

it reserved the right to “adjust rates in the future to bring them into line with forward-looking costs.”⁴⁵⁴

175. To limit possible rate shock to retail customers, the Commission also limited the amount of allocated interstate cost of a local loop that could be assessed directly on residential and business customers as a flat-rated monthly charge.⁴⁵⁵ Although the *Access Charge Reform Order* started the process toward establishing explicit subsidies, the Commission concluded that “a process that eliminates implicit subsidies from access charges over time [was] warranted.”⁴⁵⁶

176. In the 2000 *CALLS Order*,⁴⁵⁷ the Commission continued its effort to remove implicit subsidies and replace them with explicit universal service support for price cap LECs by, among other things, reducing per-minute intercarrier charges, raising the SLC cap, phasing out the Presubscribed Interexchange Carrier Charge (PICC),⁴⁵⁸ and permitting price-cap LECs to deaverage the SLC once the affected carrier charges were eliminated.⁴⁵⁹ The Commission also created a new universal service fund to compensate price-cap incumbent LECs, in part, for lost interstate access revenues.⁴⁶⁰

177. In the *MAG Order*, the Commission extended similar reforms to incumbent LECs subject

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and moving access rates to economically sustainable levels. *Access Charge Reform Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 16001–02, para. 44.

⁴⁵⁴ *Access Charge Reform Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 16003, para. 48. The Commission also applied its market-based approach to the terminating access rates charged by competitive LECs and declined to adopt any regulations governing competitive LEC access charges. *Id.* at 16141, para. 363. It reasoned that “the possibility of competitive responses by IXCs will have a constraining effect on non-incumbent LEC pricing.” *Id.* at 16141, para. 362. This reliance on a market-based approach proved misplaced. In subsequent years, competitive LECs, instead of reducing access charges, frequently raised them above the regulated rates of incumbent LECs. As a result, the Commission was forced to regulate competitive LEC access charges. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 61.26; *Access Charge Reform, Reform of Access Charges Imposed by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers*, CC Docket No. 96-262, Seventh Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 9923, 9924, paras. 1–3 (2001) (*CLEC Access Charge Order*) (establishing benchmark rates for competitive LEC access charges), *recon.*, *Access Charge Reform, Reform of Access Charges Imposed by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, Petition of Z-Tel Commc'ns Inc. For Temporary Waiver of Commission Rule 61.26(d) to Facilitate Deployment of Competitive Service in Certain Metropolitan Statistical Areas*, CC Docket No. 96-262, CCB/CPD File No. 01-19, Eighth Report and Order and Fifth Order on Reconsideration, 19 FCC Rcd 9108 (2004) (*CLEC Access Charge Recon. Order*).

⁴⁵⁵ *See, e.g., Access Charge Reform Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 16010–11, para. 73. To reduce per-minute carrier common line (CCL) charges, the Commission created the presubscribed interexchange carrier charge (PICC), a flat-rated, monthly charge imposed on IXCs on a per-line basis. *Id.* at 15998–16000, paras. 37–40. The Commission also shifted the cost of line ports from per-minute local switching charges to the common line category and established a mechanism to phase out the per-minute Transport Interconnection Charge (TIC). *Id.* at 16035–40, 16073–86, paras. 125–34, 210–43.

⁴⁵⁶ *Access Charge Reform Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 15987, para. 9.

⁴⁵⁷ *See CALLS Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 12962.

⁴⁵⁸ *See supra* note 455 (discussing the PICC).

⁴⁵⁹ *See generally CALLS Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 13025–28, paras. 151–59 (reducing interstate switched access rates); *id.* at 12991–13007, paras. 76–112 (raising SLC caps and eliminating PICCs); *id.* at 13007–14, paras. 113–28 (deaveraging SLCs).

⁴⁶⁰ *See CALLS Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 13046–49, paras. 201–05 (establishing a “\$650 million interstate access universal service support mechanism”).

to rate-of-return regulation.⁴⁶¹ As with the *CALLS Order*, these reforms were designed to rationalize the interstate access rate structure by aligning it more closely with the manner in which costs are incurred.⁴⁶² Among other things, the *MAG Order* increased the SLC caps for rate-of-return carriers and phased out the per-minute CCL charge from the common line rate structure.⁴⁶³ The Commission also created a universal service support mechanism to replace implicit support with explicit support, in order to foster competition and more efficient pricing.⁴⁶⁴ Many, but not all, states have also addressed intercarrier compensation regulation. In addition to setting rates for reciprocal compensation, many states have revised their rules governing intrastate access charges. Although some states have chosen to mirror interstate access charges,⁴⁶⁵ others continue to maintain intrastate access charges that far exceed interstate charges.⁴⁶⁶

3. Problems Associated With the Existing Intercarrier Compensation Regimes

⁴⁶¹ *Multi-Association Group (MAG) Plan for Regulation of Interstate Services of Non-Price Cap Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers and Interexchange Carriers*, CC Docket No. 00-256, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket No. 96-45, Fifteenth Report and Order, *Access Charge Reform for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Subject to Rate-of-Return Regulation*, CC Docket No. 98-77, Report and Order, *Prescribing the Authorized Rate of Return From Interstate Services of Local Exchange Carriers*, CC Docket No. 98-166, Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 19613 (2001) (*MAG Order*), *recon. in part, Multi-Association Group (MAG) Plan for Regulation of Non-Price Cap Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers and Interexchange Carriers*, CC Docket No. 00-256, First Order on Reconsideration, *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket 96-45, Twenty-Fourth Order on Reconsideration, 17 FCC Rcd 5635 (2002), *amended on recon., Multi-Association Group (MAG) Plan for Regulation of Non-Price Cap Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers and Interexchange Carriers*, CC Docket No. 00-256, *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket 96-45, Third Order on Reconsideration, 18 FCC Rcd 10284 (2003); *see also Multi-Association Group (MAG) Plan for Regulation of Non-Price Cap Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers and Interexchange Carriers; Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket Nos. 00-256, 96-45, Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 4122 (2004).

⁴⁶² *MAG Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 19617, para. 3.

⁴⁶³ *MAG Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 19621, para. 15.

⁴⁶⁴ *MAG Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 19617, para. 3. A new universal service support mechanism, Interstate Common Line Support (ICLS), was implemented to replace the CCL charge beginning July 1, 2002. *Id.* at 19621, para. 15. This mechanism recovers any shortfall between the allowed common line revenue requirement of rate-of-return carriers and their SLC and other end-user revenues, thereby ensuring that changes in the rate structure did not affect the overall recovery of interstate access costs by rate-of-return carriers serving high-cost areas. *Id.* at 19642, 19667–73, paras. 61, 128–41. To reform the local switching and transport rate structure of rate-of-return carriers, the Commission shifted the non-traffic sensitive costs of local switch line ports to the common line category, and reallocated the remaining costs contained in the TIC to other access rate elements, thus reducing per-minute switched access charges. *Id.* at 19649–61, paras. 76–111.

⁴⁶⁵ *See, e.g., BA-WV's Intrastate Access Charges*, Case No. 00-0318-T-GI, Commission Order, 2001 WL 935643 (West Virginia PSC June 1, 2001) (ordering that “the traffic-sensitive intrastate access charges of Verizon-WV shall be modified to mirror the interstate rate structure and rate elements”); *Tariff Filing of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc to Mirror Interstate Rates*, Case No. 98-065, Order (Kentucky PSC Mar. 31, 1999) (requiring BellSouth “to eliminate the state-specific Non-Traffic Sensitive Revenue Requirement . . . , thus moving its aggregate intrastate switched access rate to the FCC’s ‘CALLS’ interstate rate”); *Establishment of Carrier-to-Carrier Rules*, Case No. 06-1344-TP-ORD, Order, 2007 WL 3023991 (Ohio PUC Oct. 17, 2007) (“[T]his Commission requires ILECs to mirror their interstate switched access rate on the intrastate side . . .”).

⁴⁶⁶ *See, e.g., Letter from David C. Bartlett, Vice President of Federal Government Affairs, Embarq, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92, Exh. C (filed Aug. 1, 2008) (noting intrastate terminating switched access rates five to ten times higher than interstate rates in Missouri, Washington, Virginia, and several other States).*

178. The introduction of competition into local telephone markets revealed weaknesses in the existing intercarrier compensation regimes that remained notwithstanding the efforts of the Commission and certain states to reform interstate and intrastate access charges. As the Commission observed in 2001, “[i]nterconnection arrangements between carriers are currently governed by a complex system of intercarrier compensation regulations . . . [that] treat different types of carriers and different types of services disparately, even though there may be no significant differences in the costs among carriers or services.”⁴⁶⁷ We have seen numerous examples of regulatory arbitrage in the marketplace both because of the different rates for similar functions under different intercarrier compensation regimes and because none of these regimes currently set rate levels in an economically efficient manner.⁴⁶⁸

179. One example of regulatory arbitrage involves traffic to dial-up ISPs. Following adoption of the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, state commissions set reciprocal compensation rates for the exchange of local traffic. These reciprocal compensation rates were sufficiently high that many competitive LECs found it profitable to target and serve ISP customers who were large recipients of local traffic, since dial-up Internet customers would call their ISP and then stay on the line for hours. This practice led to significant traffic imbalances, with competitive LECs seeking billions of dollars in reciprocal compensation payments from other LECs.⁴⁶⁹ The Commission responded by adopting a separate interim intercarrier compensation regime for this traffic.

180. On February 26, 1999, the Commission issued a Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in which it held that ISP-bound traffic is jurisdictionally interstate because end users access websites across state lines. Because the *Local Competition First Report and Order* concluded that the reciprocal compensation obligation in section 251(b)(5) applied to only local traffic, the Commission found in the *Declaratory Ruling* that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to section 251(b)(5).⁴⁷⁰ On March 24, 2000, in the *Bell Atlantic* decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) vacated certain provisions of the *Declaratory Ruling*.⁴⁷¹ The court did not question the Commission’s finding that ISP-bound traffic is interstate. Rather, the court held that the Commission had not adequately explained how its end-to-end jurisdictional analysis was relevant to determining whether a call to an ISP is subject to reciprocal compensation under section 251(b)(5).⁴⁷² In particular, the court noted that a LEC serving an ISP appears to perform the function of “termination” because the LEC delivers traffic from the calling party through its end office switch to the called party, the ISP.⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁷ *Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime*, CC Docket No. 01-92, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 9610 (2001) (*Intercarrier Compensation NPRM*).

⁴⁶⁸ The phrase “regulatory arbitrage” refers to profit-seeking behavior that can arise when a regulated firm is required to set difference prices for products or services with a similar cost structure. See, e.g., PATRICK DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP AT THE CENTRAL OFFICE AS THE EFFICIENT INTERCONNECTION REGIME 1, para. 2 n.3 (Federal Communications Commission, OPP Working Paper No. 33, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp33.pdf.

⁴⁶⁹ See *Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic*, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68, Order on Remand and Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 9151, 9183, para. 70 (2001) (subsequent history omitted) (*ISP Remand Order*).

⁴⁷⁰ See *Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic*, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 3689, 3703–06, paras. 21–27 (1999) (*Declaratory Ruling*), vacated and remanded, *Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC*, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (*Bell Atlantic*).

⁴⁷¹ *Bell Atlantic*, 206 F.3d at 1.

⁴⁷² See *Bell Atlantic*, 206 F.3d at 5.

