

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of)
) WC Docket No. 07-52
Broadband Industry Practices)

REPLY COMMENTS OF QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL INC.

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COMMENTS OF QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL INC.

Qwest Communications International Inc. (“Qwest”) hereby submits its reply comments on the *Notice of Inquiry* (the “*NOI*”) issued by the Federal Communications Commission (“Commission”) on April 16, 2007 in this proceeding.¹

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The record in this proceeding demonstrates that the broadband access industry is a competitive industry, that competition has only quickened since the date of the Commission’s *2005 Broadband Order*,² and that competition continues to grow. This economic reality is confirmed by the findings of the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) in its June 2007 report on broadband competition.³ In the light of these facts, it is not surprising that there is a dearth of evidence in the record of a market failure that would warrant government intervention at this time. In its initial comments, Qwest demonstrated that the products and services at issue in the

¹ *In the Matter of Broadband Industry Practices*, Notice of Inquiry, WC Docket No. 07-52, FCC 07-31, 22 FCC Rcd 7894 (rel. Apr. 16, 2007).

² *See In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers*, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 (2005) (“*2005 Broadband Order*”), *pets. for review pending sub nom. Time Warner Telecom v. FCC*, No. 05-4769 (and cons. cases) (Third Circuit, oral argument held Mar. 16, 2007).

³ *Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy*, June 2007, hereinafter the “*FTC Broadband Competition Report*”.

NOI are subject only to Title I regulation and are not currently regulated due to the competitive nature of the services at issue. Qwest also demonstrated that there is no policy or legal basis for imposing the types of proscriptive Internet (“Internet” or “Net”) regulation advocated by some parties here, including any of the variety of non-discrimination obligations proposed. The majority of comments in the initial round echo Qwest’s position. These reply comments focus particularly on the disincentives that Internet regulation (particularly a non-discrimination obligation) creates for broadband infrastructure investment and the harm that results from placing the entire burden of such investment on end users. Proponents of Internet regulation largely ignore these economic realities and essentially claim a moral high ground -- *i.e.*, that they, and they alone, can divine the best normative “moral” structure for the Internet. However, this position is belied by, among other things, the views of two notable Internet visionaries -- David Farber and Robert Kahn -- both of whom oppose such regulation. The Commission should reject arguments by Internet regulation proponents asking that it pick winners and losers at this point in time and impose one-sided regulation on broadband service providers (“BSPs”). Instead, the Commission, following its mandate under Section 157 of the Act, should prioritize the removal of barriers to infrastructure investment. Indeed, as Qwest demonstrated in its initial comments, there is a presumption in favor of BSPs’ rights to employ Net management initiatives. Simply put, proponents of Internet regulation have not met their burden of demonstrating that the Commission should reverse its decades-old “hands-off” approach to the Internet. Moreover, while the *NOI* raises the question of whether some form of Title I regulation can be imposed here, proponents of Internet regulation make clear that their proposals would all require a complete reversal of course by the Commission and a return to Title II common carrier regulation. Whatever the view of the Commission’s Title I authority in this area, it can not be

seriously argued that any form of Title II regulation has a place in connection with the competitive services at issue.

II. QWEST'S REPLY COMMENTS

A. **The Record Includes Persuasive Evidence That The BSP Market Is Competitive And That Competition Is Increasing.**

1. **The initial comments provide extensive evidence demonstrating that the BSP industry is competitive and that competition is increasing.**

Qwest, in its initial comments, demonstrated that the BSP market continues to be competitive. Qwest cited various sources, including the Commission's own statistics and past findings.⁴ These sources, among other things, evidenced increased broadband penetration and increased diversity of broadband providers following the Commission's *2005 Broadband Order*. The other initial comments filed in response to the *NOI* add considerable evidence to the record in this proceeding regarding competition in the industry. This evidence suggests competition continues to be robust, has increased in recent years and has only quickened since the Commission's *2005 Broadband Order*. These other initial comments include evidence that:

- There is intense head-to-head competition among cable companies and telcos in the wake of the Commission's *2005 Broadband Order* -- by way of example, evidenced by "triple play" product offerings (*e.g.*, voice, video and cable) and aggressive competition in price and quality for both digital subscriber line ("DSL") and cable modem offerings.⁵

⁴ Qwest Comments at 3-4.

