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August 23, 2007

Via Electronic Delivery

Ms. Marlene H. Dortch
Federal Communications Commission
The Portals, TW-A325
445 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20554

Re: Notice of *Ex Parte* Presentation - WC Dkt. 07-135, *In the Matter of Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers*, CC Dkt. 01-92, *In the Matter of Developing a Unified Inter-carrier Compensation Regime*

Dear Ms. Dortch:

On Wednesday, August 22, 2007, Alex B. Cory, CEO, Global Conference Partners (“GCP”) dba FreeConference.com, and the undersigned met separately with Renée Crittendon, Legal Advisor to Commissioner Adelstein, and with members of the Wireline Competition Bureau including Albert Lewis, Deena Shetler, Lynne Engledow, Douglas L. Slotten, Jay Atkinson, and Donald K. Stockdale, Jr. On the same day, Mr. Cory, Donna N. Lampert of Lampert & O’Connor and the undersigned also met separately with Daniel Gonzalez, Chief of Staff to Chairman Martin, and Thomas Navin, Chief of the Wireline Competition Bureau; John W. Hunter, Chief of Staff and Senior Legal Advisor to Commissioner McDowell; and Chris Moore, Legal Advisor to Commissioner Tate. At each meeting, the parties discussed the issues raised in the attached presentation, which was distributed to all meeting attendees.

Further, GCP emphasized the faulty assumption of AT&T and others that marketing fees paid by LEC vendors to GCP are any indication that the LEC’s terminating access rates are excessive. To the contrary, these fees are costs of the LEC – a payment for marketing by GCP no different than when a LEC pays to place an advertisement on Yahoo! or another marketing channel, and just like third-party marketing costs associated with other LEC services. Further, AT&T and other IXCs complaining of conference-generated traffic are themselves profiting from the added long-distance traffic. In GCP’s case, for example, the predominant users are calling from business locations or are cell phone users, typically with either metered long-distance or limited minutes-of-use “bucket” plans. Increased traffic from greater participation in conference calls, therefore, increases revenues to the IXC serving that customer, either through increased per-minute fees or the likelihood that users will “break the bucket” of IXC and wireless calling plans and/or choose higher buckets, generating yet more revenue for the IXCs and wireless

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carriers. In GCP's case, this is especially likely because its CLEC vendors charge terminating access rates that are no more than NECA-pool based rates.

Pursuant to the Commission's rules, one copy of this notice is being filed electronically in each of the above-referenced dockets for inclusion in the public record. Please contact me directly should you have any questions.

Respectfully submitted,



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Competitive Conference Services: Providing a Public Benefit

FCC Ex Parte Presentation
of
Global Conference Partners dba FreeConference.com
August 22, 2007

Global Conference Partners dba FreeConference.com
WC Dkt. 07-135 Ex Parte



Overview

- Who is FreeConference.com?
- How do competitive conference services work?
- How does the public benefit from competitive conference services?
- How does IXC's illegal refusal to pay access charges harm consumers?
- Who are the largest companies/organizations using FreeConference.com?
- Why is "traffic pumping" just rhetoric designed to protect entrenched interests?
- Why should the FCC reject pleas to create new regulations including for CLECs?
- What should the FCC do next?



Who is FreeConference.com?


- FreeConference.com is an information service provider, helping businesses and consumers connect, *without* the expense and planning required by traditional conferencing services (*e.g.*, AT&T and Qwest).
- Conferencing services are used for business meetings, product marketing, facilitating family reunions, web-collaboration and many other group conversations, meeting the needs of previously under- and un-served customers.
- Conferencing services drive new long distance demand that generates new, incremental revenues that average several cents per minute above termination costs for long distance carriers.



How Do Competitive Conference Services Work?

- FreeConference.com provides equipment and other enhanced functions in the same way other information service providers do (including AT&T).
- FreeConference.com integrates conference calling with email, stored information (user groups, recordings), and on-line “white board” and desktop sharing functions.
- Callers pay their presubscribed carriers the normal rate for carrying their traffic – there is no unjust or unlawful use of the network.