⁴⁷³ *Bell Atlantic*, 206 F.3d at 6.

181. On April 27, 2001, the Commission released the *ISP Remand Order*, which concluded that section 251(g) excludes ISP-bound traffic from the scope of section 251(b)(5).⁴⁷⁴ The Commission explained that section 251(g) maintains the pre-1996 Act compensation requirements for “exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access,” thereby excluding such traffic from the reciprocal compensation requirements that the 1996 Act imposed. The Commission concluded that ISP-bound traffic is “information access” and, therefore, is subject instead to the Commission’s section 201 jurisdiction over interstate communications.⁴⁷⁵ The Commission concluded that a bill-and-keep regime might eliminate incentives for arbitrage and force carriers to look to their own customers for cost recovery.⁴⁷⁶ To avoid a flash cut to bill-and-keep, however, the Commission adopted an interim compensation regime pending completion of the *Intercarrier Compensation* proceeding.⁴⁷⁷

182. On May 3, 2002, the D.C. Circuit found that the Commission had not provided an adequate legal basis for the rules it adopted in the *ISP Remand Order*.⁴⁷⁸ Once again, the court did not question the Commission’s finding that ISP-bound traffic is jurisdictionally interstate. Rather, the court held that section 251(g) of the Act did not provide a basis for the Commission’s decision. The court held that section 251(g) is simply a transitional device that preserved obligations that predated the 1996 Act until the Commission adopts superseding rules, and there was no pre-1996 Act obligation with respect to intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic.⁴⁷⁹ Although the court rejected the legal rationale for the interim compensation rules, the court remanded, but did not vacate, the *ISP Remand Order* to the Commission, and it observed that “there is plainly a non-trivial likelihood that the Commission has authority” to adopt the rules.⁴⁸⁰ Accordingly, the interim rules adopted in the *ISP Remand Order* have remained in effect.

⁴⁷⁴ See *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9171–72, para. 44.

⁴⁷⁵ See *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9175, para. 52. Thus, the Commission affirmed its prior finding in the *Declaratory Ruling* that ISP-bound traffic is jurisdictionally interstate. See *id.*; see also *Declaratory Ruling*, 14 FCC Rcd at 3701–03, paras. 18–20.

⁴⁷⁶ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9184–85, paras. 74–75. The Commission discussed at length the market distortions and regulatory arbitrage opportunities created by the application of per-minute reciprocal compensation rates to ISP-bound traffic. In particular, the Commission found that requiring compensation for this type of traffic at existing reciprocal compensation rates undermined the operation of competitive markets because competitive LECs were able to recover a disproportionate share of their costs from other carriers, thereby distorting the price signals sent to their ISP customers. See *id.* at 9181–86, paras. 67–76.

⁴⁷⁷ See *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9155–57, paras. 7–8. The interim regime adopted by the Commission consisted of: (1) a gradually declining cap on intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic, beginning at \$.0015 per minute-of-use and declining to \$.0007 per minute-of-use; (2) a growth cap on total ISP-bound minutes for which a LEC may receive this compensation; (3) a “new markets rule” requiring bill-and-keep for the exchange of this traffic if two carriers were not exchanging traffic pursuant to an interconnection agreement prior to the adoption of the interim regime; and (4) a “mirroring rule” that gave incumbent LECs the benefit of the rate cap only if they offered to exchange all traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) at the same rates. *Id.* at 9187–89, 9193–94, paras. 78, 80, 89. In a subsequent order, the Commission granted forbearance to all telecommunications carriers with respect to the growth caps and the new markets rule. See *Petition of Core Commc’ns Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Application of the ISP Remand Order*, WC Docket No. 03-171, Order, 19 FCC Rcd 20179 (2004) (*Core Forbearance Order*). Thus, only the rate caps and mirroring rule remain in effect today.

⁴⁷⁸ See *WorldCom*, 288 F.3d at 429.

⁴⁷⁹ See *WorldCom*, 288 F.3d at 433.

⁴⁸⁰ See *WorldCom*, 288 F.3d at 434.

183. On November 5, 2007, Core filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the D.C. Circuit seeking to compel the Commission to enter an order resolving the court's remand in the *WorldCom* decision.⁴⁸¹ On July 8, 2008, the court granted a writ of mandamus and directed the Commission to respond to the *WorldCom* remand in the form of a final, appealable order that "explains the legal authority for the Commission's interim intercarrier compensation rules that exclude ISP-bound traffic from the reciprocal compensation requirement"⁴⁸² The court directed the Commission to respond to the writ of mandamus by November 5, 2008.⁴⁸³

184. Another regulatory arbitrage opportunity arose as a result of the Commission's 1997 decision not to regulate the interstate access charges of competitive LECs. As a result, many competitive LECs filed tariffs with access charges that were well above the rates charged by incumbent LECs for similar services.⁴⁸⁴ In response, the Commission adopted new rules that effectively capped the interstate access charges that competitive LECs could tariff.⁴⁸⁵

185. Two more recent examples of regulatory arbitrage involve billing problems and the "Access Stimulation" problem. Commenters describe problems billing for traffic when it arrives for termination with insufficient identifying information.⁴⁸⁶ Because the existing intercarrier compensation mechanisms have vastly disparate rates that apply to different types of traffic, carriers have both the opportunity and incentive to disguise the nature, or conceal the source, of the traffic being sent in order to avoid or reduce payments to other carriers.⁴⁸⁷ "Access Stimulation" refers to allegations that certain LECs may have entered into agreements with providers of services that generate large volumes of incoming calls to substantially increase the number of calls sent to the LEC.⁴⁸⁸ It has been alleged that

⁴⁸¹ Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, *In re Core Communications Inc.*, No. 07-1446 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 5, 2007).

⁴⁸² *In re Core Commc'ns Inc.*, 531 F.3d 849, at 861-62 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (*Core Decision*).

⁴⁸³ See *Core Decision*, 531 F.3d at 861-62. If the Commission fails to comply with the writ by the November 5th deadline, the interim rules will be vacated on November 6, 2008. See *id.* at 862.

⁴⁸⁴ See *CLEC Access Charge Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9931, para. 22. For instance, the Commission found that certain competitive LECs charged \$0.09 per minute and that the weighted average of competitive LEC access rates was above \$0.04 per minute. *Id.* In contrast, the same underlying data showed a composite incumbent LEC rate of \$0.0056 for that same traffic. See AT&T Additional Comments, CC Docket Nos. 96-262, 97-146, CCB/CPD File No. 98-63, App. A. (Jan. 11, 2001). The Commission found that competitive LECs could impose excessive charges due to two factors. First, the Commission observed that access charges are paid by the IXC rather than the end-user customer. Because the IXC has no ability to affect the calling or called party's choice of service providers, it cannot avoid carriers with high access charges. *CLEC Access Charge Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9935, para. 31. Second, the Commission found that the rate averaging requirements in section 254(g) of the Act precluded IXCs from passing through particular competitive LECs' excessive access charges to the end user customers of those competitive LECs. *Id.* As a result, the Commission found the existing regulatory regime did not effectively create the incentives for the end users to select a lower-priced access provider. *Id.*

⁴⁸⁵ See 47 C.F.R. § 61.26 (containing rules governing the tariffing of competitive LEC interstate switched exchange access services). As a general matter, the Commission's rules governing competitive LEC access charges limit these rates to those charged by the competing incumbent LEC. *Id.*

⁴⁸⁶ See *infra* Part V.D.

⁴⁸⁷ See *infra* para. 326.

⁴⁸⁸ See, e.g., *Qwest Commc'ns Corp. v. Farmers and Merchs. Mut. Tel. Co.*, File No. EB-07-MD-001, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 17973, para. 1 (2007) (addressing Qwest's allegations that Farmers deliberately planned to "increase dramatically the amount of terminating access traffic delivered to its exchange, via agreements with conference calling companies").

this significantly increased “growth in terminating access traffic may be causing carriers’ rates to become unjust or unreasonable” in violation of section 201 of the Act.⁴⁸⁹ In the *Access Stimulation NPRM*, the Commission has sought information about the extent of this practice, its potential impact on the rates of price cap, rate-of-return, and competitive LECs, and how this practice should be addressed.⁴⁹⁰

B. Comprehensive Reform

1. Introduction

186. Evidence of increasing regulatory arbitrage, as well as increased competition and changes in technology, has led the Commission to consider comprehensive reform of intercarrier compensation. In 2001, the Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to examine possible alternatives to existing intercarrier regimes with the intent of moving toward a more unified system.⁴⁹¹ The notice generated extensive comments that generally confirmed the need for comprehensive intercarrier compensation reform, including a number of competing proposals.⁴⁹² In 2005, the Commission adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment on the various industry proposals.⁴⁹³ In 2006, another industry coalition submitted an alternative comprehensive intercarrier compensation reform proposal, known as the Missoula Plan.⁴⁹⁴ The Commission separately requested and received comments

⁴⁸⁹ See *Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers*, WC Docket No. 07-135, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 17989, para. 1 (2007) (*Access Stimulation NPRM*).

⁴⁹⁰ *Access Stimulation NPRM*, 22 FCC Rcd 17989.

⁴⁹¹ See *Inter-carrier Compensation NPRM*, 16 FCC Rcd 9610. The Commission acknowledged a number of problems with the existing regimes, including inefficient rates and different rates for the same types of calls. *Id.* at 9616–18, paras. 11–18. The Commission thus sought comment on alternative approaches to reforming intercarrier compensation, including moving to a bill-and-keep approach to intercarrier compensation. *Id.* at 9611–13, paras. 2–4.

⁴⁹² See, e.g., Regulatory Reform Proposal of the Intercarrier Compensation Forum (ICF Proposal), attached to Letter from Gary M. Epstein and Richard R. Cameron, Counsel for the Intercarrier Compensation Forum, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92, App. A (filed Oct. 5, 2004) (ICF Oct. 5, 2004 *Ex Parte* Letter); Comprehensive Plan For Intercarrier Compensation Reform of Expanded Portland Group (EPG Proposal), attached to Letter from Glenn H. Brown, EPG Facilitator, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed Nov. 2, 2004); Intercarrier Compensation Reform Plan of Alliance for Rational Intercarrier Compensation (ARIC Plan), attached to Letter from Wendy Thompson Fast, President, Consolidated Companies, and Ken Pfister, Vice President—Strategic Policy, Great Plains Communications, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 96-45, 99-68, 96-98, WC Docket No. 04-36 (filed Oct. 25, 2004); Cost-Based Intercarrier Compensation Coalition (CBICC Proposal), attached to Letter from Richard M. Rindler, Counsel for the Cost-Based Intercarrier Compensation Coalition, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed Sept. 2, 2004); Updated *Ex Parte* of Home Telephone Company, Inc. and PBT Telecom (Home/PBT Proposal), attached to Letter from Keith Oliver, Vice President, Finance, Home Telephone Company, and Ben Spearman, Vice President, Chief Regulatory Officer, PBT Telecom, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed Nov. 2, 2004); NASUCA Intercarrier Compensation Proposal at 1 (NASUCA Proposal), attached to Letter from Philip F. McClelland, Senior Assistant Consumer Advocate, NASUCA, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed Dec. 14, 2004); Western Wireless Intercarrier Compensation Reform Plan at 9 (Western Wireless Proposal), attached to Letter from David L. Sieradzki, Counsel for Western Wireless Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed Dec. 1, 2004).

