477,262,032
<b>Total CL revenues</b>	<b>762,934,801</b>	<b>763,054,027</b>	<b>803,422,229</b>	<b>856,956,954</b>	<b>927,019,087</b>	<b>985,631,811</b>	<b>1,051,161,693</b>	<b>1,129,637,720</b>	<b>1,256,695,348</b>	<b>1,343,966,868</b>	<b>1,416,440,423</b>
Total expenses	632,084,904	627,198,445	648,208,584	691,841,161	754,674,027	810,667,325	864,492,829	919,823,658	1,024,316,159	1,097,327,303	1,163,823,063
Avg. net investment	1,153,627,221	1,164,165,744	1,186,562,657	1,294,035,335	1,429,478,840	1,616,249,419	1,716,524,139	1,808,320,084	1,888,151,194	1,945,221,547	2,019,963,250
Return (residue for dist.)	130,849,897	135,855,582	155,213,645	165,115,793	172,345,060	174,964,486	186,668,864	209,814,062	232,379,189	246,639,565	252,617,360
ROR (residue ratio)	11.34%	11.67%	13.08%	12.76%	12.06%	10.83%	10.87%	11.60%	12.31%	12.68%	12.51%
Return @ 11.25%	129,783,062	130,968,646	133,488,299	145,578,975	160,816,370	181,828,060	193,108,966	203,436,009	212,417,009	218,837,424	227,245,866
Tax adjustment	(682,075)	(3,124,434)	(13,889,975)	(12,490,752)	(7,370,802)	4,388,186	4,117,442	(4,077,771)	(12,762,705)	(17,775,139)	(16,221,119)
Flowback removal (2)									(39,592,000)	(40,509,000)	-
<b>Adjusted rev. requirement</b>	<b>761,185,892</b>	<b>755,042,657</b>	<b>767,806,908</b>	<b>824,929,384</b>	<b>908,119,594</b>	<b>996,883,571</b>	<b>1,061,719,237</b>	<b>1,119,181,896</b>	<b>1,184,378,463</b>	<b>1,257,880,588</b>	<b>1,374,847,809</b>
Marginal tax rate	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39
Access lines (2)	7,511,169	7,635,403	7,998,789	7,990,655	8,582,626	8,951,113	9,584,556	9,933,111	10,502,918	11,064,890	12,109,021
Rev. requirement per line	<b>101.34</b>	<b>98.89</b>	<b>95.99</b>	<b>103.24</b>	<b>105.81</b>	<b>111.37</b>	<b>110.77</b>	<b>112.67</b>	<b>112.77</b>	<b>113.68</b>	<b>113.54</b>
<b>Data on inflation:</b>											
GDP Price Index	4Q89	4Q90	4Q91	4Q92	4Q93	4Q94	4Q95	4Q96	4Q97	4Q98	4Q99
% increase	84.24	87.76	90.47	92.56	94.79	96.74	98.79	100.63	102.49	103.69	105.31
		4.18%	3.09%	2.31%	2.41%	2.06%	2.12%	1.86%	1.85%	1.17%	1.56%
<b>Growth rates</b>											
CL revenue	<b>1990-1999</b>	<b>1990-2000</b>	<b>1995-1999</b>	<b>1995-2000</b>							
CL revenue requirement	6.49%	6.38%	8.06%	7.52%							
Access lines	5.74%	6.09%	5.99%	6.64%							
CL rev. requirement per line	4.40%	4.89%	5.44%	6.23%							
GDP Price Index	1.29%	1.14%	0.52%	0.39%							
GDP-PI & lines combined	2.34%	2.26%	1.75%	1.71%							
	6.84%	7.26%	7.29%	8.05%							

**Notes:**

(1) Source of NECA pool results: FCC Monitoring Reports (Docket 87-339), Table 7.1 (1990-96), Table 3.3 (1996-98), Table 3.5 (1998-99), Table 3.3 (1999-2000).

(2) Access lines and flowback (universal service contributions) obtained from NECA TRP filings.

Access lines for 1990, which were not reported in NECA's 1991 TRP, are estimated on the basis of end user revenue, assuming same end user revenue per line as in 1991.

**TABLE 2 - TRAFFIC SENSITIVE POOL DATA**  
 With special access removed

	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>
<b>NECA TS pool results (1):</b>											
Access revenues	639,950,823	697,679,285	847,779,446	914,014,959	880,902,109	899,356,925	906,523,958	895,218,849	669,902,128	664,623,362	695,006,811
Local switching support									295,469,997	278,294,099	287,756,443
<b>Total TS revenues</b>	<b>639,950,823</b>	<b>697,679,285</b>	<b>847,779,446</b>	<b>914,014,959</b>	<b>880,902,109</b>	<b>899,356,925</b>	<b>906,523,958</b>	<b>895,218,849</b>	<b>965,372,125</b>	<b>942,917,461</b>	<b>982,763,254</b>
Total expenses	540,830,792	595,261,596	714,589,582	778,471,646	758,524,566	779,844,516	789,160,166	788,159,543	832,459,005	823,330,374	861,190,614
Avg. net investment	775,331,889	876,205,045	967,371,470	987,986,394	949,542,756	976,610,102	898,760,928	872,823,385	874,544,818	905,415,933	934,840,755
Return (residue for dist.)	99,120,031	102,417,689	133,189,864	135,543,313	122,377,543	119,512,409	117,363,792	107,059,306	132,913,120	119,587,087	121,572,640
ROR (residue ratio)	12.78%	11.69%	13.77%	13.72%	12.89%	12.24%	13.06%	12.27%	15.20%	13.21%	13.00%
Return @ 11.25%	87,224,838	98,573,068	108,829,290	111,148,469	106,823,560	109,868,636	101,110,604	98,192,631	98,386,292	101,859,292	105,169,585
Tax adjustment	(7,605,124)	(2,458,037)	(15,574,793)	(15,596,703)	(9,944,350)	(6,165,691)	(10,391,382)	(5,668,858)	(22,074,529)	(11,334,164)	(10,487,199)
Special access revenue (2)	52,163,000	57,808,000	56,668,000	50,629,000	48,675,000	43,874,000	52,213,000	51,388,000	83,101,000	98,909,000	135,841,000
<b>Adjusted rev. requirement</b>	<b>568,287,506</b>	<b>633,568,627</b>	<b>751,176,079</b>	<b>823,394,412</b>	<b>806,728,776</b>	<b>839,673,462</b>	<b>827,666,388</b>	<b>829,295,316</b>	<b>825,669,768</b>	<b>814,946,503</b>	<b>820,032,000</b>
Marginal tax rate	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39
Chargeable TS minutes (3)	11,160,443,808	11,842,118,638	12,082,805,836	13,222,836,257	12,693,759,293	12,105,386,402	12,451,777,195	13,364,965,704	14,782,195,075	15,831,783,747	18,225,517,942
Rev. requirement per minute	0.0509	0.0535	0.0622	0.0623	0.0636	0.0694	0.0665	0.0620	0.0559	0.0515	0.0450
<b>Data on inflation:</b>	4Q89	4Q90	4Q91	4Q92	4Q93	4Q94	4Q95	4Q96	4Q97	4Q98	4Q99
GDP Price Index	84.24	87.76	90.47	92.56	94.79	96.74	98.79	100.63	102.49	103.69	105.31
% increase		4.18%	3.09%	2.31%	2.41%	2.06%	2.12%	1.86%	1.85%	1.17%	1.56%
<b>Growth rates</b>	<b>1990-1999</b>	<b>1990-2000</b>	<b>1995-1999</b>	<b>1995-2000</b>							
TS revenue (inc. special)	4.40%	4.38%	1.19%	1.79%							
TS rev. req. (ex. special)	4.09%	3.74%	-0.74%	-0.47%							
TS minutes	3.96%	5.03%	6.94%	8.53%							
TS rev. req. per minute	0.12%	-1.23%	-7.19%	-8.29%							
Minutes per line	NA	NA	3.07%	2.44%							
Access lines (estimated)	NA	NA	3.76%	5.94%							
GDP Price Index	2.34%	2.26%	1.75%	1.71%							
GDP-PI & lines combined	NA	NA	5.57%	7.75%							

