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**ATTACHMENT D**

**STATEMENT REGARDING NSI CALLS IN SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE**

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**STATEMENT REGARDING REPEATED 911 CALLS  
RECEIVED BY THE MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
FROM A NON-SERVICE INITIALIZED DEVICE**

1. I am the Director of the Shelby County, Tennessee Emergency Communications District ("ECD"). The Memphis Police public safety answering point ("PSAP") is within the territory served by the ECD.


2. On August 23, 2006, the Memphis Police PSAP began receiving 911 calls from a non-service initialized device ("NSI device") with an ANI record of 9113723007.

3. From August 23, 2006 at 9:55 pm through September 7, 2006 at 8:02 am, the PSAP received 1,148 calls from the same NSI device. The calls often lasted less than a minute, but the connection sometimes continued more than two minutes before the caller hung up.

4. The calls finally stopped on September 7 without the Memphis Police ever locating the caller or otherwise blocking the calls; however, during the sixteen days of August 23 through September 7, the harassing calls threatened the PSAP's ability to answer legitimate calls and provide emergency communications.

5. I have in my files a call list showing each of the 1,148 calls. The list is available for review upon request.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 8, 2008.



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Raymond Chiozza, Director  
Shelby County Emergency Communications District

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**ATTACHMENT E**

**STATEMENT REGARDING NSI CALLS IN BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE**

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**STATEMENT REGARDING FALSE 911 CALLS  
FROM A CHILD PLAYING WITH NON-SERVICE INITIALIZED DEVICES  
IN BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE**


1. I am the Director of the Bedford County, Tennessee Emergency Communications District ("ECD").

2. In the summer of 2007, the communications center in Bedford County began receiving prank 911 calls from a child using non-service initialized devices ("NSI devices").

3. For more than a month the child called repeatedly, up to 30 times in a sitting, giving false information and using foul language. The child used three different NSI devices to make the calls.

4. With much effort, officials finally located the caller's exact location. The officials informed the child's parents, and the calls stopped.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 6, 2008.

  
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Cathey Mathis, Director  
Bedford County Emergency Communications District

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**ATTACHMENT F**

**STATEMENT REGARDING NSI CALLS IN MAURY COUNTY, TENNESSEE**

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**STATEMENT REGARDING FALSE 911 CALLS  
FROM NON-SERVICE INITIALIZED DEVICES  
IN MAURY COUNTY, TENNESSEE**

1. I am the Director of the Maury County, Tennessee Emergency Communications District.

2. During the past several years, the Maury County public safety answering point (“PSAP”) has received many harassing calls from non-service initialized (“NSI”) devices, including numerous calls from children playing with the phones.

3. One child called seven times from a bus on the way home from school, reporting various emergencies at different locations with each call. As a result, first responders were dispatched to four different locations. All the reports were false and wasted the time and other resources of the PSAP and the first responders.

4. A second child called the PSAP 84 times on a Saturday evening. These calls nearly immobilized the PSAP’s ability to receive or respond to actual emergency calls at a time when the PSAP typically receives a high volume of calls.


5. A third child called the PSAP 40 times on a Sunday afternoon, again disrupting the PSAP’s operations.

6. In the three instances described above, the PSAP eventually was able to locate the children, with much effort, and stop the calls. In all three cases, the families reported to the PSAP that the child was using an NSI device the mothers obtained from a domestic violence organization.

7. The harassing calls from NSI devices and the location efforts to stop the calls waste precious public safety resources.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on

2/11/08

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Freddie Rich", written over a horizontal line.

Freddie Rich, Director  
Maury County Emergency Communications District

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**ATTACHMENT G**

**STATEMENT REGARDING TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES**

**ASSOCIATED WITH CALL BLOCKING**

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2100 Seaport Boulevard  
Redwood City, California  
94063 USA

Tel: 1 650 480 8000  
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Lynn Questell  
500 James Robertson Parkway  
Nashville, TN 37243-0582

February 4, 2008

Dear Lynn Questell,

Openwave has had such a great demand from its customers to address nuisance E911 callers that it has very recently enacted new features in its MPC (Mobile Positioning Center) software to enable the carrier to specially treat these calls. These features were made in response to overwhelming requests from the industry that sees this as a major problem in E911 services. While this is a great start, we still feel that the industry has a long way to go on perfecting the capabilities and operationalizing it so as to meet all legal, operational and public safety needs.

This initial "black-listing" feature capability's primary function is to protect the carriers and the PSAPs they serve against these overwhelming numbers of nuisance calls and yet allow these calls to be completed to specialized call handling stations. Thus, the call is handled and if there is a real emergency with that particular call it can be addressed. Calls are not blocked, but rerouted. Calls are rerouted at the request of the PSAP and those requests are made to the carrier's security group who alone has access to add numbers to this list. Like the normal E911 call, location remains available and is logged in the system and available to the end answering point. As mentioned above, this initial system we have is simplistic enough for the carrier customer and the PSAP community to get started, but it is by no means a final, thought out standard which we see as being required for the industry to follow.

The above general summary of the capability that Openwave has built was deployed last month at single large tier 1 carrier and is now in the early stages of production. We are patiently awaiting feedback, but from all accounts it's well received.

It cannot be stressed enough how large of a problem these calls are to the PSAPs and carriers alike and how far we still have yet to travel. Some industry guidance has been given through ESIF, the Emergency Services Interconnection Forum, and NENA, but more needs to occur given the complex nature of this issue technically, legally and operationally. Given the criticality of the E911 support network, it is of the utmost importance that all resources are dispatched to



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true emergencies and that the resources of both carrier and public safety personnel alike are wisely used. Openwave Systems has found a starting point telling that it is technically possible to stem much of the flow of these calls through the implementation of features like those described above. Openwave remains at public safety's service to discuss these at anytime in the future.

Sincerely,

Mark Drennan,  
Sr Product Manager for E911  
Services