⁴⁹³ See *Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime*, CC Docket No. 01-92, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 4685, 4687, para. 4 (2005) (*Inter-carrier Compensation FNPRM*).

⁴⁹⁴ See Missoula Plan for Intercarrier Compensation Reform (Missoula Plan), attached to Letter from Tony Clark, Commissioner and Chair, NARUC Committee on Telecommunications, Ray Baum, Commissioner and Chair,

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on the Missoula Plan proposal.⁴⁹⁵ Finally, in 2008, the Commission stabilized the universal service fund by adopting an interim cap on payments to competitive ETCs, helping pave the way for comprehensive intercarrier compensation and universal service reform, and leading to a number of new reform proposals.⁴⁹⁶

187. As a result of the *Inter-carrier Compensation NPRM*, the *Inter-carrier Compensation FNPRM*, the filing of the Missoula Plan, and the more recent proposals that have been filed, the Commission has compiled an extensive record over the past seven years. The Commission has received comments or proposals from a wide variety of interested parties, including, states, incumbent LECs, competitive LECs, rural companies, IXCs, new technology companies, consumer advocates, business customers, and industry associations. As demonstrated throughout this order, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed and analyzed the voluminous record, has considered the evidence submitted by the parties supporting the alternatives, and has carefully evaluated each of the proposals that have been presented. Based on this examination of the options, we find that the approach we describe below and adopt in this order best achieves the goals of promoting universal service, encouraging the efficient use of, and investment in, broadband technologies, spurring competition, and ultimately, further reducing the need for regulation.

2. A New Approach to Intercarrier Compensation

188. Since the introduction of competition into long-distance telephone service, the Commission has moved toward eliminating implicit subsidies from intercarrier charges. At every stage, however, the Commission has had to balance the desire to establish more efficient intercarrier charges against the potential adverse effects on consumers (in the form of higher flat-rated charges) and carriers (in the form of reduced intercarrier revenues). The introduction of competition into local telephone markets accelerated the need for reform. As discussed above, since the implementation of the 1996 Act, not only has local competition increased, but so has the incidence and severity of regulatory arbitrage.

189. We conclude today that, with the universal service fund now stabilized, we can wait no longer to begin the process of comprehensive intercarrier compensation reform. The differences in existing intercarrier compensation regimes impose significant inefficiencies on users and distort carriers' investment incentives, which can result in losses of billions of dollars in consumers and producers surplus. Possibly more important, these legacy regulatory regimes pose an obstacle to the transition to an all-IP broadband world. Because carriers currently can receive significant revenues from charging above-cost rates to terminate telecommunications traffic, they have a reduced incentive to upgrade their networks to the most efficient technology or to negotiate interconnection agreements that are designed to accommodate the efficient exchange of IP traffic, as both actions would likely lead to reduced intercarrier

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NARUC Task Force, and Larry Landis, Commissioner and Vice-Chair, NARUC Task Force, to Hon. Kevin Martin, Chmn., FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed July 24, 2006) (NARUC Task Force July 24, 2006 *Ex Parte* Letter).

⁴⁹⁵ *Comment Sought on Missoula Intercarrier Compensation Reform Plan*, CC Docket No. 01-92, Public Notice, 21 FCC Rcd 8524 (2006). Subsequently, the Missoula Plan supporters filed additional details concerning specific aspects of the plan, on which the Commission continued to seek comment. See *Comment Sought on Missoula Plan Phantom Traffic Interim Process and Call Detail Records Proposal*, CC Docket No. 01-92, Public Notice, 21 FCC Rcd 13179 (2006); *Comment Sought on Amendments to the Missoula Plan Intercarrier Compensation Proposal to Incorporate a Federal Benchmark Mechanism*, CC Docket No. 01-92, Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 3362 (2007).

⁴⁹⁶ The Commission invited parties to refresh the record in these and other relevant dockets. *Interim Cap Clears Path for Comprehensive Reform: Commission Poised to Move Forward on Difficult Decisions Necessary to Promote and Advance Affordable Telecommunications for All Americans*, News Release (May 2, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-281939A1.pdf.

payments.⁴⁹⁷

190. In this order, we therefore adopt a new approach to intercarrier compensation and establish the blueprint for moving to new uniform termination rates that are economically efficient and sustainable in our increasingly competitive telecommunications markets. At the same time, we recognize, as the Commission has in the past, the need to be cognizant of market disruptions and potential adverse effects on consumers and carriers of moving too quickly from the existing intercarrier compensation regimes to our new uniform approach to intercarrier compensation. Accordingly, we adopt here a gradual ten-year transition plan with separate stages, designed to reduce rates over a sufficient period to minimize market disruptions and to cushion the impact of our reform on both customers and carriers. At the end of the transition period, all telecommunications traffic will be treated as falling within the reciprocal compensation provisions of section 251(b)(5), and states will set default reciprocal compensation rates pursuant to the new methodology we adopt herein.

191. The requirements that we adopt for intercarrier compensation do not apply to providers operating in Alaska, Hawaii, or any U.S. Territories and possessions. We find that these areas have very different attributes and related cost issues than the continental states.⁴⁹⁸ For this reason, we are exempting providers in Alaska, Hawaii and U.S. Territories and possessions from the requirements and rules adopted herein, and we will address them in a subsequent proceeding.⁴⁹⁹

192. *Transition Plan.* As described below, we adopt a ten-year transition plan.⁵⁰⁰ In the first stage, intrastate access rates are reduced to the levels of interstate rates. During stage two, carriers will reduce their rates to an interim uniform termination rate, set by the state. Carriers whose current rates are below the interim uniform rate set by the state, however, may not increase their rates. During stage three, the rates carriers charge at the end of stage two (either the interim uniform rates or their prior rates, whichever are lower) will be gradually reduced to the rates that will apply at the end of the transition. This transition will be designed by the state so as to minimize market disruptions and adverse economic effects. This transition is described in more detail below.

⁴⁹⁷ See, e.g., T. RANDOLPH BEARD & GEORGE S. FORD, DO HIGH CALL TERMINATION RATES DETER BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT? (Phoenix Center Policy Bulletin No. 22, Oct. 2008), available at <http://www.phoenix-center.org/PolicyBulletin/PCPB22Final.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Verizon/América Móvil Transfer Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 6211, para. 36 (describing “difficult to serve terrain and dramatic urban/rural differences” in Puerto Rico); *Rates and Services Integration Order*, 4 FCC Rcd at 396, paras. 7–8 (describing the unique market conditions and structure in Alaska); GCI Oct. 3, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter (citing cost distinctions between Alaska and the continental United States).

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. *Policies and Service Rules for the Broadcasting-Satellite Service Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 8860, para. 47 (“The Commission is committed to establishing policies and rules that will promote service to all regions in the United States, particularly to traditionally underserved areas, such as Alaska and Hawaii, and other remote areas.”).

⁵⁰⁰ A number of parties argue for a shorter transition period than that provided here. See, e.g., Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Senior Vice President, Federal Regulatory, AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed Oct. 23, 2008) (AT&T Oct. 23, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter from Kyle McSarrow, President and CEO, NCTA, to Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed Oct. 28, 2008) (NCTA Oct. 28, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter from Paul W. Garnett, Assistant Vice-President, CTIA—The Wireless Association, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed October 27, 2008) (CTIA October 27, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy (SBA) *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 5–7. We note that the reforms adopted today do not preclude carriers from entering into agreements that would reduce intercarrier charges more quickly, (See, e.g., Letter from Susanne A. Guyer, Senior Vice-President, Verizon, to Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 (filed October 28, 2008) at 6.) nor do they prevent state commissions from accelerating the glide path toward the final reciprocal compensation rate if they deem it appropriate.

193. *Intrastate Rate Reductions.* One year from the effective date of this order, we require that all LECs reduce their terminating *intrastate* switched access rates by 50 percent of the difference between their intrastate switched access rates and their *interstate* switched access rates.⁵⁰¹ Two years from the effective date of this order, we require that all LECs reduce their terminating intrastate switched access rates by the remaining 50 percent of the difference between their intrastate switched access rates and their interstate switched access rates so that their intrastate rates equal their interstate rates. Carriers will comply with state tariffing requirements or other applicable state law in effectuating those changes in intrastate terminating access rates.

194. *State Establishment of Interim, Uniform Reciprocal Compensation Rates.* Within two years from the effective date of this order, states must adopt a state-wide interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate applicable to all carriers (except carriers whose rates are below the interim, uniform rate, in which case, those carriers' rates shall be capped at those lower, existing rates). Three years from the effective date of this order, we require that all LECs reduce their terminating rates by 50 percent of the difference between their current terminating rate and the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate established by the state. Four years from the effective date of this order we require that all LECs reduce their terminating rates by the remaining 50 percent of the difference between their current terminating rate and the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate established by the state so that their terminating rates equal the state-set interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate. This rate will become the starting point for stage three—a six-year gradual downward transition to the final uniform reciprocal compensation rate, which the states will also set, consistent with the methodology we adopt in this order. The states will have discretion to determine the glide path, which begins four years from the effective date of this order and ends ten years from the effective date of this order. This glide path will determine the trajectory of the interim reciprocal compensation rate as it trends down to the final reciprocal compensation rate. All carriers are subject to this glide path. However, if a carrier's rate is below the rate specified in the glide path, such carrier cannot raise its rates, but is subject to the trajectory when the interim rate equals that carrier's rate. At the end of ten years (i.e., at the end of stage two), all the terminating rates of all carriers in each state will be reduced to the new final, uniform reciprocal compensation rate established by each state. We believe that, by establishing this ten-year, multiple-stage transition to a state-set final uniform reciprocal compensation rate, we will provide a sufficiently smooth and gradual glide path so that carriers will be able to adjust their other rates and revenues in a measured way over time, as allowed by the reforms adopted in this order, without creating unacceptable rate or revenue effects.

195. Although we permit the states to establish the particular interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate for each step of the final six years of the transition, we establish certain conditions on the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate and on the terminating intercarrier rates that carriers may charge. First, although we do not set forth a methodology that states must use in setting the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rates, we do require that, within each state, there must be a single, state-wide interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate during each year and at each stage of the transition.⁵⁰² Therefore, in establishing interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rates, a state may wish to consider the impact of those rates on all the carriers in the state. States are permitted to adopt an interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate that may be higher at the beginning of the transition than some existing incumbent LEC rates today. If they do so, however, carriers with lower termination rates may not raise

⁵⁰¹ To the extent that a carrier's intrastate terminating access rate already is below its interstate terminating access rate, it will not change that rate.

⁵⁰² We recognize that the state-wide interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rates may vary state-by-state as state commissions consider the best means of transitioning to a final, uniform reciprocal compensation rate.

them to the interim uniform rate. Second, states may determine the glide path for moving from the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate to the final, uniform reciprocal compensation rate, subject to the requirement that the interim uniform rate be identical for all carriers at each step in the transition. By the end of the transition period, the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rates must decrease to a single final, uniform reciprocal compensation rate for all carriers established pursuant to the Commission's new "additional costs" methodology.