**Notes:**

- (1) Source of NECA pool results: FCC Monitoring Reports (Docket 87-339), Table 7.2 (1990-96), Table 3.4 (1996-98), Table 3.6 (1998-99), Table 3.4 (1999-2000)
- (2) Special access revenue obtained from NECA TRP filings, RORCOS-1(H), p. 2. Data for 1997 may have been misreported.
- (3) Access minutes obtained from NECA TRP filings.

**TABLE 3 - SIMULATION OF MAG PLAN**  
**Based on Illustrative Data (1995-2000)**  
**With Special Access Removed**

	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>
<b>Estimated industry revenues:</b>						
NECA CL Revenue	985,631,811	1,051,161,693	1,129,637,720	1,256,695,348	1,343,966,868	1,416,440,423
NECA CL Rev. Requirement	996,883,571	1,061,719,237	1,119,181,896	1,184,378,463	1,257,880,588	1,374,847,809
NECA Lines	8,951,113	9,584,556	9,933,111	10,502,918	11,064,890	12,109,021
Industry Lines	9,564,065	10,136,219	10,738,149	11,317,321	11,891,586	12,990,489
NECA/Industry cost ratio	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135
NECA CL Pool % of total	94.85%	95.83%	93.75%	94.06%	94.30%	94.47%
Industry CL Revenue	1,039,097,776	1,096,856,362	1,204,923,764	1,336,102,863	1,425,139,808	1,499,308,567
Industry CL Rev. Requirement	1,050,959,892	1,107,872,849	1,193,771,099	1,259,216,451	1,333,854,087	1,455,282,598
NECA TS Revenue	899,356,925	906,523,958	895,218,849	965,372,125	942,917,461	982,763,254
NECA TS Rev. Req. ex. special	839,673,462	827,666,388	829,295,316	825,669,768	814,946,503	820,032,000
NECA TS Minutes	12,105,386,402	12,451,777,195	13,364,965,704	14,782,195,075	15,831,783,747	18,225,517,942
Industry TS Minutes (1)	22,903,762,000	24,286,811,041	26,392,898,753	28,412,215,865	32,133,321,615	35,101,503,608
NECA/ROR price ratio	1.1840	1.1840	1.1840	1.1840	1.1840	1.1840
NECA TS Pool % of total	62.58%	60.70%	59.96%	61.60%	58.33%	61.48%
Industry TS Revenue	1,437,171,334	1,493,367,641	1,493,127,033	1,567,145,170	1,616,395,927	1,598,611,925
Industry TS Rev. Requirement	1,341,797,229	1,363,461,154	1,383,173,797	1,340,358,143	1,397,021,757	1,333,905,118
Industry CL + TS Revenue	2,476,269,110	2,590,224,004	2,698,050,797	2,903,248,033	3,041,535,736	3,097,920,492
Industry CL + TS Rev. Requirement	2,392,757,121	2,471,334,003	2,576,944,896	2,599,574,593	2,730,875,844	2,789,187,716
<b>Simulation of MAG Plan:</b>						
Total access lines (2)	9,564,065	10,136,219	10,738,149	11,317,321	11,891,586	12,990,489
GDP-PI Adjustment		2.12%	1.86%	1.85%	1.17%	1.56%
Initial CL + TS revenue per line	250.18					
Adjusted revenue per line		255.48	260.24	265.05	268.16	272.35
Total CL + TS revenue		2,589,637,698	2,794,518,162	2,999,681,510	3,188,795,549	3,537,896,685
Excess revenue		118,303,695	217,573,265	400,106,917	457,919,705	748,708,969
Target Revenue						2,789,187,716
Imputed X-Factor						4.72%
<b>Sources of revenue under MAG plan</b>						
Total access lines (2)		10,136,219	10,738,149	11,317,321	11,891,586	12,990,489
Residence/SLB percentage		87.76%	82.45%	82.05%	81.36%	81.54%
MLB percentage		12.24%	17.55%	17.95%	18.64%	18.46%
Residence/SLB lines @ \$6.50		8,895,367	8,854,069	9,286,307	9,675,192	10,591,870
MLB lines @ \$9.20		1,240,852	1,884,080	2,031,013	2,216,393	2,398,619
Total SLC revenue		830,828,696	898,619,824	948,555,826	999,354,811	1,090,973,382
Special access surcharge rev.		433,321	508,254	577,643	600,914	760,223
Traffic sensitive rev. @ \$0.016/min.		388,588,977	422,286,380	454,595,454	514,133,146	561,624,058
Total access revenues		1,219,850,994	1,321,414,458	1,403,728,922	1,514,088,870	1,653,357,663
Subsidy revenue (LTS,LSS,RAS)		1,369,786,704	1,473,103,703	1,595,952,588	1,674,706,679	1,884,539,023

**Notes:**

(1) From FCC Monitoring Report (Oct. 2001), Table 8.6, Interstate access minutes by study area, 1996-99.

2000 minutes estimated by increasing 1999 minutes by growth in common line minutes reported by NECA, Alltel, and Interstate from 1999 to 2000 in 2001 TRP (RORDMD-3). 1995 minutes from FCC Monitoring Report (Nov. 2000), Table 8.6.

