incapable of rendering moot any perceived concerns; imposing net neutrality regulation is likely to impede the development of further competition.

A. The Net Neutrality Objections Are Not Merger Specific

1. Alleged Vertical Integration Into Internet Content

33. Merger critics attempt to argue that the merger will increase AT&T's ability to discriminate so as to favor its own content and applications over the content and applications of third parties. This argument fails on several levels.

34. First, BellSouth and AT&T are only minimally integrated into Internet content. AT&T's IPTV offering involves the delivery of content through a specific medium and format, but does not require AT&T to own the relevant content only to acquire from the owner the right to distribute. Thus, this transaction is qualitatively different from AOL/Time Warner where a media distribution company (Time Warner) vertically integrated into ownership of a key Internet content and application provider (AOL).

35. Second, the November 2005 quote from AT&T's Chairman concerning charging content and application providers for access to AT&T's pipes does not state, or even imply, that AT&T intends to favor its own content, as alleged by merger critics. To the contrary, the quote merely states that it may be appropriate to charge content and application providers (hereinafter "CAPs").

21 The vertical integration arguments are primarily advanced by Cooper/Royncroft Decl. at 4-5, 44-57, and by the Center for Digital Democracy at 3.

22 Cooper/Royncroft Decl. at 4-5. From this quote, Cooper/Royncroft argue that it somehow illustrates that the prospect for AT&T "to favor content and services provided by AT&T the broadband provider (or its affiliates or strategic partners) is very real." Id. at 5.
36. Third, in the section of their declaration titled “Network Neutrality Conditions Are Necessary,” Cooper/Roycroft quote extensively from Cisco Systems White Papers purporting to show that Cisco equipment would give AT&T the ability to engage in discrimination at various levels. This extensive discussion, however, merely shows that the ability to prioritize traffic and provide service tiering has long existed — one of the Cisco papers is dated 1999, and the most recent one is February 2005. As such, the Cisco discussion does not raise any issues specific to this merger.

37. Fourth, it is ironic that Cooper/Roycroft have seized on IPTV as a potential harm from this transaction, when AT&T’s substantial investment in Project Lightspeed is intended to provide enhanced consumer choice in competition with cable and DBS. The few incidents to date in which IPTV has been permitted to compete with cable demonstrate the significant benefits to consumers from such competition. The Financial Times, for example, reported earlier this year that the introduction of IPTV by Verizon in Herndon, Virginia, as part of a bundled offering at $109/month resulted in the incumbent cable company, Cox, dropping its bundled offering from $130/month to $90/month to persuade customers not to switch to Verizon.

2. Consolidating Customer Base

38. As a second claim of merger specificity, Cooper/Roycroft raise the issue of the growing size of AT&T’s customer base, but do not link the increase in the customer base to any

23 Id. at 48-55.
24 Id. at 49-55, nn. 92-94.
specific alleged harm. It is important to note that the customer bases in question — residential broadband subscribers — are almost entirely in non-overlapping regions, and thus there is virtually no increase in concentration within either company’s region and, hence, no loss of competition for broadband subscribers. To the extent the alleged harm is related to AT&T’s IPTV plans, I have shown above that the allegations are not merger specific, and ignore the strong competitive benefits that IPTV competition will bring to the video marketplace. To the extent that Cooper/Roycroft are claiming that a 23% share of national residential and broadband eyeballs raises competitive concerns from a network tipping standpoint, I have shown in the Internet Backbone portion of my declaration, that such concerns are unfounded.

39. In short, the broad issues raised by merger critics simply are not specific to this merger. To the contrary, the arguments substantiate the position, implicit in comments by other opponents, that net neutrality regulation raises complex, industry-wide, policy issues. Such issues are inappropriate for consideration in the context of a specific transaction.

B. Industry-wide Net Neutrality Intervention at Best Is Premature

40. I now explain my conclusion that net neutrality regulation, whether applied to this merger alone or industry wide, is at best premature.