196. *Transition of Rates During Stage Three.* Beginning four years from the effective date of this order, and through the remainder of the transition, each carrier must set each of its terminating rates at the lower of: (i) its current rate; or (ii) the state-set interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate applicable at that stage of the transition. Thus, for example, if a carrier has an interstate terminating access rate above the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate applicable at that stage of the transition, but a current reciprocal compensation rate below the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate, the carrier will reduce its interstate rate to the interim rate but leave its current reciprocal compensation rate unchanged. That carrier will continue to have two separate termination rates until such time as the applicable interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate is adjusted lower and becomes less than its current reciprocal compensation rate. At that time, all the carrier's rates will be set at the level of the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate for that state.

197. We emphasize that under no circumstances shall a carrier be permitted to increase its current rates, even if the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate is higher than one or more of its current rates. In this respect, the applicable interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate set by the states will act as a ceiling or cap on such rates. We do not permit a carrier to charge a rate for terminating interstate or intrastate access, reciprocal compensation, or ISP-bound traffic that is higher than the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate, but we will permit a carrier to continue to charge a rate that is lower than the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate. We note that because CMRS providers may not tariff terminating access today,⁵⁰³ and we do not permit a carrier to increase rates during the transition, CMRS providers therefore will not be permitted to charge for terminating access until the end of the transition period.⁵⁰⁴

198. We note that we already have an interim intercarrier compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic, and to avoid disruption in the marketplace, we will apply on a transitional basis the pricing standards we adopted for ISP-bound traffic in the *ISP Remand Order*,⁵⁰⁵ as modified by the *Core*

⁵⁰³ Although CMRS providers may not tariff access charges, they are not prohibited from entering into contracts with interexchange carriers that provide for the payment of such charges. *Petitions of Sprint PCS and AT&T Corp. For Declaratory Ruling Regarding CMRS Access Charges*, WT Docket No. 01-316, Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd 13192 (2002) (*CMRS Access Charges Declaratory Ruling*).

⁵⁰⁴ Consistent with our conclusion that CMRS providers are unable to assess access charges during the transition, we make clear that our symmetry rule, set forth in Part V.C.1.b, will not apply until the transition is over. Even so, we clarify that, to the extent that any carrier has a terminating rate above the permissible rate, such carrier must reduce the rate to the permissible level. Specifically, in the first year of the transition, all carriers with intrastate access charges higher than their interstate access charges must reduce such charges by 50 percent of the difference between its interstate switched access rate and its intrastate switched access rate. Similarly, once the state-set interim, uniform rate is in effect, all carriers must reduce terminating rates, whether interstate access, reciprocal compensation, or ISP-bound traffic, by 50 percent of the difference between the current terminating switched access rate and the interim, uniform rate (as it is reduced over time). Even though rates during the transition will not reflect true symmetry, rates for most carriers should be symmetric before the transition is over as all carriers reduce charges to the final, uniform rate.

⁵⁰⁵ See *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9153, 9186-93, paras. 21, 77-88.

Forbearance Order.⁵⁰⁶ Currently, two rules remain in effect: (1) ISP-bound traffic is currently subject to a reciprocal compensation rate cap of \$.0007 per minute-of-use; and (2) under the mirroring rule, the \$.0007 cap applies to traffic exchanged with an incumbent LEC only if it offers to exchange all traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) at the same rate. As explained below, we conclude that it is appropriate to retain these rules, but only on a transitional basis until a state commission, applying the “additional costs” standards adopted in this order, has established reciprocal compensation rates that are at or below \$.0007 per minute-of-use.

199. In the *ISP Remand Order* in 2001, based on “convincing evidence in the record” that carriers had “targeted ISPs as customers merely to take advantage of . . . intercarrier payments”—offering free service to ISPs, paying ISPs to be their customers, and sometimes engaging in outright fraud—the Commission adopted an interim ISP payment regime to “limit, if not end, the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage.”⁵⁰⁷ The Commission adopted a gradually declining cap on intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic, beginning at \$.0015 per minute-of-use and declining to \$.0007 per minute-of-use.⁵⁰⁸ These rate caps reflected the downward trend in intercarrier compensation rates contained in then-recently negotiated interconnection agreements.⁵⁰⁹ We have previously recognized that evidence that “carriers have agreed to rates”—through voluntary, arms-length negotiations—constitutes substantial evidence that rates are just and reasonable.⁵¹⁰

200. Most commenters urge the Commission to maintain the interim compensation rules governing ISP-bound traffic until the Commission is able to transition to comprehensive intercarrier compensation reform.⁵¹¹ These parties contend that a higher compensation rate would create new

⁵⁰⁶ See *Core Forbearance Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 20184–89, paras. 16–26.

⁵⁰⁷ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9187, para. 77.

⁵⁰⁸ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9187, para. 78.

⁵⁰⁹ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9190–91, para. 85.

⁵¹⁰ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9190–91, para. 85; see also *Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, for Forbearance from Sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1) in the Anchorage Study Area*, WC Docket No. 05-281, 22 FCC Rcd 1958, 1984–85, paras. 39, 40 n.136 (2007) (finding that “commercially negotiated rates” provide “just and reasonable prices”); *Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability*, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 98-147, 96-98, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978, 17389, para. 664 (2003) (subsequent history omitted) (*Triennial Review Order*) (finding that “arms-length agreements . . . to provide [an] element at [a] rate” “demonstrate[s]” that the rate is “just and reasonable”).

⁵¹¹ See, e.g., Letter from Gregory J. Vogt, Counsel for CenturyTel, Inc. to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 05-337, CC Docket Nos. 96-45, 01-92, Attach. at 10 (filed July 8, 2008) (asking the Commission to maintain the existing compromises reached with respect to ISP-bound traffic); Letter from Gary L. Phillips, Associate General Counsel, AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 96-98, 99-68 at 8 (filed May 9, 2008) (asserting that the public interest would be best served by maintaining the existing transitional rates pending broader intercarrier compensation reform); Letter from L. Charles Keller, Counsel for Sage Telecom, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 99-68, 01-92, Attach. at 6 (Sage Telecom May 9, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter) (stating that retaining the ISP rate serves broad policy goals); Letter from John T. Nakahata, Counsel for Level 3 Communications, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 99-68 at 1 (filed May 7, 2008) (supporting continuation of the interim compensation rules); Letter from Joshua Seidmann, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, ITTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 99-68, 96-98, Attach. at 2 (filed Apr. 28, 2008) (ITTA Apr. 28, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter) (asking the Commission to retain the current \$.0007 rate for ISP-bound traffic); Letter from Donna Epps, Vice President of Federal Regulatory Affairs, Verizon, to

(continued...)

opportunities for arbitrage⁵¹² and impose substantial financial burdens on wireless companies, incumbent LECs and state public utility commissions.⁵¹³ They further claim that the existing regime has simplified interconnection negotiations.⁵¹⁴

201. We share these commenters' concerns. The record also suggests that eliminating the \$.0007 cap and instead applying higher reciprocal compensation rates that may be set by the states during the transition period to the adoption of our new methodology would have a significant negative impact on carriers serving rural markets and broadband deployment.⁵¹⁵ The record demonstrates that dial-up minutes remain at high levels in rural areas and that the application of reciprocal compensation to these minutes would generate significant costs to carriers serving these rural areas.⁵¹⁶ Thus, it remains the case that the "rate caps help avoid arbitrage and market distortions that otherwise would result from the

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Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 99-68, 96-98 at 1 (filed Apr. 7, 2008) (urging the Commission to support its earlier finding that \$.0007 is appropriate compensation for dial-up ISP traffic); Letter from L. Charles Keller, Counsel for Verizon Wireless, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 99-68, Attach. (filed May 1, 2008) (describing how elimination of the existing ISP rate would create substantial burdens on a number of carriers and state commissions) (Verizon Wireless May 1, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter from Glenn Reynolds, Vice President, Policy, USTelecom, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 99-68, 96-262, WC Docket No. 07-135 at 2 (filed Apr. 29, 2008) (noting that the Commission's existing rules have "largely mitigated the debate around compensation for ISP-bound traffic, but there is every reason to believe the same problems would arise if the Commission were to reverse direction on this issue") (USTelecom Apr. 29, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter).

⁵¹² See, e.g., USTelecom Apr. 29, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2; Letter from Melissa E. Newman, Vice President, Federal Regulatory, Qwest, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 99-68, 96-98, WC Docket No. 07-135, Attach. at 3-5 (filed Apr. 25, 2008) (Qwest April 25, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Verizon and BellSouth, Further Supplemental White Paper on ISP Reciprocal Compensation at 20 (Verizon/BellSouth Further Supp. ISP White Paper), attached to Letter from Donna Epps, Vice President, Federal Regulatory Advocacy, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68 (filed Sept. 27, 2004).

⁵¹³ See, e.g., Verizon Wireless May 1, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach.

⁵¹⁴ See, e.g., Verizon Wireless May 1, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter (stating that "the [m]irroring [r]ule simplified wireless-ILEC interconnection negotiations tremendously."); Supplemental Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless on Inter-carrier Payments for ISP-Bound Traffic and the *WorldCom* Remand, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 96-98, 99-68 at 38-40 (filed Oct. 2, 2008) (Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments) (indicating that Verizon entered into multiple agreements using the \$.0007 rate cap established in the *ISP Remand Order*).

⁵¹⁵ See, e.g., ITTA April 28, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. at 3, 5; Embarq May 1, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. at 2, 5-7.

⁵¹⁶ See, e.g., Letter from Tamar E. Finn, Counsel for Earthlink, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 99-68, 01-92, Attach. at iii, 11-12 (filed Aug. 14, 2008) (estimating that 24% of dial-up users in rural America say that broadband service is not available where they live); Sage Telecom May 9, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3-4; Embarq May 1, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter, Attach. at 6 (calculating its cost to be \$100 million if all ISP-bound minutes were subject to TELRIC-based rates under section 251(b)(5)); ITTA Apr. 28, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter (noting that dial-up usage remains strong in rural areas); USTelecom Apr. 29, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter (noting a "recent study from the Pew Internet & American Life Project that indicated that while the number of dial-up subscribers had dropped 63% since 2001, the number of minutes spent online by each dial-up subscriber had increased approximately 70%. As a result, some USTelecom member companies are actually seeing an *increase* in dial-up minutes.") (emphasis in original); Letter from Bennett L. Ross, General Counsel—D.C., BellSouth D.C., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 99-68, WC Docket No. 03-171 (filed Aug. 29, 2005) (attaching a chart showing that "dial-up subscribers would continue to generate substantial minutes of dial-up ISP calls, notwithstanding projections of a continued decline in the number of dial-up subscribers.").

availability of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic.”⁵¹⁷ We further believe that maintaining the cap on a transitional basis will minimize the disruptive effects and regulatory uncertainty that otherwise would result from the abrupt elimination of clear compensation rules for ISP-bound traffic.

202. We expect that state commissions, applying the new “additional costs” standard adopted in this order, will set final reciprocal compensation rates at or below \$.0007 per minute-of-use. As noted below, the evidence in the record suggests that the incremental cost of call termination on modern switches is de minimis.⁵¹⁸ We have given state commissions up to ten years to transition to new rates based on the “additional costs” standard. Accordingly, the rate cap will only have an impact in a particular state on a transitional basis until that state sets rates at or below \$.0007.