(2) From FCC Monitoring Report (Oct. 2001), Table 3.3, Number of loops by study area. Average lines for each year calculated as a simple average of year-end loops for that year and year-end loops for the previous year. 2000 access lines estimated by increasing 1999 lines by growth in lines reported by NECA, Alltel, and Interstate from 1999 to 2000 in 2001 TRP (RORDMD-3).

**TABLE 4 - SIMULATION OF AT&T PLAN**  
**Based on Illustrative Data (1995-2000)**  
**With Special Access Removed**

	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>
<b>Estimated industry revenues:</b>						
NECA CL Revenue	985,631,811	1,051,161,693	1,129,637,720	1,256,695,348	1,343,966,868	1,416,440,423
NECA CL Rev. Requirement	996,883,571	1,061,719,237	1,119,181,896	1,184,378,463	1,257,880,588	1,374,847,809
NECA Lines	8,951,113	9,584,556	9,933,111	10,502,918	11,064,890	12,109,021
Industry Lines	9,564,065	10,136,219	10,738,149	11,317,321	11,891,586	12,990,489
NECA/Industry cost ratio	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135	1.0135
NECA CL Pool % of total	94.85%	95.83%	93.75%	94.06%	94.30%	94.47%
Industry CL Revenue	1,039,097,776	1,096,856,362	1,204,923,764	1,336,102,863	1,425,139,808	1,499,308,567
Industry CL Rev. Requirement	1,050,959,892	1,107,872,849	1,193,771,099	1,259,216,451	1,333,854,087	1,455,282,598
NECA TS Revenue	899,356,925	906,523,958	895,218,849	965,372,125	942,917,461	982,763,254
NECA TS Rev. Req. ex. special	839,673,462	827,666,388	829,295,316	825,669,768	814,946,503	820,032,000
NECA TS Minutes	12,105,386,402	12,451,777,195	13,364,965,704	14,782,195,075	15,831,783,747	18,225,517,942
Industry TS Minutes (1)	22,903,762,000	24,286,811,041	26,392,898,753	28,412,215,865	32,133,321,615	35,101,503,608
NECA/ROR price ratio	1.184	1.184	1.184	1.184	1.184	1.184
NECA TS Pool % of total	62.58%	60.70%	59.96%	61.60%	58.33%	61.48%
Industry TS Revenue	1,437,171,334	1,493,367,641	1,493,127,033	1,567,145,170	1,616,395,927	1,598,611,925
Industry TS Rev. Req. ex special	1,341,797,229	1,363,461,154	1,383,173,797	1,340,358,143	1,397,021,757	1,333,905,118
Industry CL + TS Revenue	2,476,269,110	2,590,224,004	2,698,050,797	2,903,248,033	3,041,535,736	3,097,920,492
Industry CL + TS Rev. Requirement	2,392,757,121	2,471,334,003	2,576,944,896	2,599,574,593	2,730,875,844	2,789,187,716
<b>Simulation of AT&amp;T Plan:</b>						
Total access lines (2)	9,564,065	10,136,219	10,738,149	11,317,321	11,891,586	12,990,489
GDP-PI Adjustment		2.12%	1.86%	1.85%	1.17%	1.56%
X-factor		9.63%	9.63%	9.63%	9.63%	9.63%
CL revenue per line	109.89	109.89	109.89	109.89	109.89	109.89
Total CL revenue		1,113,831,847	1,179,975,722	1,243,618,749	1,306,722,619	1,427,477,073
Initial TS revenue per minute	0.0586					
Adjusted revenue per minute		0.0542	0.0500	0.0461	0.0422	0.0388
Total TS revenue		1,316,017,589	1,319,116,536	1,309,601,832	1,355,893,524	1,361,710,643
Total CL + TS revenue		2,429,849,435	2,499,092,258	2,553,220,581	2,662,616,144	2,789,187,716
Target CL + TS Revenue						2,789,187,716
Imputed X-Factor						9.63%

**Notes:**

(1) From FCC Monitoring Report (Oct. 2001), Table 8.6, Interstate access minutes by study area, 1996-99.

2000 minutes estimated by increasing 1999 minutes by growth in common line minutes reported by NECA, Alltel, and Interstate from 1999 to 2000 in 2001 TRP (RORDMD-3). 1995 minutes from FCC Monitoring Report (Nov. 2000), Table 8.6.

(2) From FCC Monitoring Report (Oct. 2001), Table 3.3, Number of loops by study area. Average lines for each year calculated as a simple average of year-end loops for that year and year-end loops for the previous year. 2000 access lines estimated by increasing 1999 lines by growth in lines reported by NECA, Alltel, and Interstate from 1999 to 2000 in 2001 TRP (RORDMD-3).

TABLE 5 - NECA SPECIAL ACCESS DATA

	1995 TRP data 7/95 to 6/96			2000 TRP data 7/00 to 6/01			Price cap simulation 7/00 to 6/01		
	Rates	Demand	Revenue	Rates	Demand	Revenue	7/00 rates	demand	revenue
<b>Special - Voice grade</b>									
2-wire channel term.	\$38.25	79,576	\$3,043,782	\$41.29	26,292	\$1,085,597	\$32.33	26,292	\$849,959
4-wire channel term.	\$61.21	230,076	\$14,082,952	\$66.07	49,080	\$3,242,716	\$51.73	49,080	\$2,539,042
Channel mileage term.	\$27.38	268,323	\$7,346,684	\$29.56	65,520	\$1,936,771	\$23.14	65,520	\$1,516,178
Channel mileage facility	\$2.73	1,598,396	\$4,363,621	\$2.94	747,492	\$2,197,626	\$2.31	747,492	\$1,724,694
Non-recurring	\$171.00	355	\$60,705	\$230.00	651	\$149,730	\$144.52	651	\$94,085
<b>Special - High capacity</b>									
Channel term.	\$198.94	30,612	\$6,089,951	\$176.82	215,672	\$38,135,123	\$168.14	215,672	\$36,262,591
Channel mileage term.	\$116.34	37,420	\$4,353,443	\$94.38	189,467	\$17,881,895	\$98.33	189,467	\$18,629,689
Channel mileage facility	\$25.10	251,407	\$6,310,316	\$19.14	1,589,689	\$30,426,647	\$21.21	1,589,689	\$33,723,205
Non-recurring	\$232.00	616	\$142,912	\$251.00	5,159	\$1,294,909	\$196.08	5,159	\$1,011,571
<b>Total Voice grade &amp; Hi cap</b>			<b>\$45,794,366</b>			<b>\$96,351,015</b>			<b>\$96,351,015</b>
<b>Total Special Access</b>			<b>\$56,666,096</b>			<b>\$149,228,344</b>			

## Price cap adjustments:

	<u>4Q94</u>	<u>4Q95</u>	<u>4Q96</u>	<u>4Q97</u>	<u>4Q98</u>	<u>4Q99</u>
GDP Price Index	96.74	98.79	100.63	102.49	103.69	105.31
% GDP-PI increase		2.12%	1.86%	1.85%	1.17%	1.56%
X-factor		5.02%	5.02%	5.02%	5.02%	5.02%
Price cap adjustment (1+%GDPPI-X)		97.10%	96.84%	96.83%	96.15%	96.54%

## Note:

Special access data obtained from NECA TRP filings, RORREV-1, lines 350-440.