— Cooper/Roycroft Decl. at 44-46.

— See supra ¶ 12.
1. **The Nature and Demands of the Internet Are Evolving and Call for Increased Flexibility for Network Operators**

41. As David Farber succinctly put it, "[t]he Internet is getting old." Internet traffic has traditionally been delivered on a "best-efforts" basis that treats all traffic uniformly. This model worked fairly well when the Internet was used for only a few applications, such as e-mail and web browsing, that were quite tolerant of packet delivery with delay or jitter (i.e., variations in delay). However, with the widespread digitization of various content and applications the Internet is, and increasingly will be, used to deliver a much broader array of services, placing quite different performance requirements on the network. For example, real-time, interactive services like VoIP or on-line gaming are much less tolerant of delay and jitter than are email and web browsing.

42. Along with the new applications comes an impending surge in Internet traffic. Video streaming and IPTV (especially High Definition IPTV) will consume large amounts of bandwidth, as do certain peer-to-peer applications such as those that distribute video files. Signs of this are already present.29


29 See Broadband Working Group of the MIT Communications Futures Program, *The Broadband Incentive Problem*, Cambridge University Communications Research Network (Sept. 2005). The trends identified in the MIT Report are confirmed by more recent data. E.g., Matt Marshall, *Start-ups Find New Ways to Move Huge Data Files Over Internet*, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/loid/mercurynews/business/14764812.htm ("Major League Baseball games are hogging about half of the bandwidth of Akamai, which works with content providers, and says it delivers up to 20 percent of all Web traffic. . . . The amount of data bytes from video streaming across the Internet is doubling every three or four months, according to industry watchers.") (posted June 8, 2006) (visited June 16, 2006); James Enck, *EuroTeleco Snapshot: Thinking about the Data on Data*, Daiwa Institute of Research (Apr. 2006) (noting that the volume of Internet traffic has grown at a compound rate of 7.4% per month over the past fifteen months. "Assuming that this rate continues, daily traffic may double again by the end of this year [2006], and then again by October 2007."). *Id.* at 1.
43. Addressing these developments in an efficient manner is likely to require considerable network investment (to bring fiber closer to the customer and to boost capacity in both local aggregation and backbone networks), as well as expanded service options (e.g., different price-quality options for end users and tailored to different applications). To support these investments and expanded service options, innovative pricing and contractual arrangements — such as customized relationships between broadband providers and individual CAPs — are likely to be needed. While it is impossible to predict the exact form of the efficient new arrangements, there is great value in allowing experimentation with innovative arrangements.


a. Traffic Management Practices

44. Cooper/Roycroft contend: “While the client-server model [which AT&T’s IPTV platform will use to deliver its video services] gives the content provider a high degree of control over the delivery of content, other technologies, such as the BitTorrent content-delivery architecture, utilize bandwidth more efficiently.”[30] The opinion is flawed on several grounds. First, Cooper/Roycroft provide no evidence that these other architectures, such as BitTorrent, could not be subject to similar controls by the operator. Second, BitTorrent cannot even offer real-time video delivery so it is meaningless to assert that it utilizes bandwidth “more efficiently.”[31] Finally, Cooper/Roycroft Decl. at 48. In n. 91 they cite their source of support for the claims about BitTorrent as: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12694081.

30 Cooper/Roycroft Decl. at 48. In n. 91 they cite their source of support for the claims about BitTorrent as: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12694081.