⁵ *See, e.g.*, AT&T Inc. ("AT&T") at 58-59; Verizon and Verizon Wireless ("Verizon") at 55-56.

- There is increasing intermodal competition brought about by existing and anticipated increases in the deployment of Wi-MAX, Wi-Fi hot spots and Broadband over Powerline (“BPL”).⁶
- The availability of choice in BSPs has increased significantly -- as suggested by the Commission’s own data and other sources. Specifically, the Commission’s “High-Speed Services for Internet Access; Status as of June 30, 2006” indicates that the number of U.S. Zip codes with three or more broadband choices has jumped from 32% and 61% in 2000 and 2003, respectively, to 87% in 2006.⁷
- Broadband prices are falling -- by way of example only, initial comments report that the average cost of one Mbps fell from \$26 in 2002 to \$7 in 2006 and both DSL and cable modem prices have decreased in recent years.⁸
- BSPs continue to increase the speed and quality of their services.⁹
- Broadband deployment by rural carriers has expanded rapidly. For example, a survey of National Telecommunications Cooperative Association (“NTCA”) members shows that: (a) 100% of respondents now provide broadband to some part of their customer base, up from 96% in 2005 and 58% in 2000; and (b) 86% of respondents report facing competition in providing advanced services from at least one other provider.¹⁰ Similarly, a recent Organization for the Promotion of

⁶ AT&T at 61; *see also* Hands Off the Internet at 9-10 (estimates that fiber, satellite, wireless and BPL combined share will be over 11% by 2010 are “likely low”).

⁷ Time Warner Inc. (“Time Warner”) at 5; Verizon at 7-9 (demonstrating that both the number and variety of competitors in the industry continues to grow).

⁸ Verizon at 5; AT&T at 61-62.

⁹ Verizon at 6-9; Fiber-to-the-Home Council (“FTTH Council”) at 10-12.

¹⁰ Sprint Nextel Corporation (“Sprint Nextel”), Appendix A at 5.

Advancement of Small Telecommunications Companies (“OPASTCO”) poll reports that approximately 85% of OPASTCO members are offering broadband to their customers.¹¹

- Consumer adoption of broadband “jumped from 60 million in March 2005 to 84 million in March 2006 -- a leap of 40%” and the home broadband subscription increase rate doubled from the 2004/2005 time period to the 2005/2006 time period.¹²
- Overall, 53% of all U.S. households now subscribe to broadband.¹³
- This penetration level is expected to increase to over 70% of households by 2010.¹⁴
- As of April of 2007, 81.8% of U.S. households with Internet access subscribe to broadband compared with 70.4% in April of 2006.¹⁵
- Empirical economic analysis confirms that broadband competition only increased as a result of the Commission’s *2005 Broadband Order*.¹⁶

Indeed, in the face of this persuasive evidence, even certain proponents of Internet regulation were forced to acknowledge the evidence pointing toward increasing competition in the broadband service industry.¹⁷

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*, Appendix A at 6 (citing a study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project).

¹³ Verizon at 4.

¹⁴ FTTH Council at 9-10.

¹⁵ U.S. Chamber of Commerce at 5 (citing studies).

¹⁶ Verizon at 20-22 and Appendix A (economic analysis shows that significant gains in broadband subscribership following the Commission’s *2005 Broadband Order* and similar results from other Commission de-regulation steps).

2. The FTC's June 2007 *FTC Broadband Competition Report* provides further evidence of competition in the industry.

In its June, 2007 staff report entitled "*Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy*", the FTC recommends against imposing Internet regulation at this time.¹⁸ Part of the basis for that recommendation is the evidence the FTC finds of competition in the broadband services market. Specifically, the *FTC Broadband Competition Report* states:

By some accounts, the broadband Internet access industry is showing signs of robust competition, including fast growth, declining prices for higher-quality service, and the current market-leading technology (*i.e.*, cable modem) losing share to the more recently deregulated major alternative (*i.e.*, DSL). Broadband deployment and penetration have both increased dramatically since 2000. From June 2000 to June 2006, the number of high-speed Internet lines increased from 4.1 million to 64.6 million, with 52 percent growth from June 2005 to June 2006 alone. The FCC estimated that by 2006, broadband DSL service was available to 79 percent of the households that were served by a telephone company, and cable modem service was available to 93 percent of the households to which cable companies could provide cable television service. Penetration kept pace with deployment, as by 2006, broadband Internet access accounted for over 70 percent of all U.S. Internet access. Prices for DSL broadband services have also fallen rapidly as the telephone companies have competed aggressively to take market share from the cable companies. By one estimate, the average monthly revenue per user of DSL service decreased from 40 dollars in 2002 to 31 dollars in 2006. From May 2005 to April 2006, AT&T reduced the monthly price of 3.0 Mbps DSL service from \$29.95 to \$17.99. Quality-adjusted cable modem prices too have fallen.¹⁹

More broadly, the *FTC Broadband Competition Report* states the following with respect to the broadband services access market:

This market has quickly evolved from one in which consumers could get broadband only if they had access to cable systems offering it, to one in which

¹⁷ For example, the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates ("NASUCA") concedes that broadband prices are falling. NASUCA at 21-22 (citing a study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project reporting that the average price for broadband access dropped from \$39 per month to \$36 per month between February of 2004 and December of 2005).

¹⁸ *FTC Broadband Competition Report* at 157-61 (stating that, when it comes to such proposals, caution is warranted).

¹⁹ *Id.* at 100-01 (footnotes omitted).

many, if not most, consumers can get broadband from either a cable or telephone provider. In 2000, over 80 percent of broadband service was provided by cable modem. By the middle of 2006, broadband service by cable had fallen to 55.2 percent, while DSL's residential share had increased to 40.3 percent. The balance of the market consisted mostly of mobile wireless, with fiber, satellite, fixed wireless, and broadband over powerlines garnering relatively small shares.²⁰

Still later the report notes that "...there are national trends that appear to show an increasing number of competitive alternatives across all markets."²¹

B. The Initial Round Of Comments Confirm That There Has Been No Market Failure.

Regardless of what one's view is of the desirability of BSP Net management initiatives, it can not be seriously disputed that no party has yet demonstrated a need for the Commission or Congress or any other government entity to intervene in this area. It is not surprising, given the robust level of competition in the industry, that there has been no market failure. In fact, all evidence suggests that the market is working to protect consumers from harm. These facts are confirmed by the absence of any evidence to the contrary in the initial round of comments.

With respect to BSP practices that purportedly give rise to concern at this time, there was little or no discussion of these issues in the initial round of comments. Some proponents of Internet regulation were silent on the issue altogether.²² Others expressly acknowledged that

²⁰ *Id.* at 100 (footnotes omitted).

²¹ *Id.* at 105.

²² *See, e.g.*, New Jersey Rate Counsel at 8-9 (rather than describing any specific harmful practices, it urges the Commission to continue monitoring for potential abuses by BSPs and to reject industry recommendations to "wait until *after* there is substantial evidence of misconduct in the market and a history of consumer harm. . ." (emphasis in original)); DivX, Inc. at 10-12 (rather than describing any specific harmful practices, it discusses economic and other incentives that it argues drive BSPs to engage in discriminatory conduct); Open Internet Coalition at 11 & n.20 (rather than delineating any specific harmful practices, it suggests that the Commission has an obligation ". . . to act now to anticipate and forestall [future regulatory] problems [and acknowledges that] . . . the problem of network operator abuse of their gatekeeper positions is theoretical. . .").

there is no evidence at this time of harmful practices and, at best, merely made speculative predictions about what might or might not happen in the future.²³ Some proponents pointed only to BSP “acceptable use policies” (“AUPs”) which relate to network management practices in connection with spam, viruses and excessive bandwidth use.²⁴ For example, BSP subscriber agreements and AUPs are criticized for prohibiting the operation of a commercial Wi-Fi hotspot using a residential broadband access connection and for steering end users who desire to set up a web hosting functionality to a service designed for such functionality rather than a residential broadband access service.²⁵ These practices are indisputably legitimate and, for that matter, clearly fall within the confines of the Commission’s 2005 Internet Policy Statement.

In short, there is no record in this proceeding or elsewhere of practices that harm consumers or otherwise warrant regulatory or other government intervention at this time.²⁶ This is not surprising. As Qwest discussed in its initial comments, Qwest, in managing its Internet architecture, has every incentive to employ pro-competitive practices as it strives to meet the market demands of both customers and content/application providers.