## Appendix B-1

Price Cap-- Small Entity Rates of Return 1994 to 2000.

Exhibit B-1

REPORTING ENTITY	LEC LOOPS	INTERSTATE RATE OF RETURN* 2000	INTERSTATE RATE OF RETURN* 1999	INTERSTATE RATE OF RETURN* 1998	INTERSTATE RATE OF RETURN* 1997	INTERSTATE RATE OF RETURN* 1996	INTERSTATE RATE OF RETURN* 1995	INTERSTATE RATE OF RETURN* 1994
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GTE Midwest Inc. (COMO+COCM+COEM); See: Note M.	331,534	17.86%	15.29%	12.56%	12.39%	11.97%	9.57%	10.79%
Citizens Telecommunications Cos. (Tariff 4); See: Note L.	312,681	30.94%	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"
Frontier-Tier 2 Concurring Companies; See: Note K.	272,138	38.95%	43.42%	45.45%	31.93%	26.91%	19.32%	17.69%
GTE Southwest Inc. (Texas - COTX)	237,202	12.87%	17.13%	14.96%	18.10%	22.42%	14.62%	8.29%
GTE South Inc. (N. Carolina - GTNC)	220,661	26.43%	24.85%	27.92%	24.48%	23.83%	14.99%	19.02%
GTE South Inc. (GTSC+COESC=GTST); See Note D.	217,451	31.70%	30.70%	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"
GTE North Inc. (COIN); See: Note J.	204,183	47.41%	41.40%	34.61%	33.26%	29.02%	23.27%	22.44%
GTE North Inc. (COL)	200,856	44.39%	41.03%	14.11%	41.14%	36.34%	24.21%	26.48%
GTE South Inc. (S. Carolina - GTSC); See Note D.	191,963	"na"	"na"	30.62%	24.06%	25.70%	18.93%	17.60%
Frontier Communications of Minnesota & Iowa; See: Note I.	188,263	33.16%	35.40%	29.28%	28.26%	23.71%	21.90%	19.65%
GTE South Inc. (Alabama - GTAL)	171,112	20.48%	22.23%	17.59%	23.49%	17.68%	11.39%	11.83%
Sprint Local Telephone Cos. - Northwest; See: Note H.	164,568	32.77%	31.86%	32.54%	30.59%	34.55%	34.17%	29.32%
Citizens Telecommunications Cos. (Tariff 2) ; See: Note G.	135,896	24.05%	15.74%	14.29%	13.25%	13.58%	"na"	"na"
GTE South Inc. (N. Carolina - CONC)	135,438	17.77%	19.87%	12.78%	16.63%	11.98%	14.16%	10.75%
GTE Northwest Inc. (Idaho - GTID)	135,283	34.26%	32.24%	30.89%	30.52%	23.94%	20.78%	19.60%
GTE Midwest Inc. (Missouri - GTMO)	132,854	19.32%	11.82%	16.08%	17.88%	19.84%	17.18%	18.20%
Valor Oklahoma; See: Note G.	124,033	11.17%	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"
GTE Systems of The South (Alabama - COAL)	123,095	14.96%	10.88%	7.97%	15.31%	9.69%	11.88%	12.58%
GTE North Inc. (COPA+COQS=COPT) ; See: Note F.	113,741	40.98%	39.58%	45.97%	36.83%	40.55%	36.38%	32.60%
GTE South Inc. (Kentucky - COKY)	99,432	32.50%	9.55%	5.97%	6.62%	4.49%	4.79%	5.56%
GTE Northwest Inc. (Washington - COWA)	95,250	39.42%	39.17%	30.41%	31.85%	29.43%	22.24%	18.07%
GTE North/Contel Systems of South(GTMI+GLMI=GAMI)	55,474	16.50%	15.75%	13.17%	15.33%	14.85%	11.45%	11.10%
Valor New Mexico #1193; See: Note E.	48,645	13.41%	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"
Valor New Mexico #1164; See: Note E.	47,574	20.57%	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"
GTE California, Inc. (Nevada - CONV)	37,040	28.79%	20.57%	24.01%	31.44%	25.50%	19.15%	27.39%
GTE South Inc. (Virginia - GTVA)	36,528	6.44%	9.94%	20.56%	23.76%	11.07%	10.91%	9.29%
GTE South Inc. (COSC); See Note D.	25,488	"na"	"na"	26.14%	25.09%	17.40%	12.32%	9.77%
Micronesian Telecomm Corp (N. Mariana Islands - GTMC)	24,945	1.87%	29.24%	34.45%	21.17%	15.49%	7.49%	2.53%
GTE Alaska (GTAK); See: Note C.	23,493	"na"	13.34%	26.89%	29.58%	19.44%	22.48%	24.78%
Citizens Telecommunications Cos. (Tariff 3); See: Note B.	23,250	16.12%	15.56%	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"
Citizens Telecommunications Cos. (Tariff 5) ; See: Note A.	16,313	-11.23%	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"	"na"
GTE Northwest Inc. (West Coast - GNCA)	13,990	-8.40%	-9.93%	-6.85%	-25.83%	-24.03%	-16.99%	-15.37%
GTE California, Inc. (Arizona - COAZ)	8,558	12.17%	15.57%	13.80%	14.17%	4.15%	2.95%	6.24%

(\*) Unless noted the line data is per the FCC Monitoring Report, October 2001, Table 3.30. Rates of return are as reported on the Interstate Rate of Return Summary, January 1, 2000 - December 31, 2000. Price-Cap Carriers.

Notes:

- A. Citizens acquired these assets from Qwest on November 1, 2000. The line data is per the January 18, 2001. the sum of the line data reported by Verizon N-IN(CONTEL) and Verizon N-IN(ALLTEL).
- B. Citizens acquired these assets from Ogden on January 1, 1998. The line data is per the January 18, 2001. the sum of the line data reported by Verizon N-IN(CONTEL) and Verizon N-IN(ALLTEL).
- C. Property was sold
- D. COSC was combined with GTSC in 1999 to form a new entity operating as GTST.
- E. Valor New Mexico line data is taken from its June 18, 2001 TRP's for 1164 & 1193.
- F. Line Data equals the sum of Verizon N-PA(Quaker and Verizon N-PA(Contel).
- G. Valor Oklahoma line data is taken from its June 18, 2001 TRP.
- H. Sprint Northwest loop count equals the sum of UTC of the NW-Wa and UTC of the NW-OR.
- I. Frontier of Minnesota and Iowa loop count equals the sum of Frontier of Iowa and Frontier of Minnesota.
- J. The GTE North Indiana line data is the sum of consists of the line data reported by Verizon N-IN(CONTEL) and Verizon N-IN(ALLTEL).
- K. The Frontier concurring carriers consist of a number of small study areas.
- L. Citizens Tariff (4) loop data is taken from its June 18, 2001 TRP.
- M. Loop Count equals the sum of KS ST DBA Verizon MW and GTE-MW Verizon-MO.