31 “BitTorrent was originally designed for file distribution. Therefore, pieces of the distributed file can reach the receivers in an order that is completely un-correlated with their positions in the file. However, to apply BitTorrent to real-time media streaming, pieces of a media stream should reach the receivers more or less sequentially so that the receivers can play the pieces back as they come in.” See Gang Wu & Tzi-cker Chiuch, Peer to Peer File Download and Streaming.
the asserted "efficiency" relies heavily on a form of cost shifting, as BitTorrent itself eloquently points out:

When a file is made available using HTTP, all upload cost is placed on the hosting machine. With BitTorrent, when multiple people are downloading the same file at the same time, they upload pieces of the file to each other. This redistributes the cost of upload to downloaders, (where it is often not even metered), thus making hosting a file with a potentially unlimited number of downloaders affordable.\(^{32}\)

Thus, the claim that AT&T sacrificed efficiency simply to retain "control" is unsubstantiated.

The critics are uniformly skeptical of traffic prioritization based on payment from the CAPs to the network operator.\(^{33}\) They see such prioritization, including through Quality of Service (QoS) tiers, as merely an attempt by network operator to extract greater revenue, especially from CAPs. However, the potential benefits of such practices should be evident. Some applications require higher levels of QoS than others in order to perform well. For example, Mr. Graham Taylor, in support of Time Warner Telecom, observes that “because of the increasing importance of Internet traffic in terms of the applications, such as voice, that are now carried via the Internet, ‘best efforts’ are inadequate in many cases.”\(^{34}\) A recent OECD report on net neutrality cautions:

The introduction of quality of service over the Internet is something that policy makers should encourage and promote. There is likely a wide range of future innovations that will require better quality of service than the current Internet can provide. The ability to designate priority to certain

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\(^{32}\) See Bram Cohen, *Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent*, available at www.bittorrent.com/bittorrentecon.pdf. (Bram Cohen is the Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of BitTorrent, Inc. and the creator of the BitTorrent peer-to-peer file distribution protocol.)

\(^{33}\) See Baldwin/Bosley Decl. at ¶¶ 219, 224, 227; Center for Digital Democracy at 3; Cooper/Roycroft at 49-55.

\(^{34}\) Taylor Decl. ¶ 28.
applications will be a boon for consumers and providers as long as there is sufficient competition in the market.\textsuperscript{35}

Net neutrality regulations sought by the merger critics would preclude network operators from offering such benefits.

b. Adding Charges to CAPs: The “Paying Twice” Fallacy

Baldwin and Bosley write: "consumers are already paying for Internet access. so forcing companies behind the most useful Internet applications to pay a premium for their programs to be useful amounts to paying the network provider twice for providing one service—delivery of content."\textsuperscript{36} This “double recovery” is a common misperception, and deserves clarification.

Consider the case of CAP services that do not involve any payment between consumers and the CAP, e.g., visits to a web site of a portal or search engine. The web site owner (the CAP) gets revenue from advertising, but does not pay end users for visits nor is paid by them. In such cases, the ability to charge the CAP opens up a new revenue pool for the network operator—advertising revenue derived by the CAP. What are the likely effects of permitting the operator to charge CAPs?

To clarify, CAPs today do pay for their incremental costs of Internet access and transport, which they can purchase from entities other than—but have interconnection with—consumer broadband providers. However, CAP services require access to broadband consumers (“eyeballs”). The reverse is also true—the value of broadband to consumers rises with improved


\textsuperscript{36} Baldwin/Bosley Decl. ¶ 227.
supply of CAP services. The provider of a broadband access network, therefore, is like an intermediary. It offers a platform that allows beneficial interactions between consumers and CAPs. Economic efficiency, as well as profit-maximizing behavior by an operator, require that the structure of prices to the two sides be set in a way that “gets both sides on board” because the value to each side depends strongly on participation and usage by the other side (the two sides are strong complements). 37

49. The right pricing structure in such circumstances involves a delicate balancing act, with prices depending on various elasticities of utilization and participation on both sides of the market, and will be quite context-specific. Regulators are unlikely to know the right answers. However, it is safe to say that the current pricing system, where the large costs of providing enhanced broadband networks to mass market consumers are predominantly covered by them alone, cannot be presumed to be efficient.