203. The mirroring rule has also succeeded in promoting the Commission’s “goal of a more unified intercarrier compensation regime by requiring LECs to offer similar rates for like traffic.”⁵¹⁹ Most intraMTA traffic is now exchanged pursuant to the rate caps, and a substantial portion of wireline intraexchange traffic is being exchanged at rates at or below the rate caps as well.⁵²⁰ Eliminating the mirroring rule and allowing carriers to charge higher transitional reciprocal compensation rates for traffic currently subject to the mirroring rule would significantly increase the cost carriers incur in exchanging that traffic. Those increased costs would divert funds from investment in next generation wireless networks and likely would be borne by consumers, through increases in the costs of wireless offerings.⁵²¹

204. We reject arguments that the Commission unlawfully delegated its authority in the *ISP Remand Order* and arguments that the Commission addressed previously in the *Core Forbearance Order*.⁵²² We also disagree with parties who suggest that the Commission, in responding to the D.C. Circuit’s remand in *WorldCom*, must offer detailed new justifications for each of the four features of the ISP intercarrier payment regime: the rate caps, the mirroring rule, the growth cap, and the new markets rule.⁵²³ The prior policy justifications offered for those rules by the Commission have not been overturned by any court, and our current policy justification for retaining these rules is simply to maintain the status quo in this area on a transitional basis until our new “additional costs” methodology has been fully implemented. Indeed, pursuant to our new “additional costs” methodology, we believe that the rate caps set forth in 2001 may well be higher than the final, uniform reciprocal compensation rates set by the states. However, discarding these rules during the transition to our new methodology would be unwise and unwarranted because the “rate caps are necessary to prevent discrimination *between* dial-up Internet

⁵¹⁷ *Core Forbearance Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 20815–16, para. 18.

⁵¹⁸ *See supra* para. 255.

⁵¹⁹ *Core Forbearance Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 20816, para. 19.

⁵²⁰ *See, e.g.*, Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments at 40.

⁵²¹ Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments. at 40.

⁵²² *See* Letter from Michael B. Hazzard, Counsel for Core Communications, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 99-68, 01-92, Attach. at 18 & n.8 (filed May 14, 2008) (Core May 14, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter). We also reject Core’s argument that the *ISP Remand Order* unlawfully delegates to incumbent LECs the decision of whether the *ISP Remand Order* applies. *See id.* at 19–20. The Commission did not delegate its authority in the *ISP Remand Order* but rather provided options that were not mandatory. *See, e.g.*, *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9193, para. 89. Additionally, Core argues that the Commission provided no reasoned explanation for the growth cap and new market rules adopted in the *ISP Remand Order* and never provided notice or an opportunity for comment on those specific rules. These rules, as applicable to all carriers, were forborne from in the *Core Forbearance Order*. *See Core Forbearance Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 20186–87, paras. 20–21. As such, this argument is moot.

⁵²³ *See Core May 14, 2008 Ex Parte Letter*, Attach. at 20–26.

access customers and basic telephone service customers,” those caps “protect consumers of basic telephone service” from being forced to subsidize dial-up Internet access service, and the rate caps minimize the “classic regulatory arbitrage” that reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic had made possible.⁵²⁴

205. In sum, we maintain the \$.0007 cap and the mirroring rule, on a transitional basis, pursuant to our section 201 authority. These interim rules shall remain in place in a state until the state commission, applying the “additional costs” standard adopted in this order, has established reciprocal compensation rates that are at or below \$.0007 per minute-of-use.

206. We find that our transition plan is necessary and appropriate to prevent undue economic hardships to carriers caused by a too-rapid reduction in intercarrier compensation rates. If there is evidence that carriers are attempting to abuse the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate and/or transition process to create arbitrage opportunities, we encourage carriers to bring such evidence to our attention or that of the state commission so such claims can be investigated and, if appropriate, action taken.

3. Legal Authority

a. Legal Authority for Comprehensive Reform—Interpretation of Sections 251(b)(5) and 251(g)

207. The history of intercarrier compensation reveals many policy reasons for comprehensively reforming intercarrier compensation rates, including reducing arbitrage, promoting competition, facilitating the introduction of new technologies, and benefiting consumers. The dual structure of separate federal and state jurisdiction over communications has made accomplishing such reforms more complex, however. Although our reform does not disturb those fundamental jurisdictional distinctions, we find that, through the tools made available by the 1996 Act, we have the means to accomplish this reform by electing to partner with the states.

208. The Commission unquestionably has authority to reform intercarrier compensation with respect to interstate access services, rates charged by CMRS providers, and IP/PSTN traffic. Section 2(a) of the Act establishes the Commission’s jurisdiction over interstate services, for which the Commission ensures just, reasonable, and not unjustly and unreasonably discriminatory rates under section 201 and 202.⁵²⁵ Likewise, the Commission has authority over the rates of CMRS providers pursuant to section 332 of the Act.⁵²⁶ We also make clear that authority to impose economic regulation with respect to IP/PSTN traffic rests exclusively with this Commission. The Commission has adopted a number of regulatory requirements applicable to interconnected VoIP services and providers.⁵²⁷ With respect to the statutory classification of IP-enabled services, however, the Commission only has addressed two

⁵²⁴ *In re Core Commc’ns* 455 F.3d at 277–80 (internal quotation marks omitted).

⁵²⁵ 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 201, 202.

⁵²⁶ 47 U.S.C. § 332.

⁵²⁷ See, e.g., *Telephone Number Requirements for IP-Enabled Services Providers; Local Number Portability Porting Interval and Validation Requirements; IP-Enabled Services; CTIA Petitions for Declaratory Ruling on Wireline-Wireless Porting Issues*, CC Docket Nos. 99-200, 95-116, WC Docket Nos. 07-243, 07-244, 04-36, Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling, Order on Remand, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 19531, 19538–40, paras. 14, 16 (2008) (*LNP Order*) (imposing LNP requirements, and noting that the Commission previously imposed the requirement to provide 911 service, to contribute to universal service, to protect the privacy of customers, to comply with disability access and telecommunications relay service requirements, and to satisfy certain CALEA obligations).

situations.⁵²⁸

209. We now classify as “information services” those services that originate calls on IP networks and terminate them on circuit-switched networks, or conversely that originate calls on circuit-switched networks and terminate them on IP networks (collectively “IP/PSTN” services).⁵²⁹ Such traffic today involves a net protocol conversion between end-users, and thus constitutes an “enhanced” or “information service.”⁵³⁰

⁵²⁸ On one hand, the Commission classified as an “information service” Pulver.com’s free service that did not provide transmission and offers a number of computing capabilities. *Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications Service*, WC Docket No. 03-45, Memorandum Order and Opinion, 19 FCC Rcd 3307 (2004) (*Pulver.com Order*). On the other hand, the Commission found that certain “IP-in-the-middle” services were “telecommunications services” where they: (1) use ordinary customer premises equipment (CPE) with no enhanced functionality; (2) originate and terminate on the public switched telephone network (PSTN); and (3) undergo no net protocol conversion and provide no enhanced functionality to end users due to the provider’s use of IP technology. See, e.g., *Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T’s Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services are Exempt from Access Charges*, WC Docket No. 02-361, Order, 19 FCC Rcd 7457 (2004) (*IP-in-the-Middle Order*). See also, e.g., *Regulation of Prepaid Calling Card Services*, WC Docket No. 05-68, Declaratory Ruling and Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 7290 (2006) (*Prepaid Calling Card Order*).

⁵²⁹ We use the term “IP/PSTN” as a shorthand, without reaching any universal conclusions regarding the technology underlying the PSTN. Today the PSTN continues to rely primarily on circuit-switched technology to connect to end-user customers, although we recognize that carriers increasingly are converting portions of their networks to IP technology. See, e.g., *IP-Enabled Services; E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers*, WC Docket Nos. 04-36, 05-196, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 10245, 10258, para. 24 & n.77 (2005) (distinguishing the “specialized” CPE required for interconnected VoIP services from the standard CPE used for typical telephone calls); *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11501, 11532, para. 84 (1998) (“‘IP telephony’ services enable real-time voice transmission using Internet protocols. The services can be provided in two basic ways: through software and hardware at customer premises, or through ‘gateways’ that enable applications originating and/or terminating on the PSTN. Gateways are computers that transform the circuit-switched voice signal into IP packets, and vice versa, and perform associated signaling, control, and address translation functions.”). Insofar as a service allows a customer to originate a communication on an IP network and terminate it on a circuit-switched network, or vice versa, it involves a net protocol conversion, and we classify it as an “information service” today. Insofar as that service allows communications with no net protocol conversion, it is not subject to our “information service” classification here. We note that the presence of a net protocol conversion is not the only basis for classifying a service as an “enhanced” or “information service.” See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a); *Computer II Final Decision*, 77 FCC 2d at 420–21, para. 97. We do not reach those issues at this time, however.

⁵³⁰ See, e.g., *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended*, CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905, 21957–58, para. 106 (1996) (*Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*). Interpreting the 1996 Act’s definition of “information services,” the Commission held that “all of the services that the Commission has previously considered to be ‘enhanced services’ are ‘information services.’” *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21956, para. 103. For the all reasons discussed in Part V.B.2, we decline to defer the classification of IP/PSTN services, as requested by some parties, instead finding it appropriate to address this issue as part of our comprehensive reforms. See, e.g., Letter from Ben Scott, Policy Director, Free Press, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 05-337, 06-122, CC Docket Nos. 96-45, 01-92 at 15 (filed Oct. 24, 2008) (Free Press Oct. 24, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter from Brad E. Mutschelknaus and Genevieve Morelli, Counsel for Broadview Networks, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 2 (filed Oct. 28, 2008).

210. Although there are certain exceptions to this treatment, we do not find them applicable.⁵³¹ In particular, we do not find this to be “protocol conversion in connection with the introduction of new technology to implement existing services” that would be treated as a “basic,” rather than “enhanced” service.⁵³² That exception was designed to address situations “involving no change in an existing service, but merely a change in electrical interface characteristics to facilitate transitional introduction of new technology.”⁵³³ By contrast, we find that IP/PSTN services are not mere changes to the underlying technology used for “existing” basic services, but are entirely new services with characteristics in many ways distinct from pre-existing telephone services.⁵³⁴

211. Consistent with the *Pulver.com Order* and the *Vonage Order*, we preempt any state efforts to impose “traditional ‘telephone company’ regulations” as they relate to IP/PSTN information services as inconsistent with our generally unregulated treatment of information services.⁵³⁵ Of course, neither the *Vonage Order*, the *Pulver.com Order*, nor our actions here preempt state actions that are

⁵³¹ Two of the exceptions are: (1) protocol processing involving communications between an end user and the network itself (e.g., for initiation, routing, and termination of calls) rather than between or among users; and (2) protocol conversion to facilitate the interconnection of networks. *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21957–58, para. 106. These categories of protocol processing services may involve protocol conversions, but they result in no net protocol conversion between the end users. *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended*, CC Docket No. 96-149, Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297, 2297–99, para. 2 (1997). Thus, they are not relevant here.

⁵³² *Amendment to Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Phase II Carrier Service and Facilities Authorization Thereof; Communications Protocols Under Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations*, CC Docket No. 85-229, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd 3072, 3081, para. 65 (1987) (*Computer III Phase II Order*). See also *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21957–58, para. 106.