How Do Competitive Conference Services Work?




Global Conference Partners dba FreeConference.com
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How Does the Public Benefit from Competitive Conference Services?

- Competitive conference services:
 - Put conferencing within the reach of many more users, including consumers, nonprofits, community service organizations, and home-based and other small businesses;
 - Exert pressure on traditional conference call providers to lower rates, improve services, and innovate; and
 - Encourage network usage rather than idle capacity, allowing the public to benefit from the network and services it's paid for.
- These services are precisely the type of consumer-oriented competition the Communications Act and the FCC encourages.
- Incremental revenues and use of RLEC capacity helps the FCC meet its USF mandates.
- Revenues to rural CLECs helps fund investment in improved services in telephony, wireless, and cable services in competition with major carriers.
- Conference service model avoids regulation and reduces pressure on USF taxes and subsidies.



How Does IXC's' Illegal Refusal to Pay Access Charges Harm Consumers?

- IXCs knowingly refuse to pay interstate access charges, just like they knowingly blocked calls (payments withheld since November of 2006).
- Much smaller conference service and RLEC providers are being “squeezed” by IXCs’ refusals to pay.
- These practices harm competition, consumers’ interest in low-cost services.
- Self help weakens public trust in interconnectivity of network providers and in access charge system.



Who Are the Largest Companies/Organizations Using FreeConference.com?*

GE	FAA
Monitor Consulting	Duke
Mary Kay	USPS
Frost and Sullivan	University of Chicago
INS Consulting	University of Michigan
Teach for America	City Year
Georgia Pacific	ACORN
Incode Wireless	Wharton
Prepaid Legal	Columbia
My Arbonne	Anderson (UCLA)

Note: There are over 25,000 individually registered users from government, education, and nonprofit organizations

*based on number of accounts





Why Is “Traffic Pumping” Just Rhetoric Designed to Protect Entrenched Interests?

- AT&T and other entrenched players seek to eliminate competition from emerging information service providers and more traditional CLEC competitors with additional regulation, *e.g.*:
 - Eliminate pressure on AT&T’s conferencing services;
 - Eliminate competition for wireless services in rural areas; and
 - Eliminate competition for call center services.
- Now that the FCC has reiterated that self-help traffic blocking is unlawful, these carriers are desperate to eliminate competitive conference service providers and harm the competing carriers that partner with them.



Why Should the FCC Reject Pleas to Create New Regulations including for CLECs?

- While the FCC faces many key access charge issues, including that these same entrenched carriers still control of 83% of U.S. end-user access lines (\$\$ billions), it should follow-through with its comprehensive Intercarrier Compensation docket (CC Dkt. 01-92) and not rush to create new rules here simply because the largest carriers seek self-serving regulation.
- AT&T, Qwest and others now urge the FCC to adopt a new regulatory scheme for CLECs even while they complain loudly that regulating their so-called “competitive” access services will “embroil the Commission and the industry in a regulatory quagmire of epic proportions,” AT&T’s FCC Special Access Reply Comments, at 42 (Aug. 15, 2007).
- § 204 already provides recourse for complaints that rates are not lawful – there is no need to create a new regulatory scheme because carriers label a practice “traffic pumping.”
- Rates terminating at CLECs that are partnered with conferencing services are based on NECA pool rates that are per se just and reasonable and well below average long distance rates.



What Should the FCC Do Next?

- Examine in specific instances whether rates are just and reasonable pursuant to § 204 (tariff review and complaints).
- Issue Order for IXCs to stop “self-help” refusal to pay access charges.
- Reiterate (for the 4th time) that revenue-sharing between a carrier and a customer does not violate the Communications Act.
- Examine IXC call-blocking as violation of “Net Neutrality” and FCC truth-in-billing principles.
- Encourage competition by new information service providers, including competitive conference services.
- Examine all the facts, including the competitive and USF impacts, before rushing out an NPRM.
- Examine policies of promoting network usage, especially in rural America, and declare that “too much traffic” to rural carriers is not a problem.