50. Moreover, if a broadband provider chooses to charge CAPs, the likely outcome would be that prices to consumers will fall. This is because broader consumer adoption and greater use of broadband drives higher revenues to CAPs, notably (but not exclusively) from advertising and, therefore, increases their willingness to pay for access to that consumer broadband network. If the broadband operator can share in CAPs’ revenue, it will therefore have a stronger incentive to stimulate consumer adoption and usage by reducing prices, improving quality, or otherwise enhancing its broadband offering. Nor is it correct to fear that “the sky is the limit” on CAP charges, because if the broadband operator charged excessively on that side, it would stifle CAP participation — which ultimately would also discourage consumer participation.

37 See generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, Institut D’Economie Industrielle (2005), available at
3. Traditional Monopoly Style Regulation Is Inappropriate Given the Substantial and Growing Competition in Broadband Access

A recurring assertion made by merger critics is that broadband access is a “cozy” and durable “duopoly” and thus eligible for common carrier-like regulation. This position is faulty for several reasons.

a. Even Duopoly Is Qualitatively Different From Monopoly

Baldwin and Bosley assert that “duopoly ... is only one step away from a monopoly.” While this is true arithmetically, in an economic sense duopoly is fundamentally different from monopoly. Economic theory shows that the behavior of two competitors can range from replicating monopoly (if the firms collude perfectly) to fiercely competitive (in winner-take-all type settings). Moreover, the possibility of strong competition under duopoly is not merely theoretical but is observed in various industries. It is therefore a dangerous and unwarranted leap to extend the monopoly regulation paradigm to situations where monopoly is not deemed inevitable or desirable. In such settings, there are compelling reasons for relying on competition backed by antitrust rules as the primary check on firms’ misconduct.

b. The Claims of “Cozy Duopoly” Claims Mischaracterize the Actual State of Broadband Competition

Merger critics assert that there is lack of broadband competition, but essentially provide no evidence. By various indicators broadband competition in the U.S. is substantial and importantly for guiding future policy is growing.


38 See Baldwin/Bosley Decl. ¶ 146.
39 See Cooper/Roycroft Decl. at 7-8.; Baldwin/Bosley Decl. ¶¶ 219, 225.
54. While only a few years ago, broadband access was heavily skewed in favor of cable modem, DSL has emerged as an increasingly strong competitor. According to the FCC’s broadband deployment data, the share of all residential high-speed lines accounted for by cable modems has declined from 70% in June 2000 to 61% in June 2005, while ADSL rose from 24.4% to 37.2%. Another source shows a still larger growth of DSL share at the expense of cable. Moreover, the growth in DSL’s share has accelerated in recent years: the FCC data show that DSL’s share hovered around 31% between June 2001 and June 2003, but rose to 35.8% by June 2004 and to 37.2% a year later.

55. Both platforms continue to add subscribers rapidly. According to the FCC data, between June 2000 and June 2005, residential ADSL subscribers increased from under a million to over 14 million while residential cable subscribers increased from approximately 2 million to over 23 million. Moreover, according to the Pew Broadband Report, the rate of growth of residential
broadband subscribers has increased in the past year, primarily driven by DSL.\textsuperscript{44} The intensifying competition in broadband is also shown by the increase in the percentage of zip codes reported to have two or more providers. This percentage rose from 33.7% in December 1999 to 82.9% in December 2004 and 88.8% by June 2005.\textsuperscript{45}

56. Broadband pricing has been decreasing. According to the Pew Broadband Report, the average price of residential DSL service has decreased from $38 per month in February 2004 to $32 per month in December 2005.\textsuperscript{46} There is also ample direct evidence of head-to-head rivalry between cable and DSL providers, in the form of advertising targeted at the other’s product\textsuperscript{47} and pricing promotions targeted at the other’s customers.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{44} According to the Report, the number of Americans who have broadband at home increased by 40 percent from March 2005 to March 2006, compared to the 20 percent increase from March 2004 to March 2005. Pew Broadband Report at 1. The higher growth in DSL versus cable for the past year is shown on page 6.