²³ See, e.g., Computer & Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”) at 8 (“Today, no widespread broadband industry practices compromise neutral access to the Internet via wireline networks.”); Center for Democracy and Technology at 4 (notwithstanding its support for adding a nondiscrimination principle to the Commission’s Policy Statement, it acknowledges that “. . .there are several reasons why arguably harmful types of discriminatory practices might be *rare* in the current environment. . .” (emphasis added)); Google at 22 (“Most known network management techniques will create few if any competitive and discrimination issues”); Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union and Free Press, *et al.* (“CFA”) at 2-3 (“... current behavior does not in any way reflect the environment that will exist over time”).

²⁴ See, e.g., CFA at 96 and Appendix E; Data Foundry, Inc. (“Data Foundry”) at 6 and Attachments A and B.

²⁵ CFA at 92-98 and Appendix E; Data Foundry at Attachment A.

²⁶ Affirmative studies of BSP practices by groups such as the FTTH Council confirm that there are no current problems warranting government action. FTTH Council at 7-8.

C. The Initial Round Comments Echo Qwest’s Demonstration In Its Initial Comments That There Is No Policy Or Legal Basis For Internet Regulation At This Time.

In its initial comments, Qwest demonstrated that the products and services at issue in the *NOI* are subject only to Title I regulation and are not currently regulated due to the competitive nature of the services at issue. Qwest also demonstrated that there is no policy or legal basis for imposing the types of proscriptive regulation advocated by proponents of Internet regulation here, including any of the variety of non-discrimination obligations proposed. The majority of comments in the initial round echo these Qwest initial comments.

1. The majority of comments agree that the Commission should not impose Internet regulation at this time.

The majority of initial round comments oppose the imposition of Internet regulation at this time. These comments are rife with strong statements echoing Qwest’s position that Internet regulation, particularly in the form of a non-discrimination obligation, is bad policy that will only disincite broadband infrastructure investment and place the entire burden of such investment on end users.²⁷ Tellingly, even proponents of Internet regulation recognize that a “best efforts”

²⁷ *See, e.g.*, Ad Hoc Telecom Manufacturer Coalition at 2 (“... a growing body of research documents that regulation of this type could reduce investment in local broadband infrastructure by providing a disincentive for incumbent local broadband network operators to invest in their networks, at the risk of fewer innovations and less competition for consumers. (footnote omitted)"); American Consumer Institute at 7, 11, 12 (“... we conclude that there is no basis for imposing any new, specific nondiscrimination requirement on rates for broadband network access. . . . [and thus] the Commission . . . should insist that advocates provide evidence that rate regulation will not reduce investment, diminish the rate of roll out of new services or otherwise diminish consumers’ welfare Imposing ‘net neutrality’ ratemaking provisions will . . . increase consumer prices to pay for the buildout, . . . reduce investment. . . (footnote omitted).); AT&T at iii-iv (“Any nondiscrimination regime would be not only unnecessary to protect consumers, but affirmatively *harmful* to consumers . . . by forcing broadband networks to commoditize their services, it would reduce consumer choice and undermine the incentives of broadband providers to continue investing billions of dollars in next-generation infrastructure. That investment deterring effect would fall especially hard on underserved communities and would undermine the Commission’s core mandate to bridge the ‘digital divide.’ (emphasis in original)”), 57 (“... such regulation would harm consumers far more than it could possibly help

Internet will not be adequate in the future.²⁸ Other proponents cite transparently self-serving arguments as to why Internet regulation should be imposed in an uneven manner on BSPs.²⁹ As