⁵³³ *Communications Protocols under Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations*, GN Docket No. 80-756, Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Statement Of Principles, 95 FCC 2d 584, para. 16 (1983) (*Protocols Order*).

⁵³⁴ See, e.g., Letter from Donna Epps, Vice President, Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-36, 06-122, CC Docket No. 01-92, Attach. at 9–11 (filed Sept. 19, 2008); Letter from Susanne A. Guyer, Senior Vice President, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Verizon, to Chairman Kevin J. Martin, FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36, at 10–11 (filed Aug. 6, 2007); Letter from AT&T et al., to Chairman Kevin J. Martin, FCC, et al., WC Docket No. 04-36, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 2–3 (filed Aug. 6, 2008); VON Coalition *IP-Enabled Services NPRM* Comments at 3–16; AT&T *IP-Enabled Services NPRM* Comments at 13–17. We thus disagree with parties who suggest, in essence, that IP/PSTN services are no different than “basic” services. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jones and Jonathan Lechter, Counsel for tw telecom et al., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 96-45, WC Docket Nos. 05-337, 99-68, 04-36, Attach. at 2 (filed Oct. 28, 2008) (tw telecom et al. Oct. 28, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter). We note that whether a service is viewed by consumers as a possible substitute for a “basic” service is a distinct question from whether, as a matter of technology and the nature of the service offering, the service simply replaces the technology underlying a pre-existing basic service. Thus, our conclusion here is not inconsistent with the Commission’s recognition that interconnected VoIP services increasingly are viewed by consumers as a substitute for traditional telephone services. See, e.g., *LNP Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 19547, para. 28.

⁵³⁵ *Vonage Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 22404; see also *Pulver.com Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 3316, para. 15 (“We determine, consistent with our precedent regarding information services, that FWD is an unregulated information service and any state regulations that seek to treat FWD as a telecommunications service or otherwise subject it to public-utility type regulation would almost certainly pose a conflict with our policy of nonregulation.”).

consistent with federal policy.⁵³⁶ Moreover, as we describe below, we allow states to establish reciprocal compensation rates, pursuant to our methodology, including for IP/PSTN traffic.

212. In sections 251 and 252 of the Act, Congress altered the traditional regulatory framework based on jurisdiction by expanding the applicability of national rules to historically intrastate issues and state rules to historically interstate issues.⁵³⁷ In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission found that the 1996 Act created parallel jurisdiction for the Commission and the states over interstate and intrastate matters under sections 251 and 252.⁵³⁸ The Commission and the states “are to address the same matters through their parallel jurisdiction over both interstate and intrastate matters under sections 251 and 252.”⁵³⁹ Moreover, section 251(i) provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the Commission’s authority under section 201.”⁵⁴⁰ The Commission concluded that section 251(i) “affirms that the Commission’s preexisting authority under section 201 continues to apply for purely interstate activities.”⁵⁴¹

213. In implementing sections 251 and 252 in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission’s treatment of LEC-CMRS traffic provides an instructive approach. Prior to the 1996 Act, the Commission expressly preempted “state and local regulations of the kind of interconnection to which CMRS providers are entitled” based on its authority under section 201 and 332 of the Act.⁵⁴² Nevertheless, in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission brought LEC-CMRS interconnection within the section 251 framework as it relates to intraMTA (including interstate intraMTA) traffic.⁵⁴³ The Commission recognized, however, that it continued to retain separate authority over CMRS traffic.⁵⁴⁴

214. Courts confirmed that, in permitting LEC-CMRS interconnection to be addressed through the section 251 framework, the Commission did not in any way lose its independent jurisdiction or authority to regulate that traffic under other provisions of the Act. Thus, although the Eighth Circuit invalidated the Commission’s TELRIC pricing rules in general,⁵⁴⁵ it recognized that “because section 332(c)(1)(B) gives the FCC the authority to order LECs to interconnect with CMRS carriers, we believe that the Commission has the authority to issue the rules of special concern to the CMRS providers,

⁵³⁶ For example, states are free to require contributions to state universal service or telecommunications relay service funds through methodologies that are consistent with federal policy. *See, e.g.*, Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr. Senior Vice President, Federal Regulatory, AT&T, to Chairman Kevin J. Martin, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-36, 06-122, CC Docket No. 96-45 at 11-16 (filed July 23, 2008) (describing ways that states could require contributions to state universal service or telecommunications relay service funds in a manner that is consistent with federal policy).

⁵³⁷ *See Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15544, para. 83.

⁵³⁸ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15544-45, para. 85.

⁵³⁹ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15546-47, para. 91.

⁵⁴⁰ 47 U.S.C. § 251(i).

⁵⁴¹ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15546-47, para. 91.

⁵⁴² *Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332*, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 1411, 1498, para. 230 (1994).

⁵⁴³ *See Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16005, para. 1023.

⁵⁴⁴ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16005, para. 1023 (“By opting to proceed under sections 251 and 252, we are not finding that section 332 jurisdiction over interconnection has been repealed by implication, or rejecting it as an alternative basis for jurisdiction.”).

⁵⁴⁵ We note that the Supreme Court later reversed this decision and affirmed the TELRIC methodology. *See Verizon v. FCC*, 535 U.S. at 467.

[including the reciprocal compensation rules] but only as these provisions apply to CMRS providers. Thus, [the pricing] rules . . . remain in full force and effect with respect to the CMRS providers, and our order of vacation does not apply to them in the CMRS context.⁵⁴⁶ Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit held that CMRS providers were entitled to pursue formal complaints under section 208 of the Act for violations of the Commission's reciprocal compensation rules.⁵⁴⁷

215. We build upon our actions in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, and now permit states to establish a uniform reciprocal compensation rate, in accordance with the new methodology we establish in this order, pursuant to the section 251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2) framework. In particular, section 251(b)(5) imposes on all LECs a “duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.”⁵⁴⁸ Section 252(d)(2)(A) sets forth an “additional costs” standard that state commissions, in arbitrating interconnection disputes involving incumbent LECs, should apply in setting the “charges for transport and termination of traffic.”⁵⁴⁹ Although we allow states to set new uniform termination rates under this framework, pursuant to our methodology, we retain our authority under section 201 to find that reciprocal compensation charges are unjust and unreasonable as they relate to interstate, CMRS, and IP/PSTN traffic within our jurisdiction.⁵⁵⁰ We expect that states will faithfully implement the pricing standards adopted in this order, and thus it will not be necessary for us to exercise that authority.⁵⁵¹

216. The Commission unquestionably has authority to interpret and adopt rules implementing sections 251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2). Congress delegated to the Commission the task of administering the Communications Act. Section 201(b) authorizes the Commission to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Act.”⁵⁵² “[T]he grant in § 201(b) means what it says: The FCC has rulemaking authority to carry out the ‘provisions of this

⁵⁴⁶ *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753, 800 n.21 (8th Cir. 1997) (*Iowa Utils. I*), *rev'd in part and remanded on other grounds*, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. 366.

⁵⁴⁷ *Qwest Corp. v. FCC*, 252 F.3d 462, 465–66 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing the Eighth Circuit's analysis of section 332(c)(1)(B) in *Iowa Utils. I* and concluding that an attempt to relitigate the issue was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion).

⁵⁴⁸ 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5).

⁵⁴⁹ 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A).

⁵⁵⁰ See *supra* paras. 208–14. See also, e.g., Letter from John T. Nakahata, Counsel for Level 3 Communications, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 01-92 at 9–11 (filed on Aug. 18, 2008) (Level 3 Aug. 18, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter). Contrary to Verizon's claims, we thus find no tension between permitting states to set reciprocal compensation rates for interstate traffic under the section 251 and 252 framework and the Commission's continuing authority over traffic subject to its jurisdiction, including section 201 authority expressly preserved under section 251(i).

⁵⁵¹ We recognize that “the just and reasonable rates required by Sections 201 and 202 . . . must ordinarily be cost-based, absent a clear explanation of the Commission's reasons for a departure from cost-based ratemaking.” *Access Charge Reform*, CC Docket Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, Second Order on Reconsideration and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 16606, 16619–20, para. 44 (*Access Charge Reform Second Order*) (citing *Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC*, 87 F.3d 522, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). In this order, we adopt an incremental cost methodology for setting termination rates. We find that the proper application of that methodology produces rates that are “just and reasonable” under section 201. As discussed below, we find it appropriate to adopt a transition before carriers begin charging rates set pursuant to our incremental cost methodology.

⁵⁵² 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Act.”).

Act.”⁵⁵³ The Commission’s rulemaking authority is not limited to interstate matters; it extends to all provisions of the Communications Act.⁵⁵⁴

217. In addition, we find that the section 251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2) framework is broad enough to facilitate our intercarrier compensation reform. We acknowledge that, in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission found that section 251(b)(5) applies only to local traffic,⁵⁵⁵ and some commenters continue to press for such an interpretation.⁵⁵⁶ As other commenters recognize, however, the Commission, in the *ISP Remand Order*, reconsidered that judgment and concluded that it was a mistake to read section 251(b)(5) as limited to local traffic, given that “local” is not a term used in section 251(b)(5).⁵⁵⁷ We recognize, as the Supreme Court noted in *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board*, that “[i]t would be a gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity.”⁵⁵⁸ Nevertheless, we find that the better view is that section 251(b)(5) is not limited to local traffic.

218. We begin by looking at the text of the statute. Section 251(b)(5) imposes on all LECs the “duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.”⁵⁵⁹ The Act broadly defines “telecommunications” as “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.”⁵⁶⁰ Its scope is not limited geographically (“local,” “intrastate,” or “interstate”) or to particular services (“telephone exchange service,”⁵⁶¹ telephone toll service,⁵⁶² or “exchange access”⁵⁶³). We find that the traffic we elect to bring within this framework fits

⁵⁵³ *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. at 378.

⁵⁵⁴ *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. at 378 n.6 (“[T]he question in these cases is not whether the Federal Government has taken the regulation of local telecommunications competition away from the States. With regard to the matters addressed by the 1996 Act, it unquestionably has.”).

⁵⁵⁵ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16012–13, para. 1033.

⁵⁵⁶ See, e.g., Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments at 24–32; Letter from Daniel Mitchell, Vice President, Legal and Industry, NTCA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 9 (filed Sept. 30, 2008) (NCTA Sept. 30, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Verizon *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 38–42; NARUC *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 6–7; Rural Alliance *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 144–49; Cincinnati Bell *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 5–11; Maine PUC and Vermont Pub. Serv. Bd. *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 7; New York State PSC *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 7; Verizon and BellSouth, Supplemental White Paper on ISP Reciprocal Compensation, CC Docket No. 96-98, 99-68 at 16–20 (filed July 20, 2004) (Verizon/BellSouth Supp. ISP White Paper); NARUC’s Initial Comments at 7 n.13 (May 23, 2004). *But see, e.g.*, ICF *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 39.

⁵⁵⁷ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9166–67, para. 35. See also, e.g., Qwest, Legal Authority for Comprehensive Intercarrier Compensation Reform at 2–4, attached to Letter from Melissa Newman, Counsel for Qwest, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 06-45, 99-68, WC Docket Nos. 04-36, 05-337, 05-195, 06-122 (filed Oct. 7, 2008); Letter from Kathleen O’Brien Ham et al., Counsel for T-Mobile, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 9–10 (filed Oct. 3, 2008); Level 3 Aug. 18, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2, 15–18; AT&T *Missoula Phantom Traffic* Reply at 35–41; Brief from Gary M. Epstein, Counsel for ICF, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 29–35 (filed Oct. 5, 2004)

⁵⁵⁸ *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. at 397.