\textsuperscript{45} See FCC Broadband Report at Table 15 (showing the following trend: December 1999: 33.7%, June 2000: 41.1%, December 2000: 50.7%, June 2001: 57.4%, December 2001: 59.9%, June 2002: 65.4%, December 2002: 70.6%, June 2003: 74.6%, December 2003: 78.3%, June 2004: 80.4%, December 2004: 82.9%, June 2005: 88.8%). While the zip code data overstates somewhat the percentage of households in that locality that are actually accessed by both DSL and cable, the trends in this percentage should be less vulnerable to this bias.

\textsuperscript{46} See Pew Broadband Report at 6-7.

\textsuperscript{47} Comcast explicitly targets DSL customers to switch to cable through its “Slowskys” advertisements featuring turtles that prefer DSL because it is supposedly slower than cable. See, e.g., http://www.theslowskys.com/

\textsuperscript{48} See note 25, supra. Despite this evidence of competition, Cooper/Roycroft (at 8) claim that lack of competition explains the decline in broadband penetration in the U.S. relative to other countries from 3\textsuperscript{rd} in 2000 to 16\textsuperscript{th} in 2005, based on ITU data. Such international comparisons must be handled with great care. For example, the rankings are sensitive to the measure of performance being used. More importantly, even for a given and consistent measure, differences between countries depend on factors that affect deployment costs, such as differences in population density, and on the price of alternatives to broadband (e.g., the availability of unlimited dial-up calling in the U.S. but not in many other countries makes U.S. consumers more willing to retain dial up Internet access). Cooper/Roycroft do not control for these factors and provide no evidence regarding differences in the level of competition internationally.
57. Finally, it is important to stress that broadband access is not a blockaded duopoly. While it is true that DSL and cable today are the predominant platforms, there are no legal barriers to further entry. Furthermore, alternative technologies and providers already exist. Their share is relatively small today but their importance seems to be growing. FCC data show that between December 2004 through June 2005 the number of satellite and wireless broadband lines almost doubled, from 550,000 to almost 1 million.\(^49\) While virtually all of this increase has been for business customers, the FCC and others believe that wireless technologies have wider potential for broadband provision.\(^50\) In conclusion, broadband access cannot be characterized as a duopoly, let alone a durable duopoly.\(^51\)

c. Net Neutrality Regulation Is Likely To Impede Broadband Competition

58. To the extent that additional broadband competition would be desirable, imposing intrusive net neutrality regulation is likely to retard the development of such competition.

\(^{49}\) This includes all high-speed lines, not just those for residential end-users. See FCC Broadband Report at Table 1.


\(^{51}\) As the FCC stated: "[t]he competing analyses fail to recognize the dynamic nature of the marketplace forces. We fully recognize that not all American households can choose between cable modem and DSL-based Internet access service today. But a wide variety of competitive and potentially competitive providers and offerings are emerging in this marketplace. Cable modem and DSL providers are currently the market leaders for broadband Internet access service and have established rapidly expanding platforms. There are, however, other existing and developing platforms, such as satellite and wireless, and even broadband over power line in certain locations, indicating that broadband Internet access services in the future will not be limited to cable modem and DSL service." See In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Red. 14853, 14880-81 ¶ 50 (Sept. 23, 2005) (footnotes omitted).
59. **Diminished Investment Incentives.** Most obviously, regulatory restrictions can be expected to reduce incentives for new investment in network infrastructure. Merger critics dismiss this issue, contending that the “duopoly” should not be allowed to “extract rents,” especially from content or application providers. This position ignores the fact that the deployment of enhanced broadband networks requires massive and recurring new investments. Merger critics seem comfortable arguing that allowing broadband providers to charge CAPs will stifle investment and innovation at that end — but curiously resist acknowledging that depressing returns to broadband investment can be expected to discourage investment and entry there.