## Appendix B-2

Comparisons of Switched Access Unit Price and ROR for Price Cap Carriers vs Rate-of-Return Carriers

EXHIBIT B-2

		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1996 to 2001 % Change	Av Annual % Reduction over 5-Yr Period
<b>Price Cap Carriers</b>									
Citizens (Tariff 1)	No. of Access Lines	782,875	815,475	844,363	876,837				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.057604	\$ 0.051157	\$ 0.053603	\$ 0.045440	\$ 0.030175	\$ 0.026671	-53.70%	-10.74%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>15.42%</b>	<b>9.77%</b>	<b>17.87%</b>	<b>16.71%</b>	<b>19.68%</b>			
Citizens (Tariff 2)	No. of Access Lines	120,198	126,278	129,400	135,896				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.089386	\$ 0.088300	\$ 0.068127	\$ 0.061595	\$ 0.029855	\$ 0.025649	-71.31%	-14.26%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>13.58%</b>	<b>13.25%</b>	<b>14.29%</b>	<b>15.74%</b>	<b>24.05%</b>			
Citizens (Tariff 3)*	No. of Access Lines				23,250				
	Sw Access Unit Price@					\$ 0.013523	\$ 0.012246	-9.45%	-9.45%
	Interstate Rate Return				<b>15.56%</b>	<b>16.12%</b>			
Froniter-Tier 2 Concurring Companies	No. of Access Lines	234,647	244,557	256,206	272,138				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.059349	\$ 0.058059	\$ 0.043039	\$ 0.035596	\$ 0.022597	\$ 0.017291	-70.87%	-14.17%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>26.91%</b>	<b>31.93%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>43.42%</b>	<b>38.95%</b>			
Froniter-Minnesota & Iowa	No. of Access Lines	161,116	166,813	182,992	188,263				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.041036	\$ 0.043487	\$ 0.040741	\$ 0.032458	\$ 0.018536	\$ 0.015020	-63.40%	-12.68%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>23.71%</b>	<b>28.26%</b>	<b>29.28%</b>	<b>35.40%</b>	<b>33.16%</b>			
GTE South Inc. (Alabama-GTAL)	No. of Access Lines	150,302	156,996	162,410	171,112				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.050037	\$ 0.047795	\$ 0.043093	\$ 0.034249	\$ 0.016254	\$ 0.012886	-74.25%	-14.85%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>17.68%</b>	<b>23.49%</b>	<b>17.59%</b>	<b>22.23%</b>	<b>20.48%</b>			
GTE Sys of the South (Alabama-COAL)	No. of Access Lines	108,771	113,792	118,660	123,095				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.036440	\$ 0.036616	\$ 0.031432	\$ 0.031432	\$ 0.013082	\$ 0.012099	-66.80%	-13.36%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>9.69%</b>	<b>15.31%</b>	<b>7.97%</b>	<b>10.88%</b>	<b>14.96%</b>			
GTE California, Inc. (Arizona-COAZ)	No. of Access Lines	7,645	8,037	8,170	8,558				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.072142	\$ 0.070722	\$ 0.036831	\$ 0.041515	\$ 0.021560	\$ 0.018322	-74.60%	-14.92%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>4.15%</b>	<b>14.17%</b>	<b>13.80%</b>	<b>15.57%</b>	<b>12.17%</b>			
GTE-Alaska (GTAK)^	No. of Access Lines	18,978	20,455	22,258	23,493				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.054570	\$ 0.059840	\$ 0.043792	\$ 0.027974	\$ 0.020454		-48.74%	-12.18%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>19.44%</b>	<b>29.58%</b>	<b>26.89%</b>	<b>13.34%</b>				
GTE Northwest Inc. (Westcoast-GNCA)	No. of Access Lines	13,190	13,268	13,450	13,990				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.077878	\$ 0.049977	\$ 0.013610	\$ 0.037777	\$ -	\$ -	-100.00%	-20.00%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>-24.03%</b>	<b>-25.83%</b>	<b>-6.85%</b>	<b>-9.93%</b>	<b>-8.40%</b>			
GTE Northwest Inc. (Idaho-GTID)	No. of Access Lines	121,733	128,068	131,106	135,283				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.053730	\$ 0.064952	\$ 0.059819	\$ 0.051644	\$ 0.020333	\$ 0.015576	-71.01%	-14.20%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>23.94%</b>	<b>30.52%</b>	<b>30.89%</b>	<b>32.24%</b>	<b>34.26%</b>			
GTE North Inc. (Indiana Contel-COIN)	No. of Access Lines	172,594	179,777	187,153	193,226				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.040333	\$ 0.041642	\$ 0.048843	\$ 0.037885	\$ 0.017676	\$ 0.013674	-66.10%	-13.22%

Comparisons of Switched Access Unit Price and ROR for Price Cap Carriers vs Rate-of-Return Carriers