⁵⁵⁹ 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5).

⁵⁶⁰ 47 U.S.C. § 153(43).

⁵⁶¹ *Id.* at § 153(47).

⁵⁶² *Id.* at § 153(48).

⁵⁶³ *Id.* at § 153(16).

squarely within the meaning of “telecommunications.”⁵⁶⁴ Had Congress intended to preclude the Commission from bringing certain types of telecommunications traffic within the section 251(b)(5) framework, it could have easily done so by incorporating restrictive terms in section 251(b)(5). Because Congress used the term “telecommunications,” the broadest of the statute’s defined terms, we conclude that section 251(b)(5) is not limited only to the transport and termination of certain types of telecommunications traffic, such as local traffic.

219. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order* the Commission concluded that section 251(b)(5) applies only to local traffic, but recognized that “[u]ltimately . . . the rates that local carriers impose for the transport and termination of local traffic and for the transport and termination of long distance traffic should converge.”⁵⁶⁵ In the *ISP Remand Order*, the Commission reversed course on the scope of section 251(b)(5), finding that “the phrase ‘local traffic’ created unnecessary ambiguities, and we correct that mistake here.”⁵⁶⁶ The *ISP Remand Order* noted that “the term ‘local,’ not being a statutorily defined category, . . . is not a term used in section 251(b)(5).”⁵⁶⁷ The Commission found that the scope of section 251(b)(5) is limited only by section 251(g), which temporarily grandfathered the pre-1996 Act rules governing “exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access” provided to IXCs and information service providers until “explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the Commission.”⁵⁶⁸ On appeal, the D.C. Circuit left intact the Commission’s findings concerning the scope of section 251(b)(5), although it took issue with other aspects of the *ISP Remand Order*.⁵⁶⁹

220. We agree with the finding in the *ISP Remand Order* that traffic encompassed by section 251(g) is excluded from section 251(b)(5) except to the extent that the Commission acts to bring that traffic within its scope. Section 251(g) preserved the pre-1996 Act regulatory regime that applies to access traffic, including rules governing “receipt of compensation.”⁵⁷⁰ There would have been no need for Congress to have preserved these compensation rules against the effects of section 251 if the scope of section 251(b)(5) was not broad enough for the Commission to bring within its scope the traffic covered by section 251(g), i.e., access traffic. Because Congress is presumed not to have wasted its breath, particularly with a provision as lengthy and detailed as section 251(g), we find that section 251(g) confirms that section 251(b)(5) applies to the transport and termination of all telecommunications traffic exchanged with LECs, including ISP-bound traffic. And because section 251(g) “is worded simply as a transitional device, preserving various LEC duties that antedated the 1996 Act until such time as the Commission should adopt new rules pursuant to the Act,”⁵⁷¹ we clearly have authority under the Act to

⁵⁶⁴ As discussed above, we classify IP/PSTN services as “information services.” We note, however, that information services, by definition, are provided “via telecommunications,” enabling us to bring IP/PSTN traffic within the section 251(b)(5) framework. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). Moreover, given that we retain independent authority under section 201, we find it reasonably ancillary to that authority to regulate IP/PSTN services in this regard, consistent with our efforts to ensure uniform treatment of all traffic on the PSTN for intercarrier compensation purposes. Thus, IP/PSTN traffic ultimately will be subject to the final uniform reciprocal compensation rates established pursuant to the methodology adopted in this order. We maintain the status quo for this traffic during the transition, however.

⁵⁶⁵ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16012, para. 1033.

⁵⁶⁶ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9173, para. 46.

⁵⁶⁷ *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9167, para. 34.

⁵⁶⁸ 47 U.S.C. § 251(g).

⁵⁶⁹ See *WorldCom*, 288 F.3d at 429.

⁵⁷⁰ 47 U.S.C. 251(g).

⁵⁷¹ *WorldCom*, 288 F.3d at 430.

adopt regulations superseding that regime. We exercise that authority today.⁵⁷²

221. By placing all traffic under the umbrella of one compensation scheme, we eliminate jurisdictional and regulatory distinctions that are not tied to economic or technical differences between services. As the Commission observed in the *Intercarrier Compensation NPRM*, regulatory arbitrage arises from different rates that different types of providers must pay for essentially the same functions.⁵⁷³ Our current classifications require carriers to treat identical uses of the network differently, even though such disparate treatment usually has no economic or technical basis. These artificial distinctions distort the telecommunications markets at the expense of healthy competition. Similar types of traffic should be subject to similar rules. Similar types of functions should be subject to similar cost recovery mechanisms. We achieve that result by moving away from the regime preserved by section 251(g) and bringing that traffic within the section 251(b)(5) framework.

222. We disagree with commenters who argue that section 251(b)(5) only can be applied to traffic exchanged between LECs, and not traffic exchanged between a LEC and another carrier.⁵⁷⁴ The Commission rejected that argument in the *Local Competition Order*, finding that section 251(b)(5) applies to traffic exchanged by a LEC and any other telecommunications carrier, and adopted rules implementing that finding.⁵⁷⁵ In a specific application of that principle, the Commission concluded that “CMRS providers will not be classified as LECs,”⁵⁷⁶ but nevertheless found that “LECs are obligated,

⁵⁷² Verizon notes that although the Commission in the *ISP Remand Order* deleted the word “local” from its regulations governing reciprocal compensation, the regulations continued to exclude access services from the scope of section 251(b)(5). See Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments at 24–32; 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(b)(1). At that time, it made sense to retain the access exemption because the Commission had not issued rules superseding the access regime preserved by section 251(g). We supersede the grandfathered access regime in this order, at least in part.

⁵⁷³ *Intercarrier Compensation NPRM*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9616, para. 12.

⁵⁷⁴ See, e.g., Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments (“The best interpretation of § 251(b)(5) – read in light of the text, structure, and history of the 1996 Act – is that the reciprocal compensation obligation applies only to intraexchange (or ‘local’) voice calls that originate on the network of one LEC (or wireless provider) and terminate on the network of another LEC (or wireless provider) operating in the same exchange (or, in the case of wireless providers, the same MTA.”); Verizon and BellSouth, *Internet-Bound Traffic is Not Compensable Under Sections 251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2)* at 26 (Verizon/BellSouth ISP White Paper) (“By its nature, ‘reciprocal compensation’ must . . . apply to ‘telecommunications’ exchanged *between LECs* (or carriers, like CMRS providers, that the Commission is authorized to treat as LECs), not to traffic that is exchanged between LECs and non-LECs.”), attached to Letter from Ann D. Berkowitz, Associate Director, Federal Regulatory Advocacy, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 99-68, 96-98 (filed May 17, 2004).

⁵⁷⁵ See *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16013–16, paras. 1034–41. See also 47 C.F.R. 51.703(a) (“Each LEC shall establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transport and termination of telecommunications traffic with any requesting telecommunications carrier.”); *ISP Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9193–94, para. 89 n.177 (“Section 251(b)(5) applies to telecommunications traffic between a LEC and a telecommunications carrier . . .”).

⁵⁷⁶ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15996, para. 1005. In this regard, we note that, absent a determination that CMRS providers are LECs, IXC-CMRS traffic would not be encompassed by section 251(b)(5), since neither are LECs. Nevertheless, it is our intention that, at the end of the transition, CMRS providers be entitled to reciprocal compensation for all the traffic they terminate. As the Commission has observed, “[t]here are three ways in which a carrier seeking to impose charges on another carrier can establish a duty to pay such charges: pursuant to (1) Commission rule; (2) tariff; or (3) contract.” *Petitions of Sprint PCS and AT&T Corp. For Declaratory Ruling Regarding CMRS Access Charges, Declaratory Ruling*, 17 FCC Rcd 13192, 13196, para. 8 (2002).

pursuant to section 251(b)(5) (and the corresponding pricing standards of section 252(d)(2)), to enter into reciprocal compensation agreements with all CMRS providers.”⁵⁷⁷ No one challenged that finding on appeal, and it has been settled law for the past 12 years. We see no reason to revisit that conclusion now. Although section 251(b)(5) indisputably imposes the duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements on LECs alone, Congress did not limit the class of potential beneficiaries of that obligation to LECs.⁵⁷⁸

223. We also disagree with commenters who argue that section 252(d)(2)(A)(i) limits the scope of section 251(b)(5).⁵⁷⁹ Section 252(d)(2)(A)(i) provides that a state commission “shall not consider the terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable” unless “such terms and conditions provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on each carrier’s network facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the other carrier.”⁵⁸⁰ Verizon and others argue that this provision necessarily excludes interexchange traffic from the scope of section 251(b)(5) because at the time the 1996 Act was passed, calls neither originated nor terminated on an IXC’s network.⁵⁸¹ We reject this reasoning because it erroneously assumes that Congress intended the pricing standards in section 252(d)(2) to limit the otherwise broad scope of section 251(b)(5). We do not believe that Congress intended the tail to wag the dog.

224. Section 251(b)(5) defines the scope of traffic that is subject to reciprocal compensation. Section 252(d)(2)(A)(i), in turn, deals with the mechanics of who owes what to whom, it does not define the scope of traffic to which section 251(b)(5) applies. Section 252(d)(2)(A)(i) provides that, at a minimum, a reciprocal compensation arrangement must provide for the recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on each carrier’s network of calls that originate on the network of the other carrier.⁵⁸² Section 252(d)(2)(A)(i) does not address what happens when carriers exchange traffic that originates or terminates on a third carrier’s network. This does not mean, as Verizon suggests, that section 251(b)(5) must be read as limited to traffic involving only two carriers. Rather, it means that there is a gap in the pricing rules in section 252(d)(2), and the Commission has authority under section 201(b) to adopt rules to fill that gap.

225. We reject Verizon’s argument that a telecommunications carrier that delivers traffic to an ISP is not eligible for reciprocal compensation because the carrier does not “terminate” telecommunications traffic at the ISP.⁵⁸³ In the *Local Competition Order*, the Commission defined

⁵⁷⁷ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15997, para. 1008.

⁵⁷⁸ If Congress had intended to limit the class of potential beneficiaries of LECs’ duty to establish reciprocal obligation arrangements, it would have said so explicitly. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3) (describing the “duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service”).

⁵⁷⁹ See, e.g., Verizon/BellSouth ISP White Paper at 41–43; New York State PSC *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 8–9; TDS *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 19 n.27; Qwest *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 39; NASUCA *ICC FNPRM* Reply at 17–18.

⁵⁸⁰ 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).

⁵⁸¹ See, e.g., Maine PUC and Vermont Pub. Serv. Bd. *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 7–8; New York State PSC *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 7–10; Verizon/BellSouth Supp. ISP White Paper at 16–20; NARUC *ICC FNPRM* Comments at 7 n.13.

⁵⁸² 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).

⁵⁸³ See, e.g., Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments at 33–34; Verizon/BellSouth ISP White Paper at 31–32.