60. **Reduced Scope for Differentiation.** Baldwin and Bosley, citing the critique by Roycroft, reject the argument by Ford et al. that net neutrality regulations may make it more difficult to support additional broadband competitors by impeding the ability of competitors to differentiate their offerings. While the empirical magnitude of this effect is uncertain, the theoretical point made by Ford et al. is correct. Impeding through regulation competitors’ ability to differentiate their offerings can reduce the prospects for entry. The fact that net neutrality

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52 See Baldwin/Bosley Decl. ¶ 225.
obligations would not entirely eliminate the ability to differentiate, as argued by Roycroft, does not negate the basic point.

C. Conclusions

61. The evolution of Internet applications, content, and usage patterns can be expected to place increased strain on the traditional Internet business models of infrastructure providers. Expanded price/service options and large increased investments in enhanced mass market broadband networks are likely to be needed in order to address the evolving demands. As I have shown, imposing net neutrality regulation runs the serious risk of stifling the emergence of efficient new options and reducing the incentives for broadband investment. Merger critics seem to greatly downplay this issue - as well as the substantial and growing broadband competition that undercuts the need for regulation. There are sound economic reasons to continue to allow competition to evolve, rather than to overlay the Internet with intrusive regulation at this stage.

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signature: /s/ Marius Schwartz
Marius Schwartz

Date: June 19, 2006
APPENDICES & TABLES

Appendix 1
Curriculum Vitae of Professor Marius Schwartz

Table 1
Internet Traffic Shares: North America Total and Tier 1

Table 2
Internet Revenues Shares: Backbone Related Functions for Tier 1 Internet Backbone Providers
MARIUS SCHWARTZ

Work: Department of Economics
Georgetown University, ICC 583
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Home: 3905 Jocelyn Street, NW
Washington DC 20015
tel (202) 363-1896

EDUCATION
University of California, Los Angeles: Ph.D. in Economics, September 1982
University of California, Los Angeles: M.A. in Economics, March 1978
London School of Economics: B.Sc., in Economics (1st Class Honors), August 1976

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Georgetown University, Department of Economics
Professor, June 1993—present
Associate Professor, August 1987—May 1993
Assistant Professor, January 1983—July 1987 (part time in Fall 1982)

Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching Award, Economics Department, 2001
Director of Graduate Studies: Spring 1993—Spring 1995

Courses Taught: Graduate—Industrial Organization, Microeconomics for executives and policy makers, Macroeconomic Theory I and II, Monetary Policy. Undergraduate—Antitrust, Industrial Organization, Mergers & Corporate Control, Microeconomics (Principles, and Intermediate), Topics in Competition and Regulation, International Economics, Macroeconomic Theory

President's Council of Economic Advisers


Served as the senior economist responsible for antitrust, regulated industries, and other industrial organization matters. Work included: Telecommunications Act of 1996; competition in international satellite services; competition in the electric utility industry; reforming the patent and trademark office; intellectual property rights; international trade disputes; health care.

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division

Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, January 1999—June 1999


In these positions, I was responsible for overseeing economic analysis at the Antitrust Division of numerous mergers and non-merger matters in various industries, including:

Mergers & Joint Ventures - Ameritech/SBC, Bell Atlantic/GTE, AT&T/BT, Cargill/Continental, Aetna/Prudential, CBS/Viacom.
Monopolization—suit against American Airlines for predatory pricing (pending).

Regulatory—Bell entry into long-distance telecommunications services.

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (continued)

Outside Expert

UPM-RAAT/BEKim-MACv merger, 2003—testified at trial.


General Electric/Honeywell merger, 2000-01 — prepared to serve as the testifying economic expert.

WorldCom/Sprint merger, 2000—prepared to serve as the testifying economic expert on Internet backbone issues.

Bell entry, 1996-997—served as DOJ’s outside economic expert on Bell entry into long-distance telecommunications services, under section 271 of the Telecom Act, and submitted two affidavits on behalf of DOJ to the Federal Communications Commission.