EXHIBIT B-2

		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1996 to 2001 % Change	Av Annual % Reduction over 5-Yr Period
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>29.02%</b>	<b>33.26%</b>	<b>34.61%</b>	<b>41.40%</b>	<b>47.71%</b>			
GTE North Inc. (Indiana Alltel-COIN)	No. of Access Lines	9,967	10,342	10,835	10,957				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.040333	\$ 0.041642	\$ 0.048843	\$ 0.037885	\$ 0.017676	\$ 0.013674	-66.10%	-13.22%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>29.02%</b>	<b>33.26%</b>	<b>34.61%</b>	<b>41.40%</b>	<b>47.71%</b>			
GTE South Inc. (Kentucky-COKY)	No. of Access Lines	88,473	92,569	95,776	99,432				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.044296	\$ 0.043138	\$ 0.038220	\$ 0.035954	\$ 0.016441	\$ 0.014242	-67.85%	-13.57%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>4.49%</b>	<b>6.62%</b>	<b>5.97%</b>	<b>9.55%</b>	<b>32.50%</b>			
GTE Midwest Inc. (Missouri-GTMO)	No. of Access Lines	119,487	124,607	128,032	132,854				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.040983	\$ 0.043061	\$ 0.036487	\$ 0.025428	\$ 0.013133	\$ 0.006853	-83.28%	-16.66%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>19.84%</b>	<b>17.88%</b>	<b>16.08%</b>	<b>11.82%</b>	<b>19.32%</b>			
GTE Midwest Inc.-KS ST (Missouri-COMT)	No. of Access Lines	3,943	4,099	4,283	4,484				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.040983	\$ 0.043061	\$ 0.036487	\$ 0.025428	\$ 0.013133	\$ 0.006853	-83.28%	-16.66%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.97%</b>	<b>12.39%</b>	<b>12.56%</b>	<b>15.29%</b>	<b>17.86%</b>			
GTE Midwest Inc. (Missouri-COMT)	No. of Access Lines	52,162	54,779	54,202	56,774				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.049773	\$ 0.045873	\$ 0.042716	\$ 0.031790	\$ 0.014554	\$ 0.006490	-86.96%	-17.39%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.97%</b>	<b>12.39%</b>	<b>12.56%</b>	<b>15.29%</b>	<b>17.86%</b>			
GTE California, Inc. (Nevada-CONV)	No. of Access Lines	30,458	32,905	34,880	37,040				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.040381	\$ 0.052874	\$ 0.037976	\$ 0.028627	\$ 0.012154	\$ 0.010376	-74.30%	-14.86%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>25.50%</b>	<b>31.44%</b>	<b>24.01%</b>	<b>20.57%</b>	<b>28.79%</b>			
GTE South Inc. (N Carolina-CONC)	No. of Access Lines	117,749	124,874	128,838	135,438				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.044342	\$ 0.039627	\$ 0.035407	\$ 0.031332	\$ 0.015108	\$ 0.012551	-71.69%	-14.34%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.98%</b>	<b>16.63%</b>	<b>12.78%</b>	<b>19.87%</b>	<b>17.77%</b>			
Micronesian Telecomm Corp (GTMC)	No. of Access Lines	18,837	20,639	20,639	24,945				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.147447	\$ 0.130564	\$ 0.059950	\$ 0.046119	\$ 0.029991	\$ 0.018616	-87.37%	-17.47%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>15.49%</b>	<b>21.17%</b>	<b>34.45%</b>	<b>29.24%</b>	<b>1.87%</b>			
GTE North Inc. PA (Contel-COPA)	No. of Access Lines	62,032	65,018	65,374	66,903				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.030114	\$ 0.050225	\$ 0.031191	\$ 0.033277	\$ 0.014901	\$ 0.012406	-58.80%	-11.76%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>40.55%</b>	<b>36.83%</b>	<b>45.97%</b>	<b>39.58%</b>	<b>40.98%</b>			
GTE North Inc. Quaker State (Contel-COQS)	No. of Access Lines	40,773	42,632	44,547	46,838				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.030114	\$ 0.050225	\$ 0.031191	\$ 0.033277	\$ 0.014901	\$ 0.012406	-58.80%	-11.76%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>40.55%</b>	<b>36.83%</b>	<b>45.97%</b>	<b>39.58%</b>	<b>40.98%</b>			
GTE South Inc. (S. Carolina-GTSC)	No. of Access Lines	169,753	177,720	187,219	191,963				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.042665	\$ 0.044124	\$ 0.038512	\$ 0.030934	\$ 0.013624	\$ 0.011621	-72.76%	-14.55%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>25.70%</b>	<b>24.06%</b>	<b>30.62%</b>	<b>30.70%</b>	<b>31.70%</b>			
GTE South Inc. (S. Carolina-COSC)	No. of Access Lines	20,934	22,610	24,225	25,488				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.041969	\$ 0.043852	\$ 0.031752	\$ 0.030934	\$ 0.013624	\$ 0.011621	-72.31%	-14.46%

Comparisons of Switched Access Unit Price and ROR for Price Cap Carriers vs Rate-of-Return Carriers

EXHIBIT B-2

		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1996 to 2001 % Change	Av Annual % Reduction over 5-Yr Period
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>17.40%</b>	<b>25.09%</b>	<b>26.14%</b>	<b>30.70%</b>	<b>31.70%</b>			
GTE South Inc. (Virginia-GTVA)	No. of Access Lines	33,940	35,140	36,367	36,528				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.050335	\$ 0.046501	\$ 0.031080	\$ 0.018197	\$ 0.012980	\$ 0.011252	-77.65%	-15.53%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.07%</b>	<b>23.76%</b>	<b>20.56%</b>	<b>9.94%</b>	<b>6.44%</b>			
GTE Northwest Inc. (Washington-COWA)	No. of Access Lines	79,420	83,753	91,428	95,250				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.053976	\$ 0.060710	\$ 0.053069	\$ 0.045296	\$ 0.017985	\$ 0.015477	-71.33%	-14.27%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>29.43%</b>	<b>31.85%</b>	<b>30.41%</b>	<b>39.17%</b>	<b>39.42%</b>			
GTE Southwest Inc. (Texas-GTTX)	No. of Access Lines	1,511,422	1,610,872	1,688,954	1,777,873				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.048549	\$ 0.042149	\$ 0.034368	\$ 0.026471	\$ 0.012257	\$ 0.010579	-78.21%	-15.64%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.53%</b>	<b>14.81%</b>	<b>16.43%</b>	<b>21.42%</b>	<b>21.74%</b>			
GTE Florida (GTFL)	No. of Access Lines	2,082,160	2,199,225	2,272,117	2,320,241				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.038965	\$ 0.030768	\$ 0.025483	\$ 0.019673	\$ 0.011708	\$ 0.010913	-71.99%	-14.40%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>15.17%</b>	<b>19.14%</b>	<b>14.58%</b>	<b>18.93%</b>	<b>21.81%</b>			
Sprint-MW (MO, KS, MN, NE, WY, TX)	No. of Access Lines	862,260	901,105	938,896	996,917				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.057574	\$ 0.050676	\$ 0.046673	\$ 0.035544	\$ 0.015787	\$ 0.011656	-79.75%	-15.95%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>21.53%</b>	<b>19.97%</b>	<b>19.66%</b>	<b>17.69%</b>	<b>18.88%</b>			
Sprint-NW (OR & WA)	No. of Access Lines	146,473	152,997	158,962	164,568				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066993	\$ 0.062586	\$ 0.059983	\$ 0.043954	\$ 0.025109	\$ 0.019183	-71.37%	-14.27%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>34.55%</b>	<b>30.59%</b>	<b>32.54%</b>	<b>31.86%</b>	<b>32.77%</b>			
Sprint-SE (TN, VA & SC)	No. of Access Lines	705,178	734,779	764,831	763,234				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.036248	\$ 0.031592	\$ 0.028120	\$ 0.019152	\$ 0.009030	\$ 0.008137	-77.55%	-15.51%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>19.30%</b>	<b>17.62%</b>	<b>15.87%</b>	<b>17.50%</b>	<b>23.32%</b>			
Sprint-Indiana	No. of Access Lines	225,592	233,235	239,321	256,398				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.051051	\$ 0.046323	\$ 0.043401	\$ 0.041331	\$ 0.016719	\$ 0.012327	-75.85%	-15.17%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>24.30%</b>	<b>26.13%</b>	<b>24.19%</b>	<b>28.98%</b>	<b>38.21%</b>			
Cincinnati Bell	No. of Access Lines	941,316	976,922	987,374	998,991				
	Sw Access Unit Price@		\$ 0.026605	\$ 0.025069	\$ 0.013717	\$ 0.007777	\$ 0.007282	-72.63%	-18.16%
	Interstate Rate Return		<b>20.04%</b>	<b>17.81%</b>	<b>25.45%</b>	<b>28.95%</b>			
Southern New England Telephone	No. of Access Lines	1,990,248	2,130,708	2,188,763	2,411,062				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.034171	\$ 0.030090	\$ 0.027095	\$ 0.018113	\$ 0.010539	\$ 0.009497	-72.21%	-14.44%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.64%</b>	<b>12.70%</b>	<b>10.99%</b>	<b>12.12%</b>	<b>23.91%</b>			
Nevada Bell	No. of Access Lines	313,150	330,523	348,674	358,700				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.035316	\$ 0.034173	\$ 0.032548	\$ 0.021744	\$ 0.014325	\$ 0.010741	-69.59%	-13.92%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>17.75%</b>	<b>19.47%</b>	<b>16.02%</b>	<b>19.26%</b>	<b>22.07%</b>			
Aliant	No. of Access Lines	269,410	279,581	290,596	294,397				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.033774	\$ 0.032397	\$ 0.029330	\$ 0.020841	\$ 0.014317	\$ 0.012703	-62.39%	-12.48%