them because it would needlessly suppress incentives for innovation and investment. (footnote omitted)”, 80 (“In the *Wireline Broadband Order*, the Commission . . . concluded that continued application of common carrier regulation to *any* broadband access providers would serve no purpose beyond the destruction of healthy investment incentives. The Commission thus categorically exempted those providers from the ‘nondiscrimination’ rules. . . . (footnote omitted; italics in original)”); FTTH Council at 66, 70, 71 (“. . . a non-discrimination requirement . . . will produce perhaps the worse of all possible combinations -- unnecessary and correspondingly ineffective yet overly burdensome and counter-productive regulation . . . [a result being that] network platform providers would have a decreased incentive to invest [,] network architectures would stagnate, and innovations would be stifled. . . . [and t]he costs of regulation do not stop here. This [approach] would inhibit providers at all levels from responding rapidly to consumer needs and extracting the full potential value from the Internet (footnote omitted.)”); Freedom Works at 7 (“Perhaps the most notable effect of . . . a fifth principle on ‘non-discrimination’ . . . would be the disincentives created for investing in new technologies or expanded broadband deployment.”); Hands Off the Internet at 10 (“New investment in diverse platforms . . . hold[s] the promise for even greater broadband access provider choices. . . . [and] for these options to continue to grow, investors must be confident that new regulations will not encumber their investments or diminish incentives for network owners to invest in capacity expansion and the provision of innovative services and applications that complement and compete . . . all to the benefit of consumers. (footnote omitted)”); Sprint Nextel at 5 (“Regulations . . . attempting to define discrimination . . . would be complex . . . [and] adding such complexity to the broadband market will stifle investment, not encourage it.”); Time Warner at 14 (“The Commission . . . has found that the compliance burdens associated with a “nondiscrimination” regime – which could be significant . . . – would create a further drag on investment. . . . [and] the detrimental effects of regulatory uncertainty and compliance costs . . . would force the cost of network upgrades and maintenance entirely on end users. . . (footnote omitted)”; Verizon at 41, 43-44 (“. . . regulation that would impose a so-called ‘non-discrimination’ obligation – is unjustified. Inefficient new regulation of broadband services would impede the emergence of innovative new network services; . . . [rather, t]he Commission should encourage . . . innovation and experimentation, not preempt them with anticipatory regulation. . . . [and b]y spreading the costs of network investment over a broader base, consumers will not have to foot the entire bill for broadband network deployment.”).

²⁸ See, e.g., BT Americas Inc. *et al.* (“BT Americas”) at 12-15 (“The problem with freezing the Internet as only a ‘best efforts’ medium is that it does not allow the Internet to evolve into the next generation of Internet able to fully meet the demands of prioritized service or quality of service that are already demanded by users of today’s Internet application and content.”); Nebraska Rural Independent Companies (“NRIC”) at 8 (“In the absence of infinite bandwidth and infinitesimal network delays, only a managed network can ensure that the quality-of-service (“QoS”) requirements of a particular network application can be fulfilled to a degree that meets ever-rising consumer expectations”).

Qwest demonstrated in its initial comments,³⁰ all good policy arguments support a hands-off regulatory approach at this time. Numerous comments in the initial round make clear that the Commission is faced with an array of arguably “non-neutral” practices if it takes a broad view of the Internet (*i.e.*, not just the physical layer, but the applications layer, the content layer, functionality deployed around the Internet edge such as caching, etc.). The Commission should reject arguments by Internet regulation proponents that it pick winners and losers at this point in time and impose one-sided regulation on BSPs. Again, no party can claim to know with certainty what this market will or should look like. And no party can claim to know with certainty that the trade-offs of proscriptive Internet regulation are worth it. In the context of a competitive industry with no evident market failure, the potential downside of any kind of government intervention is extremely high. Moreover, as Qwest and other commenters have stressed, even the threat of such regulation has a tendency to chill innovation and investment.

To proponents of Internet regulation, however, these economic arguments are largely beside the point. They would have the Commission believe that they, and they alone, can divine the best normative “moral” structure for the Internet regardless of the economic realities discussed above. This contention is belied, among other things, by the views of two notable Internet visionaries -- David Farber and Robert Kahn -- both of whom oppose such regulation.

²⁹ See, *e.g.*, Google at 21-22. Google advocates for regulation of BSPs while opposing such regulation for itself despite the fact that no BSP possesses anything approaching the dominant position that Google maintains in the Internet search engine market. See Verizon at 49-53. Additionally, many Google practices -- such as allowing advertisers to bid for key words to be associated with their sites in Google searches or selling paid listings that are shown on top of, or to the side of, standard unpaid search results -- wreak of the very type of purportedly harmful “prioritization” that Google would deny BSPs. See http://www.organicspam.com/google_revenue_streams.asp. On the other hand, other content and application providers recognize the dangers of Internet regulation. See, *e.g.*, generally, Internet Content and Service Provider Coalition.