Expert Testimony

Presented written and oral court testimony in successful challenges of merger and of consent decree.

Mergers

Investigated mergers in several industries and helped to design appropriate relief.

Business Practices

Worked on vertical-restraints cases (tying, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, exclusive territorial arrangements) and horizontal-conduct cases (collusion and predation).

Legislation, Congressional Matters, Division Reports

Provided input to Antitrust Division’s Merger Guidelines (1992) and Vertical Restraints Guidelines (1984). Helped draft Division comments on various Congressional legislation and responses to inquiries in several areas including price discrimination and dealer termination.

Cooperation with Foreign Competition Authorities

Interacted with competition officials from several countries and agencies, and commented on various documents covering subjects such as predatory pricing, price discrimination, distribution systems, sole import distributorships, joint R&D, and the interaction between trade and competition policies.

Other Professional Experience

New Zealand Commerce Commission, Consultant (2005-2006)

Consultant in private antitrust and regulatory matters — details and references available on request.

ILADES: Participated in designing and teaching a short course in industrial organization to policy makers and executives in Santiago, Chile, June 1994.

Pew Freedom Fellows Program: Taught short course in microeconomics to twenty Fellows from transition economies, annually, January 1993–1999. (Fellows hold middle-level or upper-level positions in government and private business.)

Center for Economic Development, Slovakia: Academic Advisory Board.

World Bank: Consultant.

Abt Associates/USAID: Advised Government of Zimbabwe in Harare on formulating antitrust law, summer 1993 (consultant to Abt, work funded by USAID’s Implementing Policy Change Project).

LANGUAGES

French, Hebrew, Romanian (speak and read Hebrew fluently; proficient in French and Romanian).

HONORS

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division: Special Achievement Awards
Brookings Institution: Research Fellow, 1979-80
University of California, Los Angeles: Earhart Fellowship, 1977-78
University of California, Los Angeles: Regents fellowship, 1976-77
London School of Economics: Premchand Prize in Monetary Economics, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Journals


Marius Schwartz cv, April 2006


This issue of the journal was published in parallel as *Strategic Behavior and Industrial Competition*, Morris et al. Eds., Oxford University Press, 1986.


**Monographs, Book Chapters, and Other Publications**


"Vertical Restraints," published in German by Forschungsinstutur fur Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wettbewer by E.V. Kuhn, Helt 5, 1984.

REGULATORY FILINGS, DISCUSSION PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS


"Interconnection Incentives of a Large Network Facing Multiple Rivals." (with David Malueg), Georgetown University, Department of Economics Working Paper 03-01, January 2003 <http://cecor.georgetown.edu/workingpapers/>


"Exclusive Dealing, Product Differentiation, and Rent Extraction," in progress (with Serge Moresi and Francis O'Toole).


"Intelsat Restructuring and Comsat's Non-Dominance: Reply to Dr. Owen and Professor Waverman," paper filed on behalf of Comsat Corporation with the FCC. In the Matter of Comsat Corporation Petition for Forbearance from Dominant Carrier Regulation and for Reclassification As a Non-Dominant Carrier, ("Comsat's Forbearance Petition") File No. 60-SAT-ISP-97, March 1998.


"The 'Open Local Market Standard' for Authorizing BOC InterLATA Entry: Reply to BOC Criticisms," Supplemental Affidavit submitted on behalf of U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to FCC, along with DOJ's evaluation of following BOC application(s): BellSouth in South Carolina, November 4, 1997 and in Louisiana, December 10, 1997. <www.usdoj.gov/atr/statements/1281.htm>

"Competitive Implications of Bell Operating Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Services," Affidavit submitted on behalf of U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to FCC, along with DOJ's evaluations of following BOC applications: SBC in Oklahoma, May 16, 1997; Ameritech in Michigan, June 25, 1997; and BellSouth in South Carolina, November 4, 1997 and in Louisiana, December 10, 1997. <www.usdoj.gov/atr/statements/Affirm60.htm>


"Do Sunk Costs Discourage or Encourage Collusion?" U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, EPO Discussion Paper 85-10 (September 1985).