Comparisons of Switched Access Unit Price and ROR for Price Cap Carriers vs Rate-of-Return Carriers

EXHIBIT B-2

		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1996 to 2001 % Change	Av Annual % Reduction over 5-Yr Period
	Interstate Rate Return	14.95%	12.27%	15.02%	19.27%	12.00%			

Sources:

October 2001 FCC Monitoring Report, Table 3.30, USF Loops are reported up to 1999

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 Annual Access Tariff Filings, SUM-1 TRP and RTE-1 TRP

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 FCC Form 492 Summary

@ The Sw Access Unit Price is the sum of the Carrier Common Line including PICC Revenues, Traffic Sensitive and Trunking Basket Revenues obtained from the Carriers' Annual Access Tariff Filing SUM-1 TRP divided by the Local Switching Demand from the Annual Access Tariff Filing RTE-1 TRP.

\* Odgen Telephone Company acquired by Citizens in 1999

^ GTE-Alaska was sold to ATEAC in 2000

Comparisons of Switched Access Unit Price and ROR for Price Cap Carriers vs Rate-of-Return Carriers

EXHIBIT B-2

		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1996 to 2001 % Change	Av Annual % Reduction over 5-Yr Period
<b>Rate-of-Return Carriers/Holding Companies</b>									
ALLTEL Communications Service Corp.%+# (excludes Aliant)	No. of Access Lines	1,701,506	1,794,101	1,884,338	1,977,248				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.033950	\$ 0.033679	\$ 0.035243	\$ 0.029824	\$ 0.027361	\$ 0.029389	-13.43%	-2.69%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.94%</b>		<b>13.42%</b>		<b>11.43%</b>			
ACS-Anchorage	No. of Access Lines	157,299	163,729	157,658	190,013				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.025416	\$ 0.024816	\$ 0.034841	\$ 0.035645	\$ 0.034080	\$ 0.035857	41.08%	8.22%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>12.96%</b>		<b>11.40%</b>		<b>17.09%</b>			
CenturyTel-Ohio#	No. of Access Lines	72,911	75,717	78,282	81,571				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.037255	\$ 0.034836	\$ 0.034044	\$ 0.034044	\$ 0.031679	\$ 0.031166	-16.34%	-3.27%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>21.33%</b>		<b>19.57%</b>		<b>18.96%</b>			
CenturyTel-Wisconsin	No. of Access Lines	51,601	53,831	56,199	59,264				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.030993	\$ 0.030393	\$ 0.032231	\$ 0.033035	\$ 0.028938	\$ 0.030716	-0.89%	-0.18%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>15.82%</b>		<b>16.62%</b>		<b>19.68%</b>			
CenturyTel-Midwest & Michigan>	No. of Access Lines	80,753	84,231	87,888	91,123				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066810	\$ 0.065604	\$ 0.040615	\$ 0.041419	\$ 0.038515	\$ 0.040293	-39.69%	-7.94%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		<b>16.30%</b>		<b>16.63%</b>			
CenturyTel-Other (concur with NECA)	No. of Access Lines	289,047	316,636	332,603	350,690				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066810	\$ 0.065604	\$ 0.047766	\$ 0.045299	\$ 0.042404	\$ 0.044022	-34.11%	-6.82%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		n/a			
CenturyTel-TUECA^	No. of Access Lines	475,833	527,349	631,571	660,708				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.034148	\$ 0.033707	\$ 0.033498	\$ 0.034303	\$ 0.033192	\$ 0.034969	2.41%	0.48%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.31%</b>		<b>12.39%</b>		<b>11.97%</b>			
Commonwealth Telephone Ent*	No. of Access Lines	239,060	256,674	276,778	297,405				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066810	\$ 0.065604	\$ 0.047766	\$ 0.045299	\$ 0.042404	\$ 0.044022	-34.11%	-6.82%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		n/a			
Concord Telephone	No. of Access Lines	97,866	103,380	110,525	118,218				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.022928	\$ 0.021277	\$ 0.025723	\$ 0.024231	\$ 0.024124	\$ 0.025901	12.97%	2.59%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>12.61%</b>		<b>14.05%</b>		<b>15.58%</b>			
Farmers Telephone Coop	No. of Access Lines	49,172	52,017	54,080	57,255				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.035206	\$ 0.024727	\$ 0.028093	\$ 0.027736	\$ 0.025345	\$ 0.027123	-22.96%	-4.59%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		<b>13.26%</b>			
Horry Telephone Coop	No. of Access Lines	66,130	72,893	75,821	86,423				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.027346	\$ 0.025289	\$ 0.028861	\$ 0.032273	\$ 0.030863	\$ 0.032640	19.36%	3.87%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>11.93%</b>		<b>12.91%</b>		<b>11.88%</b>			
Illinois Consolidated	No. of Access Lines	74,904	85,594	87,210	88,953				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.033396	\$ 0.032796	\$ 0.042299	\$ 0.043103	\$ 0.041520	\$ 0.043297	29.65%	5.93%
	Interstate Rate Return	<b>9.48%</b>		<b>10.34%</b>		<b>11.77%</b>			
Low Country Telephone Company%	No. of Access Lines	52,923	57,945	60,141	67,645				