“termination” as “the switching of traffic that is subject to section 251(b)(5) at the terminating carrier’s end office switch . . . and delivery of that traffic to the called party’s premises.”⁵⁸⁴ As the D.C. Circuit suggested in the *Bell Atlantic* decision, “Calls to ISPs appear to fit this definition: the traffic is switched by the LEC whose customer is the ISP and then delivered to the ISP, which is clearly the ‘called party.’”⁵⁸⁵ We agree.⁵⁸⁶ Consequently, ISP-bound traffic is subject to our new intercarrier compensation framework.⁵⁸⁷

226. We reject opponents’ other arguments that the context and history of the 1996 Act compel a finding that section 251(b)(5) could not be applied to access traffic. Verizon argues, for example, that section 251(g) demonstrates that Congress did not intend to displace the existing access pricing regime.⁵⁸⁸ This argument ignores that Congress preserved the access regime only “until such restrictions and obligations are explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the Commission.”⁵⁸⁹ As noted above, we find that section 251(g) actually supports a finding that section 251(b)(5) is broad enough to cover access traffic. Verizon also argues that the reference to reciprocal compensation in the competitive checklist in section 271,⁵⁹⁰ which was designed to ensure that local markets are open to competition, somehow shows that Congress intended to limit the scope of section 251(b)(5) to local traffic.⁵⁹¹ We do not see how this argument sheds any light on the scope of section 251(b)(5). Congress no doubt included the reference to reciprocal compensation in section 271 because section 251(b)(5) applies to local traffic, a point that no one disputes. That does not suggest, however, that section 251(b)(5) applies *only* to local traffic.

227. We need not respond to every other variation of the argument that the history and structure of the Act somehow demonstrate that section 251(b)(5) does not apply to access traffic. At best, these arguments show that one plausible interpretation of the statute is that section 251(b)(5) applies only to local traffic, a view that the Commission embraced in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*.

⁵⁸⁴ *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16015, para. 1040. See also 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(d).

⁵⁸⁵ 206 F.3d at 6.

⁵⁸⁶ Because ISP-bound traffic did not fall within the section 251(g) carve out from section 251(b)(5) as “there had been *no* pre-Act obligation relating to intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic,” *WorldCom*, 288 F.3d at 433, ISP-bound traffic is, and always has been, subject to section 251(b)(5), although clearly interstate in nature and subject to our section 201 authority.

⁵⁸⁷ We reject Verizon’s argument against the application of section 251(b)(5) to ISP-bound traffic because this traffic is one-way traffic and as such is not reciprocal. See *Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments* at 26; *Verizon/BellSouth ISP White Paper* at 41–43. As Level 3 points out, these arguments have been rejected by the Commission and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Level 3 Aug. 18, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter at 18; *Pacific Bell v. Cook Telecom, Inc.*, 197 F.3d 1236, 1242–44 (9th Cir. 1999) (reciprocal compensation applies to paging traffic); *TSR Wireless, LLC v. U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc.*, 15 FCC Rcd 11166, 11178, para. 21 (2000) (the Commission’s reciprocal compensation rules draw “no distinction between one-way and two-way carriers”). Because our conclusion in this order concerning the scope of section 251(b)(5) is no longer tied to whether this traffic is local or long distance, we need not address arguments made by the parties as to whether ISP-bound traffic constitutes “telephone exchange service” under the Act. See, e.g., Letter from John T. Nakahata, Counsel for Level 3 Communications, LLC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 99-68, 96-98, Attach. at 1 (filed Sept. 24, 2004). We note, however, that we retain our interim ISP-bound traffic rules. See *supra* paras. 198–205.

⁵⁸⁸ See *Verizon ICC FNPRM Comments* at 41.

⁵⁸⁹ 47 U.S.C. § 251(g).

⁵⁹⁰ See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).

⁵⁹¹ See *Verizon/Verizon Wireless Oct. 2, 2008 Supp. Comments* at 26; *Verizon/BellSouth ISP White Paper* at 9.

These arguments do not persuade us, however, that this is the only plausible reading of the statute. Moreover, many of the same arguments based on the history and context of the adoption of section 251 to limit its scope to local traffic were rejected by the D.C. Circuit in the context of section 251(c).⁵⁹² We find that the better reading of the Act as a whole, in particular the broad language of section 251(b)(5) and the grandfather clause in section 251(g), supports our view that the transport and termination of all telecommunications exchanged with LECs is subject to the reciprocal compensation regime in sections 251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2).

228. The approach we adopt here provides a sound basis for comprehensive reform, and we thus decline to adopt alternative proposals. On one hand, we note that some commenters advocate that the Commission adopt an intercarrier compensation rate or cap of \$0.0007 per minute of use for all traffic.⁵⁹³ To implement this reform proposal, parties have suggested that it would likely be necessary for the Commission to preempt state regulation of intrastate access charges.⁵⁹⁴ We believe that such a significant step is not currently warranted, and elect instead to allow states to continue setting rates for intrastate traffic, as well as permitting them to set rates for traffic subject to federal jurisdiction, pursuant to our methodology. We fully expect the new pricing methodology to achieve the goals of our continuing intercarrier compensation reform. On the other hand, some parties contend that the Commission should leave matters of intrastate intercarrier compensation reform entirely to the states.⁵⁹⁵ These proposals evidence a pre-1996 Act worldview, however. Given the tools that the 1996 Act put at our disposal, we find it possible to move forward with truly comprehensive intercarrier compensation reform under an approach which still provides for a state role.

229. We note that, in the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission observed that section 251(b)(5) does not address charges payable to a carrier that originates traffic and

⁵⁹² *United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC*, 359 F.3d 554, 592 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (*USTA II*) (“Even under the deferential *Chevron* standard of review, an agency cannot, absent strong structural or contextual evidence, exclude from coverage certain items that clearly fall within the plain meaning of a statutory term. The argument that long distance services are not ‘telecommunications services’ has no support.”). In *USTA II*, the D.C. Circuit was addressing whether the term “telecommunications services” was limited to local telecommunications services under section 251(c), while here we consider the analogous question of whether “telecommunications” is limited to local telecommunications under section 251(b).

⁵⁹³ See, e.g., Letter from Grace E. Koh, Policy Counsel, Cox Enterprises, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92, Attach. A at 1 (filed Oct. 6, 2008); Letter from Teresa D. Bauer and Richard R. Cameron, Counsel for Global Crossing North America, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 1 (filed Sept. 18, 2008); Letter from Susanne A. Guyer, Senior Vice President of Federal Regulatory Affairs, Verizon, to Kevin Martin et al., Commissioners, FCC, CC Docket. 01-92 at 4 (filed Sept. 12, 2008) (Verizon Sept. 12, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter). But see, e.g., Letter from Richard A. Askoff, Executive Director—Regulatory, NECA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 3 (filed Oct. 7, 2008) (“Prescription of a nationwide uniform default rate of \$0.0007 is unnecessary to solve the rate arbitrage problems identified by Verizon. It would also represent bad policy.”); Letter from Lawrence Zawalick, Senior Vice President, Rural Telephone Finance Cooperative, to Kevin Martin et al., Commissioners, FCC, CC Docket 01-92 at 1 (filed Sept. 30, 2008) (“The Rural Telephone Finance Cooperative (RTFC) strongly opposes [the \$0.0007] proposal.”).

⁵⁹⁴ See, e.g., Letter from Donna Epps, Vice President, Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-36, 06-122, CC Docket No. 01-92, Attach. at 14–25 (filed Sept. 19, 2008) (Verizon Sept. 19, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter).

⁵⁹⁵ In some cases, parties propose that the Commission make available universal service support as an “enticement” for states to reform intrastate rates, but ultimately the decisions would be left to the individual states. See Letter from Tom Karalis, Counsel for Rural Alliance, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92, Attach. at 7 (filed Sept. 26, 2008).

concluded, therefore, that such charges were prohibited under that provision of the Act.⁵⁹⁶ Because we elect to have the states set rates under section 251(b)(5), pursuant to our methodology, we find that retention of originating charges would be inconsistent with that statutory scheme and our new regulatory approach. Accordingly, we find that originating charges for all telecommunications traffic subject to our comprehensive intercarrier compensation framework must be eliminated at the conclusion of the transition to the new regime. We recognize, however, that changes to originating access charge rates may raise issues distinct from terminating charges. Moreover, several parties urge the Commission to delay any changes to originating charges.⁵⁹⁷ For these reasons, we ask parties to comment on the appropriate transition for eliminating originating access charges in the accompanying Further Notice.⁵⁹⁸ Although we ask parties to comment on the appropriate transition for eliminating originating access charges, we clarify that, under the transitional mechanism we adopt today, carriers are not permitted to increase any of their current rates, including their originating access rates.⁵⁹⁹ Thus, both interstate and intrastate originating switched access rates will remain capped at current levels until further action by the Commission addressing the appropriate transition for this traffic. This approach is consistent with our transition of terminating rates⁶⁰⁰ and with our goal of eliminating originating access charges at the conclusion of the transition to the new regime.

b. Legal Authority for the Transition

230. Although we comprehensively reform intercarrier compensation, we do not flash cut to our new regime, but provide for a measured transition.⁶⁰¹ The goal of this transition is to avoid overly rapid rate changes for consumers while providing carriers with sufficient means to preserve their financial

⁵⁹⁶ See *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16016, para. 1042. See also 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b) (stating that a “LEC may not assess charges on any other telecommunications carrier for telecommunications traffic that originates on the LEC’s network”).

⁵⁹⁷ See, e.g., Verizon Sept. 12, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter at 5 (asking the Commission to defer reform of originating access); Letter from Grace E. Kohl, Policy Counsel, Cox, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 06-122, 05-337, CC Docket Nos. 96-45, 01-92, 99-68, 96-262 at 2 (filed Oct. 6, 2008) (supporting proposals to delay reform of originating access) (Cox Oct. 6, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter from Brian Benison, Director—Federal Regulatory, AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 99-68, 96-45, WC Docket Nos. 05-337, 07-135, Attach. at 3 (filed Oct. 7, 2008) (describing model with “No Change to Current Structure and Rates” for originating access); Letter from Kathleen O’Brien Ham, Federal Regulatory Affairs, T-Mobile, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92 at 5 (filed Oct. 3, 2008); cf. Letter from Mary C. Albert, Assistant General Counsel, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01-92, WC Docket Nos. 04-36, 05-337, Attach. at 1 (filed Oct. 2, 2008) (urging the Commission to delay any changes to intercarrier compensation). But see Letter from Anna M. Gomez, Vice President, Government Affairs, COMPTTEL, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 96-45, WC Docket No. 04-36 at 7 (filed Oct. 1, 2008) (urging the Commission to reform originating access immediately) (Sprint Oct. 1, 2008 *Ex Parte* Letter).

⁵⁹⁸ See *infra* para 346.

⁵⁹⁹ This prohibition on increasing access rates also applies to the Primary Interexchange Carrier Charge in section 69.153 of the Commission’s rules, the per-minute Carrier Common Line charge in section 69.154 of the Commission’s rules, and the per-minute Residual Interconnection Charge in section 69.155 of the Commission’s rules. 47 C.F.R. §§ 69.153, 69.154, 69.155.

⁶⁰⁰ See *supra* paras. 194–95 (prohibiting carriers from increasing their current rates, even if the interim, uniform reciprocal compensation rate is higher than one or more of its current rates).

⁶⁰¹ See *supra* section V.B.2.