OTHER SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES

Seminars Presented

Bellcore
Bureau of Competition Policy, Industry Canada
California State University, Hayward
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Columbia University
ENSAE, Paris
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Georgetown University
George Washington University
U.S. International Trade Commission
Johns Hopkins University
New York University - Economics Department
New York University - Stern School of Business
Pennsylvania State University
Simon Fraser University
Tel Aviv University Law School
Tulane University
University of Alberta
University of British Columbia
University of Calgary
University of California, Davis
University of California, Los Angeles
University of Colorado, Boulder
University of Illinois
University of Maryland
University of Montreal
University of Pennsylvania
University of Toronto
University of Virginia
U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Federal Communications Commission
U.S. Federal Trade Commission
Conferences: Speaker, Discussant or Panelist

- Institut d’Economie Industrielle, "The Economics of Electronic Communication Markets," Toulouse, October 2004
- DOJ/FTC Merger Enforcement Workshop, Washington DC, February 2004
- DOJ/FTC Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy, Washington DC, April 2003
- "Integration, Investment and Innovation: Future Directions for the Telecommunications Industry," Georgetown University McDonough School of Business, February 2003
- "The Regulation of Information Platforms," University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, January 2002
- "Telecommunications After Bell Entry," Conference at University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, April 2000
- 48th Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting, American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Washington DC, April 2000
- Telecom-IT Americas ’99 Conference, Institute of the Americas, La Jolla, November 1999
- 5th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, October 1999
- "Regulatory Reform in Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands and the United States," OECD, Paris, March 1999
- Federal Communications Bar Association Competition Committee, Symposium, Washington DC, January 1999
- Conference on Anticompetitive Regulation, Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute, Florence, September 1999
- 47th Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting, American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Washington DC, April 1999
- Telecommunications seminar series, Canadian Bureau of Competition, Ottawa, September 1997
- Competition Policy Workshop, The World Bank, June 1997
- Economics of Interconnection Forum, Federal Communications Commission, Washington DC, May 1996
- Authors’ Symposium on Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, Canadian Bureau of Competition, Aylmer, Quebec, May 1996
- Electric Generation Association, Annual Meetings, West Palm Beach, April 1996
- "New Learning on Barriers to Entry in Competition Policy." Canadian Bureau of Competition, Ottawa, March 1995
  Southeastern Economic Theory Meetings, Charlottesville, October 1994
- FARIE Conference, Tel Aviv, September 1993
- Midwest International Economics Meetings, Pittsburgh, October 1992
- Latin American Econometric Society, Mexico City, September 1992
- Conference on Industrial Organization, Carleton University, Ottawa, July 1991
  Workshop on Strategic and Dynamic Aspects of International Trade, SUNY at Stony Brook, July 1991
- EARE Conference, Lisbon, September 1990
- EARE Conference, Budapest, August 1989
- Conference on Strategy and Market Structure, Dundee University, Dundee, August 1988
- Conference on "Firm Ownership and Competition," Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, June 1987
- EARIE Conference, Berlin, August 1986
  AEA Annual Meetings, Dallas, December 1984

Referee for Professional Journals

American Economic Review
Canadian Journal of Economics
Economica
Economic Journal
Economics Letters
European Economic Review
European Journal of Political Economy
International Economic Review
International Journal of Industrial Organization
Journal of Business
Journal of Business Economics
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Journal of Economic Education
Journal of Economic Theory
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Journal of Industrial Economics
Journal of International Economics
Journal of Law & Economics
Journal of Political Economy
Managerial and Decision Economics
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business
RAND Journal of Economics
Review of Industrial Organization
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