Comparisons of Switched Access Unit Price and ROR for Price Cap Carriers vs Rate-of-Return Carriers

EXHIBIT B-2

		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1996 to 2001 % Change	Av Annual % Reduction over 5-Yr Period
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.058930	\$ 0.056681	\$ 0.056651	\$ 0.039528	\$ 0.039304	\$ 0.031776	-46.08%	-9.22%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		n/a			
Matanuska Telephone	No. of Access Lines	41,908	45,508	51,760	56,575				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066810	\$ 0.065604	\$ 0.047766	\$ 0.045299	\$ 0.042404	\$ 0.044022	-34.11%	-6.82%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		n/a			
Pioneer Telephone Coop	No. of Access Lines	47,485	48,926	50,640	50,282				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066810	\$ 0.065604	\$ 0.047766	\$ 0.045299	\$ 0.042404	\$ 0.044022	-34.11%	-6.82%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		n/a			
Puerto Rico Telephone Company	No. of Access Lines	1,188,082	1,256,646	1,261,733	1,294,704				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.048404	\$ 0.042615	\$ 0.355096	\$ 0.043615	\$ 0.041477	\$ 0.040416	-16.50%	-3.30%
	Interstate Rate Return	10.89%		11.95%		9.63%			
Rock Hill Telephone Company%~	No. of Access Lines	101,032	107,240	114,819	123,806				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066810	\$ 0.025463	\$ 0.021017	\$ 0.019733	\$ 0.020859	\$ 0.022649	-66.10%	-13.22%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		n/a			
Roseville Telephone Company	No. of Access Lines	103,468	111,074	117,860	123,520				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.032070	\$ 0.031385	\$ 0.040700	\$ 0.042142	\$ 0.041848	\$ 0.026429	-17.59%	-3.52%
	Interstate Rate Return	9.38%		9.97%		18.42%			
Telephone And Data Systems, Inc.%+	No. of Access Lines	501,070	529,281	557,755	588,355				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.066459	\$ 0.065297	\$ 0.047766	\$ 0.045283	\$ 0.042340	\$ 0.043950	-33.87%	-6.77%
	Interstate Rate Return	n/a		n/a		n/a			
TXU Communications%	No. of Access Lines	93,559	101,217	109,385	117,268				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.034208	\$ 0.028887	\$ 0.026140	\$ 0.023057	\$ 0.021768	\$ 0.024415	-28.63%	-5.73%
	Interstate Rate Return	10.90%		13.84%		11.67%			
Virgin Islands Telephone	No. of Access Lines	58,315	60,902	63,234	67,229				
	Sw Access Unit Price@	\$ 0.030512	\$ 0.033609	\$ 0.029563	\$ 0.030367	\$ 0.024036	\$ 0.025813	-15.40%	-3.08%
	Interstate Rate Return	11.08%		15.29%		11.48%			

Sources:

October 2001 FCC Monitoring Report, Table 3.30, USF Loops are reported up to 1999

1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 Annual Access Tariff Filings and Access Reform Tariff Filings made in 1997, 1998 and 1999

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 FCC Form 492 Summary

Footnotes:

@ The Sw Access Unit Price is the sum of the Carrier Common Line Rate and the Traffic Sensitive Revenue Requirements divided by the Local Switching Demand obtained from the Carriers' Cost Support provided in their Annual Access Tariff Filings and Access Reform Tariff Filings. Where Local Switching Demand was not available, AMOUS from the October 2001 FCC Monitoring Report was used. TS MOU Tariff Rates were used for Winterhaven Telephone Company, a TDS carrier, for 1999 and 2000.

Comparisons of Switched Access Unit Price and ROR for Price Cap Carriers vs Rate-of-Return Carriers

EXHIBIT B-2

		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1996 to 2001 % Change	Av Annual % Reduction over 5-Yr Period
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% Sw Access Unit Price developed on a Holding Company Level.

~ Rock Hill Telephone Company was a member of the NECA CL and TS Pools in 1996 and withdrew from the TS Pool in 1997.

+ some study areas are average schedule companies

# recent acquisitions from Verizon will allow Alltel to grow to approximately 3.2M access lines and for CenturyTel to grow to approximately 2.5M accessn lines.

> prior to 1997, CenturyTel-Midwest & Michigan concurred with NECA.

^ does not include Alaska study areas that were purchased from Pacific Telecom, Inc. and then sold to Alaska Communications Systems.

\* Conestoga Enterprises, Inc., Denver & Ephrata, North Pittsburgh Telephone and North State are average schedule carriers with greater than 50K access lines and, like Commonwealth Telephone (also an average schedule carrier), concur with NECA.

Madison River Telephone Company, FairPoint Communications, Inc, Guam Telephone Authorities are Holding Companies with greater than 50K access lines where cost support data were not available to perform a comparison.

## Appendix C

**LOST ANNUAL GDP-PI MINUS X PRICE REDUCTIONS  
BEGINNING WITH 2001 ANNUAL FILING AS A RESULT OF  
PHASE II PRICING FLEXIBILITY**

APPENDIX C

**SPECIAL ACCESS AND DEDICATED TRANSPORT**

<b>COMPANY</b>	<b>Specials/Ded Trans \$ Removed from Price Caps (A)</b>	<b>Date &amp; Transmittal No. When Removed (B)</b>	<b>Lost GDP-PI minus X \$ (C = A * .0413)</b>
Ameritech	\$126,179,560	5/15/01 TR# 1267	\$5,047,182
Bell South	\$690,713,421	12/26/00 TR# 575	\$27,628,537
Pacific Bell	\$134,730,620	5/15/01 TR# 35	\$5,389,225
SWBT	\$304,785,975	5/15/01 TR# 2864	\$12,191,439
Verizon East	\$1,123,582,027	6/18/01 TR# 55	\$44,943,281
GTE	\$81,244,052	6/17/01 TR# 52	\$3,249,762
Sprint	\$75,322,155	6/1/01 TR# 152&156	\$3,012,886
Frontier of Rochester	<u>\$10,992,235</u>	8/17/01 TR# 51	<u>\$439,689</u>
<b>TOTAL*</b>	<b>\$2,547,550,045</b>		<b>\$101,902,002</b>

\* Ameritech, Pacific Bell, SWBT, Verizon East, GTE, Qwest, and SNET have all filed for additional Phase II pricing flexibility in the past 90 days. These LECs are requesting that an additional \$1.0 billion of Special Access and Dedicated Transport Revenues be removed from price caps. If their requests are granted, this would increase the lost GDP-PI minus X price reductions to over \$140 million annually beginning with the 2002 annual filing.