³⁰ Qwest Comments at 11-13.

As Kahn puts it, it would be a mistake “to mandate[e] that nothing interesting can happen inside the net.”³¹ As Qwest discussed in greater detail in its initial comments, the legal (and “moral”) priority of the Commission, as mandated by Section 157 of the Act, is to remove barriers to infrastructure investment and continue its “hands-off” approach to the Internet.

2. The proposals of proponents of Internet regulation are not supported by existing law and would require a reversal of course by the Commission and a return to Title II common carrier regulation.

As Qwest demonstrated in its initial comments and as the comments of other parties in the initial round, discussed above, have demonstrated, the products and services at issue in the *NOI* are competitive services subject only to Title I regulation. Nor is there any legal basis for the Commission to reverse course now and impose onerous regulation upon the products and services at issue here, particularly when considering the high level of competition already present in the market.³² Even assuming the Commission had authority to act in a given manner, Section 157 (and relevant statutory history)³³ makes clear that the proponents of Internet regulation must, at the very least, affirmatively demonstrate that the current system has actually brought about discriminatory conduct, and that this discriminatory conduct (if any) was detrimental to the public interest. Again, there has been no such showing here.

Moreover, while the *NOI* raises the question of whether some form of Title I regulation can be imposed here, proponents of Internet regulation make clear that their proposals would all

³¹ Andrew Orlovski, *Father of the Internet Warns Against New Neutrality*, The Register (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.register.co.uk/2007/01/18/kahn_net_neutrality_warning/ (App. B Exh 3)(quoting Robert Kahn). See also David Farber, Gerald Faulhaber, Michael L. Katz & Christopher S. Yoo, *Common Sense About Network Neutrality* (June 2006), available at <http://www.interestingpeople.org/archives/interesting-people/200606/msg00014.html>; see David Farber, Michael Katz, Gerald Faulhaber & Christopher S. Yoo, *Hold Off On Net Neutrality*, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 2007, at A19 (App. B Exh. 1).

³² See, e.g., AT&T at 81.

³³ See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).

require a complete reversal of course by the Commission and a return to Title II common carrier regulation. For example, BT Americas and State of New York Department of Public Service expressly call for “common carrier” regulation.³⁴ CCIA advocates for structural separation and unbundling.³⁵ CFA calls for a return to the *Computer Inquiries* model.³⁶ Google, NASUCA, Open Internet Coalition, and the NRIC all call for the imposition of a non-discrimination obligation that is at least, if not more, onerous than classic Title II non-discrimination obligations (e.g., Sections 201 and 202 of the Act).³⁷ The Center for Democracy and Technology calls for a ban on any type of discrimination.³⁸ New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel calls for the Commission to require BSPs to demonstrate that their rates are adequately cost-based.³⁹ In other words, while reflecting no consensus of any kind on the specifics of the regulation that they seek, the proponents of Internet regulation make clear that they seek classic Title II regulation of one form or another. Again, whatever the view of the Commission’s Title I authority in this area, it

³⁴ BT Americas at 3, 16; State of New York Department of Public Service (“NYDPS”) at 2.

³⁵ CCIA at 5-7.

³⁶ CFA at 48.

³⁷ Google at 38-40; NASUCA at 23-29; Open Internet Coalition at 12-15; NRIC at 5-8; NYDPS at 1-2. *See also* CTIA at 19-20 (contending that non-discrimination obligations proposed by proponents go even beyond those imposed on common carriers under Title II).

³⁸ Center for Democracy & Technology at 14.

³⁹ New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel at 11.

can not be seriously argued that any form of Title II regulation has a place in connection with the competitive services at issue.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Richard Grozier, do hereby certify that I have caused the foregoing **REPLY COMMENTS OF QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL INC.** to be 1) filed with the FCC via its Electronic Comment Filing System in WC Docket No. 07-52; 2) served via e-mail on Ms. Janice M. Myles, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau at janice.myles@fcc.gov; 3) served via e-mail on the FCC's duplicating contractor Best Copy and Printing, Inc. at fcc@bcpiweb.com; and 4) served via First Class United States Mail, postage prepaid, on the parties listed on the attached service list.

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